Great power ambtions : understanding India's strategic engagement with maritime East Asia by Brewster, David
Great power ambitions:
Understanding India's strategic engagement with maritime East Asia
David Halstead Brewster 
June 2010
A thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy of 
The Australian National University
Acknowledgements
The author would like to thank the members of his Supervisory Panel, Dr Ron Huisken, 
Professor Robert Ayson, Professor Robin Jeffrey and Professor Hugh White for 
contributing their wisdom and guidance to this thesis.
The author also thanks Christine, Jack, Juliette, Bronte and Essie for their love, 
patience, support and understanding over these years.
Statement
This thesis is entirely the work of David Halstead Brewster.
ii
Abstract
East Asia is in strategic flux. Two factors are having a profound effect on the Asian 
strategic order: the rise of China and the more recent emergence of India as a major 
regional power. While there has been much debate over the rise of China, India's 
broad strategic ambitions are not widely understood. The way in which India rises to 
power over the coming decades, and its strategic interaction with China and others, is 
likely to have profound consequences for the security of East Asia.
Over the past two decades, India has been actively developing security relationships in 
maritime East Asia. Some believe that these relationships are driven by India's 
strategic rivalry with China, while others see it as a consequence of India's emergence 
as a major power and the expansion of its strategic footprint. This thesis will examine 
India's strategic engagement with maritime East Asia and consider to what extent its 
relationships involve balancing against China or a desire to expand India's strategic 
space.
This thesis will examine the foundations of India's emergence as a major power and 
then make detailed case studies of India's key strategic relationships in maritime East 
Asia: Japan, Singapore, Indonesia, Vietnam and South Korea. An understanding of 
these relationships and of India's strategic objectives in East Asia will be crucial to 
understanding the shape of East Asia's future strategic order and India's likely role in 
that order.
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Introduction
Great power ambitions:
Understanding India's strategic engagement with maritime East Asia 
Introduction
East Asia is in strategic flux. Two factors are having a profound effect on the Asian 
strategic order: the rise of China and the more recent emergence of India as a major 
regional power. There has been intense debate in recent times over the consequences 
of the rise of China. Many perceive China, an authoritarian and potentially revisionist 
power, as the greatest threat to stability of the region. While India is usually seen in 
more benign terms, its broad strategic ambitions are not widely understood and its 
relationship with China is unstable. The way in which India rises to power over the 
coming decades, and its strategic interaction with China and others, is likely to have 
profound consequences for the security of East Asia.
Over the past two decades, India has been actively developing security relationships in 
maritime East Asia. However the balance of its motives for doing so are unclear. Some 
believe that these relationships are driven by India's strategic rivalry with China, while 
others see it primarily as a consequence of India's emergence as a major power and 
the expansion of its strategic footprint. This thesis will examine India's strategic 
engagement with maritime East Asia in recent years and consider the strategic 
imperatives behind India's key relationships in the region. This will be addressed 
through the following lines of inquiry:
• What are India's strategic objectives in maritime East Asia?
• What are East Asian motivations for engaging with India?
• What insights do international relations theories provide for India's strategic 
behaviour in maritime East Asia?
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The answers to each of these questions will be crucial in understanding the shape of 
East Asia's future strategic order and India's role in that order. This thesis will suggest 
that states are likely to have several different motivations for strategic actions that 
may be more or less consistent and more or less articulated. An understanding of that 
mix of objectives and how they are likely to affect strategic behaviour is therefore 
essential in understanding the likely future role of India in the East Asian strategic 
order.
This introduction will include the following sections:
• A synopsis of this thesis and an overview of the major themes to be explored;
• A review of existing literature in this area;
• An explanation of some key terms used in this thesis;
• A discussion of the methodology and sources used; and
• A glossary of abbreviations and acronyms.
Synopsis and themes
This thesis is divided into 5 parts. First, it will provide an overview of the changing East 
Asian strategic environment and some major theoretical frameworks used in thinking 
about Asian security. Second, it will examine the foundations of India's strategic 
engagement with East Asia. Third, it will examine India's strategic relationships with 
key middle powers in maritime East Asia: Singapore; Indonesia; Vietnam and South 
Korea. Fourth, it will make a detailed examination of the development of India's 
"peer" relationship with Japan. Fifth, it will provide an overview of perspectives of 
India's strategic engagement with East Asia. These are expanded upon below.
Part 1 of this thesis will provide an overview of what is arguably the greatest strategic 
challenge facing the international system: the changing strategic order in East Asia 
involving the rise to power of China, the virtually simultaneous emergence of India and 
the relative decline in power of the United States. Part 1 will then consider the major
2
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theoretical frameworks that are often applied in thinking about Asian security. There 
has been extensive theoretical debate about the consequences of China's rise as a 
regional power for the East Asian strategic order and the responses of the United 
States and others, a debate that has often been reduced to questions of balancing 
against or accommodation of China's rise. There has, however, been little theoretical 
examination of the emergence of India as a major power and its consequences to the 
East Asian strategic order. This thesis will argue that India's strategic ambitions in East 
Asia can only be properly understood through use of several theoretical lenses.
Part 2 will examine the foundations of India's strategic engagement with maritime East 
Asia. It will provide an overview of India's emergence as a major power, focusing on 
developments in India's strategic relationships over the last two decades and its 
aspirations towards becoming a great power. Part 2 will then provide a detailed 
analysis of the development of Indian strategic thinking since the end of the Cold War, 
including Indian ideas of multipolarity and an Asian balance of power and the growing 
significance of thinking about maritime security and strategic space. Part 2 will then 
make an examination of two crucial factors underlying India's strategic ambitions in 
East Asia: first, the development of India's ambitions as a great maritime power, and 
second, the long-running strategic rivalry between India and China.
Parts 3 and 4 will provide case studies on India's most significant strategic 
relationships in maritime East Asia in order to understand both Indian and East Asian 
perspectives and motivations. These relationships also provide excellent illustrations 
of the differing historical, political, economic and geographic factors in India's 
engagement in the region.
Part 3 will examine India's key relationships with middle powers in maritime East Asia: 
Singapore, Indonesia, Vietnam and South Korea. Singapore has been a major focus of 
India's strategic ambitions in Southeast Asia. Since the mid-1990s, Singapore has 
positioned itself as India's economic and political gateway to Southeast Asia.
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Singapore has actively nurtured a close security partnership with India, regarding it as 
having a valuable role in a regional balance of power. India now sees Singapore not 
only as a hub for its regional ambitions, but also increasingly as an eastern anchor to 
an Indian strategic space that extends throughout the Indian Ocean and includes the 
Malacca Strait. India's partnership with Singapore exemplifies the intersection of 
ideas about a balance of power in Southeast Asia with ideas about an Indian maritime 
sphere of influence.
Indonesia is another regional power likely to play a vital role in India's strategic 
ambitions in Southeast Asia. While India and Indonesia have many shared interests, 
including a desire for a multipolar regional order, the relationship has not always been 
easy. As the largest power in archipelagic Southeast Asia, Indonesia's cooperation will 
now be essential to India's specific security ambitions in the Malacca Strait and 
maritime Southeast Asia. Among other things, this relationship illustrates the next 
steps that India will need to take in gaining broader acceptance for a security role in 
the region.
Vietnam is India's only longstanding political ally in East Asia. This is a relationship 
forged from a shared history of anti-colonialism and resistance against China's power, 
and an appreciation by India of Vietnam's geostrategic position in Southeast Asia. The 
limited success of India's attempts over the last decade to develop a security 
relationship with its old partner provides an excellent illustration of some of the 
potential constraints on India's strategic engagement with East Asia. As will be seen, 
India has not always fully appreciated its limitations as a security partner in East Asia or 
understood regional relations with China. While many in New Delhi see Vietnam as a 
potential balancer against China, Hanoi is unlikely to allow itself to be used in that way. 
As a result, the political and economic dimensions are likely to dominate over security 
aspects of this relationship.
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The development of India's relationship with South Korea, a key middle power in 
Northeast Asia, will then be examined. Shared concerns of India and South Korea over 
the nuclear proliferation relationship between Pakistan and North Korea - and of 
China's role in that relationship - will be used to illustrate the growing strategic 
centrality of China in Asia as a whole. China's growing strategic role in Asia is a prime 
reason for the gradual erosion of the historical divide between South Asia and 
Northeast Asia, including in the security dimension. South Korea's success in 
developing an economic relationship with India also provides an understanding of the 
significance of the economic dimension in aligning strategic interests.
Part 4 will look at the development of India's strategic relationship with Japan, East 
Asia's great maritime power and strategic rival to China. The "peer"relationship 
between Japan and India, two major Asian powers, has significant qualitative 
differences to India's strategic relationship with East Asia's middle powers. This 
relationship, more than any other single relationship, is likely to establish and define 
India's strategic role in East Asia, and will be examined in some detail. As will be seen, 
until recently Japan and India have shown an extraordinary degree of strategic 
indifference towards each other. In the history of major interactions between them in 
modern times, each has seen the other as being largely beyond its sphere of strategic 
interest and each has seen little common cause in their relationships with China, the 
giant that lies between them. In strategic terms, China, even one perceived in 
threatening terms, divided rather than united them. However, in recent years, growing 
mutual concerns about China and the emergence of India as a major power has led to 
a desire to develop a partnership between them as strategic "peers." This does not 
necessarily involve a recognition of a role for India as a security provider in East Asia. 
Rather, one can discern the elements of a possible "grand strategic bargain" between 
India and Japan. This may involve the formation of an informal coalition to balance the 
power of China and potentially also the recognition of India's great power status and 
sphere of influence in the Indian Ocean.
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Lastly, Part 5 will provide an overview of India's strategic relationships in East Asia and 
seek to answer the questions that have been posed above.
The major themes underlying India's strategic engagement with East Asia will be 
elucidated throughout Parts 2, 3 and 4. As will be seen, many of India's strategic 
relationships in East Asia include considerations of the balance of power, although in 
quite different ways. "Soft" balancing against China in the neorealist sense can be 
seen as a significant factor in India's relationship with Japan. While balancing 
considerations are also central to India's relationships in Southeast Asia, Southeast 
Asian concepts of a balance of power are more in the nature of an attempt to develop 
a "harmonious" balance between several external major powers, what has been 
described as a "multiplicity of suns." While Southeast Asian states wish to see a 
regional balance between major powers, they have little inclination to join any 
balancing coalition against China.
However, India's strategic motivations in East Asia go far beyond considerations of 
balancing China. India's strategic engagement with East Asia should be seen as an 
integral part of India's emergence as a major regional power and a long-standing 
desire by India to have that status recognised within the region. The extension of 
India's influence into Southeast Asia and beyond is a natural consequence of India's 
rise as a major power. As India's economy grows and becomes more closely integrated 
with East Asia, its economic and political influence would be expected to grow. 
However, India also has aspirations to become the predominant naval power in the 
Indian Ocean region and there are some that see India as having a natural sphere of 
influence that extends into archipelagic Southeast Asia and Indochina. These 
ambitions to essentially extend India's strategic space, if not primarily driven by 
strategic rivalry with China, are certainly given greater force by China's perceived 
"incursions" into South Asia and the Indian Ocean region.
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While the interaction of these two sets of strategic motivations may be complex, it is 
possible to discern differing emphases in India's strategic relations in East Asia. As 
noted above, one can distinguish a strong emphasis on balancing in India's relationship 
with Japan. In contrast, some of India's strategic relationships in Southeast Asia -  
particularly with Singapore -  have strong overtones of a desire to extend India's 
strategic space. This thesis will seek to draw out some of the potential consequences 
of these differing emphases in strategic motivations.
Literature on India's strategic engagement with East Asia
While there is considerable literature on particular aspects of India's strategic 
engagement with East Asia, there are few studies that comprehensively examine 
India's strategic engagement with the whole of East Asia or provide a coherent analysis 
of India's strategic thinking about East Asia. Some of the most useful discussions in 
this area are highlighted below:
Indio's emergence as o major power: There are several very good general studies on 
India's emergence as a major power. Babbage and Gordon's India's strategic future: 
regional state or global power?1 provides an excellent analysis of India's prospects as a 
major power in the immediate post-Cold War years. More contemporary discussions 
of India can be found in Cohen, India: Emerging power,2 3Nayar and Paul, India in the 
World Order: Searching fo r Major Power Status;2 and Kapur, India, from regional to 
world power.4 These provide useful analyses of India's great power ambitions and its 
economic, military and ideological resources. In particular, Nayar and Paul's study
1 Ross Babbage and Sandy Gordon (eds), India's strategic future: regional state or global 
power? (London: Macmillan, 1992).
2 Stephen Cohen, India: Emerging Power (Washington: Brookings Institute, 2001).
3 Baldev Raj Nayar and T.V.Paul, India in the World Order: Searching for Major Power Status 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003).
4 Ashok Kapur, India, from regional to world power (New York: Routledge, 2006).
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includes an important discussion of the apparent gap between India's current 
capabilities and its claims to recognition of great power status, what has been called 
India's "post-dated self image" as a great power.
Indian strategic thinking: While there are some excellent studies in this area, there are 
none that specifically focus on Indian strategic thinking about East Asia. Tanham's 
classic Indian Strategic Thought: An Interpretive Essay5, provides an older, but still 
highly relevant, source on the traditional defensive features of Indian strategic thinking 
in the early 1990s. Mohan's Crossing the Rubicon6 7is an indispensible and strongly 
opinionated guide to the revolution in Indian strategic thinking since the end of the 
Cold War. Tanham, Bajpai and Mattoo's Securing India: Strategic Thought and Practice 
in an Emerging Power7 also provides a highly useful view on Indian strategic thinking as 
an emerging power, including a valuable discussion on the different ideological 
streams in Indian foreign policy.
Indian naval strategy: G.V.C. Naidu's, The Indian navy and Southeast Asia8 is a useful 
turn of the century study on the history of Indian naval thinking as it relates to 
Southeast Asia. The recently published Indian naval strategy in the twenty-first 
century9 by Holmes, Winner and Yoshihara provides a highly valuable resource in 
understanding India's naval ambitions within the context of its great power ambitions.
5 George Tanham, Indian strategic thought: an interpretative essay (Santa Monica: Rand, 
1992).
6 C. Raja Mohan, Crossing the Rubicon: The Shaping of India's New Foreign Policy (New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2003).
7 George K. Tanham, Kanti P. Bajpai and Amitabh Mattoo (eds.), Securing India: Strategic 
Thought and Practice in an Emerging Power (New Delhi: Manhora, 1996).
8 Naidu, The Indian navy and Southeast Asia (New Delhi: Institute for Defence Studies and 
Analyses, 2000).
9 James R. Holmes, Andrew C. Winner and Toshi Yoshihara, Indian Naval Strategy in the 
Twenty-First Century (London: Routledge, 2009).
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It includes an important discussion on the role of naval power in the historical rise of 
other major powers such as the United States and Japan, and possible comparisons 
w ith India's experience.
Indio's strategic engagement in East Asia: As noted above there are few 
comprehensive studies on India's strategic engagement with East Asia as a whole.
India looks east: an emerging power and its Asia-Pacific neighbours10 by Gordon and 
Henningham is a good examination of India's engagement with East Asia as at the mid- 
1990s. A more contemporary study, Eastward bound: India's new positioning in Asia* 11 
by Saint-Mezard is a good empirical source on the development of India's relationships 
in East Asia although it does not include a detailed analysis of Indian strategic thinking 
in the subject.
There are several good empirical studies on India's relations in Southeast Asia. A good 
historical survey of India's regional relations is provided by Ayoob, India and Southeast 
Asia: Indian perceptions and policies.12 More contemporary surveys can be found in 
Grare and M attoo, India and ASEAN: The Politics o f India's Look East Policy;1J Devare, 
India and Southeast Asia: Towards Security Convergence;14 and Sridharan, The ASEAN 
Region in India's Foreign Policy.15 There are also some useful country specific studies
10 Sandy Gordon and Stephen Henningham (eds), India Looks East: an Emerging Power and its 
Asia Pacific neighbours (Canberra: Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, 1995).
11 Isabelle Saint-Mezard, Eastward Bound: India's new positioning in Asia (New Delhi: Manohar 
Publishers, 2006).
12 Mohammed Ayoob, India and Southeast Asia : Indian perceptions and policies (New York: 
Routledge, 1990).
13 Frederick Grare and Amitabh Mattoo (eds), India and ASEAN: The Politics of India's Look East 
Policy, (New Delhi: Centre de Sciences Humaines, 2001).
14 Sudhir Devare, India and Southeast Asia: Towards Security Convergence, (Singapore:
Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2006).
15 Kripa Sridharan, The ASEAN Region in India's Foreign Policy (Aldershot: Dartmouth 
Publishing, 1996).
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on India's historical and contemporary relations in the region, although these tend to 
lack a perspective on how these engagements fit w ith India's engagement with the 
region as a whole. For Singapore, a useful historical and contemporary discussion can 
be found in Latif, Between Rising Powers: China, Singapore and India.16 For Indonesia, 
the historical relationship is surveyed in Arora, Indian-lndonesian relations, 1961- 
1980,17 but there is no detailed study of the contemporary relationship. For Vietnam, 
there is an excellent historical study of Cold War relations in Soviet Relations with India 
and Vietnam18 by Thakur and Thayer, but again there is no comprehensive study of the 
contemporary bilateral relationship.
There is little  literature on India's strategic engagement w ith Northeast Asia.
For Japan, a key empirical source for the historical relationship is P.A. Narasimha 
Murthy's, India and Japan: dimensions o f their relations: historical politica l19 and an 
excellent survey of contemporary developments can be found in Purnendra Jain,
"From Condemnation to Strategic Partnership: Japan's Changing View of India (1998- 
2007)."20 However, there is very little  publicly available analysis of the place of India in 
Japanese strategic thinking about India. Nor does available analysis place the Japan 
relationship w ithin the context of India's relationships with East Asia as a whole. There 
are no comprehensive studies on strategic aspects of the India-South Korea 
relationship.
16 Asad-ul Iqbal Latif, Between Rising Powers: China, Singapore and India (Singapore: ISEAS 
Publishing, 2007).
17 B.D.Arora, India-lndonesia relations, 1961-1980 (New Delhi: Asian Educational Services, 
1981).
18 Ramesh Thakur and Carlyle A. Thayer, Soviet Relations with India and Vietnam (New York: St. 
Martin's Press, 1992).
19 P.A Narasimha Murthy, India and Japan: dimensions of their relations: historical political 
(New Delhi: ABC Pub.House, 1986).
20 Purnendra Jain, "From Condemnation to Strategic Partnership: Japan's Changing View of 
India (1998-2007), Institute of South Asian Studies Working Paper No.41,10 March 2008.
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Where possible, historical analysis of Indian strategic perspectives has referred to 
memoirs and other writings of former political and bureaucratic decision-makers. Of 
particular value in this respect are the writings of form er secretaries of the Indian 
M inistry of External Affairs, including T.N.Kaul,21 J.N.Dixit,22 Sudhir Devare,23 and Rajiv 
Sikri.24
Some key terminology
Several key phrases lie at the heart of this thesis. The term East Asia has become a 
somewhat contested concept with significant political implications. This thesis will use 
the term to mean the eastern portion of the Eurasian continent and related 
archipelagic states, running from far eastern Russia in the north to Indonesia in the 
south, and from Japan and the Philippines in the east to Burma and China in the west. 
Importantly, as used in this thesis, the term will not include India or other states that 
are generally understood to form part of South Asia.2;> This thesis will further divide 
East Asia into Northeast Asia, which includes eastern Russia, China, the Koreas, Japan 
and Taiwan and Southeast Asia, which essentially consists of the members of ASEAN. 
The term maritime East Asia will be used to mean East Asia excluding China, the state 
which dominates the East Asian continent. The term is used as a convenient way of
21 T.N. Kaul, India, China and Indochina (New Delhi: Lancer Press, 1987).
22 J.N.Dixit, My South Block Years: Memoirs of a Foreign Secretary (New Delhi: UBS Publishers, 
1996).
23 Devare, India and Southeast Asia.
24 Rajiv Sikri, Challenge and Strategy: Rethinking India's Foreign Policy (New Delhi: Sage, 2009).
25 In some ways Australia represents a continuation of India's relationships in maritime East 
Asia and could potentially be considered in parallel to relationships in East Asia. However, 
India's strategic relationship with Australia also involves some very different considerations 
from those that are common to its relationships in East Asia and therefore it has not been 
included in the scope of this study.
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reflecting the fundamental differences in India's strategic relationship with China as 
compared with the archipelagic and peninsula states of East Asia.
Another key term is strategic. This thesis has been written as part of the field of 
strategic studies, which itself is embedded within the broader discipline of 
international relations. Hedley Bull defines strategic studies as the art or science of 
exploiting military force so as to attain given objects of policy26 while Louis Halle 
defines it as the branch of political studies concerned with the political implications of 
the war-making capacity of nations.27 This thesis will have a central focus on military 
(or more broadly security) relationships between states, although it will frequently also 
focus on economic, cultural, geographic, ideological and historical factors as they 
inform such military or security relationships. This also has methodological 
implications. Although strategic studies is usually seen as falling within the field of 
international relations, the tradition of strategic studies is frequently characterised by 
a somewhat distinctive methodology that gives an emphasis to empirical analysis.
This thesis wili broadly follow that tradition.
Methodology and sources
This thesis will derive an understanding of India's strategic engagement with East Asia 
(and the thinking of relevant decision-makers) from a series of empirical studies of the 
historical and contemporary relationships between India and major East Asian states. 
As will be seen in Parts 3 and 4, these studies reveal a wide range of strategic thinking, 
perceptions and motivations held by decision-makers about India's strategic 
engagement in East Asia.
26 Hedley Bull, "Strategic studies and its critics," World Politics, Vol.20, No.4 (July 1968), 
pp.593-605 at p.593.
27 Louis Halle, The elements of international strategy: a primer for the nuclear age (Lanham: 
University Press of America, 1984), p.4.
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The major theoretical approaches (e.g. realism, geopolitical, constructivist) used to 
understand the Asian strategic order are explored in detail in chapter 1.2. That 
examination will conclude that while these approaches can provide important 
perspectives in understanding strategic motivations, no single approach is capable of 
providing a complete explanation of India's strategic motivations in East Asia. As a 
result, this thesis will not seek to apply a single, universalistic, theoretical framework of 
international relations to explain India's strategic engagement with East Asia. Rather, 
it will take more an eclectic theoretical approach, which acknowledges that strategic 
behaviour may have multiple motivations, each of which may require explanation in a 
different way. This approach is discussed in greater detail in section 1.2.5.
In undertaking an empirical examination of strategic behaviour and strategic thinking, 
this thesis will primarily rely on publicly available statements by relevant political, 
bureaucratic and military leaders and others with influence on decision or policy­
making. In doing so, it relies on the following sources:
official governmental policies and statements, contemporary newspaper 
reports, memoirs and some declassified internal governmental materials.
analysis of strategic behaviour and thought by senior academic commentators 
and former political, bureaucratic or military decision-makers.
author interviews with current or former government officials and security 
analysts in India, China, Japan and Southeast Asia.
economic information is generally drawn from either governmental sources or 
studies conducted by leading financial institutions.
Except as otherwise stated, all references to materials by URL were last accessed as at 
March 2010.
13
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Glossary
APEC Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation forum
ARF ASEAN Regional Forum
A SEA N Association of South East Asian Nations
A SEA N  + 3 ASEAN Plus Three, an arrangem ent under which China, Japan and 
South Korea maintain regular dialogue w ith  ASEAN states
B M D Ballistic Missile Defence
DPRK Democratic People's Republic o f Korea (North Korea)
EAC East Asian Economic Com m unity
EAS East Asian Summit
FD! Foreign Direct investm ent
G D P Gross Domestic Product
O D A Official Development Aid
PRC Peoples Republic o f China
ROK Republic o f Korea (South Korea)
SAARC South Asian Association fo r Regional Cooperation
SLOC Sea lines of com m unication
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Part 1 - An uncertain regional order
Part 1 provides a background discussion on the Asian strategic order as a basis for a 
subsequent examination of India's strategic role in East Asia. It will provide an 
overview of some of the systemic changes that are occurring in the regional order and 
then consider the major strands of theoretical analysis of the Asian strategic order.
Key themes to be examined in this part are:
• The uncertainties to the regional order created by the rise of China and 
emergence of India as major regional powers.
Insights and limitations of the major theoretical frameworks in analysing the 
changing regional order.
Part 1 Chapter 1.1 -  
Asia in strategic flux
Chapter 1.1 Asia in strategic flux
1.1.1 Asia's strategic order at the end of the Cold War
1.1.2 The rise of China as a great power
1.1.3 The emergence of India
1.1.4 The role of the United States in Asia
1.1.5 Russia, Japan and Southeast Asia in the changing strategic environment
1.1.6 Thinking about the regional security order
Introduction
East Asia is in strategic flux. Its leap towards becoming the economic engine room of 
the world has been accompanied by major changes in the balance of power as new 
powers rise and challenge the existing order. Some fear that Asia is coming to 
resemble nineteenth century Europe, where new powers jockeyed with the old for 
their place in the sun. Whether "Asia's future will resemble Europe's past" as some 
believe1 or "Asia's future will resemble its past" as others suggest,2 or Asia's future will 
resemble something else entirely, it seems likely that India will play an increasingly 
important role in the region's strategic order in years to come.
This chapter will provide an overview of some of the major systemic changes taking 
place in the East Asian strategic order. It will first examine the strategic landscape in 
East Asia at the end of the Cold War and then consider the two main causes of 
systemic change in the regional strategic order: the rise of China as a major power over 
that last two decades, and more recently the recognition of India as an emerging
1 See A. Friedberg, "Will Europe's Past be Asia's Future?" Survival, Vol.42, No.3 (2000), pp.147- 
160.
2 See Amitav Acharya, "Will Asia's Past be its Future?" International Security, Vol.28 No.3 
(Winter 2003/4), pp.149-164.
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power. This chapter will then consider the impact of these changes on the strategic 
predominance of the United States in East Asia and on the positions of Russia, Japan 
and ASEAN states. Lastly, it will provide an overview of some scenarios of how the 
Asian strategic order may look in coming years.
1.1.1 East Asia's strategic order at the end of the Cold War
The consequences of the end of the Cold War have generally been slower to 
materialise in East Asia than in other parts of the world. The collapse of the Soviet 
Union removed a significant source of tensions in the region and led to the dissolution 
of coalitions between the United States and China (to contain the Soviet Union) and 
between the Soviet Union and India (to balance China). Nevertheless, marry of the 
region's conflicts and disputes remained virtually frozen in place. As a result, Asia has 
many potential "flashpoints" that could lead to significant interstate conflict. These 
include, in Northeast Asia, the division of the Korean peninsula and the status of 
Taiwan; in Southeast Asia, competing territorial claims over the South China Sea; and 
in South Asia, the continuing stand-off between India and Pakistan over Kashmir and 
territorial disputes between China and India in the Himalayas. Most of these directly 
or indirectly involve China, which occupies a geographically central role. There 
remains therefore a significant risk of interstate conflict involving China.
In the decades following the end of the Cold War, the United States has retained 
strategic predominance and continues to act as an offshore guarantor of regional 
stability. The US Pacific alliance system, a series of formal bilateral alliances between 
the United States and its key regional partners, Japan, South Korea and Australia, that 
has been in place since the 1950s, continues to provide the bedrock for regional 
security. This system is supplemented by lesser alliances or informal security 
arrangements with Singapore, the Philippines and Thailand among others. Although 
many believe that this system, in itself, is becoming insufficient to provide continuing 
strategic stability in East Asia, there is little consensus on the alternatives.
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1.1.2 The rise of China as a great power
Although the rise of China in recent years and its potential implications for the security 
of the  region has been well-documented elsewhere,3 it is worth reviewing some of the 
highlights.
The economic rise of China since the late 1970s has been nothing short of remarkable. 
Between 1978 and 2008, China's GDP grew from Rmb362 billion to Rmb31,404 billion 
(in current price terms). Over the period 1978 to 2007, Chinese annual exports grew 
from US$9.8 billion to  US$1,218 billion. Between 1983 and 2007, annual FDI to China 
grew from US$916 million to US$74 billion.4 By 2009, China's estimated GDP was 
US$8,791 trillion (in purchasing power parity terms), making it the second largest 
economy in the world after the United States in PPP term s.5 6 Estimated GDP growth for 
2009 was estimated at 8.7% per annum, after growing at an annual rate of around 10% 
over the last decade.5 Although some have questioned the sustainability of China's 
economic growth, particularly under a relatively inflexible authoritarian political 
regime,7 the performance of the Chinese economy through the Global Financial Crisis 
has underlined its resilience. The aggregate size of China's economy (but not of
3 See, for example, Liselotte Odgaard, The Balance o f Power in Asia-Pacific Security: US-China 
policies on Regional Order (Routledge: London, 2007); Rex Li, A Rising China and Security in 
East Asia (Routledge: London, 2009); Evelyn Goh, “The U.S.-China Relationship and Asia-Pacific 
Security: Negotiating Change" Asian Security, Vol.l No.3 (2005), pp.216-244; and Evan
S.Medeiros et ai, Pacific Currents: The Responses o f U.S. Allies and Security Partners in East 
Asia to China's Rise (Santa Monica: Rand Corporation, 2008).
4 China National Bureau of Statistics. <http://www.chinability.com/GDP.htm>.
5 CIA World Factbook. <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ 
ch.html>.
6 Ibid.
7 Susan L.Shirk, China, fragile superpower (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007).
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course per capita GDP) is predicted to be almost as large as the United States by 2030 
and significantly larger by 2050.8
On the back of its remarkable economic growth, China has engaged in significant 
modernisation of its armed forces. The PRC increased defence spending from US$11.3 
billion in 1993 to  US$128 billion in 2006 (in purchasing power parity terms).9 According 
to "conservative" 2007 estimates by the US Defence Department, China's m ilitary 
spending was almost twice that of Russia, 2.5 times the size of Japan's and nearly five 
times the size of India's.10 Increased defence expenditure has been focused on 
modernisation and power projection capabilities, including modernisation of China's 
nuclear capabilities, space warfare and a blue water navy.
Despite its rising economic and m ilitary power, over the last two decades China has 
generally taken an accommodative stance in regional affairs. China's leadership seems 
generally committed to maintaining good relations with the United States and its 
regional neighbours while it builds comprehensive national power and expands its 
influence throughout Asia and around the world. It has repaired strained relations 
w ith many of its neighbours, including the resolution of long-standing land border 
disputes with Russia, Vietnam, Burma, Mongolia and its Central Asian neighbours. 
China's most significant remaining land border dispute is with India in the Himalayas 
and the most significant maritime border dispute is with several Southeast Asian states 
over the South China Sea. China also continues to take an unyielding position over any 
suggestions of Taiwanese independence. Since the early 1990s, China has also made
8 Uri Dadush and Bennett Stancil, "The G20 in 2050," International Economic Bulletin, Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace, November 2009.
9 Or $62 billion at market exchange rates. The official defence budget showed an increase of 
around 20% over the prior year in local currency terms. The Military Balance 2009, (London: 
International Institute of Strategic Studies, 2009).
10 Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military Power of the People's 
Republic of China 2008.
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significant, and quite successful, diplomatic efforts to improve relations in the region, 
particularly in Southeast Asia, seeking to demonstrate that its rise will be "peaceful" 
and that it will act as a constructive stakeholder in the international community.11 It 
is as yet unclear whether what some see as Beijing's "charm offensive" will continue in 
the long term or if China will become more assertive and revisionist as its economic 
and military power grows. Some believe that Chinese leadership will remain 
preoccupied w ith internal issues or that China will grow into a status quo power. 
However many believe that China will become increasingly assertive in its exercise of 
power and may perhaps seek to regain the strategic predominance that it once held in 
the region.12
1.1.3 The emergence of India
The other major source of systemic change in the Asia-Pacific security order, and one 
whose implications are only starting to be widely explored, is the emergence of India 
as a major regional and potentially a world power. The emergence of India, occurring 
in conjunction w ith the rise of China creates an additional level of complexity in the 
regional security calculus and, arguably, magnifies the risk of conflict.
Analysts have been predicting the emergence of India as a major power for decades, 
in itially hesitantly characterising India as a potential regional power and more recently 
confidently predicting that India will become a world power. As will be seen in chapter 
2.1, India's potential as a major power is now widely (although not universally) 
recognised, including by the United States. The most significant factor in India's
11 See Bates Gill, Rising Star: China's New Security Diplomacy (New York: Brookings Institute, 
2007).
12 For a useful discussion of different schools of thought, see Aaron L.Friedberg, "The Future of 
U.S.-China Relations: Is Conflict Inevitable?" International Security, Vol.30, No.2 (Fall 2005), 
pp.7-45.
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emergence has been economic development over the last two decades that has placed 
it on a path towards becoming a major economic power.
The emergence of India as a regional power is taking place after two decades of 
expansion of China's power in East Asia. While there are some similarities between 
the strategic trajectories of India and China, there are some important differences.
First, China's history as a revisionist state during much of the Cold War has led to 
widely-held suspicions about its role as a major power. In contrast, India's 
comparatively passive role in East Asia has led it to be seen in relatively benign terms, 
an assumption which needs to be tested. As will be seen, while this has often 
positioned India as reacting to China, it has also sometimes obscured India's own 
strategic ambitions in the region.
The emergence of India will affect the East Asian security environment in numerous 
ways. India has long asserted a leading security role in South Asia. It is increasingly 
aspiring to achieving naval predominance in the Indian Ocean (in the long term) and a 
significant security role in Southeast Asia generally. Another major consequence of 
India's rise is its relationship with China. India sees itself as a civilisational peer of 
China, something which it believes is not properly acknowledged. Strategic rivalry with 
China is a major motivating factor in India's strategic behaviour in East Asia and ideas 
of balancing against China is an important factor in India's growing relationships in the 
region. The extension of China's strategic influence into South Asia and the Indian 
Ocean just as India is seeking to consolidate its own influence in the region is a major 
source of resentment in New Delhi. India's growing strategic relationship with the 
United States is another potential source of uncertainty in the region. India has used 
its strategic relationship with the United States as something of a "bridge" to enhance 
its relationships in East Asia. However, the relationship with the United States is far 
from settled and there are many aspects to be worked through. India is unlikely in the 
long term to accept US strategic predominance in the region. It seeks the
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development of a regional order in which India is able to exercise strategic autonomy 
and is recognised as a great power alongside the United States, China and Japan.
Currently, India is widely seen in East Asia as an emerging but essentially benign 
power. The gradual extension of Indian political, economic and strategic influence into 
the region is generally seen in favourable terms as potentially helping to balance the 
growth of China's influence. However, there is the possibility of India being seen in 
less benign terms as it seeks to expand its sphere of influence.
1.1.4 The role of the United States in Asia
The counterpoint to the rising power of China and India is the evolution of the US 
strategic role. Since 1945 the United States has been the predominant power in East 
Asia. It underpins the regional security environment and is likely to continue to do so 
for decades to come. While its role has evolved significantly since 1945 with the 
economic development of Asia, the rise of China (and, to a lesser extent, India) will 
present challenges of a different order to the United States. It seems unlikely that the 
United States will give up its pursuit of dominance, either globally or in Asia, any time 
soon. Rather, the question will be how the United States will pursue that objective 
compared with the past.
There is little doubt that the relationship between the United States and China and 
their respective strategic roles represents the greatest regional security challenge in 
coming years. To what extent will China challenge the predominant position of the 
United States in Asia? Will China seek to compete with Japan or co-opt it? Will China 
resort to force in its territorial disputes with Japan, Southeast Asia and India? There is 
much debate about the options available to the United States in dealing with China's 
rise. Should, for example, the United States be balancing, containing and/or engaging 
with China (or some combination of those approaches)? To what extent should the 
United States confront China or seek to negotiate an acceptable sharing of power? As
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will be discussed further in chapter 1.2, some argue that in coming years the Asian 
security order will be characterised by bipolarity, perhaps with each of China and the 
United States having spheres of influence in continental and maritime East Asia.
Others see a multipolar system as eventually emerging, perhaps with regional security 
being managed by a concert of powers among major states such as the United States, 
China, Japan and perhaps India.
The rise of India adds another layer to this calculus. Over the last decade or so the 
United States has recognised India as a potential balancer of China, and has supported 
India taking a more active strategic role in the region. According to Tellis the presence 
of two rising powers (China and India) in the international system -  especially ones 
that share a history of mistrust and rivalry -  makes the weaker of the two states an 
especially attractive partner for the reigning hegemon (the United States).13 Some 
have argued that the United States is encouraging India to "do a China on China" (i.e. 
encouraging India to form a coalition with the United States to balance and contain 
China just as a coalition of the United States and China balanced and contained the 
former Soviet Union from the early 1970s).14 However, as will be seen, India will not 
necessarily allow itself to be played off against China. As a result, over the coming 
years, the United States will need to play a rather delicate game of bringing China and 
India into a regional order in which the United States remains a fundamental 
participant. The US also will also need to provide continuing reassurance to its partners 
in maritime East Asia that it will continue in its role as a benign offshore balancer.
13 Ashley Tellis, "US and Indian Interests in India's Extended Neighbourhood," in Alyssa Ayres 
and C.Raja Mohan, Power Realignments in Asia: China, India and the United States (New Delhi: 
Sage Publications, 2009), pp.221-248, at p.222.
14 Venu Rajamony, "India-China-U.S. triangle: A "Soft" Balance of Power System in the 
Making," Centre for Strategic and International Studies, March 2002.
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1.1.5 Russia, Japan and Southeast Asia in the changing strategic environment
For most practical purposes Russia lost its status as a great power in East Asia with the 
end of the Cold War. After two decades deterioration of its conventional military 
capabilities, including the once powerful Soviet Pacific Fleet, Russia now has limited 
power projection capacity in East Asia and relatively limited regional influence. China 
has been the greatest winner in this strategic shift. The end of the armed standoff 
between the Soviet Union and China and renewed strategic cooperation between 
Russia and China has allowed China to refocus its military strength elsewhere.
Nevertheless, Russia is still widely regarded as a "great" power in global terms by 
virtue, among other things, of a nuclear weapons capacity rivalling the United States 
and its position on the UN Security Council. There have also been indications of 
greater strategic assertiveness of Russia in Europe and Central Asia in recent years. 
However, it seems unlikely that Russia will regain the strategic influence that it once 
had in East Asia, at least in the short or medium term. Some of Russia's strategic 
relationships in the region continue, particularly its longstanding arms supply 
relationships with India and Vietnam. However, as will be discussed in chapter 2.2, 
while Russia is still regarded by many in New Delhi as a strategic friend of India, it has 
largely lost its broader influence on Indian strategic thinking.
Japan is the other major power in the Asia Pacific strategic order. Nowhere have the 
uncertainties in the current strategic environment been more keenly felt than there.15 
Japan was the greatest beneficiary of the Cold War strategic order. Its strategic 
importance to the United States during the Cold War granted it a "free ride" in security
15 See generally, Kenneth Pyle, Japan Rising: the resurgence o f Japanese power and purpose 
(New York: Public Affairs, 2007); and Richard J.Samuels, Securing Japan: Tokyo's Grand 
Strategy and the Future o f East Asia (Ithica: Cornell University Press, 2007).
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and allowed it to pursue mercantilist economic policies, making it one of the richest 
states in the world. Its strategic position has since progressively unravelled. Japan's 
relative economic power peaked in 1990 and has been in relative decline since then 
and Japan's ability to pursue a free ride in security is also becoming increasingly 
unviable. Since the turn of the century Tokyo has had growing security concerns 
about China, particularly about the potential for the United States to abandon it in 
favour of a partnership with China. Japan's security fears, which some have described 
as "approaching panic" are increasingly leading it to take a more active role in 
developing security relationships in the region. As will be discussed in Part 4, Japan is 
likely to play a crucial role in India's strategic engagement with East Asia.
The states of Southeast Asia have arguably been the most successful in 
accommodating changes in the regional balance of power and encouraging first China 
and now India to become constructive participants in the regional security order. The 
formation of ASEAN in the late 1960s provided Southeast Asian member states with a 
mechanism for moderating sub-regional tensions and for leveraging their position with 
the major powers, including through regional economic and political institutions that 
are centred on ASEAN (including the ASEAN Regional Forum, ASEAN Plus Three and the 
East Asian Summit). With the rise of China, ASEAN states have successfully engaged 
with China while implicitly encouraging the continued role of the United States as a 
guarantor of regional security. ASEAN states have also, for the most part, been 
enthusiastic in developing economic, political and security relationships with India to 
ensure a continued balance among the major powers. ASEAN states have benefited 
significantly from the growth of China's economy and are now well positioned to 
benefit from growth in the Indian economy. However, in recent years there has been 
growing impatience about the limitations of the "ASEAN" way in the realm of security 
and there is a perceived risk that ASEAN will lose its position as an organisational focus 
for the region.
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1.1.6 Thinking about the regional security order
Much ink has been spilled about the developing regional security ''architecture" 
although little consensus has developed on how to address the changing security 
order.16 Although there is a widespread view that the long-standing US "hub and 
spoke" alliance system is not adequate to deal w ith the current security environment 
few argue that it does not continue to play an important role. There have been some 
important developments in the US-alliance system in recent years, including the 
development of bilateral security linkages between the principal US regional allies 
(Japan, South Korea and Australia), complemented by bilateral security linkages 
between India and the US, Japan and Australia. This has been described as a "core and 
network." system in which there is a network of security relationships throughout the 
region, anchored by the core US alliances. Some who regard China as the region's 
principal security threat see these developments as part of an evolution of the US 
alliance system into a multilateral collective defence system to "balance" or "contain" 
China and that the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, founded by China to promote 
security cooperation w ith Russia and Central Asian states, is the rough counterpart to a 
US-sponsored group ing.17
Others have argued in favour of a cooperative regional security model including China, 
somewhat along the lines of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation which 
brought the Soviet Union into a Europe-wide security system.18 However, few believe 
that Asia is ready for a region-wide collective security system.
16 See for example, Ron Huisken (ed.), The Architecture of Security in the Asia-Pacific,
Australian National University, Canberra Papers on Strategy and Defence No. 174; and Amitav 
Acharya and Evelyn Goh (eds), Reassessing Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific: 
Competition, Congruence and Transformation (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2007).
17 Robert Kagan, "The Illusion of 'Managing' China," The Washington Post, 15 May 2005.
18 Jung Sung-ki, "Helsinki Model proposed for N-E Asian Security," The Korea Times, 21 June 
2007.
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Many proposals fo r regional security revolve around ideas o f a "concert o f powers" 
among the major powers o f the Asia-Pacific which are usually identified to  include the 
United States, China, Japan and India and o the rs .19 A concert o f powers most 
fam ously operated in n ineteenth century Europe fo r a period after the Napoleonic 
wars when a consortium o f great powers took responsibility fo r regional security. A 
concert does not necessarily require harmony among the major powers and can act as 
a mechanism fo r the se ttlem ent o f disputes between them  and in relation to  smaller 
states. Such an approach if developed in Asia, it is claimed, would allow the major 
Asia-Pacific powers to  take in form al responsibility fo r management o f regional 
security, allow ing them  to  reach acceptable compromises w ithou t the distractions and 
demands o f small states in the large m ultila tera l fora. However, it is not clear what 
factors, short o f a major war, m ight precip ita te such a coalition o f major powers and 
w hether the relationships between the m ajor powers have reached the requisite level 
o f m aturity  and depth fo r such a system to  work.
19 See for example, Coral Bell, "The End of the Vasco da Gama Era: The Next Landscape of 
World Politics" Lowy Institute for International Policy, Paper #21, 2007; Amitav Acharya, "A 
Concert of Asia", Survival, Vol.41, No.3 (September 1999), pp.84-101; Susan L. Shirk, "Asia- 
Pacific Regional Security: Balance of Power or Concert of Powers?" in David A. Lake and Patrick 
M. Morgan (eds), Regional Orders: Building Security in a New World (University Park: Penn 
State University Press, 1997); Jusuf Wanandi, "East Asian Regionalism and Global Governance" 
in Jusuf Wanandi and Tadashi Yamamoto, East Asia and a Crossroads. (Tokyo: Japan Centre for 
International Exchange, 2008), pp.19-37.
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Chapter 1.2 Theoretical analysis of the Asian strategic order
1.2.1 Realist explanations of the Asian security order
1.2.2 Empirical theories of the Asian security order
1.2.3 Geopolitical analysis and Asia
1.2.4 The role of regions in Asian security
1.2.5 A case for analytical eclecticism in understanding India's strategic engagement 
with East Asia
Introduction
Theoretical debates on Asian security over the last two decades have led to little 
consensus in explanations of the evolving strategic order. Strategic developments in 
Asia since the end of the Cold War have been a fertile battleground between those 
who see confrontation between China and the United States as the driving force in the 
changing regional order, and others who have sought to explain the evolving order 
through sui generis theories or who emphasise the importance of geographical or sub­
regional dynamics. This section will review four groups of theories of international 
relations that seek to explain strategic behaviour in Asia and will argue that each 
theory is useful - but not sufficient - in understanding the intersection of forces 
underlying India's strategic engagement w ith East Asia.
1.2.1 Realist explanations of the Asian security order
Realist theories of international relations have not proved to be a good predictive tool 
for developments in the Asian strategic order since the end of the Cold War. The 
behaviour of states seems to have been very different from the stark choices that 
these theories would suggest. However, many analysts continue to use realist 
concepts in describing state behaviour and the concept of the balance of power 
continues, expressly or impliedly, to occupy an important role in strategic analysis.
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An examination of realist theories and their lim itations therefore forms a good starting 
point for any theoretical discussion.
A central claim of structural realist theories is that states will in the aggregate react to 
any change in the distribution of power to prevent any other state gaining hegemony 
and that they will be expected to do so primarily by joining with other states to 
"balance" against the stronger state. There are a number of variations within this 
claim. So-called "offensive" realists claim that the primary aim of a state is to increase 
its power relative to other states.1 In contrast "defensive" realists focus on a state's 
search for security, primarily through the balance of power.2 A state's security needs 
can be affected by such factors as the offensive-defensive m ilitary balance (i.e. the 
extent to which geography, technology or other factors advantages offensive or 
defensive military action), or the "security dilemma" created by search for security by 
another state.3 Another im portant variation is the suggestion that states will primarily 
respond not to another state's objective capabilities, but to the "balance of threats"
(i.e. the perceived threat presented by another state).4
Predictions using realist theories
Realist theory has been used to make a number of predictions about the likely 
responses of states to changes in the distribution of power in Asia, particularly the 
impact of changes in relative power between the United States and China. Waltzian 
realists might predict that smaller states would flock to join the weaker side (i.e. China)
1 John J.Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: W.W.Norton & Co, 
2001) .
2 Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading: Addison-Wesley, 1979).
3 See Robert Jervis, "Cooperation under the Security Dilemma" World Politics, Vol.30 No.2 
(1978), pp.167-214.
4 Stephen Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987).
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to  balance against the stronger US power, while  W oltian  realists m ight predict tha t 
they would flock to  jo in the United States against the greater th rea t perceived to  be 
posed by China.
Offensive realists have a particularly bleak view  o f w hat they call the "unpeaceful" rise 
o f China and its challenge to  US hegemony.5 Mearsheim er believes tha t over the next 
few  decades, the United States and China are likely to  engage in intense security 
com petition as China seeks to  become a regional hegemon, predicting tha t China w ill 
seek to  dom inate Asia just as the United States has dom inated the Western 
Hemisphere since the nineteen century. In order to  achieve this, China w ill pursue 
m ilitary superiority so tha t it is in a position to  d ictate the boundaries o f acceptable 
behaviour in neighbouring states. He predicts tha t the United States w ill seek to  
contain China through strategies sim ilar to  those employed against the Soviet Union. 
Mearsheim er believes tha t most o f China's neighbours, including India, Japan, 
Singapore, South Korea, Russia and Vietnam w ill jo in  a US-led balancing coalition to  
check China's rise just as many states joined w ith  the United States to  contain the 
Soviet Union during the Cold War.
So-called "defensive" neorealists are generally less pessimistic about the inevitab ility  
o f conflict in Asia, suggesting tha t while security com petition between China and the 
United States exists it is likely to  be manageable. They see many countervailing factors 
which favour stab ility  and cooperation in Sino-US relations, such as the effects of 
nuclear deterrence, economic factors, or a defensive m ilitary advantage which favours 
China in its continenta l East Asian domain and the United States in its m aritim e 
dom ain.6 W hile they acknowledge tha t there  are dangers o f "foo lish" assertiveness on
5 See, for example, Kagan, "The Illusion of 'Managing' China"; and John Mearsheimer, "China's 
Unpeaceful Rise" Current History, (April 2006) 105, 690, Academic Research Library, pp.160-2.
6 Thomas J. Christensen, "Fostering Stability or Creating a Monster? The Rise of China and U.S. 
Policy toward East Asia," International Security, Vol.31 N o.l (Summer 2006), pp.81-126; and
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the part of China, they generally believe that it does not make much sense for China to 
aggressively pursue regional hegemony because to do so would cause its rivals to form 
a balancing coalition. Despite these reasons for optimism, they nevertheless see an 
inevitability in the logic of balance of power. As a result, defensive realists would 
perceive the United States' security relationships w ith larger powers such as Japan and 
India as being foundation stones in the US balancing strategy against China in the 
Pacific and Indian Oceans. Further, there is an assumption that if push comes to shove 
between the United States and China, smaller states could no longer avoid the issue by 
accommodating China, as many have done, but would be essentially forced to take 
sides.* 7
Critiques of realist analysis
Realist theory has been the subject of significant criticism due to its apparent inability 
to predict strategic behaviour in Asia over the last two decades. Many realists 
predicted that with the end of the Cold War Japan would be expected to abandon its 
alliance w ith the United States and balance m ilitarily against it, a prediction which has 
neither occurred nor seems likely in the foreseeable fu tu re.8 Similarly, there is little  
evidence in support of realist predictions that Southeast Asian states will join a 
balancing coalition with the United States against China any time soon. Several studies 
of strategic behaviour in East Asia have concluded that most states are
Robert Ross, "Bipolarity and Balancing in East Asia," in T.V.Paul, James J.Wirtz and Michel
Fortmann (eds), Balance of Power: theory and practice in the 21st century (Stanford: Stanford
University Press, 2004), pp.267-304.
7 See, for example, Robert S. Ross, "Balance of power politics and the rise of China: 
Accommodation and balancing in East Asia," Security Studies, Vol.15, No.3 (July-September 
2006), pp.355-395.
8 Kenneth Waltz, "Interview with Kenneth Waltz", Review of International Studies, Vol.24, No.3 
(1998), pp.371-86 at p.378; and Christopher Layne, "The unipolar illusion: Why new great 
powers will rise" International Security, Vol.17 No.4 (1993) pp. 5-51.
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accommodating China's rise and few are balancing against China.9 While some realists 
would argue that the theory can only be judged in the "long run" others might argue 
that this predictive failure can be attributed to certain methodological limitations of 
realist theory, particularly in its application to a multipolar security system.
As noted above, the central "mechanism" of realist theory is its version of the "balance 
of power," which might be seen as a process involving the aggregate actions of states 
moving from an unbalanced distribution of power towards a balanced distribution of 
power. If an "external" factor (e.g. economic growth) causes a change in the relative 
distribution of military power among states (i.e. disequilibrium), other states will make 
an aggregate response in the long run (e.g. forming a balancing coalition against the 
rising state) to bring the overall system to a new equilibrium. Importantly, realism 
does not purport to predict the reaction of each and every state to disequilibrium, only 
the aggregate effect of state reactions. The modern realist tradition treats states as 
essentially functionally undifferentiated except for their respective power capabilities. 
States are treated as being like "billiard balls" that vary only in size. Differentiating 
features of a state, such as its culture, historical experience, ideology, political system, 
or character or beliefs of political leaders are discarded as irrelevant to the model.10 
This functional undifferentiation underlies what has been called the problem of 
"indeterminacy." That is, the theory can be used to identify a range of strategies that 
states may use to maximise their position. However, beyond the case of a simplified 
bipolar world, realist theory is not helpful in predicting the behaviour of a specific state
9 See, for example, David C.Kang, China Rising: Peace, Power, and Order in East Asia (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2007); Evelyn Goh, "Great Powers and Hierachical Order in 
Southeast Asia: Analysing Regional Security Challenges" International Security, Vol.32, No.3 
(Winter 2007/08), pp.113-157 at p.116; and Acharya, "Will Asia's Past be its Future?" 
International Security, at pp.152-3.
10 Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, at p.18
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in face of a possible threat. This means that all manner of different strategic 
behaviours are potentially consistent with the theory.
The problem of indeterminacy is closely related to another lim itation -  derived from 
the problem of collective action. At its essence, realist theory may identify the 
collective interests of states in responding to a change in the relative distribution of 
power. However, it is not well equipped to identify the interests of individual states in 
relation to  that change, nor can it necessarily identify the aggregate outcome. The 
issue of collective action of states is merely one instance of the problem of collective 
action w ithin any social group. According to the theory of collective action, if an 
individual actor needs to do something that will profit only him then he will do it if the 
personal benefit outweighs the personal cost. However, where a benefit is available to 
everyone an individual will generally avoid paying the costs of providing the common 
good unless compelled to do so. If only some individuals make sacrifices to provide 
the common good then they will be required to bear a disproportionate part of the 
cost. As a result, common goods will often go unprovided or may be provided 
inefficiently, particularly where there is no ultimate authority over individual 
behaviour.11 International security is a commonly recognised example of a common 
good, where states may benefit from security w ithout having contributed towards it.
When seen in this light, it is little surprise that an individual state may not be 
compelled to engage in highly costly and risky active balancing behaviour suggested by 
realist theory if it perceives that another state will do so and its own circumstances are 
not conducive to it taking an active role. Although realist theory may help us identify 
a collective interest in balancing (e.g. against a perceived threat from China), it would 
also be a mistake to assume that the collective interest will (sooner or later) lead to a 
collective outcome. These limitations are particularly evident in predicting the 
behaviour of smaller powers. The smaller a state is, then the greater its dilemma will
11 Mancur Olson, Logic of Collective Action (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965), p.35.
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be in deciding to contribute to the common good through balancing against a 
perceived threat -  the costs to a small state in contributing to the common good can 
easily outweigh the benefits.
The problems of indeterminacy and collective action can be used as grounds for the 
fundamental criticism of realist theory.12 While balancing could make sense to a great 
power such as the United States, lesser states in East Asia often have very different 
considerations. This is not to say that the theory cannot provide useful insights 
relevant to India's strategic engagement with East Asia. Problems with the use of 
realist theory as a predictive device does not mean that some states do not pay great 
attention to the balance of power and act to maintain that balance. This is particularly 
the case with larger states where the differential between individual and group costs is 
less. Thus, as will be seen in Parts 3 and 4, while the security relationship between 
India and Japan could not be described as engaging in "hard balancing" against China, 
considerations of "soft balancing" are an important factor in the relationship.
However, balance of power considerations are much less evident in India's 
relationships with lesser states in East Asia.
1.2.2 Empirical explanations of the Asian security order
This section will examine some empirically based explanations of the Asian security 
order. These often focus on Southeast Asia where states have displayed a significant 
decree of pro-active behaviour in molding the regional order. Goh, for example, 
suggests that instead of engaging in classic "balance of power" behaviour predicted by 
realist theory, Southeast Asian states are engaging in a sophisticated type of balancing
12 Thomas J.Christensen and Jack Snyder, "Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks: predicting alliance 
patterns in multipolarity," International Organisation, Vol.44, No.2 (March 1990),pp.138-168 
at p.138; and Ned Lebow "The Long Peace, the End of the Cold War and the Failure of Realism" 
International Organization, Vol.48, No.2 (Spring 1994), pp.249-77 at p.250.
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behaviour she calls "om ni-enm eshm ent."13 According to  Goh, the way in which 
balance o f power is understood and acted upon in Southeast Asia differs from  the 
standard realist defin ition. Rather than balancing against external powers such as the 
United States or China, they seek to  facilita te a balance among external powers in 
term s o f the ir interests in Southeast Asia. Since the end o f the Cold W ar this has 
involved harnessing superior US forces in the region to  persuade Beijing tha t any 
aggressive action by it would be too costly, through "triangular politics" (i.e. the use of 
b ilateral relations w ith  one power as leverage to  improve relations w ith  another), and 
through integration and socialisation o f China in to the regional system.
According to  Goh, the process o f "om ni-enm eshm ent" fo llow ed in Southeast Asia is 
not merely a tim e-buying or avoidance strategy in relation to  the rise o f China. It has 
involved drawing China in to a deep involvem ent in in ternational society, enveloping it 
in a web o f sustained exchanges and relationships, w ith  the long term  aim of 
in tegration into the regional order. According to  Goh, the rationale behind this 
approach draws from  liberal institu tionalist approaches to  in ternational relations, 
involving the "opening up, tying down and binding toge ther" o f potentia l rivals. It 
shares much in common w ith  w hat others describe as the "socialisation" o f China in 
in ternationa l affa irs.14 Singapore, in particular, has most clearly articulated the 
strategy o f diversifying bilateral relations w ith  major powers by prom oting them  as 
integral elements of policies to  manage regional stability. The idea, according to  one 
Singaporean official, is to  "deepen interdependence and to  strengthen the ir sense of
13 Goh, "Great Powers and Hierachical Order in Southeast Asia."
14 See generally, Alastair I. Johnston, "Socialization in International Relations: The ASEAN Way 
and International Relations Theory," in G. John Ikenberry and Michael Mastanduno (eds), 
International Relations Theory and the Asia-Pacific (New York: Columbia University Press, 
2003).
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having a stake in the region's security, so that they would be more interested in 
helping to maintain regional stability."15
While much of the focus of the debate has been on ASEAN's embrace of China, Goh 
emphasises that this is a multidirectional strategy that also applies to other extra- 
regional powers (including the United States, Japan and India), in relation to which 
ASEAN has much lesser threat perceptions. According to Goh, this policy involves an 
attempt to alter the relationship between major extra-regional powers to avoid 
destabilising rivalry within Southeast Asia. According to one Malaysian official: "what 
we really want to do is help the 'elephants' get to a point where their interests are so 
intertwined that it would be too costly for them to figh t."16
Others who argue for the importance of sui generis factors in East Asian relations 
include those who emphasise the significance of a historical hierarchy of states in the 
region. Kang argues that the international system in East Asia is historically a 
hierarchical system centred on China and that this stable and relatively peaceful 
system is now being re-created.17 Kang claims that Europe's historical system was 
based on the formal equality of states w ith an informal hierarchy based on power 
while the Chinese tribute system rested on formal inequality but de facto  equality in 
the sense that tributary states remained effectively free. As long as these states did 
what was expected in the Chinese court, China largely left them alone. Even when 
China was m ilitarily strong it rarely invaded its neighbours. Goh also emphasises the 
importance of state hierarchy in East Asia, not as a modern version of the Chinese 
tribute system but as a flexible hierarchical order headed by the United States. 
According to Goh, East Asian states recognise the United States as the superpower,
15 Goh, "Great Powers and Hierachical Order in Southeast Asia," p.122.
16 As quoted in Goh, "Great Powers and Hierachical Order in Southeast Asia," p.123.
17 Kang, China Rising, at p.49.
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China as the regional great power, Japan and India as regional major powers, and then 
other regional players such as ASEAN, Australia and South Korea.18
As will be seen in Part 3, India's relationships in Southeast Asia, and particularly with 
Singapore, contain many elements of the complex balancing behaviour suggested by 
Goh. Singapore is actively drawing India into the region in political, economic and 
security terms in order to help provide a counterweight not only to China but arguably 
also to the United States and Japan. However, in contrast to realist predictions, there 
is no suggestion that Singapore is seeking to build, or even lay a foundation for, any 
balancing coalition against China. Considerations of hierarchy also provide insights 
into some of India's relationships in East Asia. Kang's observations about traditional 
hierarchies and tribute relationships w ith China are important in understanding some 
features of India's engagement with Southeast Asia. India, which always lay outside 
the Chinese tribute system and regards itself as a civilisational peer of China, is 
arguably in some ways a disruptive force in East Asian relations. In its dealings with 
the region, India has not always paid adequate cognisance to the complexities of East 
Asian relationships w ith China, nor are India's great power ambitions always consistent 
w ith East Asian perceptions of regional hierarchy. This analysis underlines India's 
historical status as an outsider in its dealings in East Asia.
1.2.3 Geopolitical analysis and Asia
Geopolitical analysis has long languished as a virtual footnote in Western international 
relations theory, where it is sometimes regarded as an outmoded or unsophisticated 
lens for understanding strategic relationships. However, over the last decade or more 
geopolitical theories, particularly focusing on the importance of maritime power, have
18 Goh, “Great Powers and Hierachical Order in Southeast Asia," at p.150.
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become prominent in strategic analysis in Asia.19 As will be seen in chapter 2.2, 
geopolitical analysis is now an important factor in India's understanding of regional 
security dynamics, particularly in justifications for the development of an Indian sphere 
of influence. According to Mohan: "The sneering tone of the West vis a vis the 
Chinese and Indian fascination for geopolitics tells us more about the ethnocentrism in 
the West and its belief that the dominant view of the West today must necessarily be 
the prevailing fashion all across the w orld ..."20
Geopolitics places emphasis on geographic factors in shaping strategic behaviour. 
Geopolitical theorists tend to see differences between the basic strategic outlooks and 
behaviour of states as arising from geography, making distinctions between 
"continental" states that are physically and psychologically centred in the Eurasian 
continent and "m aritim e" states that are more or less located on the Eurasian 
periphery or elsewhere. Cohen, for example, sees Asia as comprised of: a continental 
realm which includes Russia and (historically) China; a maritime realm which includes 
Japan and other trade dependent East Asian states; and a mixed maritime/continental 
realm which includes India.21 The difference is seen as critical in terms of military 
power. While continental states will seek to project power over land, maritime states 
will focus on the projection of maritime power over long distances, the control of 
maritime trade through control over sea lines of communication and the development 
of maritime spheres of influence. Some regard the difference as also affecting a 
state's underlying economic and political systems: maritime states are often 
characterised as liberal both economically and politically, in contrast to continental 
states that tend to be economically illiberal and authoritarian. Thus maritime Britain
19 For example, Scott, "India's "Grand Strategy" for the Indian Ocean: Mahanian Visions," at 
109; and Banyan, "The notion that geography is power is making an unwelcome comeback in 
Asia," The Economist, 11 June 2009.
20 Mohan, "Maritime Power: India and China turn to Mahan," 9.
21 Saul Bernard Cohen, Geopolitics of the World System (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003).
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is contrasted with pre-war continental Germany22 and the maritime United States with 
continental Russia.23 According to one maritime theorist:
"Maritime supremacy is the key which unlocks most, i f  not all, large questions in 
modern history, certainly the puzzle o f how and why we -  the Western 
democracies -  are as we are. We are the heirs o f maritime supremacy ” 2A
There is no clear consensus among geopolitical theorists as to where India fits in this 
picture. Although India has historically had a largely continental strategic outlook, 
some believe that it may evolve into a great maritime power. Karnad, a leading Indian 
nuclear theorist, argues that India as a so-called "Rimland" power has the flexibility to 
choose between a maritime or continental perspective and in doing so is able to tip 
the balance for or against the mainly maritimist United States in its contest with a 
continentalist China.25 Questions of maritime versus continental perspectives also 
underlie the debate as to whether the centre of gravity of India's strategic orientation 
should lie towards the west (e.g. Pakistan, Iran, the Middle East), a region which is 
predominantly continentalist in outlook or the east (eg. Southeast Asia and maritime 
East Asia), which is primarily maritime in nature. Arguably, India's strategic re­
orientation towards maritime East Asia in recent years not only reflects a change in 
geographical focus, but also reflects a change in Indian strategic outlook towards the 
strategic perspectives shared by those states.
22 See, for example, H. van der Wüsten; G. Dijkink, "German, British and French Geopolitics: 
The Enduring Differences," Geopolitics, Vol. 7, No. 3 (Winter 2002), pp.19 -  38.
23 Colin S. Gray, The geopolitics of the nuclear era: heartland, rimlands, and the technological 
revolution (New York: Crane, Russak, 1977).
24 Peter Padfield, Maritime supremacy and the opening of the western mind: Naval campaigns 
that shaped the modern world (New York: Overlook, 2000), p.l.
25 B.Karnad, "India's Future Plans and Defence Requirements" in N.S. Sisodia and C. Uday 
Bhaskar (eds), Emerging India: Security and Foreign Policy Perspectives (New Delhi: Institute 
for Defence Studies and Analyses, 2005), pp.62-63.
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As will be discussed in Part 2, geopolitical analysis can usefully contribute to an 
understanding of India's changing strategic perspectives, particularly towards maritime 
power and a perceived imperative to expand its strategic space. These are important 
elements in the overall picture of India's strategic outlook. However, geopolitical 
analysis is relatively undeveloped in many respects, particularly in understanding the 
dynamics of India's interaction with other states. Geopolitical analysis therefore only 
provides a limited theoretical framework for the examination of India's engagement 
w ith East Asia.
1.2.4 The role of regions in Asian security
A further theoretical dimension is the extent to which it is valid to examine the 
strategic interaction of states as geographically disparate as India, Singapore and Japan 
within a presumed "Asian" security order. As will be argued, the existence and 
evolution of security subregions in Asia - South, Southeast and Northeast Asia - is of 
crucial importance in understanding India's historical relationships and the increased 
strategic interaction between India and East Asia in recent years.
Focus on the role and significance of regional and subregional security orders has been 
particularly associated with what has been called the "Copenhagen School." This 
school of thought claims that, despite the impact of globalisation, the regional level 
has become a major locus of conflict and cooperation for states and an important level 
of strategic analysis.26 According to Buzan, regional security dynamics must be 
understood within what he calls a "security complex" or a set of states whose major 
security perceptions and concerns are so interlinked that their national security
26 See Barry Buzan, Ole Waever and Jaap de Wilde, Security: A New Framework for Analysis 
(Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998); Barry Buzan and Gowher Rizvi, South Asian 
Insecurity and the Great Powers (New York: St Martin's Press, 1986); and Lake and Morgan, 
Regional Orders.
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problems cannot reasonably be analysed or resolved apart from one another. Buzan 
asserts that regionally based clusters are the normal pattern of security 
interdependence in the international system, and have gained particular importance 
following the end of the imperialist era and the Cold War.27 The particular character of 
a regional security complex will often be affected by historical factors such as long­
standing enmities or a common cultural embrace of a civilisational area. The standard 
security pattern for a regional security complex is a pattern of rivalry and balance of 
power among the main powers within the region, to which can be added the effect of 
intervening external powers which occurs when outside powers make security 
alignments with states within the region. Balance of power logic encourages local 
rivals to call in outside help and by this mechanism the local patterns of rivalry become 
linked to the global ones.
Regional security complex theory and Asia
For Buzan, Asia represents a peculiar case in understanding regional security dynamics. 
Buzan believes that for geographical and historical reasons Asia could be split into 3 
distinct sub-regions: Northeast Asia, Southeast Asia and South Asia. Northeast Asia is 
comprised of China, the Korean peninsula and Japan. It is characterised by great power 
rivalry between China and Japan, with the significant involvement of the United States 
(and, until the end of the Cold War, Russia). Southeast Asia is comprised of a large 
number of secondary states in the Southeast Asian peninsula and archipelago. South 
Asia is comprised of India and Pakistan, as the major regional rivals, and a number of 
smaller states that are geographically and civilisationally part of the region.
Until relatively recently the security dynamics of each of these regions operated with 
relative indifference towards each other. Historically, there has been negligible 
political or security interaction between South Asia and Northeast Asia. Until the
27 Buzan et al, Security: A New Framework for Analysis, pp.10-11.
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1950s, Tibet served to insulate South Asia from China; although the Himalayas 
continue to represent a major geographical barrier. Since the 1950s China has played 
a relatively active role as an outside power in South Asia through an alliance with 
Pakistan and relations with smaller states. South Asia is also divided from Southeast 
Asia by an "insulator" state, Burma, which was one cause of the absence of security 
interaction between the regions. Historically there was a greater level of security 
interaction between Northeast Asia and Southeast Asia. These included Japan's short­
lived empire in Southeast Asia in the 1940s and China's cultural and ethnic links with 
the region, which included historical suzerainty over several states.
According to Buzan, since the end of the Cold War, the distinctions between the 
security regions in Asia have been changing - the Northeast and Southeast Asian 
security regions have been merging with each other and, to a lesser extent, also with 
the South Asia.28 The transformation has been most evident in East Asia. The end of 
the Cold War involving the withdrawal of Soviet and the partial withdrawal of US 
military power from Southeast Asia allowed significantly greater freedom for China 
and greater incentive for Japan to interact with Southeast Asia on a security level. 
ASEAN, which was formed as a weak subregional security regime in the face of 
superpower intervention during the Cold War, institutionalised engagement between 
Southeast and Northeast Asia on a number of levels.
The increased level of security interaction between South and East Asia in recent times 
has been driven by the transformations in South Asia including the decay of Pakistan's 
claim to be a regional pole of power and the intensification of India's rivalry with 
China. Buzan argues that the South Asian security region is trending towards 
unipolarity, allowing India to gradually transcend its long-standing confinement to 
South Asia and carve out a wider role as an Asian great power. The greater economic 
and political role of China in Southeast Asia has also led to ASEAN states "pulling" India
28 Ibid., p.96.
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into the region as a balancing force. As will be seen in chapter 3.1, Singapore has been 
at the forefront of recognising the breakdown of barriers between strategic South Asia 
and East Asia. According to Singapore's Senior M inister Goh Chok Tong, the issue is 
how to "fold a growing South Asia and East Asia into one equation."29
This thesis will argue that the impact of security sub-regions w ithin Asia as suggested 
by Buzan is highly consistent with the history of India's interaction with East Asia. The 
theory appears to provide an extremely useful framework for understanding the 
history of strategic indifference between South Asia and East Asia and the partial 
breakdown of that indifference. However, regional theory in itself does not fully 
explain the forces driving state behaviour beyond historical patterns of enmity and 
amity between states, and is therefore an incomplete explanation of strategic 
behaviour.
1.2.5 A case for analytical eclecticism in understanding India's strategic 
engagement with East Asia
It has been argued above that several theories of strategic behaviour can provide 
useful, if incomplete, insights into India's strategic interaction with East Asia. This 
thesis proposes that the starting point for understanding India's security relationships 
in East Asia is the perceptions of the participants in those relationships. This is an 
approach which arguably underlies both materialist and non-materialist explanations 
of international relations.30 As Robert Jervis has shown, the perceptions used in 
making foreign policy decisions come from the application of data by a state's 
decision-makers to existing theories about international relations and images of other
29 Goh Chok Tong, "Reconceptualising East Asia", Speech at the Institute of South Asian 
Studies, 27 January 2005.
30 For example, the "balance of threat" theory is inevitably a balance of threats as perceived by 
decision-makers. See Walt, The Origins of Alliances.
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states. The application of data to different theories and images will often result in the 
same set of data being perceived or understood in different ways, including 
perceptions of threats and of shared interests.31 In order to properly understand 
those differing perceptions, one must therefore also understand the theories and 
images being applied by relevant decision-makers. As will be seen in chapter 2.2, 
India's security relationships in East Asia are perceived through a variety of concepts, 
including the balance of power, regional identity politics, as well as strong elements of 
geopolitical thinking.
In understanding these perceptions, this thesis will not seek to characterise them by 
applying what has been called the "jealous god" of a single universalist theoretical 
paradigm.32 It is submitted that such an approach often conceals more than it reveais 
in seeking to understand the multifaceted -  and sometimes inconsistent -  motivations 
involved. Significant developments in international relations are rarely shaped by a 
single factor (or set of factors) emphasised by the competing paradigms in 
international relations theory. Rather, they are invariably shaped by complementary 
processes which happen to converge or intersect so as to overcome contradictory 
processes.33 One could argue that the security dynamics in Asia, w ith its great cultural 
and historical diversity and quite delineated security subregions, may be particularly 
prone to a confusion of complementary and contradictory strategic processes as 
compared w ith other regions of the world. Certainly, attempts to apply a single 
theoretical perspective to Asia have consistently failed to fully explain strategic 
behaviour, particularly that of India.34
31 See generally, Robert Jervis, Perceptions and Misperceptions in International Politics 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976).
32 Tony Smith, America's Mission: The United States and the Worldwide Struggle for Democracy 
in the Twentieth Century (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), at p.350.
33 Friedberg, "The Future of U.S.-China Relations," p . l l .
34 Mohan, Crossing the Rubicon.
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Rather than attempting to explain India's strategic engagement w ith East Asia through 
the lens of a single paradigm, this thesis will seek to use something analogous to what 
has been called "analytical eclecticism." This is an approach which acknowledges that 
elements of different strategic paradigms may be operating simultaneously in strategic 
relationships w ithout a single paradigm providing a comprehensive understanding of 
that relationship.35 It also acknowledges that strategic relationships are rarely viewed 
by decision-makers in accordance with a single theoretical perspective. Parts 2, 3 and 
4 of this thesis will examine the competing and contradictory factors shaping India's 
strategic relationships. The significance of these factors will then be considered using 
the insights provided by the theoretical paradigms discussed above.
35 See Peter J.Katzenstein and Rudra Sil, "A Case for Analytical Eclecticisim" in J.J.Suh, Peter 
J.Katzenstein and Allen Carlson, Rethinking Security in East Asia: Identity, Power and Efficiency 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004).
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Part 2 The foundations of India's engagement with East Asia
Part 2 will establish the underpinnings of India's engagement with East Asia. Chapter 
2.1 provides an overview of India's emergence as a major Asian power over the last 
two decades. Chapter 2.2 will discuss the development of Indian strategic thinking, 
particularly in relation to East Asia. The following two chapters will focus on the two 
main drivers of India's strategic engagement with East Asia: chapter 2.3 will focus on 
India's ambitions to become a great maritime power in the Indian Ocean region and 
beyond, and chapter 2.4 will consider the dimensions of strategic rivalry between India 
and China.
Key themes that will be examined in this part include:
• The emergence of India as a major regional power and the gap between its 
capabilities and strategic aspirations.
• The key elements in Indian strategic thinking about East Asia, including the 
objectives of strategic autonomy, multipolarity and the creation of a sphere of 
influence in the Indian Ocean region.
• The significance of India's strategic ambitions in the Indian Ocean for its role in 
East Asia.
• Strategic competition with China as a driving force in Indian strategic 
behaviour.
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Chapter 2.1 The emergence of India as a major regional power
2.1.1 India's strategic position at the end of the Cold War
2.1.2 India's post-Cold War engagement with Asia
2.1.3 The role of the United States in India's emergence
2.1.4 India as an emerging great power
Introduction
This chapter provides an overview of India's emergence as a major power in Asia. It 
will examine India's strategic circumstances at the end of the Cold War and provide an 
overview of India's strategic engagement with Asia, w ith particular focus on East Asia. 
It will then consider India's strategic engagement w ith the United States over the last 
decade or more. Lastly, it will examine India's claims to be an emerging great power.
2.1.1 India's strategic position at the end of the Cold War
From independence until the end of the Cold War India functioned within what might 
be called the "Nehruvian system," a series of interlocking political, economic and 
foreign policy systems put in place by Jawalharlal Nehru, and later modified by his 
daughter Indira Gandhi and then his grandson, Rajiv Gandhi.
The political system was dominated by the Congress Party, led by the Nehru dynasty, 
which had brought India independence and had, except for a brief period, held central 
government since 1947.1 The Indian economy operated under a mixture of state- 
owned enterprises holding the "commanding heights" of the economy and a private 
sector dominated by monopoly capitalists protected by a strict licensing system (the
1 For a study of the Nehruvian political system, see Tariq Ali, The Nehrus and the Gandhis: an 
Indian Dynasty (London: Picador, 2005).
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so-called "Licensing Raj"). Nehruvian economic policies left India with the most 
closed and one of the most highly regulated economies in the non-communist world. 
Foreign investment was actively discouraged through legal and bureaucratic 
requirements, imports were restricted and exports were largely dependent upon 
agricultural commodities and low grade manufactures. Since independence India had 
recorded the so-called "Hindu Rate" of economic growth averaging around 2-3 % per 
annum, which hardly exceeded population growth. Although economic growth 
increased somewhat during the 1980s, it was largely funded by unsustainable external 
borrowing not adequately matched by growth in exports. Despite periodic attempts 
at reform during the 1980s, the essentials of the Nehruvian economic system were 
largely untouched.2
India's basic strategic stance had also been established in the years following 
independence. This involved formal nonalignment w ith either of the Cold War blocs 
and claims to moral leadership of the developing world. This stance was modified by 
Indira Gandhi in the 1960s when India pursued a somewhat more realist approach and 
entered into a de facto  security partnership with the Soviet Union, while retaining the 
rhetoric of nonalignment.3 Among other things, the Soviet relationship provided India 
w ith a strategic counterweight to China and a veto in the UN Security Council on issues 
vital to India. India gained status from its leadership of the Non-Aligned Movement of 
developing states which provided a platform for rhetorical opposition to the United 
States and the West. Although during the 1980s there were moves by India to improve 
relations with the United States, the weight of Nehruvian ideology continued to 
dominate the Indian bureaucracy and political elite, significantly narrowing India's 
strategic options and making cooperative strategic relationships between India and the 
United States and its allies difficult.
2 For a study of the Nehruvian economic system, see Bishnupad Singh, India's economic policy 
in Nehruvian era (Jaipur: ABD Publishers, 2010).
3 Nehruvian strategic doctrine will be discussed further at section 2.2.1.
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In 1990 and 1991 India experienced an unprecedented and virtually simultaneous 
series of crises that would ultimately overturn the Nehruvian system. The defeat of 
the Congress Party government in November 1989 and the assassination of the 
Congress leader, Rajiv Gandhi, in May 1991, appeared to mark the end of the 
Nehruvian political dynasty. Although a minority Congress government was elected in 
June 1991 under Prime Minister P.V.Narasimha Rao there was little expectation of 
strong leadership. At the same time, India suffered its greatest economic crisis since 
independence. During the 1980s the Indian government had been facing persistent 
and increasing budget deficits, and during the latter half of the 1980s India's sovereign 
foreign debt more than doubled. In 1990, India was then hit by a series of external 
economic shocks: the disintegration of the Eastern bloc economies led to a collapse in 
India's exports, while Iraq's invasion of Kuwait resulted in a doubling of oil prices. A 
surge in imports and collapse in exports led to a severe balance of payments crisis 
virtually exhausting India's foreign exchange reserves. In January 1991, the Indian 
government suffered the ignominy of sending 30 tonnes of its gold reserves to the 
Bank of England as collateral for further international loans. By May 1991, the Indian 
Finance Minister believed that, "the country was on the verge of bankruptcy."4
The political and economic crises were mirrored by a strategic crisis. The end of the 
Cold War and collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 left India's strategic posture in 
shambles. Not only had India's superpower guarantor disappeared, but the end of the 
Cold War seemed to destroy the roison d'etre of the Non-Aligned Movement that had 
provided India with a degree of international stature. When the bipolar world 
disappeared India's cherished policy of nonalignment had little meaning. For India, 
the collapse of the Soviet Union not only meant the loss of India's strategic guarantor 
against China, but also of important markets for Indian manufactured goods of
4 Baldev Raj Nayar, "Political Structure and India's Economic Reforms of the 1990s," Pacific 
Affairs, Vol.71, No.3. (Autumn, 1998), pp. 335-358 at p.345.
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doubtful quality, a major source of economic aid and India's primary supplier of 
m ilitary equipment. By late 1991 India's strategic outlook seemed bleak. According to 
one commentator: "India's reach for great power status is in shambles. The keystone 
of Indian power and pretence in the 1980s, the Indo-Soviet link, is history.... India has 
no 'useful friends'"5
2.1.2 India's Post-Cold War Engagement with Asia
Although the end of the Cold War left India strategically isolated, it also expanded 
India's strategic options. The removal of many of the Cold War tensions and 
ideological certainties has, over the last two decades, allowed India to engage with 
Asia in a way that was previously not possible. Over the same period India has 
demonstrated a determination to try to transcend its traditional strategic 
preoccupations in South Asia; a willingness to discard many of the old imperatives of 
nonalignment; and an overall ideological reorientation of the Indian elite towards the 
West. India's post-Cold War foreign policy has been characterised by an 
omnidirectional expansion of India's political, economic and strategic links with key 
stakeholders in Asia. India's regional initiatives in the immediate post-Cold War years 
were to a significant extent motivated by its domestic economic crisis and the need to 
expand trade and attract investment, particularly from East Asia. This section will 
provide an overview of India's foreign policy in Asia in the years following the Cold 
War, w ith particular emphasis on East Asia.6
One of India's key strategic aims over the last two decades has been to transcend its 
traditional preoccupations in South Asia, so as to allow India to better develop regional
5 Ross H. Munro, "The Loser: India in the Nineties," National Interest, No.33 (Summer 1993), 
pp.62-63.
6 For some very different perspectives on India's post-Cold War foreign policy, see Mohan, 
Crossing the Rubicon; and Sikri, Challenge and Strategy.
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relationships. The so-called "Gujral doctrine/' as enunciated by Indian Foreign 
Minister I.K.Gujral in 1996, has led India to be generally less demanding and more 
generous in its relations with its smaller South Asian neighbours. While India's 
relations with Pakistan, its main protagonist in South Asia, have stabilised somewhat in 
recent years, Pakistan remains a major source of terrorist violence against India. The 
Afghan war has also provided Pakistan with significant leverage in its relationship with 
the United States in competition with India. Unless India can resolve Pakistan's claims 
over Kashmir (something that appears unlikely), it seems that Pakistan will continue to 
be a thorn in India's side for many years to come, constraining India's ability to project 
power and influence beyond South Asia. Nevertheless, India has had some success in 
"de-hyphenating" itself from Pakistan in developing its regional relationships.
Over the last twenty years, India has also given increased focus to relationships with 
key states in West and Central Asia. The end of the Cold War and the 1991 Gulf War 
forced India to review its relationships in the Middle East, leading to closer economic 
and political links with major regional states such as Saudi Arabia and Turkey. Of 
particular significance is Israel, with which India has developed a close security 
relationship, particularly as a major supplier of defence technology.7 India has also 
cautiously renewed its political relationship with Iran which is both a major energy 
supplier and an important regional counterweight to Pakistan.8 Simultaneously, the 
Indian navy actively pursued relationships in the Persian Gulf, particularly with Oman 
and Qatar. In 2005, India sought to give greater coherence to its relationships in West 
Asia through the launch of a "Look West" policy, intended to act as a counterpoint to 
its "Look East" policy in East Asia. There are, however, some important limitations on 
India's ability to expand its influence in West Asia. This includes the overwhelming
7 See generally, Krishan Gopal and Sarbjit Sharma, India and Israel: towards strategic 
partnership (New Delhi: Authorspress, 2007).
8 Christine Fair, "India and Iran: New Delhi's Balancing Act," The Washington Quarterly, Vol.SO, 
No.3 (Summer 2007), pp.145-159.
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m ilita ry dominance o f the United States in the Persian Gulf, which has sometimes left 
litt le  room fo r major in itiatives by India.9 India's relationship w ith  Iran is currently 
severely constrained by Iran's hostile relationship w ith  the United States and its 
relationship w ith  Israel is constrained by foreign and domestic political considerations.
At the same tim e, India has also been hesitantly developing relationships w ith  the 
newly independent Central Asian states. Since 2003, the Indian air force has had an 
active role at the Farkhor A ir Base in Tajikstan, which is intended to  support o f India's 
interests in Afghanistan. However, India's relations in Central Asia, at least in 
comparison w ith  Russia and China, are likely to  be lim ited by India's geographic access 
to  the region, which makes trade, particularly trade in energy, d ifficu lt.10
However, India's engagement w ith  East Asia has been the most im portant and 
successful part o f India's regional strategy. As w ill be discussed in Parts 3 and 4, during 
the Cold War, India had shown relatively little  strategic interest in East Asia. India 
eschewed the developm ent o f regional security relationships and saw its interests as 
largely lim ited to  rhetorical e fforts to  m inim ise the intrusion of o the r major powers 
in to  the region. In 1992, the Rao governm ent launched the "Look East Policy" which 
was designed to  expand economic, political and security ties w ith  East Asia. The policy 
in itia lly  had the expansion of economic links w ith  Japan as a prim ary objective, 
reflecting Japan's position as a world economic power and Asia's m ajor source of 
capital (then at its peak). Japan was seen by many in New Delhi as the firs t economic 
success story o f Asia and the epitom e o f non-W estern m odernity, something to  be
9 Mohan, "Is India an East Asian Power? Explaining New Delhi's Security Politics in the Western 
Pacific," p.5.
10 P.Stobdan, "Central Asia and India's Security," Strategic Analysis, Vol.28, No.l (2004), pp.54- 
83.
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emulated by India.11 In 1991 Japan had played a crucial role in averting India's 
economic crisis. At the request of India, the Japanese government had organised a 
rollover of short term Indian government debt to Japanese banks to avert an almost 
certain default on India's sovereign debt.12 The Japanese government then provided 
around US$6 billion in additional loans to address the immediate crisis and significantly 
expanded ongoing ODA. However, as will be seen in chapter 4.3, attempts by India 
through the 1990s to encourage investment by Japanese business in India had little 
success. Japanese business saw India as too difficult and unwilling to reform the Indian 
business environment while Indian bureaucrats viewed Japanese reform proposals for 
India as "mainly pegged to their own interests."13
India had much greater success in developing links in Southeast Asia which during the 
1990s became the primary focus of the Look East Policy.14 India saw its inclusion in 
the regional political, economic and security groupings based in Southeast Asia as an 
important way of avoiding marginalisation in the post-Cold War international 
landscape. As will be seen in Part 3, India moved to improve bilateral security links 
w ith key Southeast Asian states and in the early 1990s identified Singapore as its key 
gateway into the region. India also sought to further develop links w ith its 
longstanding political ally Vietnam and more recently with Indonesia. These bilateral 
relationships have come to form the key points in India's Southeast Asian strategy. 
W ith the assistance of Singapore in particular, India's institutional links in Southeast 
Asia developed quickly, becoming a sectoral ASEAN dialogue partner in 1992 and a full 
ASEAN dialogue partner in December 1995. India also sought a security role in the
11 Christophe Jaffrelot, "India's Look East Policy: An Asianist Strategy in Perspective," India 
Review, Vol.2 No.2, pp.35-68, p.55.
12 Arjun Asrani, "India-Japan Relations in the 21st Century" in Rajaram Panda and Kazuo Ando 
(eds.), India and Japan: Indian Intellectual Perspectives (New Delhi: The Japan Foundation, 
1998) atp.25.
13 Dixit, My South Block Years, p255.
14 Jaffrelot, "India's Look East Policy," p.47.
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region, w ith  Indian Prime M in ister P.V.Narasimha Rao declaring in 1994 tha t: "India 
would like to  be part o f the evolving security fram ew ork in the region to  assuage 
doubts about arising from  its potentia l m ilitary m ight as to  contribu te  to  the security 
edifice tha t was being crafted by the Asia-Pacific powers." (sic.)15 India joined the ARF 
in 1996.
In the late 1990s, India signalled a broadening of its Look East policy. As Indian Foreign 
M in ister Jaswant Singh described it, "ou r Look East policy w ill be integrated into a 
larger regionalization strategy which encompasses... the Asia Pacific."16 The so-called 
"Phase 2" o f the Look East policy involved a deepening o f India's relationships in 
Southeast Asia, including the entry into bilateral and m ultila tera l free trade 
arrangements, expanding India's focus to  a broader region extending from  Australia to  
Northeast Asia w ith  ASEAN as its core, and pursuing a broader agenda involving 
security cooperation.17 As E. Ahamed, the jun io r Indian Foreign M inister, commented: 
"the  Look East policy is not merely an external economic policy, but a "strategic shift in 
India's v is io n .""18 India's institu tiona l relationships in East Asia continued to  develop in 
the early years o f this century. India was granted the firs t "ASEAN plus One" sum m it 
w ith  ASEAN, firs t held in November 2002 a fte r India was refused entry to  the ASEAN +
3 grouping. India acceded to  ASEAN's Treaty o f A m ity and Cooperation in 2003, 
participated in the firs t East Asian Summit in December 2005 and jo ined the Asia- 
Europe M eeting in 2008. As ASEAN Secretary General, Yong Ong, commented,
15 Sridharan, The ASEAN Region in India's Foreign Policy, p.178.
16 Jaswant Singh, "Statement by Deputy Chairman Planning Commission of India Jaswant Singh 
on the Occasion of the ASEAN 31st Post Ministerial Conference (ASEAN+9) Plenary Session" 28 
July 1998. See <aseansec.org/3944>.
17 C.Raja Mohan, "Look East policy: phase two" The Hindu, 9 October 2003.
18 E.Ahamed, "Reinforcing "Look East" Policy," 16 January 2006. <http://pib.nic.in/release/ 
rel_print_pagel.asp?relid=14984>
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"...India will play an important role in maintaining the peace, stability and prosperity of 
the region... and security of Southeast Asia."19
Despite the broader focus given to India's relationships, the economic integration of 
India with East Asia remains a key driver of India's engagement with the region. In 
August 2009, India signed a multilateral ASEAN-India Free Trade Agreement which will 
substantially reduce tariffs on most manufactured items with the exception of 
important sectors such as textiles, chemicals, automobiles and steel. The deal will be 
largely confined to manufactured goods, allowing India to continue to protect 
agriculture, while ASEAN states will continue to protect their services sectors. In 
recent years India has also pushed for a non-exclusive "Asian Economic Community" 
which would bring together Japan, ASEAN, China, India and South Korea. However, 
the Indian proposal is in direct competition with other proposals supported by China 
for an East Asian economic community that exclude India.20 These competing 
proposals were the subject of controversy at the East Asian Summit in December 2005. 
Although the Summit agreed to the admittance of India (as well as Australia and New 
Zealand) to any proposed regional economic grouping, India, Australia and New 
Zealand were effectively relegated to second class status. The Summit resolved that 
ASEAN would be in the "driving seat" of the process for an East Asian Community, and 
Malaysian Prime Minister Abdullah Badawi announced that ASEAN +3 would be "a 
vehicle" for realising it. Despite this manoeuvring, the prospects for any region-wide 
economic grouping seems unlikely for some years to come.
Although there has been significant progress in developing India's institutional links 
w ith East Asia, in many ways India is still an outsider to East Asian multilateral
19 Yong Ong, "Advancing the ASEAN-India Partnership in the New Millenium" Addess in New 
Delhi, 18 October 2004
20 Mohan Malik, "China's Strategy of Containing India" Power and Interest News Report, 
February 6, 2006, <http://www.pinr.com/report.php?ac=view_report&report_id=434>.
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groupings. Perceptions of a second-ranking status in the East Asian Summit still rankle. 
India is not a member of ASEAN + 3 or APEC and it remains uncertain whether it will be 
allowed to join APEC when its membership is next considered. Despite comments by 
Prime Minister Vajpayee in 2002 that: "India's belonging to the Asia-Pacific community 
is a geographical fact and a political reality. It does not require formal membership of 
any regional organisation for its recognition and sustenance/'21 it is clear that India, as 
a late starter in the process of economic and political engagement with the region, has 
not approached the depth of the relationships that others such as China has w ith most 
ASEAN states.
Although some ASEAN states (in particular, Singapore) have welcomed an increased 
security role for India in the region, others have been more cautious, though not 
unwelcoming. India is generally seen as a benign security presence, however concerns 
remain about the potential for strategic rivalry between India and China and there are 
real questions about India's ability to act as a regional security provider, particularly if 
it is unable to create a stable security environment in South Asia. As one commentator 
put it: "More than any power projection capabilities, ASEAN's main expectation vis-a- 
vis India in terms of security would be its capacity to ensure the stability of the 
subcontinent itself... India's aspirations to a political role in Southeast Asia would 
certainly be more credible if it was able to settle its dispute with Pakistan."22
In the two decades following the end of the Cold War, India has also radically recast its 
relations with the key major powers of East Asia during the Cold War - China, Russia 
and the United States. The loss of Soviet strategic guarantees following the collapse of 
the Soviet Union forced India to partially recast its relationship with China, leading to
21 Atal Vajpayee, India's Perspective on ASEAN and the Asia-Pacific region (Speech to Institute 
of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore, 9 April 2002)
22 Frederick Grare, "In Search of a Role: India and the ASEAN Regional Forum" in Grare and 
Mattoo, India and ASEAN, pp.119-145 at p.136.
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important improvements in certain dimensions of the relationship and opening the 
way for major increases in bilateral trade. However, as will be discussed in chapter 
2.4, relations with China remain uneven at best and new areas of strategic rivalry have 
developed, including in relation to energy, the Indian Ocean and Southeast Asia. Since 
the late 1990s, India has also sought to partially renew its relationship with Russia, a 
country which continues to have significant emotional resonance in parts of India's 
security community. Russia continues to be India's largest supplier of defence 
technology, representing some 80% of arms imports to India in 2008, a role which is 
likely to continue for some tim e.23 While Russia continues to be an important 
strategic partner for India, it is no longer a major factor in India's strategic 
relationships in East Asia.
2.1.3 The role of the United States in India's emergence
The other important change has been in India's relations w ith the United States. The 
end of the Cold War facilitated India's strategic engagement with the United States. 
This has in many ways underpinned India's emergence as a major power.24
For most of the Cold War India's relationship w ith the United States was distant and 
often strained.25 India refused to accept a predominant role for the United States in 
the international system, and the United States would not cede to India predominance
23 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, <http://armstrade.sipri.org/armstrade/ 
html/export_values.php>
24 For discussion of this relationship see generally, Ashley Tellis, India as a New Global Power: 
An Action Agenda for the United States (Washington D.C., Carnegie Endowment for World 
Peace, 2005); and Ganguly et al, US-Indian strategic cooperation into the 21st century.
25 For accounts of the India U.S. relationship during the Coid War, see: H.W.Brands, India and 
the United States: the Cold Peace (Boston: Twayne Publishers, 1990); and Dennis Klux, India 
and the United States: Estranged Democracies, 1941 -1991  (Washington D.C.: National 
Defence University Press, 1992).
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in South Asia. India's strategic partnership with the Soviet Union from the late 1960s 
only served to further estrange the United States, giving rise to a view in Washington 
of India as a Soviet "fellow traveller." Although relations steadily improved during the 
latter years of the Cold War, particularly following the Soviet intervention in 
Afghanistan, only the end of the Cold War removed the political and psychological 
obstacles that prevented improvements in the strategic relationship.
Economic relations, which had been severely constrained by the closed nature of the 
Indian economy during the Cold War, surged with the liberalisation of the Indian 
economy in the early 1990s. The United States played a major role in providing 
assistance during the Indian economic crisis in 1991 and US investment has been a 
significant factor in the development of the Indian economy since then. Growth of the 
relationship has been assisted by the large Indian ethnic community in the United 
States, numbering almost 2 million, which also forms a natural political base for India 
in the United States. The United States is now India's largest trading and investment 
partner.
The political relationship between India and the United States also improved during 
the 1990s, although it was limited by continuing US hopes that India would give up its 
ambitions to become a nuclear weapons state. India's 1998 nuclear tests caused a 
major rupture in the relationship when the United States and its regional allies 
imposed punitive economic sanctions on India. However, this development also 
removed a psychological obstacle to US acceptance of India's emergence as a major 
power and led to intensified and sustained political engagement between the United 
States and India.26 The rupture in the relationship following the nuclear tests turned 
out to be short-lived. India continued to pursue the relationship, with Prime Minister 
Vajpayee calling India and the United States "natural allies" whose relations
26 See generally, Strobe Talbott, Engaging India: Diplomacy, Democracy and the Bomb 
(Washington D.C., Brookings Institution, 2004).
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"constitute the key element in the architecture of tomorrow's democratised world 
order."27 The United States reciprocated, demonstrating its credentials as a useful 
diplomatic partner during the 1999 Kargil crisis when the United States supported New 
Delhi and pressured Pakistan to withdraw its insurgents from beyond the Line of 
Control in Kashmir. This act went a long way to  dispelling a decades-long view that the 
United States would always support Pakistan over Kashmir.28 India was able to return 
the gesture following 9/11, when it offered its "unconditional and unambivalent 
support" to the United States,29 offering Indian military facilities in support of the 
Afghanistan campaign and participating in Operation Enduring Freedom by providing 
naval escorts for US shipping through the Malacca Strait.
The engagement accelerated under the Bush administration which saw benefits in 
developing India as a partial balance to the rising power of China, which was now 
characterised as a "strategic competitor." The relationship was given particular 
impetus with the appointment of Condoleezza Rice as US secretary of state in 2005. 
Washington decided to facilitate India's emergence as a great power rather than 
hinder it and to make every effort to tell India of its importance.30 In December 2004, 
Ashley Tellis revealed that the US Central Intelligence Agency had called India the most 
important "swing state" in the international system.31 In March 2005, the Bush 
administration announced that it would "help India become a major world power in 
the 21st century," adding that "We understand fully the implications, including the
27 K.P. Nayar, "Vajpayee describes India and US as natural allies," The Telegraph, 29 September 
1998.
28 Mohan, Crossing the Rubicon, p.100.
29 Washington Post, 17 September 2001.
30 Later referred to by a Secretary of the Indian Foreign Ministry as a "free ego massage." See 
Sikri, Challenge and Strategy, p.187.
31 Ashley Tellis, "Assessing America's War on Terror: Confronting Insurgency, Cementing 
Primacy," NBR Analysis, Vol.15, No.4 (2004).
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m ilita ry implications, o f th a t  s ta tem ent."32 Condoleezza Rice portrayed India as "a 
rising global pow er tha t can be a p illar o f stability in a rapidly changing Asia."33 As a 
senior US offic ia l in New Delhi put it: "India as a global power is in an early, form ative 
phase. The United States' job  fo r the next 5 to  10 years is to  prom ote, assist and shape 
tha t process."34
The Bush adm inistration was relatively open about placing its relationship w ith  India in 
the context o f China's rising power. Condoleezza Rice's comments on this are w orth 
quoting at length:
"/ really do believe that the US-Japan relationship, the US-South Korean 
relationship, the US-Indian relationship, all are im portant in creating an 
environment in which China is more likely to play a positive role than a negative 
role. These alliances are not against China; they are alliances that are devoted 
to a stable security and political and economic and', indeed, values-based 
relationships that put China in the context o f those relationships, and a different 
path to development than i f  China were simply untethered, simply operating 
without that strategic context. "35
The Bush adm inistration approached the relationship w ith  an uncharacteristic degree 
o f sensitivity, particularly tow ards India's am bitions towards strategic autonomy.
W hile encouraging India to  develop strategic perceptions closer to  those of the United
32 Office of Spokesman, U.S. Department of State, "Background Briefing by Administration 
Officials on U.S.-South Asia Relations" Washington D.C., 25 March 2005.
33 Condoleezza Rice, "US-India Civil Nuclear Cooperation Agreement: Opening Remarks Before 
House International Relations Committee," 5 April 2006.
34 Quoted in Daniel Twining, "America's Grand Design in Asia," The Washington Quarterly, 
Vol.30 No.3 (2007), pp.79-94.
35 Condoleezza Rice, Speech at Sophia University, 19 March 2005.
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States, Washington did not, in general, expect public support from New Delhi in 
international fora in the manner of the diplomatic support expected from US allies.
The Indo-US civilian nuclear agreement (known as the "123 agreement"), reached in 
July 2007 although not signed until October 2008, represents the centrepiece of the 
strategic relationship, in which the United States effectively recognised India as a de 
facto nuclear weapons state and allowed India access to civil nuclear and other 
sophisticated technology from the United States.36 The Indian government faced 
significant opposition to the agreement, largely derived from fears that India was being 
lured into a US strategic "web." Although a reprocessing agreement was finalised in 
March 2010, full implementation of the 123 agreement is yet to occur.
The US-India strategic relationship has a heavy focus on military-to- military 
cooperation, particularly naval cooperation. The US focus has been on assisting in a 
build-up of India's conventional naval and air force capabilities to complement the US 
naval and air force presence in the Indian Ocean. The US Navy, through its Hawaii- 
based Pacific Command (USPACOM), took the lead in engaging with the Indian military 
in the early 1990s, after which "Executive Steering Groups" were established to 
coordinate cooperation between each of the Indian and US armed services. A 1995 
defence agreement was renewed and expanded in 2005 providing for intelligence 
sharing and training, technology transfers and missile defence cooperation. Strategic 
dialogue has been institutionalised through the Defence Policy Group, a consultative 
mechanism jo in tly chaired by the US Secretary of State for Defense for Policy and the 
Indian Defence Secretary. This sits over the Executive Steering Groups for m ilitary to
36 For a discussion of the 123 agreement, see K. Alan Krondstadt, "India-US Relations," 
Congressional Research Service Report RL33529, August 12, 2008.
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m ilitary dialogue and a Defence Procurement and Production Group.37 India has now 
also posted a liaison officer to USPACOM headquarters in Hawaii -  a position only 
previously offered to Japan, South Korea and Australia. USPACOM retains a leading 
role in the India relationship, reflecting both the emphasis on maritime security in the 
relationship and a desire to reduce operational frictions arising from US military 
support for Pakistan, which falls within the ambit of USCENTCOM.
Following USPACOM's overtures in 1991, the United States and India began conducting 
jo in t m ilitary exercises in 1992, which have since increased significantly in frequency, 
scope and scale. Since 2000, there have been frequent exercises between the Indian 
and US armed services, often multiple times per year.38 The major annual naval 
“ Malabar" exercises have particularly increased in scale and complexity, including the 
controversial 2007 Malabar exercise in the Bay of Bengal which involved three carrier 
battle groups and other ships from India, the United States, Japan, Australia and 
Singapore. The central role of naval cooperation in the relationship was formalised in 
the 2006 Framework for Maritime Security Cooperation which among other things 
commits India and the United States to “ comprehensive cooperation in ensuring a 
secure maritime domain." The United States has also proposed a Logistics Support 
Agreement that would facilitate increased use of shared logistical services, although as 
of early 2010 this has not yet been signed due to domestic opposition in India. As will 
be discussed in chapter 2.3, the United States now envisages that India will play a 
leading role as a maritime security provider in the Indian Ocean region and the United 
States has called for India to coordinate its maritime strategy with the United States in 
Southeast Asia and as far as the Taiwan straits.
37 See generally, V.P.Malik, "Indo-US Defense and Military Relations: From “estrangement" to 
"strategic partnership"" in Sumit Ganguly, Brian Shoup and Andrew Scobell (eds), US-Indian 
Strategic Cooperation into the 21st Century (London: Routledge, 2006), pp.82-112.
38 For details, see Malik, “ Indo-US Defense and Military Relations."
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Defence trade is one of the least developed aspects of the relationship, largely due to 
bureaucratic and legal hurdles. Some have claimed that for India unfettered access to 
US defence technology has now become the litmus test of the strategic partnership.39 
Progress in this area has been slow, reflecting both US legal hurdles and the ponderous 
nature of the Indian defence acquisitions process. A crucial End-User Agreement was 
signed in 2009, while in early 2010 other agreements required under US domestic law 
for the transfer of sensitive defence technology were still being finalised. The United 
States has the objectives of both improving India's power projection capabilities, 
particularly in the maritime sphere, and supplanting Russia as India's primary defence 
supplier, something that is likely to  take many years. Only a few acquisitions of 
significant size have been finalised to date, including the sale of the USS Trenton (a 
16,000 tonne amphibious landing ship), 6 Hercules C130J aircraft (for use by special 
forces) and 24 Harpoon Block II missiles.40 However, some very large acquisitions are 
in process or have been proposed. The US has approved the sale of 8 P-8 long range 
maritime surveillance aircraft fo r US$2.2 billion and in January 2010 reportedly offered 
a naval version of F-35 aircraft to the Indian navy.41
Some have argued that while the United States and India have succeeded in putting in 
place a strong bilateral relationship they have not yet transformed it into a global 
partnership. The United States and India continue to hold different views on what it 
means to be strategic partners and about China. While the Obama administration has 
continued the development of the partnership under the slogan "U.S.-India 3.0," it is 
generally seen as somewhat less sympathetic towards India and less China-centric in
39 Brian Shoup and Sumit Ganguly, "Introduction," in Ganguly et al, US-Indian Strategic 
Cooperation into the 21st Century.
40 There were also reportedly serious discussions over the transfer of the USS Kitty Hawk, a 
80,000 tonne aircraft carrier. "Will the USS Kitty Hawk cement U.S.-India military ties?," UPI 
Asia.com, 28 November 2007
41 "US offers F-35 for Indian Navy," Indian Military, 13 January 2010.
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its relationship with India than was the Bush administration. The United States also 
toned down its references to India in the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review. In 
contrast with the QDR 2006 where India was called an "emerging strategic partner/' 
the QDR 2010 instead merely commented that, "As its military capabilities grow, India 
will contribute to Asia as a net provider of security in the Indian Ocean and beyond."42 
Although some have attributed the change to sensitivity towards Pakistan,43 it could 
be taken as another indication of the reduced emphasis on the India relationship by 
the United States. In coming years, it appears that the United States will continue to 
build security links (including the defence trade relationship) and support India in 
regional institutions, while allowing economic aspect of the relationship to grow and 
encouraging India to continue to develop as a constructive partner in international 
affairs.
Despite improvements in the relationship, there are several potential sources of 
friction. The relationship continues to be controversial in India, particularly with those 
of a leftist or a Nehruvian strategic perspective who regard Indian relations w ith the 
United States in zero sum terms, essentially seeing cooperation w ith the United States 
as co-option or coercion.44 Pakistan also remains a significant issue, although one that 
both sides have successfully managed to date. The revival of US military support to 
Pakistan in the wake of 9/11 and the Afghanistan war has been treated with a degree 
of understanding that would not have been imaginable in previous years. Some 
believe that in coming years mutual relationships in West Asia, particularly w ith Iran 
and Saudi Arabia are likely to be a significant source of friction. However, the most
42 United States Department of Defence, Quadrennial Defence Review Report, February 2006, 
p.28; United States Department of Defence, Quadrennial Defence Review Report, February
2010, p.60.
43 Anirudh Bhattacharyya, "India no longer strategic partner", Hindustani Times, 5 February 
2010.
44 For a good example of this perspective, see the views of former Secretary of the Ministry of 
External Affairs, Sikri, Challenge and Strategy.
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important source of concern is likely to be the extent to which the United States is 
perceived as allowing its relationship with China to trum p its relationship with India in 
South Asia and the Indian Ocean region. Any suggestion that the United States 
recognises a legitimate role for China in the security of South Asia is particularly 
infuriating to New Delhi. In November 2009 a jo in t US-China statement calling on 
China "to promote peace, stability and development" in South Asia, led Prime Minister 
Singh to "emphatically reiterate" to Washington that China has no role in South Asia.45 
Some believe that in coming years the United States can be expected to actively play 
India and China off against each other.46 As will be seen in chapter 2.3, the United 
States may see Sino-lndian rivalry in the Indian Ocean region as not being contrary to 
its interests and may, in some cases, even seek to promote such rivalry.
2.1.4 India as an emerging great power
In order to understand India's strategic ambitions in the region one must also 
understand both India's capabilities to project power and its self-perceptions as an 
emerging "great power."
Strategic analysts have long predicted the emergence of India as a major power, at first 
hesitantly characterising India as a potential major power in Asia and more recently 
predicting that India will become a world power over the coming decades.47 Indian 
elites have also long believed that India is destined to become a "great" state of global 
significance, and it is now relatively commonplace for India's leaders to talk of India's
45 Smita Prakash "India to tell US no role for China in South Asia" Hindustan Times, 22 
November 2009.
46 Tellis, "China and India in Asia."
47 See, for example, Stephen P. Cohen and Richard L. Park, India: emergent power? (New York: 
Crane, Russak, 1978); Babbage and Gordon, India's strategic future; Cohen, India: Emerging 
Power; Nayar and Paul, India in the World Order; and Kapur, India, from regional to world 
power.
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"destiny" as a great power.48 As Cohen comments: "unlike the people of other middle 
powers such as Indonesia, Brazil and Nigeria, Indians believe that their country has 
both the destiny and an obligation to play a large role on the international stage."49 
This reflects a view that as one of the world's largest and most enduring civilisational 
entities India is not only destined to have an international leadership role but also has 
a moral obligation to do so. Some see this combination of destiny and obligation as a 
legacy of India's nationalist independence movement, as later articulated by Nehru.50 
Others link it w ith Hindutva views on the superiority of Hindu civilisation.51 At the 
same time there has been much debate about the nature of India's "greatness."
George Tanham writing in the early 1990s contrasted those of the Indian elite who 
wanted India to become a great power in conventional terms w ith those who would 
prefer India to be a spiritual or moral leader of the world and those who merely 
wanted India to become an economic power.52 During the post-Cold War period there 
has been less emphasis on spiritual or moral leadership and more emphasis on 
conventional great power status backed by economic power. Nevertheless, ideas of 
Indian exceptionalism remain strong. As Indian Foreign M inister Yashwant Sinha 
comments in relation to India's emergence as a major power:
" It is im portant therefore that India distances itself from  the conventional idea 
o f power, as the ability o f a nation to bend other nations to its w ill through 
coercive use o f force. It is also essential to make clear at the very outset that
48 See for example, comments by Prime Minister Manmohan Singh in "Want dialogue? Then 
contain terror, PM tells Gilani," Thaindian News, 16 July 2009.
49 Stephen Cohen, "India Rising" Wilson Quarterly, Summer 2000.<http://www.brookings.edu/ 
articles/2000/summerjndia_cohen.aspx>.
50 Nayar and Paul, India in the World Order, p.252.
51 Kanti Bajpai, "Indian conceptions of order/justice in international relations: Nehruvian, 
Gandhian, Hindutva and Neo-Liberal," in V.R. Mehta and Thomas Pantham (eds.), Political 
ideas in modern India: thematic explorations (New Delhi: Sage, 2006), pp.367-392.
52 Tanham, Indian strategic thought.
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Indio approaches the notion o f power with an alternate vision and a deep 
consciousness o f responsibilities. There can be no other way fo r  India."53,
Many have argued that India's foreign policy behaviour since independence has been 
driven by a desire to achieve major power status - although India has had varying 
degrees of success in that aim. As Cohen puts it: "Despite foreign policy failures and 
much debate over tactics, the Indian elite holds fast to a vision of national 
greatness..."54 However, only since the 1990s has there been broad international 
recognition of India as an emerging major power in Asia with an important role in the 
regional balance of power. As discussed above, over the last several years the United 
States has publicly recognised and acknowledged India's potential as a "major world 
power in the 21st century" as part of its efforts to build a strategic partnership. Many 
believe that India will achieve great power status (at least within Asia) within the next 
two or three decades primarily driven by its size and sustained economic growth.
An assessment o f India's characteristics as a great power
There is some debate among strategists as to what characterises a "great" power.
Some argue that a great power must hold certain "hard power" resources: military, 
economic, technological and demographic, as well as so-called "soft power" resources. 
Hedley Bull also emphasised the importance of perceived status, commenting that in 
addition to objective characteristics, great powers must be:
" recognised by others to have, and conceived by their leaders and peoples to 
have, certain rights and duties. Great powers, fo r  example, assert the right, and 
are accorded the right, to play a part in determining issues that affect the peace
53 Yashwant Sinha, "Geopolitics: What it takes to be a world power," Speech in New Delhi, 12 
March 2004.
54 Cohen, India: Emerging power, p.51.
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and security o f the international system as a whole. They accept the duty, and 
are thought by others to have the duty, o f modifying the policies in light o f the 
managerial responsibility they bear."ss
This thesis will not seek to resolve the debate about the necessary characteristics of a 
great power, preferring to use the more amorphous term “ major power“ as an 
adequate description of India's emerging status in Asia. However, a brief analysis of 
India's capabilities against some key indicia commonly applied to “great powers" 
provides some useful pointers towards India's “ objective" ranking in the international 
system.56
The application of “ objective" indicators to India provides a somewhat mixed resuit.
As will be discussed below, in tw o key indicators of “ hard power", economic and 
m ilitary power, India might be regarded as being currently a middle power or more, 
w ith potential to become a great power over the coming decades. India is well 
endowed in some “ hard" power factors: in terms of population, India is the second 
most populous state in the world (estimated at around 1.17 billion in 2009); and in 
terms of space, India is geographically one of the world's largest countries (with 
around 3.3 million square kilometres).57 However, in other hard power factors, such 
as political and social cohesion, infrastructure and education, India ranks poorly. Some 
claim that India also has advantage in "soft power" attributes - the ability of a state to 
get what it wants through attraction rather than coercion or payments. Nayar and 
Paul, for example, claim that India's soft power indicators are high in some areas (e.g.
55 Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society: a study of order in world politics (London: Macmillan, 
1977), p.200.
56 For more detailed analyses, see Sandy Gordon, India's Rise to Power in the Twentieth 
Century and Beyond (London: Macmillan, 1995); and George Perkovich, "Is India a Major 
PowerT’The Washington Quarterly, Vol.27, No.l (Winter 2003-04), pp.129-144.
57 CIA World Factbook (last updated 18 February 2010). <https://www.cia.gov/library/ 
publications/the-world-factbook/geos/in.html>
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normative, cultural) and relatively weak in others (e.g. state power, strategy and 
diplomacy).58 However, Nye, the leading exponent of soft power, believes that while 
India's soft power is expanding at this point India does not rank high on the indices of 
soft power possessed by other major powers.59
Economically, India is currently a middle-sized power. India is, in the aggregate, the 
12th largest economy in world in exchange rate terms (US$1,243 trillion on 2009 
estimates) and 4th largest (after Japan) in purchasing power parity terms (US$3,548 
trillion on 2009 estimates). Nevertheless, India remains a poor country with per capita 
GDP in purchasing power parity terms of US$3,100 on 2009 estimates, placing India far 
below any other country claiming to be a regional power. (By comparison, 2009 per 
capita GDP for Indonesia was approximately US$4,000, China was US$6,500; Russia 
was US$15,200; Japan was US$32,600; and for the United States was US$46,400.60) 
Similarly India ranks 115 out of 162 countries on the UN Human Development Index (a 
composition of variables of life expectancy, literacy, school enrolment and GDP per 
capita).61 Although the aggregate size of India's economy is relatively large, the low 
per capita GDP is a major constraint on India's ability to mobilise an economic surplus 
for the purposes of projecting power (e.g. its ability to purchase sophisticated foreign 
weaponry).
Nevertheless, India's economic power is expected to increase significantly in the 
coming decades. India's economic development has been remarkable since the early 
1990s when the Indian government began liberalising the economy to a degree hardly 
less significant than the opening of the Chinese economy in the late 1970s. These
58 Nayar and Paul, India in the World Order, pp.57-63.
59 Joseph S. Nye, Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics (New York: Public Affairs, 
2004), pp.88-9.
60 2009 estimates, each at purchasing power parity. CIA World Factbook.
61 CIA World Factbook.
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reforms led to an acceleration in India's economic growth from 0.8% p.a. in 1991/92 to 
7.4% p.a. in 2008.62 PricewaterhouseCoopers has projected India's growth to average 
around 7.5% per annum in coming decades, predicting that in 2050, India's GDP will be 
around 58% of US GDP in US dollar terms and equivalent to the United States in 
purchasing power parity terms.63 Goldman Sachs has predicted that India's GDP (in US 
dollar terms) w ill exceed the United States prior to 2050.64
In terms of m ilitary power, apart from its nuclear weapons capacity and the size of its 
m ilitary establishment, India might be ranked as a middle to major regional power. In 
2008 India's m ilitary expenditure was the 10th largest in the world at US$30 billion 
(below Italy and Saudi Arabia).65 India has been a declared nuclear weapons state 
since 1998 and by 2007 had approximately 50-60 nuclear devices.66 There are 
significant lim itations in its long-range delivery capabilities (currently limited to aircraft 
and short-range ballistic missiles), meaning that while India has adequate capabilities 
to  deploy nuclear devices against Pakistan, it cannot deploy nuclear devices against 
China's eastern cities. India's nuclear doctrine calls for the development of a triad of 
air, land and sea-based delivery capabilities. Supersonic cruise missile, and medium 
range ballistic missile and submarine launched ballistic missile delivery capabilities are 
currently being developed.
62 Ibid.
63 John Hawksworth "The World In 2050: How big will the major emerging market economies 
get and how can the OECD compete?" PricewaterhouseCoopers, March 2006.<www.pwc.com/ 
en_GX/gx/world-2050/pdf/world2050emergingeconomies.pdf>.
64 Dominic Wilson and Anna Stupnytska, "The N il:  More than an Acronym," Goldman Sachs 
Global Economics Paper No.153, 28 March 2007. <www.chicagobooth.edu/alumni/clubs/ 
pakistan/docs/nextlldream-march%20,07-goldmansachs.pdf>.
65 "The Top 15 Military Spenders, 2008," Stockholm International Peace Research Insitute.
66 "India's Nuclear Forces, 2007" Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, Vol.63, No.4 (July/August 2007), 
pp.74-8.
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India's m ilitary establishment is very large in size: w ith the world's second largest army 
(with around 1.1 million active regular personnel); the world's fourth largest air force 
(with around 850 combat aircraft); and the world's seventh largest navy (in terms of 
personnel). Although India has a huge standing army, much of it is deployed to deal 
w ith domestic insurgencies or in defensive roles along its western and northern 
borders. In addition, much of its equipment requires modernisation. There are 
significant limitations on India's force projection capabilities meaning that its ability to 
project power beyond South Asia is severely constrained. In summary, India's current 
conventional m ilitary capabilities do not anywhere match other major powers present 
in the region (United States, Japan or China).
India's rapid economic growth is also being translated into expanded military 
capability. India's military expenditure has increased significantly from Rs 196 billion 
(US$11.2 billion) in 1991 to Rs 1,306 billion (US$24.7 billion) in 2008, although as a 
percentage of GDP, m ilitary spending declined from around 3% to 2.5% over the same 
period.57 With the projected growth in the Indian economy, Indian military spending 
is likely to increase significantly in future years and there is also claimed to be broad 
political support for an increase in m ilitary spending as a percentage of GDP.68 Much 
of the increase in India's defence expenditure in recent years has been devoted to 
modernising army and air force capabilities and transforming the Indian navy into a 
blue water navy. As will be discussed in section 2.3.1, the navy's share of defence 
expenditure (and particularly o f capital expenditure) has increased very significantly in 
recent years. Nevertheless, it will be more than a decade before the Indian naval
67 Excluding expenditure on nuclear weapons. US dollar figures are at constant 2005 exchange 
rates. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, <http://milexdata.sipri.org/
result.php4>.
68 Harsh V. Pant, "India in the Indian Ocean: Growing Mismatch between Ambitions and 
Capabilities," Pacific Affairs, Vol.82, No.2 (Summer 2009), pp.279-297.
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modernisation and expansion program has a significant impact on India's ability to 
project maritime power.
The application of these "objective" criteria suggest that India might be regarded as a 
major power in Asia and has the potential to become a "great" power" in coming 
decades, assuming that current economic growth is sustained. There also remains 
scepticism, to greater or lesser degrees, about the likelihood of India fulfilling its 
potential. Some analysts point, among other things, to India's major developmental 
challenges, flawed governance institutions, lack of strategic thinking and a long history 
of India's strategic ambitions exceeding its capabilities. Gordon, for example, 
concludes that although India has many attributes of a great Asian power, it is still 
constrained by its difficult regional circumstances, its incomplete economic reforms 
and its need to achieve balanced development.69 Perkovich concludes that while India 
has just enough power to resist the influence of others, it must make great strides 
before it can attain significant power over other states.70 Cohen, who has over 
decades argued the case for India's emergence as a great power, has recently reversed 
his predictions, commenting that India is less likely to emerge as a military great power 
than an economic great power -  with an influence in the region perhaps equivalent to 
that of Japan. He believes, among other things, that the Indian political community is 
too domestically focussed and calls the Indian security community "hopelessly 
unstrategic."71 As will be discussed in chapter 2.4, China has also long been publicly 
sceptical about India's great power aspirations, seeing India as weak and divided with 
unrealistic and unachievable 'big power dreams' (doguomeng).72 Whether or not these
69 Sandy Gordon, Widening Horizons: Australia's new relationship with India (Canberra: 
Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 2007).
70 Perkovich, "Is India a Major Power?"
71 Nitin Pai and Aruna Urs "Look Before You Hop: A Discussion on strategic affairs with Stephen 
Cohen," Pragati: The Indian National Interest Review, No.15, June 2008, p.9.
72 Andrew Scobell, "'Cult of Defense' and 'Big Power Dreams': The Influence of Strategic 
Culture on China's Relationship with India," in Malcolm R.Chambers (ed.), South Asia in 2020:
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views are balanced by a greater level of private respect as some believe, they only 
serve to infuriate India.
Apart from these doubts about India's ability to fu lfil its potential, there does seem to 
be a significant gap between what might be called India's strategic self-perceptions 
and its actual role in the international order. Nayar and Paul label India as a "status 
inconsistent" p o w e r-th a t is, there is a discrepancy between a state's perceived 
achievements and its ascribed status at an international level.73 This perceived 
discrepancy is somewhat curious given that, as has been seen above, India is generally 
regarded as currently possessing only some great power capabilities (e.g. nuclear 
weapons, population), and having the potentia l to possess others (e.g. economic 
strength, m ilitary power projection capabilities). In other words, India perceives an 
entitlem ent to international status based on its potentia l rather than actual 
capabilities. As Selig Harrison put it, "Many Indians have what might be called a "post­
dated self image." They are confident that India is on the way to great power status 
and want others to treat them as if they had, in fact, already arrived."74
Some commentators have argued that the actions of Western powers have had the 
unintended effect of propelling India to a status as a world power before India is itself 
ready for such a global role in terms of its internal development, institutional 
capabilities and strategic planning, and that India has not yet articulated a strategic 
vision of what its hopes to achieve with its emergent status.75 While there may be
Future Strategic Balances and Alliances (Carlisle: US Army War College, Strategic Studies 
Institute, 2002), pp.329-359.
73 Nayar and Paul, India in the World Order, pp.1,25.
74 Selig Harrison, "A Nuclear Bargain with India," paper presented at the conference "India at 
the Crossroads," Southern Methodist University, Dallas, Texas, 27 March 1998, quoted in 
Nayar and Paul, India in the World Order, p.77.
75 Aseema Sinha and Jon P. Dorshner, "India: Rising power or mere revolution in rising 
expectations?" Polity, Vol.42, No.l (January 2010), pp.74-99.
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some tru th  in this, many would argue that there is nothing new in India's self- 
perceived status exceeding its capabilities. As one Indian analyst commented: "There 
exists a gulf between its desires and abilities and the consequences of an action are 
not always thought through seriously before making commitments."76
As will be seen in Parts 3 and 4, India's perceived status inconsistency (i.e. as perceived 
by New Delhi), whether or not justified by its current capabilities, is an important 
factor shaping its strategic ambitions in East Asia. Although East Asian states are to 
some extent willing to deal with India on the basis of its great power potential, the 
inconsistency between India's current capabilities and its ambitions will nevertheless 
lim it India's strategic role in East Asia.
76 P.R.Kumaraswamy, "National Security: A Critique" in P.R.Kumaraswamy (ed.), Security 
Beyond Survival: Essays for K.Subrahmanyam (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 2004), pp.11-32.
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Chapter 2.2 Developments in Indian strategic thinking and East Asia
2.2.1 Nehruvian strategic doctrine and the post-Cold War revolution in Indian 
strategic thinking
2.2.2 India's quest for strategic autonomy and a multipolar order
2.2.3 Indian ideas on a new Asian balance of power
2.2.4 The ideological dimension: flirting with values-based alliances
2.2.5 India as a maritime power
2.2.6 An Indian sphere of influence?
Introduction
This chapter will review key themes in the "mosaic" of Indian strategic thinking that 
underlies and informs India's strategic engagement in East Asia. The end of the Cold 
War led to major changes in Indian strategic thinking. The disappearance of alignments 
that underlay India's Cold War strategic posture led India to discard much of its 
nonaligned rhetoric and draw closer to Western strategic thought. Nevertheless, as 
will be seen, Indian strategic thinking remains very much a function of Indian culture, 
history and geographic position.
Indian strategic thinking about East Asia reveals a number of influences, including a 
desire to develop a multipolar regional system, to balance against China and the 
assertion of an extended Indian "sphere of influence." As will be seen in Parts 3 and 4, 
India's key bilateral relationships in East Asia contain differing mixes of these 
motivations.
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2.2.1 Nehruvian strategic doctrine and the post-Cold War revolution in Indian 
strategic thinking
India's engagement with East Asia since the end of the Cold War has been 
accompanied by a revolution in Indian strategic thinking. Through much of the Cold 
War, Nehruvian strategic doctrine formed the intellectual foundation of Indian 
strategic analysis. At its core was the concept of nonalignment, which brought 
together several long-running strands of Indian strategic thought.1 The key principles 
of nonalignment were nonviolence, international cooperation and the preservation of 
India's international freedom of action through refusing to align India with any Cold 
War bloc. Nonalignment represented an insistence that even relatively weak powers 
could choose to stay aloof from great power rivalries. Although Indian strategic 
practice was progressively modified towards a more realist stance following India's 
defeat at the hands of China in 1962 and India's strategic alignment with the Soviet 
Union in 1971, Nehruvian strategic principles remained an intellectual anchor to Indian 
strategic thinking and dominated Indian strategic rhetoric up until the end of the Cold 
War.
Nehruvian strategic doctrine inhibited India from playing a significant role in the 
security of East Asia until the early 1990s. Throughout much of the Cold War India 
saw its interests in East Asia as largely limited to rhetorical efforts to minimise the 
influence of other major powers in East Asia. As a result, India abdicated any 
leadership role that it could have had in Southeast Asia and only really sought to exert 
its influence in negative terms, such as its emphatic rejection of regional security
1 For studies on Nehruvian strategic doctrine, see Mannaraswamighala Sreeranga Rajan, 
Studies on nonalignment and the nonaligned movement: theory and practice (New Delhi: ABC 
Publishing House, 1986); and K. Subrahmanyam, Indian security perspectives (New Delhi: ABC, 
1982).
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relationships with the United States.2 Although this position was progressively 
moderated under Indira Gandhi and successive Indian leaders, the basic temper of 
India's relationship with Southeast Asia continued until the early 1990s. Nehruvian 
strategic doctrine also contributed to a virtual absence of any strategic relationships 
between India and maritime Northeast Asia. Throughout most of the Cold War, Indian 
leaders viewed Japan, South Korea and Taiwan as little more than protectorates of the 
United States and therefore of little interest to India except, in the case of Japan, as a 
potential source of capital and technology.
The end of the Cold War forced India to re-examine the viability of the Nehruvian 
principles in guiding India's strategic stance. With the collapse of the Soviet Union the 
idea of nonalignment seemed to have lost its raison d'etre. India's leaders were forced 
to fashion a new set of strategic goals based on a more pragmatic view of the world. 
India's strategic options included attempting to continue with the logic of 
nonalignment, joining the US alliance system or attempting to balance against the 
United States through joining with other second-tier powers. Alternatively, it could 
pursue a multipolar world in which it would establish itself as one of the major powers 
in the international system without recourse to any alliance. While the notion of a 
triangular security relationship among India, Russia and China was debated within the 
Indian strategic community during the 1990s, there was a realisation that there was 
little to gain from seeking to create a countervailing bloc against the United States. By 
the end of the 1990s, the dominant emphasis in Indian strategic thinking had settled 
on building a new partnership with the United States as part of a multidirectional 
engagement of the major powers.
Many believe that India's Pokhran II nuclear tests in 1998 became the fulcrum around 
which India's post Cold War strategic thinking turned. Before the tests, India's
2 For discussions of India's political relations in Southeast Asia during the Cold War see Ayoob, 
India and Southeast Asia and Sridharan, The ASEAN Region in India's Foreign Policy.
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ambiguous nuclear status created significant obstacles to improving relations with the 
United States and its allies. Although the nuclear tests caused a storm of protest 
internationally, it led to a transformation of India's relationship with the United States 
and provided India with a new status in Asia. According to Mohan, after Pokhran II, 
India's self-perception as an emerging great power armed with nuclear weapons 
allowed it to negotiate with other powers without the sense of defensiveness that 
permeated earlier relationships. India's successful transition to a nuclear power also 
moved India's intellectual balance in favour of realists and pragmatists and effectively 
ended the long-standing dominance of Nehruvians and left-of-centre internationalists 
over the foreign policy discourse.3
There have been several attempts to characterise and define the various ideological 
schools in Indian strategic thinking as they have developed since the end of the Cold 
War. Bajpai identifies three paradigms of Indian strategic thinking: Nehruvianism, 
neoliberalism and hyper-realism, each characterised by differing attitudes towards 
internal security, regional security and relations with great powers and each of which 
are broadly associated with differing political ideologies.4 Sagar proposes a 
categorisation between moralists (who uphold the Nehruvian tradition), Hindu 
nationalists (who advocate protecting national values through building strength), 
strategists (secularists who advocate developing strategic capabilities) and liberals 
(who emphasise attaining security through trade and interdependence).5
These categorisations provide a useful context for understanding the main ideological 
streams of Indian strategic thinking. However, in considering India's strategic
3 Mohan, Crossing the Rubicon, p.27.
4 Kanti Bajpai, "Indian Strategic Culture" in Michael R. Chambers, South Asia in 2020: Future 
Strategic Balances and Alliances (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2002).
5 Rahul Sagar, "State of mind: what kind of power will India become," International Affairs 
Vol.85, No.4 (2009), pp.801-816.
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perceptions of East Asia such categorisations can quickly become sterile. Rather than 
attempting to identify a dominant or cohesive intellectual school of thought behind 
Indian strategic ambitions, it is in many ways more instructive to examine those 
ambitions in light of various underlying themes in Indian strategic thinking relevant to 
East Asia. One might see Indian strategic thinking in terms of a "mosaic" of many 
different threads and contrasting themes and influences which often cross ideological 
boundaries. This is partly a function of the immediate post-Cold War years, when 
Indian leadership allowed strategic policy to develop in a pragmatic way, generally 
avoiding a clear rejection of the past. As a result, it is arguable that India is unlikely to 
articulate a grand strategic theory including about East Asia. Having flirted disastrously 
w ith grand concepts in the past, India's emphasis is on cautious realpolitik 6 Tellis 
suggests that in the current strategic environment, India does not have the luxury of 
pursuing policies that are "utterly transparent or completely straightforward" and 
instead must develop the institutional and psychological capacity to move deftly.7 
However, ambiguity or a lack of transparency over India's security objectives in East 
Asia has not prevented it from making significant steps towards engagement in the 
region.
Key themes in Indian strategic thinking relevant to its engagement with East Asia 
include its objectives of strategic autonomy and a multipolar order; concepts of an 
Asian balance of power; the ideological dimension; the development of a maritime 
strategic outlook; and ideas about an Indian sphere of influence. Each of these will be 
discussed in detail below.
6 C.Raja Mohan, "India's Changing Strategic Profile in East and Southeast Asia," paper 
presented at the Regional Outlook Forum, Singapore, 8 January 2008, p.12.
7 Ashley J. Tellis, "India in Asian Geopolitics" in Prakash Nanda (ed.), Rising India: Friends and 
Foes, (New Delhi: Lancer, 2007) at p.129.
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2.2.2 India's quest for strategic autonomy and a multipolar order
Throughout its modern history India has sought what has been called the "Holy Grail" 
of Indian security policy: strategic autonomy.8 Since independence and before, many 
Indian leaders saw India's destiny as a great power, beholden to no-one, even if it 
lacked the resources to assert itself in traditional ways. The combination of a destined 
greatness and material weakness was a key reason for India pursuing its nonaligned 
policy, allowing India to claim strategic space and assert itself as an international 
leader. As has been discussed in chapter 2.1, India's destiny as a great power is now 
largely a given among Indian strategic thinkers and is virtually ubiquitous in strategic 
discussions; the only question being when the world will recognise India's emergence.
For many Indian strategists, strategic autonomy is the sine qua non of great power 
status. For some, particularly those influenced by Nehruvian traditions, it is an 
absolute imperative: any compromise of India's strategic autonomy will also 
compromise India's destiny. According to Nehruvians this not only forbids significant 
security cooperation with the United States and its regional allies but would also cast 
doubt on any security alignments outside the US alliance system. Others see the goal 
of strategic autonomy in less absolute or immediate terms, conceding that India's 
interests may be served in entering into security relationships with the United States 
and others provided that India retains significant freedom of action. Mohan for 
example argues that, "Alliance formation and balancing are tools in the kits of all great 
powers."9 Closely related to India's "destiny" as a great power and its quest for 
strategic autonomy is a desire for the development of a multipolar security order in 
the region and worldwide which, it is believed, is necessary to elevate India's status
8 Varun Sahni, "India and the Asian Security Architecture," Current History, Vol.105 (690) (April 
2006), pp.163-7.
9 C.Raja Mohan, "India and the Balance of Power," Foreign Affairs, Vol.85, Issue 4 (July/August 
2006), p.17.
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and maximise its freedom of action. To some extent calls for a multipolar world have 
replaced nonalignment as a core concept of Indian foreign policy.
India's tw in goals of strategic autonomy and m ultipolarity have a profound impact on 
India's strategic engagement w ith East Asia. As will be seen below, in order to achieve 
a goal of regional multipolarity, India not only must cooperate with other major 
powers to balance against potential Chinese hegemony in East Asia, but arguably is 
also driven to establish its own maritime predominance in the Indian Ocean region. In 
pursuing those aims there are significant unresolved tensions between a desire for 
strategic autonomy and a perceived need to cooperate with the United States and its 
allies.
2.2.3. Indian ideas on an Asian balance of power
To what extent is the development of India's strategic relationships in East Asia 
consciously driven by a strategy of forming a balancing coalition against China? India's 
potential role in an East Asian balance of power is an important theme in Indian 
strategic thinking. This might be expressed either in neorealist terms of creating a 
balancing coalition against China or in more classical realist terms of seeking to create 
a multipolar regional balance. Mohan claims that balancing China is in "the very DNA 
of India's geopolitics" and has been since the early 1950s.10
However, Indian thinking about an Asian balance of power is complicated by several 
factors. As discussed, Indian strategic thinking is still in the process of evolving from 
Nehruvian traditions in which discussions of a "balance of power" were frowned upon. 
Ideas of nonalignment still have resonance in Indian strategic debate, often with 
strong overtones of Indian exceptionalism. Sahni, fo r example, sees India as playing a
10 C.Raja Mohan, "The Evolution of Sino-lndian Relations: Implications for the United States," in 
Ayres and Mohan, Power Realignments in Asia, pp.270-290 at p.288.
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new nonaligned role in the developing Asian strategic order. He believes tha t India is 
destined to  be a fence-sitter in Asia, re latively equid istant and nonaligned between 
tw o  poles o f China and a US-led coalition, although making significant e fforts to 
cu ltivate friendships w ith  powers such as Russia and Japan.11 In o the r words, India will 
again be able to  transcend considerations of the balance o f power, as Nehruvians 
claimed during the Cold War.
Others such as Mohan believe tha t while it has not entire ly discarded a com m itm ent 
to  liberal in ternationa list notions over the last tw o  decades, Indian political discourse 
has had to  come to  term s w ith  realist concepts o f the balance o f pow er.12 Certainly 
there is much more open discussion about a balance of power in Asia than was the 
case during the Cold W ar.13 Although there is some official acknowledgement from  
Indian leaders o f w hat Defence M in ister M ukherjee called India's "crucial" role in 
m aintain ing a "stable balance of pow er"14 or an "equitab le  strategic balance"15 in 
Southeast Asia, at the same tim e there is considerable reluctance to  acknowledge that 
any balancing m ight be aimed at China. New Delhi is acutely conscious o f its 
lim ita tions in East Asia and any im plication tha t its relationships in East Asia are driven
11 Rajesh Rajagopalan and Varun Sahni, "India and the Great Powers: Strategic Imperatives, 
Normative Necessities," South Asian Survey Vol. 15 No.5 (2008), pp.5-32.
12 C.Raja Mohan, "The Asian balance of power" Seminar, No.487 (2000).
13 See, for example, Anindya Batabyal, "Balancing China in Asia: A Realist Assessment of India's 
Look East Strategy," China Report (New Delhi), Vol.42, No.2 (2006), pp.79-197; and Bharat 
Karnad, "India's Future Plans and Defence Requirements" in N.Sisodia and C.Udaya Bhaskar 
(eds), Emerging India: Security and Foreign Policy Perspectives (New Delhi: Institute for 
Defence Studies and Analysis, 2005), pp.61-76.
14 Pranab Mukherjee, Address to the 5th MSS Asian Security Summit, 3 June 2006.
15 Pranab Mukherjee, Address to the 7th Asian Security Conference, 29 January 2005.
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by a desire to  balance against China.16 India wishes to  expand its strategic weight in 
the region while avoiding creating open rivalry w ith  China.17
In addition to  concerns about reactions to  an overt balancing strategy, there is 
considerable sensitivity w ith in  India as to  how such as strategy would affect India's 
"Holy Grail" o f strategic autonom y. In particular, to  w hat extent would India need to  
ally itse lf w ith  the United States and its regional allies in order to  create an East Asian 
balance against China? Many in India see a significant risk tha t the United States w ill 
build India as a jun io r alliance partner to  contain China and tha t India w ill be caught in 
a web o f bilateral arrangements tha t meshes w ith  the US "hub and spoke" alliance 
system .18 Thus there was considerable caution in portions o f the Indian security 
com m unity towards the 2007 "Q uadrila tera l" proposal fo r a security dialogue involving 
the United States, Japan, Australia and India not only on the grounds o f unnecessarily 
provoking China, but also about the im plications o f being perceived to  be part o f a US- 
led security grouping. According to  Tellis, even if an anti-China coalition led by the 
United States were to  eventuate in the fu ture , New Delhi's in tu itive  preference would 
be to  assert its strategic autonom y even more forcefu lly. Short o f the most extreme 
threats, India would prefer to  deal w ith  Beijing independently.19 India has thus 
emphasised the developm ent o f strategic relationships in East Asia on a bilateral basis
16 Devare, India and Southeast Asia, p.211.
17 C.Raja Mohan, "India's Geopolitics and Southeast Asian Security" in Daljit Singh and Tin 
Maung Maung (eds.), Southeast Asian Affairs 2008 (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian 
Studies, 2008) at p.53.
18 Purnendra Jain, "From Condemnation to Strategic Partnership: Japan's Changing View of 
India (1998-2007)" and Brahma Chellaney and Horimoto Takenori, ""Indo kara mita Nihon, 
Ajia" [Japan-lndia Links Critical for Asia-Pacific Security] Gaiko Forum Vol.7 No.2 (Fall 2007).
19 Ashley J.Tellis, "The Changing Political-Military Environment: South Asia" in Zalmay Khalilzad 
et al, The United States and Asia: Towards a New US Strategy and Force Posture (Santa 
Monica: Rand Corporation, 2001) at p.214.
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which is regarded as being less provocative to China and maximising India's freedom of 
action.
There is also a tendency among Indian strategic analysts of all stripes to see India as of 
significantly greater consequence to an East Asian balance of power than might be 
perceived in East Asia - where the focus is overwhelmingly on the United States, China 
and, to a lesser extent, Japan. Thus, a report from a US Central Intelligence Agency 
think tank calling India the most important "swing state" in the international system20 
is quoted widely and approvingly among Indian leaders and commentators, 
recognising as it does an apparently powerful international role for India.21 In a similar 
vein, Mohan argues that India's objective is to become an indispensable element in the 
Asian balance of power.22 To the extent that such a statement assumes that India is 
likely to become an important element in an Asian balance of power, it is 
unexceptional. However, to the extent that it might be taken to imply that India has 
the option not to opposed Chinese hegemony over East Asia, it overstates India's 
freedom of action. As will be seen, it is difficult to realistically conceive o f India not 
seeking to balance against China in Asia. As this thesis will argue, India is in fact 
compelled by its own great power aspirations to seek to form (limited) balancing 
relationships with the United States and its allies in relation to China.
Spurred by dreams of strategic autonomy and a multipolar region, some Indian 
commentators have gone so far as to propose that India should develop an Indian- 
centred "constellation" of Asian states linked by strategic cooperation and sharing
20 Quoted in Ashley Tellis, India as a New Global Power: An Action Agenda for the United 
States (Washington D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for World Peace, 2005)
21 See, for example, Siddharth Varadarajan, "Bush, India and two degrees of separation," The 
Hindu, 3 March 2006; Amit Gupta, "US-India-China: Assessing Tripolarity," China Report (New 
Delhi), Vol.42, No.l, (2006), pp. 69-83; Mohan, "India and the Balance of Power," p.17; and 
Sikri, Challenge and Strategy.
22 C.Raja Mohan, "India, China and Asian Security," The Hindu, January 27, 2003.
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common interests, including in counterbalancing China. Chellaney, for example, sees 
the India - Japan relationship as forming the potential foundation of overlapping 
security relationships in Asia. The relationship would provide India with a link into the 
US security sphere, forming the foundation or axis of a quadrilateral relationship 
including the United States and Australia. However, India would also develop a series 
of balancing relationships that go beyond the US security sphere, including, for 
example, an India-Japan-Russian trilateral relationship which, according to Chellaney, 
is the way to get a "true counterbalance to China" because it "would effectively 
contain China on all sides."23 India's security relationship w ith Vietnam is also widely 
viewed in the Indian security community in approving terms, partly at least, because 
Vietnam lies outside the US security sphere.
Despite these dreams there is a widespread understanding in the Indian security 
community that a relationship of some type with United States is a necessary or 
desirable feature of Indian security, if only as a step towards other strategic objectives. 
Some believe that India's challenge will be to form part of an informal balancing 
coalition against China with the US and its allies while avoiding becoming part of a US- 
led web of relationships. Bajpai, for example, characterises Indian policy since the end 
of the Cold War as essentially bandwagoning with the United States, while also 
hedging in the sense of developing coalitions w ith first, second and third tier states 
that would assist it in standing up to the United States.24 Others see the possibility of 
India occupying a middle ground of partial attachment to the United States while 
retaining significant strategic autonomy. Mohan endorses the idea that India can 
navigate between the "two extremes" of an uncritical US alliance and what he calls the 
"slogans" of a multipolar world. A somewhat more ambiguous outcome of this nature 
is likely to be both more realistic and fit better with India's strategic tradition and
23 Chellaney, "Indo kara mita Nihon, Ajia."
24 Kanti Bajpai, "India: Modified Structuralism," in Muthiah Alagappa (ed.), Asian Security 
Practice: Material and Ideational Influences (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998).
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dom estic political imperatives. This am biguity can be used to  India's advantage, fo r 
example, in allow ing India to  be cast w ith in  East Asia as a potentia l benign balancer not 
only against a potentia lly  threatening China but also (if perhaps only symbolically) 
against potentia lly  overwhelm ing US power.
2.2.4. The ideological dimension: flirting with values-based alliances
To w hat extent does India's strategic behaviour in East Asia involve an ideological 
dimension? A notable feature o f Nehruvian strategic doctrine was tha t India rarely 
allowed dom estic political affairs o f o ther states to  be a significant factor in India's 
foreign policy decision-making. To the extent tha t India's foreign policy had an 
ideological dimension it often involved an alliance w ith  com m unist or authoritarian 
states in opposing the supposed imperialism o f the West. However, in recent years 
Indian leaders have begun to  make considerable use of the rhetoric o f "shared 
dem ocratic values" as justifica tion fo r cooperation w ith  Japan and o ther US allies in 
the region, to  the exclusion of China. Prime M in iste r Manmohan Singh has called
1C
liberal democracy "the  natural order o f social and political organisation," describing 
India and Japan, the largest and most developed democracies in Asia, as being "natural 
partners."26 Such statem ents are consistent w ith  e ffo rts  by the United States and 
Japan to  use shared dem ocratic values as an ideological foundation fo r strategic 
relationships w ith  India.
Some Indian com m entators have suggested tha t shared political values represent a 
"secret weapon" against China on the basis tha t China has much more to  fear from  the
25 Manmohan Singh, "PM's Speech at India Today Conclave" 25 February 2005, New Delhi. 
<www. pmindia. nie. in/speech/content.asp?id=510>.
26 Joint Statement of Prime Minister Singh and Prime Minister Abe, 16 December 2006.
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ideological subversion of democracy than in military terms,27 while others have 
invoked the theory of ''Democratic Peace" to justify India forming alliances with other 
regional democracies.28 The significance of alliances among democratic states is a 
matter of some theoretical debate. It has little  support from the so-called theory of 
"Democratic Peace" which proposes that democratic states never (or rarely) go to war 
w ith each other, but not the idea that democracies will or should become alliance 
partners against non-democracies. Some theorists nevertheless suggest that 
members of ideological-based alliances may have similarities in threat perceptions,29 
and that alliances between democracies are both deeper and longer lasting than 
alliances with non-democracies.30 It has also been argued that as a great power 
matures, it will increasingly seek to shape its region and the international order in ways 
that reflect its values and identity.31 According to this argument, as a great power, 
India might eventually seek to impose its own values on Asia despite its avowed policy 
of not exporting ideology.
However, for the moment, ideology plays only a very minor part in India's strategic 
engagement in East Asia, either as a motivation or as a tool of "soft power." 
Democratic values form part of a rhetorical package of shared interests between India 
and the United States and others such as Japan, South Korea and Australia. India also 
finds it useful in differentiating itself from its two principal strategic adversaries,
27 B.Raman, "India & Japan: Democracy as a Strategic Weapon" South Asia Analysis Group, 
Paper No. 206, 17 December 2006.
28 Brahma Chellaney, "Towards Asian power equilibrium," The Hindu, 1 November 2008.
29 Walt, The Origins of Alliances, p.266.
30 Victor D. Cha, "The Ideational Dimension of America's Alliances in Asia," in Amitav Acharya 
and Evelyn Goh (eds.), Reassessing Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific: Competition, 
Congruence and Transformation (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2007), pp.41-70.
31 GJohn Ikenberry, Liberal order and imperial ambition: essays on American power and world 
politics (Malden, MA : Polity, 2006).
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Pakistan and China.32 However there is little history of democratic values playing a 
significant role in East Asian strategic relationships and democratic values (or the lack 
of them) seem to have been little impediment to the development of India's 
relationships with Singapore or Vietnam. India has also demonstrated a willingness to 
abandon democracy as a guiding principle where it believes that its interests are 
otherwise threatened (e.g. when support for Burma's democratic opposition was 
reversed in the face of China's increased influence with the Burmese junta). As Indian 
Foreign Secretary Shyam Saran commented in February 2005, although "democracy 
remains India's biding conviction, the importance of our neighbourhood requires that 
we remain engaged with whichever government is exercising authority in any 
country."33
2.2.5 India as a maritime power
A new and potentially significant element in Indian strategic thinking is a partial 
reorientation in India's strategic outlook from purely continentalist towards a more 
maritimist perspective. This helps fuel India's ambition to become the predominant 
naval power in the Indian Ocean region, an ambition which has significant 
consequences on India's security role in Southeast Asia. More generally, it suggests a 
reorientation in strategic thinking towards maritime states such as those in East Asia.
Indian security thinking has traditionally tended to take a "continental" outlook. For 
thousands of years military threats to India have been perceived as coming primarily 
from India's north-west. This was reinforced by India's experience in the twentieth 
century, when any direct military threats to India were land-based: from the north-
32 C.Raja Mohan, "Balancing Interests and Values: India's Struggle with Democracy Promotion," 
The Washington Quarterly, Vol.30 No.3 (Summer 2007), pp.99-115.
33 Shyam Saran, "India and its Neighbours", address in New Delhi, 14 February 2005. 
<www.meaindia.nic.in>.
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east (Japan, 1941-45), the west (Pakistan, 1947 and after) and the north (China, 1962 
and after). The continuing threats on India's western and northern borders and from 
domestic insurgencies has led to the Indian Army holding an undisputedly dominant 
position w ithin the Indian military establishment, in comparison to which the Indian 
navy and its supporters have had little strategic influence.
Despite this tradition there has been a developing view among some Indian strategists 
of India as primarily a maritime and not a continental power. According to some New 
Delhi is making a conscious effort to expand the Indian "mental map" in strategic 
affairs to include the seafaring dimension, which can be compared w ith the 
fundamental shifts in strategic culture experienced by Japan and the United States in 
the nineteenth century.34 Many Indian naval leaders and commentators argue that 
India's peninsular character and central position in the Indian Ocean gives the sea a 
preponderant influence over its destiny. In 2000, Indian Chief of Naval Staff, Admiral 
Sushil Kumar stated: "in my view the continentalist era is over and the next millennium 
will witness the dawning of a new maritime period. I believe that during the next 
century India will realise her potential as a full-fledged maritime nation and that India's 
maritime dimension will decisively shape our country's destiny in the years ahead." 
Kumar further claimed that under the then government, "India's national interest had 
been made coterminous with maritime security." 35
Some Indian leaders have drawn a close connection between India's maritime 
ambitions and its destiny as a great power. As Indian Foreign Minister Pranab 
Mukherjee commented in June 2007, "Fortunately, after nearly a millennia of inward 
and landward focus, we are once again turning our gaze outwards and seawards, 
which is the natural direction of view for a nation seeking to re-establish itself, not
34 Holmes et ai, Indian Naval Strategy in the Twenty-First Century, p.33.
35 Quoted in David Scott, "India's "Grand Strategy for the Indian Ocean: Mahanian Visions," 
Asia-Pacific Review, Vol.13, No.2 (2006),pp.97-129 at 109.
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simply as a continental power, but even more so as a maritime power, and 
consequently as one that is o f significance on the world stage (emphasis added)."36 
Such thinking seems to echo other great power aspirants such as the Soviet Union (in 
the 1970s), and now, China that maritime power is at the very least a sine qua non of 
great power status. One could also argue that for geographical reasons any significant 
expansion of Indian influence can only take place in the maritime domain. The 
Himalayas provide a formidable barrier to India's ability to project power and influence 
northwards. As Rajiv Sikri, a former Secretary in India's Foreign Ministry commented: 
"If India aspires to be a great power, then the only direction in which India's strategic 
influence can spread is across the seas. In every other direction there are formidable 
constraints." 37
India's standing as the most populous state in the Indian Ocean region and its central 
position in the northern Indian Ocean have long contributed to beliefs in New Delhi 
about India's destiny to control its eponymous ocean. Even before India's 
independence, K.M. Panikkar, India's most famous maritime strategist, argued that the 
Indian Ocean must remain "tru ly Indian" advocating the creation of a "steel ring" 
around India through the establishment of forward naval bases in Singapore,
Mauritius, Yemen and Sri Lanka. According to some reports there is now a "well 
established trad ition" among the Indian strategic community that the Indian Ocean is, 
or should be, "India's Ocean."38
Not surprisingly, India's area of maritime interest is primarily focused on the northern 
Indian Ocean, although it has increasingly also extended into the southwest Indian 
Ocean. In 2000, Defence M inister George Fernandes spoke of an extended Indian
36 Pranab Mukherjee, Speech for the Admiral A. K. Chatterjee Memorial Lecture, Kolkata, 30 
June 2007.
37 Sikri, Challenge and Strategy, p.250.
38 Scott, "India's "Grand Strategy" for the Indian Ocean," at p.99
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area o f interest from "the north of the Arabian Sea to the South China Sea."39 In 2001, 
the Ministry of Defence Annual Report described what it called India's security 
environment as extending from the Persian Gulf in the west, to the Straits of Malacca 
in the east,40 an area which the former BJP Foreign Minister Jaswant Singh called 
India's sphere o f influence*1 and the current Prime Minister Manmohan Singh has 
perhaps more diplomatically called India's strategic footprint *2 Many believe that 
the Indian Navy has come to see itself as destined to become the predominant 
maritime security provider in a region stretching from the Red Sea to Singapore and 
having a significant security role in areas beyond, including the South China Sea.43
There is also a widespread view in New Delhi that control of the Indian Ocean 
(including the chokepoints into the Pacific Ocean) could give India the ability to 
dominate the whole of maritime Asia. Alfred Thayer Mahan, the nineteenth century 
American naval strategist, is quoted widely and approvingly among Indian strategic 
thinkers including a statement attributed to Mahan that: "Whoever controls the Indian 
Ocean dominates Asia....In the 21st century, the destiny of the world will be decided 
on its waters." Although the attribution of the statement has been shown to be 
fictitious, it has not inhibited the enthusiasm for the ideas that it carries.44 Chapter 2.3 
will examine how India's ambitions in the Indian Ocean to a significant extent underpin 
India's security ambitions in maritime Southeast Asia.
39 Atul Aneja "India, Vietnam partners in safeguarding sea lanes," The Hindu, 15 April 2000.
40 Ministry of Defence, Annual Report 2000-2001.
41 Chidanand Rajghatta, "Singhing Bush's Praise,"T/mes of India, 13 April 2001.
42 "PM's Address at the Combined Commander's Conference," 24 October 2004.
43 Scott, "India's "Grand Strategy" for the Indian Ocean."
44 See generally, Rahul Roy-Chaudhury, Sea Power and India's Security (London: Brassey's, 
1995), p.199.
91
Part 2 Chapter 2.2 -  Developments in Indian 
strategic thinking and East Asia
2.2.6 An Indian sphere of influence?
Related to the increased prominence of maritime perspectives is a revival in thinking 
about an Indian sphere of influence in the Indian Ocean region, potentially extending 
into Southeast Asia. While such ideas can, in part, be viewed as a reaction to 
perceived incursions of China into India's neighbourhood, they should primarily be 
seen as a natural consequence of India's ambitions as a great regional power.
Discussions of an Indian sphere of influence beyond South Asia are sometimes 
identified w ith Lord Curzon, the British Viceroy of India at the beginning of the 
twentie th century, who advocated that British India adopt a "Forward Policy" to secure 
India. Curzon's so-called "Forward School" argued that India's security demanded 
control of the maritime routes and key ports en route to India (including Aden and 
Singapore) and the creation of territoria l buffers to insulate direct contact with other 
empires (including Afghanistan in the west, Tibet in the north and Siam in the east) and 
for British India to take an active role in managing the affairs of the buffer zones.
In many ways the policies of the British Raj represented a significant departure from 
Indian traditions, which had little  history of territoria l expansion or military or political 
adventure beyond the limits of the subcontinent. Tanham's classic study of India's 
strategic culture in the early 1990s characterised Indian strategic thinking as being 
"defensive" and having a "lack of an expansionist m ilitary trad ition ."45 Certainly, any 
affirmation of an Indian security sphere beyond South Asia largely ceased following 
independence. After 1947, India effectively w ithdrew to the Indian subcontinent and 
asserted what has been called "India's Monroe Doctrine" according to which India 
would not permit any intervention by any "external" power in India's immediate 
neighbours in South Asia and related islands. However, attempts by both India and
45 George Tanham, "Indian Strategic Thought: An Interpretive Essay," in Tanham, Bajpai and 
Mattoo, Securing India, p.73.
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China to impose a "Monroe Doctrine" in their neighbourhoods since the mid twentieth 
century have had limited success: assertions of traditional suzerainty over smaller 
neighbours encountered resistance from both regional and extra-regional powers.46 
Nevertheless, India's Monroe Doctrine was used to justify interventions in India's 
smaller neighbours such as Sri Lanka and Maldives.47 An important extension of 
India's perceived area of influence was to Indochina, where during the Cold War India 
developed a strong political relationship with Vietnam in an effort to lim it the 
influence of China and other "external" powers in that subregion. Through the Cold 
War and thereafter, Indian leaders and leading strategists claimed that Vietnam 
guarded the eastern flank of India's "core sphere of influence" in South Asia.48
Since the end of the Cold War there has been a revival in discussion in India about a 
"natural" sphere of influence extending well beyond the Indian subcontinent. This is 
related to attempts to move beyond India's strategic preoccupations in South Asia and 
re-engage w ith its extended neighbourhood so as to rectify what Foreign Minister 
Jaswant Singh called India's unnecessary acceptance of "the post-Partition limits 
geography imposed on policy."49 As noted above, over the last decade there have 
been repeated assertions at both a political and m ilitary level in New Delhi that 
Southeast Asia forms part of India's "sphere of influence" or its "strategic footprin t," at 
least in the maritime sphere. However, this vision extends beyond mere maritime 
predominance. Some have tried to re-articulate commonly understood geographical 
concepts through, for example, expanding the traditional concept of "South Asia" (in 
which India is naturally predominant) towards a concept of "Southern Asia", an area
46 J.Mohan Malik, "India and China: Bound to Collide" in in P.R.Kumaraswamy (ed.), Security 
Beyond Survival: Essays for K.Subrahmanyam (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 2004) pp.127-165.
47 James R.Holmes and Toshi Yoshihara, "India's 'Monroe Doctrine' and Asia's Maritime 
Future," Strategic Analysis Mo\32, No.6 (November 2008), pp.997- 1011.
48 According to Indira Gandhi. See John W.Ganzer, "Chinese-Indian Rivalry in Indochina," Asian 
Survey, Vol.27, No.11 (Nov. 1987), pp.1205-1219 at p.1207-8.
49 Mohan, Crossing the Rubicon, p.205.
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extending from the Persian Gulf to Singapore. K. Subrahmanyam, once called the 
"doyen" of Indian strategists by Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, reportedly 
proclaimed that it is India's "manifest destiny to control Southern Asia and the Indian 
Ocean sea-lanes around us."50 (emphasis added) Subrahmanyam's words were no 
doubt intended to evoke claims by the United States to a special role in the Western 
Hemisphere.
Mohan has labelled India's reach into its extended neighbourhood over the last decade 
or more as a neo-Curzonian "Forward Policy." Mohan claims:
"The end of the cold war and the efforts to globalise the economy put India 
willy-nilly on the path of a new forward policy. India never consciously 
articulated its approach in terms of theory that demanded activism in the 
neighbouring regions to enhance its own security. Its regional initiatives were 
presented in terms of mutual economic benefit and the restoration of historic 
links, but their strategic significance was unmistakable."51
According to Mohan, this new Forward Policy includes the revival of commercial 
cooperation; the building of institutional and political links in the region; developing 
physical connectivity with neighbouring regions; initiation of defence contacts with key 
states and strategic competition with China and Pakistan. Suggestions that India is 
pursuing (or should pursue) a new Forward Policy have been strongly criticised by 
some Indian strategists seeing it as an inappropriate, irrelevant or "quixotic" attempt 
to return to imperial thinking. Despite such criticism, it is not difficult to view India's 
strategic engagement with East Asia, and particularly with Southeast Asia, as a part of 
a reassertion of British India's sphere of influence centred on the Indian Ocean and 
extending from Aden to Singapore. In the east one might see Indian hopes to develop
50 Quoted in Holmes et al, Indian Naval Strategy in the 21st Century,p.38.
51 Mohan, Crossing the Rubicon, p.209.
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Burma as a buffer state against China, while India gains maritime predominance in the 
Bay of Bengal/Andaman Sea and a major role in the Malacca Strait. Singapore would 
act as the eastern "anchor" to this space. In the west India exerts influence in 
Afghanistan while it renews its historical relationships with the Gulf States and Iran.52
While there are indications of India's ambitions to build something that might be called 
a "sphere of influence" there has been little guidance as to what it might look like, 
particularly in Southeast Asia. Certainly, India's approach to building a sphere of 
influence from Aden to Singapore differs significantly from Lord Curzon's. India has no 
choice but to accept that it must develop its influence in a non-confrontational way.
As Foreign Minister Pranab Mukherjee commented (in relation to South Asia): "India 
does not seek an exclusive sphere of influence, but a shared sphere of mutual 
development and cooperation."53 Similarly, Mohan argues that New Delhi is unlikely 
to make an attempt to regain the hegemonic role of British India in the Indian Ocean 
region.54 India's cooperative approach to developing security relationships with 
smaller states has been particularly evident in Southeast Asia, where the Indian navy 
has been successful in developing good relationships in the region and has displayed a 
degree of sensitivity towards local political concerns in relation to the Malacca Strait.
The failure of India to project military power beyond the limits of South Asia during the 
Cold War has placed India in good stead in East Asia. India has a noticeable lack of 
historical baggage in its dealings in the region, perhaps with the exception of the 
Islamic factor arising from India's conflict with Pakistan. India is commonly perceived 
in Southeast Asia as essentially a benign power and not a would-be hegemon, often in
52 In December 2008 India negotiated a security agreement with Qatar which has been 
reportedly described by Indian officials as "just short of stationing troops." Zakir Hussain, 
"Indian PM's visit to Oman and Qatar," IDSA Comment, 2 December 2008.
53 Amit Baruah, "Not seeking exclusive sphere of influence," The Hindu, 11 February 2007.
54 Mohan, Crossing the Rubicon,ch.8.
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contrast w ith other external powers such as China, the United States and Japan. 
According to some, India's track record of nonaggression, its cultural and philosophical 
virtues, and its ethnic and religious ties to Southeast Asia lend credence to Indian soft 
power diplomacy.55 While India is not in a position to exert significant power through 
m ilitary predominance or ideological means, it may be able to do so as a provider of 
public goods.56 In the early 1990s, Tanham described India's regional ambitions in the 
following terms:
"Strategically; India aspires to be a friendly international peacekeeper. It sees 
itse lf as a benevolent nation and a friendly policeman that seeks peace and 
stability fo r  the entire Indian Ocean region. It denies any hegemonistic designs 
or territoria l ambitions. It vehemently rejects and resents charges o f being a 
regional bully. It wants not only to play the role o f regional peace-keeper but 
also to be acknowledged and endorsed in that role by others, especially the 
great powers.” 57
India shows a strong desire to project power into the region as a benign maritime 
peacekeeper. There are indications that some in Southeast Asia (particularly 
Singapore) are now willing to cede India a role as a maritime security provider in the 
Malacca Strait, if only in the context of balancing other major powers. Mohan claims 
that as the Indian economy grows and it modernises its m ilitary capabilities it will 
become an attractive partner, generating strategic "options that did not exist before in 
the Western Pacific."58 This may well become the case; however, as will be seen in
55 Holmes et at, Indian Naval Strategy in the 21st Century,p. 155.
56 For a discussion of these different ways of exerting hegemony, see Rajesh Rajagopalan, 
"India and the Great Powers: Strategic Imperatives, Normative Necessities," South Asian 
Survey, Vol.15, No.5 (2008) pp. 5 -32.
57 Tanham, "Indian Strategic Thought: An Interpretive Essay," p.69.
58C.Raja Mohan, "Is India an East Asian Power? Explaining New Delhi's Security Politics in the 
Western Pacific," ISAS Working Paper No.81,11 August 2009.
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Parts 3 and 4, few in East Asia currently see India as playing any material security role 
in the Western Pacific.
As it expands its influence in Southeast Asia, India has had to accept that other major 
powers will continue to have significant interests in the region. The United States, 
particularly w ith its base at Diego Garcia and its naval facilities in Singapore and the 
Gulf, seems likely to remain the predominant naval power in the Indian Ocean region 
for some time to come. However, there are indications that the United States is willing 
to cede -  and indeed encourage -  a major regional naval role for India across the 
Indian Ocean and including in the Malacca Strait.59 US thinking in this respect is 
considered further at section 2.3.1. For its part, India's willingness to cooperate with 
the United States in achieving its ambitions is not as paradoxical as it may seem. As 
the form er US Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, once conceded, the United States in 
developing its sphere of influence in the Western Hemisphere in the nineteenth 
century relied on the then superpower Britain (then in relative decline), to enforce the 
Monroe Doctrine until the United States was sufficiently strong to do so itself.50
Nevertheless, with the exception of the United States, which is unlikely soon to 
recognise India's predominance (except, perhaps, in specific areas), India will likely 
wish to cooperate w ith extra-regional navies in the Indian Ocean only as long as they 
recognise India's leading role.61 Japan's apparent willingness to recognise India's role 
as the "leading" maritime security provider west of the Malacca Strait forms a not 
insignificant element in the developing India-Japan security relationship. In contrast, 
others such as China and Australia seem unlikely to cede any such role to India.
59 Which contrasts with the United States' refusal to cede any regional security role for China in 
the Pacific Ocean.
60 Dean G. Acheson, A Democrat Looks at his Party (New York: Harper, 1955), p.64.
61 M.Pardesi, Deducing India's Grand Strategy of Regional Hegemony from Historical and 
Conceptual Perspectives (Singapore: Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, 2005), p.53.
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Is the revival in Indian strategic thinking about a sphere of influence merely a defensive 
reaction to the rise of China and perceived intrusions of China into India's strategic 
space or is it derived from India's ambitions as a great power? Neorealists argue that it 
is natural for especially powerful states to seek regional hegemony.62 One study of 
India's regional plans concluded that: "a rising India will try to establish regional 
hegemony in South Asia and the Indian Ocean Region... just like all the other rising 
powers have since Napoleonic times, with the long term goal of achieving great power 
status on an Asian and perhaps even global scale."63 Neorealist theory might explain 
the development of a sphere of interest by a great power in terms of small states 
electing to bandwagon with a larger power instead of balancing against it.64 This 
analysis is at the very least incomplete in the case of India -  where few except perhaps 
the smallest of Indian Ocean island states could be described as "bandwagoning" with 
India against any other power. From a geopolitical perspective, spheres of influence 
are seen as a normal part of ordering the international system. According to Cohen: 
"... spheres of influence are essential to the preservation of national and regional 
expression....the alternative is either a monolithic world system or utter chaos."65 
From an Indian perspective the expression of a sphere of influence over the Indian 
Ocean region up to Singapore might be seen as India reasserting an historical or 
geographical role that was interrupted by India's post-independence self-limitations, 
limitations which India is now consciously seeking to overcome. Such a sphere of 
influence might also be seen as a "natural" appurtenance of a great power.
62 Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, p.232.
63 Pardesi, Deducing India's Grand Strategy of Regional Hegemony from Historical and 
Conceptual Perspectives, p.55.
64 Walt, The Origins of Alliances, pp.23-4.
65 Saul Cohen, Geography and politics in a world divided (2d ed.) (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1973), p.viii.
98
Part 2 Chapter 2.2 -  Developments in Indian 
strategic thinking and East Asia
However, China also provides good defensive reasons for the development of a sphere 
of influence. Many Indian strategists see China's actions in Southern Asia, including its 
consolidation of Tibet, its alliance with Pakistan and its relationships with Burma, 
Bangladesh and Nepal as part of a cohesive and successful policy of "encirclement" or 
"containment" of India. As will be discussed in section 2.3.2, China's putative String of 
Pearls strategy is widely viewed among the Indian security community as primarily 
motivated by a strategy of maritime encirclement of India. The development of a 
"defensive" sphere of influence is thus justified by China's actions in South Asia and 
the Indian Ocean. As the former Indian Chief of Naval Staff, Admiral Arun Prakash, 
commented: "The appropriate counter to China's encirclement of India is to build our 
own relations, particularly in our neighbourhood, on the basis of our national interests 
and magnanimity towards smaller neighbours...."66
Many Indian security "hawks" claim China's putative encirclement strategy justifies a 
more offensive approach by India, advocating a policy of "counter-encirclement" of 
China, including the development of security relationships along China's periphery in 
Southeast and Northeast Asia and North and Central Asia.67 The development by India 
of security-related facilities in Tajikistan and Mongolia are taken as evidence of India's 
counter-encirclement strategy in Central and North Asia and such a strategy is seen as 
driving India's relationships w ith Vietnam, Taiwan, South Korea and Japan on China's 
eastern periphery. A counter-encirclement strategy is also used to advocate the
66 Admiral Arun Prakash, "China and the Indian Ocean Region" Indian Defence Review Vol.21 
No.4 (October -  December 2006), pp.7-12 at 11.
67 See, for example, Colonel Gurmeet Kanwal, "Countering China's Strategic Encirclement of 
India," Indian Defence Review, Vol.15 No.3 (July-September 2000), p.17; Bharat Karnad, 
Nuclear Weapons and Indian Security: The Realist Foundations of Strategy (Delhi: Macmillan 
India, 2005); Mohan Malik, "Sino-lndian Relations in the 21st Century: The Continuing 
Rivalry," in Brahma Chellaney (ed.), Securing India's Future in the New Millenium (New Delhi: 
Centre for Policy Research, 1999); and Iskander Rehman, "Keeping the Dragon at Bay: India's 
Counter-Containment of China in Asia," Asian Security, Vol.5 No.2 (May 2009), pp.114-143.
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development of a direct India security presence on China's periphery, including Indian 
control of the Malacca Strait and ultimately an Indian naval presence in the South 
China Sea and even possibly in the Sea of Japan.68 Many Indian strategists would 
strongly reject any proposition that India is involved in any counter-encirclement 
strategy against China.69 Nevertheless, advocates of such a policy could gain greater 
influence in New Delhi in the event of a significant deterioration in the Sino-lndian 
relationship, particularly if China is perceived as being too assertive in the Indian 
Ocean region.
Conclusion
India has not articulated any "grand strategy" about East Asia and seems unlikely to do 
so any time soon. As a result, Indian strategic thinking about East Asia is best 
understood as a mosaic of perspectives and pragmatic goals which often cross 
ideological boundaries and which may or may not be wholly consistent. It is, however, 
possible to identify two key factors that are driving Indian strategic thinking about East 
Asia: rivalry with China (which is essentially a reactive dynamic) and India's ambitions 
to achieve great power status (essentially an active dynamic).
Fears of possible Chinese hegemony in East Asia and of Chinese "intrusions" into 
India's strategic space in South Asia and the Indian Ocean region have led to greater 
prominence in realist thinking about balancing China. From India's perspective this is a 
significant factor in its relationship with the United States and Japan and smaller 
powers such as Singapore and Vietnam (although, as will be seen, such motivations 
may not necessarily be reciprocated in Southeast Asia). However, India's ability to 
enter into any balancing coalition with the United States and its allies is limited by its
68 Karnad, Nuclear Weapons and Indian Security, p.541 and Mohan Malik, "China's Strategy of 
Containing India" Public Interest News Report, 6 February 2009. <www.pinr.com>.
69 See, for example, Mohan, "Is India an East Asian Power?" p.17.
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objectives of maintaining strategic autonomy and avoiding overt rivalry with China.
The dimensions of Sino-lndian rivalry will be explored in chapter 2.4.
Beliefs about India's destiny as a great power underlie a separate stream of strategic 
thinking, one more rooted in geopolitical perspectives. India's strategic outlook is 
increasingly oriented towards a maritime perspective, driving its aspirations to become 
the predominant naval power in the Indian Ocean. Related to these ambitions are 
ideas about the development of an Indian sphere of influence which, among other 
things, would encompass the littoral states in the northeast Indian Ocean. As a result, 
India in increasingly projecting naval power into Southeast Asia, although it has been 
careful to do so in a cooperative manner. India's maritime ambitions will be explored 
in greater detail in chapter 2.3.
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Chapter 2.3 India as a great maritime power
2.3.1 India's maritime security role in the Indian Ocean
2.3.2 Sino-lndian maritime rivalry
2.3.3 India's maritime security ambitions in Southeast Asia
2.3.4 Proposals for cooperative security arrangements in the Indian Ocean
Introduction
The previous chapter included a discussion of the development of Indian strategic 
thought about maritime power and ideas about an expanded Indian sphere of 
maritime influence. This chapter will argue that India's ambition to be a great maritime 
power in the Indian Ocean region is a significant underlying factor in its security 
relationships in East Asia.
2.3.1 India's maritime security role in the Indian Ocean
This section will provide an overview of India's potential maritime security role in the 
Indian Ocean.1
The current and planned expansion of India's naval capabilities has been examined in 
detail elsewhere.2 During the Cold War, India's ability to pursue its maritime 
ambitions was severely constrained through a combination of superpower rivalry in
1 For general discussions of India's maritime strategy, see Naidu, The Indian navy and 
Southeast Asia; David Scott, "India's "Grand Strategy" for the Indian Ocean: Mahanian 
Visions," Asia-Pacific Review, Vol. 13, No.2 (2006), pp.97-129; and Holmes etai, Indian Naval 
Strategy in the 21st Century.
2 See, for example, Holmes et al, Indian Naval Strategy in the Twenty-first Century, Ch.5 and 
Leszek Buzsynski, "Emerging Naval Rivalry in East Asia and the Indian Ocean: Implications for 
Australia," Security Challenges Vol.5 No.3 (2009), pp.73-93.
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the Indian Ocean and a lack of economic resources. For decades following 
independence the Indian navy was the "Cinderella" of the Indian armed forces, while 
India focused on immediate security threats on India's western and northern land 
borders. However, since the mid-1990s, India has embarked on a major program to 
develop a "Blue Water" navy involving significant increases in naval expenditure.
India's armed forces budget grew at an annual rate of 5% from 2001 to 2005 and at 
around 10% from 2005-2008. The navy's share of the defence budget has risen from 
11% in 1992/93 to 18% in 2008/09. The proportion of the navy's budget allocated to 
capital expenditure significantly exceeds the proportions allocated by the army or air 
force.3 At the same time, the Indian navy's force structure has been undergoing 
significant change with an emphasis on sea control capabilities. Plans announced in 
2008 call for a fleet of over 160 ships by 2022, including three aircraft carriers and 60 
major combatant ships, as well as almost 400 naval aircraft. According to Admiral 
Arun Prakash, the former Chief of Naval Staff, India aims to exercise selective sea 
control of the Indian Ocean through task forces built around three aircraft carriers that 
will form  the core of separate fleets in the Bay of Bengal, the Indian Ocean and the 
Arabian Sea.4
In conjunction with an increase in its naval capabilities, over the last two decades,
India has been quietly expanding its sphere of influence throughout the Indian Ocean. 
The Indian navy has been active in developing security relationships w ith states 
throughout the Indian Ocean region that are intended to enhance India's ability to 
project power and restrict China's ability to develop security relationships in the 
region. India's strategic ambitions are primarily focused on the northern Indian 
Ocean. Although it has also pursued a "Look West" policy in recent years, the navy's
3 Harsh V. Pant, "India in the Indian Ocean: Growing Mismatch between Ambitions and 
Capabilities," Pacific Affairs, Vol.82, No.2 (Summer 2009), pp.279-297, at p.284.
4 Arun Prakash, "A Vision of India's Maritime Power in the 21st Century" USI Journal (July- 
September 2006), pp. 454-63.
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"Look East" projection remains its major focus beyond South Asia. In Southeast Asia 
India has developed a strong security relationship w ith Singapore (see chapter 3.1) and 
is in the process of developing a security relationship with Indonesia (see chapter 3.2).
In the northern Indian Ocean, India has also developed a close security relationship 
with the Maldives (where the Indian navy/air force has been granted use of the old 
British airbase on Gan island and India is building a system of electronic monitoring 
facilities across the country)5 and in the Persian Gulf, where the Indian navy has 
security relationships with Oman and Qatar.6 India has also made significant progress 
in developing maritime security partnerships with island states in the southwestern 
Indian Ocean including Mauritius, Seychelles and Mozambique (where the Indian navy 
assists in providing maritime security)7 and Madagascar (where India operates sigint 
facilities).8 Arguably these relationships form the basis for a sphere of naval influence 
covering most of the Indian Ocean.9 The Indian navy has also sought to institutionalise 
a position for itself as the leading Indian Ocean power through such initiatives as 
sponsoring the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium, modelled on the US-led Western 
Pacific Naval Symposium.10
Given that the Indian Ocean is in many ways an enclosed sea, the Indian navy has given 
particular focus to the chokepoints at entrances to the ocean, including in southern 
Africa and the Arabian peninsula, and most particularly the straits that connect the
5 Balaji Chandramohan, "India, Maldives and the Indian Ocean," IDSA Comment, 13 October 
2009.
6 Hussain, "Indian PM's visit to Oman and Qatar."
7 "Indian ship to patrol Seychelles, Mauritius," Deccan Chronicle, 24 November 2009.
8 "Indian Navy Activates Listening Post, Monitoring Station in Madagascar, Indian Ocean," India 
Defence, 18 July 2007.
9 See generally, David Brewster, "An Indian sphere of influence in the Indian Ocean?" Security 
Challenges (2010) (forthcoming).
10 See generally, Gurpreet S.Khurana, "Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS): Where 
from....Whither-Bound?"/D5A Comment, 22 February 2008.
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Indian and Pacific Oceans through the Indonesian archipelago (the Malacca, Sunda and 
Lombok Straits). According to the Indian Navy's 2004 Maritime Doctrine:
" By virtue o f geography, we are... in a position to greatly influence the 
movement/security o f shipping along the [sea lines o f communication] in the 
[Indian Ocean region] provided we have the maritime power to do so. Control 
o f the choke points could be useful as a bargaining chip in the international
11power game, where the currency o f m ilitary power remains a stark reality."
India's strategic ambitions in relation to the most significant of these chokepoints in 
Southeast Asia, the Malacca Strait, are discussed in detail in section 2.3.3 below.
The type of security role which India envisages for itself in the Indian Ocean region 
remains a work in progress. To a significant extent this will be determined by the 
extent to which India's naval expansion plans come to fruition. Drawing on the 
experience of the United States in the Western Hemisphere in the nineteenth and 
twentie th centuries, Holmes has identified three basic roles which the Indian navy 
could play: first, a "free-rider" navy, in which the Indian navy can play a growing role in 
maritime policing and humanitarian functions while the United States continues to 
play a dominant role; second, a "constable" navy, in which the Indian navy would, 
sparingly and with tact, intervene in littoral states to advance a common interest of 
South Asian states, and third, a "strong-man" navy where it sought to establish 
hegemony in the Indian Ocean and had the capability of mounting forward defence 
beyond the Indian Ocean.12 Holmes concludes that the ambitions represented by the 
Indian navy's expansion program in the coming decades would give it the capability to 
act somewhere between a "free-rider" navy and a "constable" navy.
11 India, Integrated Headquarters, Ministry of Defence (Navy), Indian Maritime Doctrine, 2004, 
p.64. This statement was not repeated in the 2009 edition of Indian Maritime Doctrine.
12 Holmes et al, Indian Naval Strategy in the Twenty-first Century, pp.50-52.
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India's naval ambitions have not been without critics. Given the long-standing lack of 
co-ordination in strategic planning between the military services and within 
government itself, the Indian navy's activist role in the Indian Ocean region and 
Southeast Asia has often been ahead of other armed services and the government. 
There is long running tension between the Indian navy and Ministry of External Affairs 
over the navy's assertive regional policy, including most recently in the decision to 
participate in anti-piracy operations off Somalia. Others are sceptical about the ability 
of India to transform itself from a continental to a maritime power. Sahni, for 
example, warns that the Soviet Union's failed attempts to become a naval power in the 
1970s and 1980s should act as "a cautionary tale for India's Mahanian navalists....[and] 
a grim warning of what happens to a continental state that harbours overly grandiose 
maritime ambitions." 13 Sahni suggests that India should move away from following a 
"sea control" strategy based around expensive and vulnerable aircraft carriers and 
follow a "sea denial" strategy based on submarines. India also has a long tradition of 
its strategic ambitions surpassing its capabilities and of strategic goals and military 
expansion plans going unfulfilled, reflecting a lack of integrated planning among the 
armed services and with the government.
Despite these caveats, there are grounds to believe that a maritime perspective now 
holds a significantly stronger place in Indian strategic thinking than in the past.
US perspectives on India as a major maritime power in the Indian Ocean
The United States has played a particularly important role in facilitating the expansion 
of India's naval power. Over the last decade or more the United States has actively 
encouraged the expansion of India's naval ambitions and capabilities, according to
13 Varun Sahni, "India's Security Challenges out to 2000," paper presented at the Australia- 
India Security Roundtable, Canberra, 11-12 April 2005.
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some, calling for India to coordinate its maritime strategy with the United States in the 
Persian Gulf, Southeast Asia and as far as the Taiwan straits.14 The US Secretary of 
State Designate, Colin Powell, told the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee in 2001 
that, "... India has the potential to help keep the peace in the vast Indian Ocean area 
and its periphery. We need to work harder and more consistently to help them in this 
endeavor../'15. Similarly, US Secretary of the Navy, Donald Winter, commented in 
2008, the United States welcomed India "taking up the responsibility to ensure 
security in this part of the w orld ."16
The United States has given particular encouragement to increase India's naval 
presence in the northeast Indian Ocean (including the development of facilities at 
India's Andaman Island naval base)17 and appears to have indicated its acquiescence in 
a direct security role for India inside the Malacca Strait.18 Much (but not all) of this is a 
reflection of a desire by the United States to build India as an important balancing 
factor against China, particularly in the Indian Ocean region where the United States 
has encouraged Indian fears of Chinese naval power.19 It has been argued that the
14 Ashley Tellis, "South Asia," in Richard J.EIIings and Aaron L Friedberg (eds.) Strategic Asia 
2001-02 Power and Purpose (Seattle: National Bureau of Asian Research, 2002) at pp.262-3.
15 Washington File, 2001, Powell Statement before Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 17 
January 2001, <http://usinfo.org/wf-archive/2001/010117/epf301.htm>.
16 Sandeep Dikshit, "No Strings Attached to Sale of Ships," The Hindu, 29 March 2008.
17 According to one report, the United States offered to partly fund construction of port 
facilities. Ramtanu Maitra, "India bids to rule the waves," Asia Times, 19 October, 2005.
18 In contrast, the northwestern Indian Ocean region (including the Persian Gulf) remains an 
area where the United States has been somewhat less forthcoming in encouraging naval 
cooperation with India -  reflecting both US naval predominance in that region and the level of 
naval cooperation between the US and Pakistan.
19 Thus a joke by a Chinese naval officer to his US counterpart that China should take 
responsibility for maritime security in the Western Pacific and the Indian Ocean was dutifully 
reported to the Indian press by Admiral Keating of the US Pacific Command. See Manu Pubby,
107
Part 2 Chapter 2.3- India as a 
great maritime power
approach of the United States in encouraging the development of India as an emerging 
regional naval power with a particular responsibility for the Indian Ocean is analogous 
to Britain's strategy in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, when it found 
itself challenged by the growth of German naval power. Britain forged partnerships 
w ith emerging naval powers, the United States in the western hemisphere and Japan 
in the Pacific, allowing them a measure of regional hegemony, while Britain 
concentrated its naval resources in the North Atlantic against the greater threat 
presented by the rise of Germany.20 Such an analogy, while far from perfect, captures 
some of the factors present in US thinking, particularly in its perceptions of the 
growing maritime threat presented by China.
2.3.2 Sino-lndian maritime rivalry
Strategic competition between India and China will be discussed generally in chapter 
2.4. Naval competition with China has been a major factor in driving India's maritime 
security ambitions in the Indian Ocean and Southeast Asia. While the Indian navy's 
immediate objectives involve countering Pakistan and enforcing control over India's 
EEZ, the potential for China to project naval power into the Indian Ocean has become 
its principal long term source of concern.
In the mid-1980s China began implementing plans for a blue water navy. Although 
focused on protecting China's interests in the western Pacific Ocean, in particular the 
Taiwan Strait, it also had long term implications for India. China's naval capabilities 
now exceed India's by a considerable margin in both quantitative and qualitative 
terms. However, its ability to project power into the Indian Ocean is severely limited 
by the distance from ports in southern China and its lack of logistical support in the
"China proposed division of Pacific, Indian Ocean regions, we declined: US Admiral," Indian 
Express, 15 May 2009.
20 Holmes et al, Indian Naval Strategy in the Twenty-first Century, Ch.3.
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Indian Ocean, as well as China's need to deploy to the Indian Ocean through 
chokepoints, including the Strait of Malacca.21
China's perceived attempts to overcome these strategic limitations in the Indian Ocean 
region have been called its "String of Pearls" strategy.22 China has been developing 
political relationships and commercial interests in the Indian Ocean region for some 
years. According to numerous Indian reports, China is involved in some military- 
related facilities in the region, such as the Chinese constructed port at Gwadar in 
Pakistan (which some have claimed includes a Chinese sigint facility)23 and monitoring 
and communications facilities in Burma's Coco islands in the Bay of Bengal. China has 
also been involved in the development of a number of commercial port facilities in the 
region, including in Burma, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka and there are concerns in New 
Delhi that China has negotiated naval access rights as part of these developments.24 
Since early 2009, China has stationed several naval vessels in the Gulf of Aden area to 
protect Chinese ships from Somali pirates, which have received logistical support out 
of Djibouti. A senior Chinese naval official has also recently proposed the 
establishment of a permanent base in the Gulf of Aden to provide support for Chinese 
ships carrying out anti-piracy patrols.25
21 John W. Garver, Protracted Contest: Sino-lndian Rivalry in the Twentieth Century (Seattle: 
University of Washington Press, 2001), pp.287; and Buzsynski, "Emerging Naval Rivalry in East 
Asia and the Indian Ocean."
22 The term was first used in a 2005 report titled "Energy Futures in Asia" prepared for the US 
Secretary of Defence by the private consultants, Booz-Allen-Hamilton.
23 Brahma Chellaney, "Assessing India's Reactions to China's "Peaceful Development" 
Doctrine," NBR Analysis, Vol. 18, No. 5 (April 2008).
24 Ramtanu Maitra, "India bids to rule the waves," Asia Times, 19 October 2005; and Sudha 
Ramachandran, "China moves into India's back yard," Asia Times. 13 March 2007.
25 "China mulling naval base in Gulf of Aden: admiral," Agence-France Presse, 29 December 
2009.
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While some non-Indian analysts believe that many Indian claims about the Chinese 
presence in the northern Indian Ocean are exaggerated, particularly claims of Chinese 
m ilitary presence in Burma and the Andaman Sea,26 the String of Pearls theory is 
widely followed in New Delhi. China's relationships in the Indian Ocean region are 
often not perceived in the Indian security community as being a legitimate reflection of 
Chinese interests in protecting its SLOCs across the Indian Ocean. Rather, many 
perceive China's regional relationships as being directed against India: either as a plan 
of maritime "encirclement" of India or otherwise intended to keep India strategically 
preoccupied in South Asia. Others, who might acknowledge China's interests in SLOC 
security, argue that China is "overstepping" the mark in developing influence in the 
Indian Ocean region, creating a security dilemma for India. Although few have 
suggested that any Chinese threat to India is likely to be primarily seaborne, many in 
New Delhi see an almost inevitability (or at least a significant risk) that India and China 
will, as the form er Indian Chief of Naval Staff put it, "compete and even clash in the 
same strategic space."27
India has responded to China's perceived Indian Ocean strategy in several ways. First, 
it is trying to  pre-empt the development by China of security relationships in the Indian 
Ocean through the development of India's own security relationships in the region 
(discussed above). Second, it is developing its capability to exert negative control over 
the maritime choke points between the Indian and Pacific Oceans, principally the 
Malacca Strait, as well as the Lombok and Sunda Straits. This is an important factor in 
its security relations in Southeast Asia. As will be argued in chapter 4.2, India's role in 
the Indian Ocean has also become a significant factor in India's security relationship
26 See for example, Andrew Selth, "Chinese Military Bases in Burma: The Explosion of a Myth" 
Regional Outlook Paper No.10, 2007 (Brisbane: Griffith University, 2007); and You Ji, "Dealing 
with the Malacca Dilemma: China's Effort to Protect its Energy Supply," Strategic Analysis, 
Vo!.31, No.3, (May 2007), pp.467-489.
27 Arun Prakash, "India's Maritime Strategy," Indian Defence Review, 137 No.568, April-June 
2007, pp.157-176.
110
Part 2 Chapter 2.3- India as a 
great maritime power
with Japan, which sees significant value in India as a maritime security partner in that 
region.
2.3.3 India's maritime security ambitions in Southeast Asia 
The Malacca Strait
The focal point of India's maritime security ambitions in Southeast Asia is its ambition 
to take an important security role in the Malacca Strait, which has been identified by 
the Indian navy as part of its "primary area of interest."28 As noted above, the 
Malacca Strait is the primary chokepoint for sea traffic between the Indian and Pacific 
Oceans and Indian control over the Strait is seen as a prerequisite of effective control 
of the eastern Indian Ocean. Some have argued that for India the Malacca Strait 
represents a rough counterpart to the importance of the Panama Canal to the United 
States in terms of its ability to maintain regional hegemony.29 Others place it as the 
significant mid-point in an "arc of rivalry" between India and China stretching from the 
Persian Gulf to the Sea of Japan.30
The Malacca Strait is one of the world's busiest waterways carrying over 62,000 ship 
movements in 2006. It is the key trade route between East Asia and Europe, carrying 
an estimated one third of global trade and the bulk of energy supplies from the Middle 
East to East Asia (including an estimated 70-80% of China's energy imports and 90% of 
Japan's).31 The Strait, some 550 nautical miles long and whose navigable routes narrow 
to less than 1 nautical mile, is considered to be particularly prone to commercial piracy
28 Indian Navy, "Freedom to use the seas: India's Maritime Military Strategy," May 2007.
29 Holmes et al, Indian Naval Strategy in the Twenty-first Century, p.154.
30 Gurpreet S. Khurana, "China-lndia Maritime Rivalry," Indian Defence Review, Vol.23 No.4 
(2009).
31 Ian Storey, "Securing Southeast Asia's Sea Lanes: A Work in Progress," Asia Policy, No.6 (July 
2008), pp.95-127.
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and terrorist attacks. In the early years of last decade there were widely-held concerns 
about piracy and sea-robbery of ships transiting the Strait, concerns which India have 
sought to use to justify a security role for itself. However, reported cases of sea 
robbery in the Malacca Strait and surrounding areas have fallen significantly in recent 
years, principally due to improved land policing in Indonesia, improved economic 
conditions and the end of the insurgency in Indonesia's Aceh province.32 Since 2001 
politically motivated piracy or terrorism has also been of concern including attacks 
believed to have been planned by jihadist organisations on merchant and naval vessels 
in the Strait and surrounding areas, although no such attacks have eventuated.
Since the 1990s India has placed significant emphasis on achieving a predominant 
position in the Bay of Bengal and the western approaches to the Malacca Strait.
India's Andaman and Nicobar islands, which run north-south through the Andaman Sea 
form  a natural base for projecting power into the Strait and beyond into the South 
China Sea. In the mid-1990s, reportedly at request of the United States, India 
commenced development of m ilitary facilities in the Andaman Islands for a new tr i­
service Andaman & Nicobar Command. This chain of bases now includes extensive 
port facilities to service elements of the Indian Eastern Fleet and several air bases for 
surveillance and strike aircraft. India's naval presence in the Andamans will be 
supported by a new base being constructed for India's Eastern Fleet south of 
Visakhapatnam on India's east coast.33 The operational radius of aircraft based in the 
Andamans encompasses the Malacca Strait and large portions of the South China 
Sea.34 The Andaman Islands have particular significance for the security of the Strait
32 Author interviews, Singapore, June 2009.
33 By Sudha Ramachandran, "Indian navy drops another anchor," Asia Times, 17 October 2006. 
<http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/HJ17Df02.html>.
34 A.K.Dhar, "Indian Air Force Carries out Exercise from Andaman Islands Base," Press Trust of 
India, 15 April 2005.
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and have been described by a Chinese naval w riter as constituting a "metal chain" that 
could lock the western end of the Strait tigh t.35
After September 2001, India significantly stepped up its presence in the Strait itself 
through the provision of naval escorts for high value commercial traffic through the 
Strait as part of the US-led Operation Enduring Freedom. India's participation in the 
operation was supported by Singapore (which hosted Indian naval vessels), while 
Malaysia and Indonesia were "consulted." India is now seeking a more permanent 
security role inside the Strait, which is an important factor underlying India's strategic 
relationships w ith both Singapore and Indonesia. India also wants to improve its 
capability to project power into the South China Sea, which is a significant factor in 
India's security relationship with Vietnam.
Security in the Strait is complicated by legal and political issues surrounding its status. 
The Strait (as traditionally defined) is largely w ithin the territoria l waters of Indonesia, 
Malaysia and Singapore and under international law foreign naval vessels have a right 
of transit only. Foreign naval vessels may "escort" other transiting vessels while 
transiting themselves, but, at least according to the littoral states, may not conduct 
armed "patrols." Indonesia and Malaysia are particularly jealous in safeguarding their 
sovereignty over the Strait and are highly sensitive to the presence of any "external" 
maritime security providers in the Strait.
There has been significant controversy in recent years over moves by the United States 
and other major users to take a role in providing maritime security in the Strait. In 
April 2004, the United States announced its Regional Maritime Security Initiative 
(RMSI) under which it proposed to provide security in the Malacca Strait in partnership 
with littoral states. The initiative was strongly opposed by Indonesia and Malaysia
35 Zhang Ming, "The Malacca Dilemma and the Chinese Navy's Strategic Choices," Modern 
Ships, No.274, October 2006, p.23.
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who construed it as proposing the deploym ent o f US special forces in the Strait. 
Indonesia and Malaysia also refused to  participate in the Japanese-sponsored 
m ultila tera l ReCAAP in itia tive involving the vo luntary exchange of in form ation 
regarding piracy and other security threats in the Strait.
In July 2004, at the in itia tive o f Indonesia, the  three litto ra l states commenced the so- 
called MALSINDO "co-ord ina ted" naval patrols in the Strait. A lthough seen as a step in 
addressing in ternational security concerns, the  effectiveness of this program is 
hampered by significant lim itations in the ir m aritim e security capabilities. In June 
2005, w ith  continued piracy incidents, the Lloyds insurance association declared the 
Strait as a war-risk zone and shipping companies began regularly employing armed 
private security operators.36 Indonesia is strongly opposed to  the use of private 
security operators and is particularly sensitive to  claims tha t it is the "weakest link" 
among litto ra l states in term s o f m aritim e security and air surveillance capabilities.37 
Although there  has been some success in recent years in reducing incidents o f piracy, 
observers are concerned about Indonesia's acute lack o f resources and the likelihood 
tha t it w ill succumb to  "pa tro l fa tigue ."38
Since 2001 India has been careful to  position itse lf as a potentia l benign security 
provider in the Strait, and to  ensure tha t any naval presence was seen as "non- 
intrusive, cooperative and benign" by the litto ra l states.39 According to  one Indian 
naval officer: "Our role [in the Malacca Strait] is being perceived as tha t o f a 
responsible nation, which can create a balance in the region. Also, everyone realises
36 Although the Strait was removed from Lloyd's war risk list in August 2006.
37 See generally, Shafiah Fifi Muhibat, "Competing to Secure the Straits of Malacca and 
Singapore," The Indonesian Quarterly, Vol.35, No.3 (2007), pp.242-253.
38 Storey, "Securing Southeast Asia's Sea Lanes," at p.120.
39 Asia Times, 19 October 2005.
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that India has no ambitions of hegemony."40 Since 2004 the Indian navy has 
participated in coordinated anti-piracy patrols w ith Indonesia in the area west of the 
Strait (for further details, see section 3.2.3). In the wake of the RMSI controversy,
India publicly distanced itself from the United States. In February 2006, the United 
States convened a "user-state" conference in California to discuss security of the Strait. 
The Indians were vocal in opposing what was claimed to be a US unilateralist 
approach, insisting that any proposal from the meeting must be subject to the 
unanimous consent of littoral states.41 At the same time, India has consistently 
lobbied littoral states for an active role both at the political and military level, including 
reportedly using the MILAN naval gathering to lobby the Indonesian and other navies 
for an operational role in the Strait.42 In June 2006 the Indian Defence Minister 
Mukherjee reaffirmed India's offers to provide assistance, but only "subject to the 
desire of the littoral states."43 India supported the proposal by Indonesia and other 
littoral states for a compulsory pilotage program through the Strait and has also 
supported other cooperative proposals relating to safety and environmental 
protection. Singapore Defence Minister Teo Chee Hean stated that Singapore 
"welcomed" India's offer to contribute to the security of the Malacca Strait, although 
"it should be done in a way that littoral states are comfortable w ith ."44 There are 
indications that the United States supports a direct security role for India in the Strait. 
In 2006, the commander of the US Pacific Fleet, Admiral Roughead, commented that 
that the United States was "not interested" in patrolling the region, while the 
Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Pace, noted that the United States
40 Gurpreet S Khurana, "Safeguarding the Malacca Straits," IDSA Comment, 5 January 2005.
41 Gurpreet S. Khurana, "The Malacca Straits 'Conundrum' and India," in N.S.Sisodia and 
Sreeradha Datta (eds.), Changing Security Dynamics in Southeast Asia (New Delhi: Magnum 
Books, 2008), pp.125-142 at p.134.
42 Shiv Aroor, "Centre approves Navy's Malacca Plan," The Indian Express, 11 January 2006. 
www.indianexpress.com.
43 Government of India press release, 3 June 2006. <www.pib.nic.in>.
44 Bernama (Malaysian News Agency), 3 June 2006.
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was "very comfortable with the fact that India has offered its assistance" in providing 
security in the Strait.45
In light of political sensitivities about any perceived internationalisation of the Strait, 
some have argued for an extended definition of the "Malacca Strait" from the 
Singapore Strait in the south to the Six Degree Channel in the north that would include 
Thailand and India as "litto ra l" states and allow the creation of a composite security 
system of jo in t patrols throughout the relevant waters.46 India has also sought to 
categorise itself and Thailand as "funnel states" to the Strait of Malacca, thereby 
justifying a greater status than mere "user" states such as the United States, Japan and 
China.
There can be little  doubt the India's interest in the Strait is motivated by broad 
strategic considerations. The official justifications for India's security interest in the 
Strait -  that is, securing the Strait from threats of piracy and terrorism - hold little 
water. Not only are these primarily policing rather than military issues, the reported 
statistics in recent years clearly demonstrate that there is no crisis that requires 
external intervention.47 It is evident that India's interest in the Strait is primarily 
motivated by a desire to enhance its role as the leading maritime security provider in 
the Indian Ocean and to control access to the Indian Ocean in case of potential threats 
from extra-regional powers, particularly China. For its part, China regards risks from 
the intervention in the Malacca Strait by an external power as far outweighing any risk
45 India Defence 7 June 2006.
46 Rajeev Sawhney, "Redefining the limits of the Straits: A Composite Malacca Straits Security 
System," RSIS Commentaries No. 37, 18 May 2006.
47 According to official figures, cases of piracy and sea robbery within the Straits of Malacca 
and Singapore peaked at some 38 reported cases in 2004, falling in recent years to 9 reported 
cases in 2009. Annual Report 2009, (ReCAAP Information Sharing Centre, Singapore, 2009).
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of piracy.48 However, it is possible that China may be prepared to tolerate a limited 
role for India as an alternative to a US presence. As the Chinese ambassador to India 
commented in 2005, "Now, geographically, you [India] have access to that area. As far 
as India is concerned, we don't have any problem.... But if Americans come and put 
their battleships there, we might worry about it."49 Nevertheless, China may well be 
encouraging regional friends such as Malaysia to help limit the extent of any Indian 
presence.
India's naval ambitions in the Western Pacific
While a cooperative role for the Indian navy in the region west of the Malacca Strait is 
now more or less accepted within Southeast Asia, the extension of Indian naval power 
north into the South China Sea remains more controversial in East Asia. The Indian 
navy currently identifies the South China Sea as a "secondary area" of interest.50 
While in the 1990s, India was regarded only as of marginal interest in the naval balance 
in the South China Sea, some claim that India is a potential factor in the naval balance 
of power as far north as the Taiwan Strait.51 Mohan believes that India, simply by 
virtue of its growing economic and military power, will become a significant naval 
power in the western Pacific with Singapore acting as the "fulcrum" of India's 
extended reach into the Pacific.52 However, to date, Indian naval activity north of 
Singapore appears to have been more in the nature of demonstrations towards China, 
driven more by Sino-lndian rivalry in the Indian Ocean, than any intention to project 
significant naval power into the Western Pacific.
48 Hongyi Li, "Security of China's Energy Imports" in Hongyi Lai (ed.), Asian Energy Security: the 
Maritime Dimension (London: Palgrave MacMillan 2009), pp.49-77.
49 Gurpreet S. Khurana, "The Malacca Straits 'Conundrum' and India."
50 Indian Navy, "Freedom to use the seas," May 2007.
bl John Daly, "Can the Dragon Swim? The Naval Balance in the Taiwan Strait," China Brief,
Vol.4, No.2, 20 January 2004.
52 Mohan, "Is India an East Asian Power?"
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Since the turn of this century, India has been quietly extending its naval power into the 
South China Sea through regular visits and joint exercises in what has been called 
"deliberate, significant and maintained long range Indian naval appearances."53 The 
Indians began implementing a "detailed plan" to expand the horizons of Indian naval 
diplomacy in late 2000, when Indian warships made an extended visit to the South 
China Sea including port visits to Vietnam, China and the Philippines, and as far north 
as South Korea and Japan.54 During 2004, the Indian navy made three separate 
deployments into South China Sea as part of "Presence-cum-Surveillance Missions" in 
the Malacca Strait, and in 2005 the Indian aircraft carrier INS Vikraat and task force 
made a first ever visit to Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia.
Much of India's naval activity in the South China Sea has been conducted in 
conjunction with its two main regional partners, Singapore and Vietnam. As will be 
seen in chapter 3.3, Indian naval strategists have long recognised the potential role of 
Vietnam to control the South China Sea and block Chinese naval penetration of the 
Indian Ocean. However, India has had limited success over the last two decades in 
building a maritime security relationship with Vietnam. Requests by India to use 
Vietnam's Cam Ranh Bay naval base, reportedly made in 1990 and 2000, were turned 
down by Vietnam and there seems little likelihood that such rights would be granted in 
the foreseeable future. India has conducted joint naval and coastguard exercises with 
Vietnam, however, their significance is very limited given the parlous state of 
Vietnam's sea-going vessels. As will be seen in chapter 3.1, India has been much more 
successful in developing a security relationship with Singapore. Since 2005, India has 
conducted biennial naval exercises with Singapore in the South China Sea (which have
53 David Scott, "India's Drive for a 'Blue Water' Navy," Journal of Military and Strategic Studies, 
Vol.10, Issue 2 (Winter 2007), pp.1-42 at p.33.
54 Josy Joseph, "Navy Hails Successful South China Sea Visit," Rediffon the Net, 17 October 
2000 .
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been expanded to jo in t naval and air exercises) and some suggest that India may 
obtain non-exclusive arrangements for the use of Singapore's Changi Naval Base, just 
as it is currently used by the United States navy.55
At the same time India has sought to demonstrate its ability to project naval power 
into Northeast Asia, if only symbolically. India has begun periodic exercises with the 
United States and Japan in Northeast Asia, including the Malabar exercises off Okinawa 
in April 2009 which focused on ASW, AAW and PSI exercises. In 2009, India also agreed 
to  invite China to participate in future Malabar exercises involving the United States 
and India in the Western Pacific. China's participation in such exercises would not 
only be a useful political tool to refute claims that India and the United States are 
seeking to develop a maritime coalition against China, it may also help legitimise a 
lim ited role for India in the western Pacific. India has also (unsuccessfully) sought full 
membership of the Western Pacific Naval Symposium, a US-sponsored talk shop for 
East Asian naval chiefs.56
However, India's naval aspirations in the South China Sea are viewed with mixed 
feelings in East Asia, where there is a sense that any Indian naval presence would be 
primarily motivated by Sino-lndian rivalry in the Indian Ocean rather than reflecting 
India's legitimate regional interests. It is not at all clear what security role India might 
have in the South China Sea. Would the primary purpose of any Indian presence be to 
support ASEAN littoral states against Chinese territoria l claims, to protect its SLOCs to 
Northeast Asia or to project power against China?57 Although a significant proportion
55 C.Raja Mohan , "India's Geopolitics and Southeast Asian Security" in Daljit Singh and Tin 
Maung Maung (eds.), Southeast Asian Affairs 2008 (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian 
Studies, 2008), p.49.
56 According to a senior Indian naval officer, its application was opposed by China. Others 
believe that India's application was also opposed by the United States.
57 Some believe that limitations in India's missile delivery technology will compel the 
deployment of Indian nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (when they become
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of Indian trade passes through the South China Sea, it currently includes only a small 
proportion of energy imports (although this will likely grow over time as Sakhalin island 
oil and gas production increases). In other words, at least for the moment, it is not 
likely that an Indian naval presence be seen as having any clear rationale.
Further, the projection of Indian naval power north of Singapore will be of limited 
credibility w ithout logistical support in Southeast Asia, something which is unlikely to 
be forthcoming in the current security environment. There are significant regional 
concerns about China's growing military capacity in Southeast Asia (including the new 
Chinese Sanya Naval Base on Hainan Island) and China's continuing assertiveness over 
its maritime territoria l claims in the South China Sea (including the establishment in 
November 2007 of an administrative body for the Spratly and Paracel islands). 
However, ASEAN states have made great efforts in recent years to reduce tensions and 
engage China in dialogue over the South China Sea territoria l disputes. Any naval 
rivalry between India and China in the South China Sea would likely be seen as bringing 
further complications to the regional security environment beyond ASEAN's control 
and adversely affecting its ability to build regional security institutions that include 
China. China would also likely regard the presence of any Indian surface warships 
based in Southeast Asia as a major strategic challenge that would affect the whole 
framework of India-China relations. As a result, while there may be some increase in 
the tempo of Indian naval visits north of Singapore in coming years, it seems unlikely in 
the current security environment that there will be a significant increase in Indian 
naval activity in the South China Sea or the Western Pacific generally.
operational) into the South China Sea and the Western Pacific in range of China's East Coast. 
Holmes, et ai, Indian Naval Strategy in the 21st Century, p.155. It is not clear how this would 
square with India's stated willingness to abide by the Southeast Asian Nuclear Weapons Free 
Zone treaty.
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2.3.4 Proposals for cooperative security arrangements in the Indian Ocean
Some have begun to suggest multilateral security arrangements for the Indian Ocean 
region as a solution to the Sino-lndian maritime security dilemma. In recent months 
there has also been some acknowledgement in New Delhi of China's security concerns 
in the Indian Ocean. In February 2010, the Indian junior Defence Minister, Pallam Raju, 
suggested that India might provide maritime security to Chinese ships in the Indian 
Ocean, a proposal to which China has not publicly responded.58 Shiv Shankar Menon, 
form erly Foreign Secretary and now National Security Advisor, has taken a more 
ambitious approach, recently proposing the discussion of "collective security" 
arrangements among the "major powers concerned in the Indian Ocean" in order to 
minimise the risk of interstate conflict and threats from piracy and terrorism. 
Importantly, according to Menon, Indian Ocean security concerns cannot be 
considered in isolation from the Pacific. He commented that:
" India's concerns in the north-west Indian Ocean and China's vulnerabilities in the 
north-east Indian Ocean cannot be solved through m ilitary means alone. The issue 
is not lim ited just to the Indian Ocean but indeed is one o f security o f these [energy
and trade] flows in areas and seas which affect the choke points.....what is
suggested is a real concert o f Asian powers, including the USA which has a major 
m aritime presence and interests in Asia, to deal with issues o f maritime security in 
all o f Asia's oceans. As Asia becomes more integrated from  Suez to the Pacific, 
none o f Asia's seas or oceans can be considered in isolation."59
58 "India's surprising but welcome message," People's Daily, 23 February 2010. See also the 
suggestion that India should take a leading role in coordinating maritime participation by 
China, Singapore and Japan in anti-piracy operations. B.Raman, "Wanted: India-China-Japan- 
Singapore task force on maritime counter-terrorism," South Asia Analysis Group, Paper 3739, 
30 March 2010.
59 Shiv Shankar Menon, "Maritime Imperatives of Indian Foreign Policy," speech to the 
National Maritime Foundation, New Delhi, 11 September, 2009.
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This suggestion, though positioned as "unofficial/' could be a significant step in seeking 
to resolve the Sino-lndian security dilemma in the Indian Ocean region. The proposal 
that maritime security concerns in the Indian Ocean region and the Pacific need to be 
addressed in an integrated manner reflects the significant security interaction between 
the Indian and Pacific Oceans -  with a focus on the Malacca Strait - that has already 
been discussed in this chapter. Several assumptions are also implicit in the proposal: 
first, that the Sino-lndian security dilemma in the Indian Ocean cannot be resolved by 
bilateral means; second, that if a Sino-lndian security dilemma exists in the Indian 
Ocean it may (or will) also arise in the Pacific, and third, that India would be unlikely to 
agree to fetter its position in the northeast Indian Ocean without resolving its concerns 
in the South China Sea and the Western Pacific generally. Such a multilateral 
arrangement might not only institutionalise a leading maritime security role for India in 
the Indian Ocean but also a role for India in the Western Pacific. The development of 
a working concert of major powers with a limited focus on maritime security would 
also have obvious implications for the broader Asian security order consistent with 
India's overall objective of developing a multipolar order.
Given the broader context of Sino-lndian strategic rivalry (which will be discussed in 
the next chapter) it seems unlikely that there would be any conditions under which 
China would be prepared to rely on India for its maritime security needs in the Indian 
Ocean absent an overarching multilateral cooperative security arrangement. Whether 
China and others including the United States and Japan would be prepared to extend 
such a multilateral arrangement into the Pacific (including an institutionalised role for 
India) is another matter.
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Chapter 2.4 Sino-lndian strategic rivalry and East Asia
2.4.1 The evolution of the relationship in the twentieth century
2.4.2 New dimensions of rivalry and cooperation
2.4.3 Visions of the future of Sino-lndian relations
2.4.4 Political and economic rivalry in Southeast Asia
Introduction
The previous chapter included a discussion of Sino-lndian naval rivalry in the Indian 
Ocean. This chapter provides an overview of various dimensions of the strategic 
relationship between India and China, with a particular focus on their strategic rivalry 
in Southeast Asia.
2.4.1 The evolution of the relationship in the twentieth century
Despite sharing a long land border, the two great civilisations of India and China have 
had relatively little political interaction until modern times. The Himalayas has always 
served as a major geographical barrier and both civilisations were largely inward­
looking for much of their history. Many Indians and Chinese have professed a 
particular incomprehension of the other, particularly in political and strategic affairs. It 
has been argued that each civilisation holds a particular concept of its own centrality in 
the world, which contributes to a “blindness" which each country has exhibited 
towards the other in modern times.1
From India's independence until 1962 one of the primary goals of Indian diplomacy in 
Asia was to preserve the goodwill and friendship of China. Nehru believed that
1 Austin Coates, Chino, Indio and the Ruins of Washington (New York: The John Day Company, 
1972).
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notwithstanding ideological differences there were strategic imperatives to develop a 
good relationship. According to Nehru, India's engagement with China would lead to 
China's engagement with the region as a whole, mitigating China's expansionist 
tendencies and drawing it away from its relationship with the Soviet Union. Although 
Nehru discounted the likelihood of Chinese expansionism in the short term, he was 
aware of the underlying rivalry between India and China, commenting: "that some day 
or other these two Asian giants were bound to tread on each others' corns and come 
into conflict, and that would be a calamity for Asia."2
Throughout the first half of the 1950s India offered considerable diplomatic support to 
the People's Republic of China (PRC), which many then considered a pariah. India was 
one of the first non-communist states in the world to recognise the Communist 
Chinese government in 1949 and lobbied hard to give China's seat in the UN to the 
PRC. As will be discussed in detail in chapter 4.1, in 1951, India unsuccessfully 
demanded the inclusion of the PRC as a signatory to the peace treaty between Japan 
and 41 other states (which India also argued should include explicit recognition of 
PRC's claims to Taiwan), a stance which led to India's refusal to sign the treaty. India 
sought, with mixed success, to mediate between the PRC and the West during the 
Korean war and at the 1954 Geneva conference on Indochina. Nehru also insisted on 
the PRC's participation in the 1955 Bandung conference among newly independent 
Asian and African states that was later to evolve into the Non-Aligned Movement.
In the early 1950s, both India and China moved to consolidate their positions in the 
Himalayas: India, through treaties with Bhutan, Nepal and Sikkim; and China, through 
its occupation of Tibet. Despite conflicting historical claims over the territories, neither 
China nor India offered significant opposition to the other's actions. In 1954, India 
formally recognised China's full sovereignty over Tibet in return for China's agreement 
on the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence (known as Panchsheel). The mid-1950s
2 D.R.Makekar, The Guilty Men of 1962 (Bombay: Tulsi Shah Enterprises, 1968), p.110.
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represented the honeymoon for the India-China strategic relationship, trumpeted by 
the Indians under the catchphrase "Hindi-Chini bhai-bhai" (in Hindi, "India and China 
are brothers").
The Indians had hoped that India's recognition of Chinese sovereignty over Tibet had 
addressed China's ambitions in the Himalayas. However, in early 1959, Tibetan 
resistance to the Chinese takeover turned into open revolt and, despite the strenuous 
objections of China, India granted political asylum to the Dalai Lama. In 1962, disputes 
over the McMahon Line, the colonial-era border claimed by India, escalated into full 
scale conflict. Chinese forces quickly defeated the Indian army and, after occupying 
significant areas of Indian administered territory, declared a ceasefire and unilaterally 
withdrew to the current line of control. India's military defeat was a humiliating blow 
to the credibility of Nehru and his foreign policies and for many established China as a 
long term threat. The border dispute remains unresolved today and continues to be 
the most significant obstacle to the improvement in relations between India and China.
The second major historical issue in Sino-lndian relations is China's strategic 
relationship with Pakistan. China began pursuing this relationship following the 1962 
war, establishing itself as a major supplier of arms to Pakistan and effectively acting as 
its strategic guarantor. The so-called "all weather friendship" with Pakistan (possibly 
alongside its relationship with the DPRK) is the closest relationship China has to a long­
term alliance. Since the 1960s, the China factor has played a significant role in limiting 
India's strategic options with Pakistan, essentially keeping India strategically pre­
occupied in South Asia. The perceived military threat from China and its alliance with 
Pakistan were the primary motivations for India's security relationship with the Soviet 
Union, as formalised in their 1971 Friendship Treaty. For much of the remainder of 
the Cold War, strategic rivalry between the Soviet Union and China and the Soviet veto 
in the UN Security Council served as an important balance to the China "threat" to 
India. During the 1980s and 1990s China played a central role in the proliferation of 
nuclear weapons and missiles to Pakistan. Although some believe that since the end of
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the Cold War China has been partially "disinvesting" in the Pakistan security 
relationship (e.g. through moderating its position on Pakistan's claims to Kashmir), 
China's nuclear proliferation to Pakistan will have a lasting impact on the balance of 
power in South Asia and is seen by some in New Delhi as China's second great strategic 
"betrayal" of India.
The end of the Cold War and the dissolution of the Soviet Union allowed significant 
improvements in bilateral relations, which had been largely frozen since the 1962 war. 
While India no longer viewed China as an immediate military threat, the relationship 
remained an uneasy one. The greatest shift in the relationship occurred as a result of 
India's 1998 nuclear tests which formed a turning point in India's search for great 
power status. Rather than seeking to justify this move on the basis of an apparent 
threat from Pakistan, the Indians pointed the finger squarely at China, calling it: "an 
overt nuclear weapons state on our borders, a state which committed armed 
aggression against India in 1962."3 Many see India's new status as a declared nuclear 
weapons state as redefining what Mohan calls the "psychological framework" of 
India's relations with China.4
2.4.2 New dimensions of rivalry and cooperation
Although the primary focus for strategic rivalry between India and China remains 
South Asia, in recent years, the scope of the relationship has extended to cover a much 
broader geographical area, including Central and West Asia, Southeast Asia and the 
Indian Ocean region. It has also involved important new dimensions, including an 
evolving nuclear balance, growing competition in energy security and a rapidly 
expanding economic relationship. These dimensions involve elements of both conflict 
and cooperation.
3 The New York Times, 13 May 1998.
4 Mohan, Crossing the Rubicon, p.149.
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The balance of conventional and nuclear forces
Since the end of the Cold War, and particularly since the maturation of India's nuclear 
weapons capabilities, India has perceived a reduced military threat from China along 
the Himalayan border. This has had an important effect in changing the nature and 
scope of strategic rivalry between India and China. While China's overall conventional 
military capabilities exceed those of India, many view India as enjoying relative 
superiority in conventional forces along the Himalayan border in terms of quality of its 
personnel, training, infrastructure and logistics and superiority in tactical air forces.
The terrain also gives significant defensive advantage, meaning that while there is the 
potential for skirmishes along the border, a large-scale surprise attack in the nature of 
the 1962 war is viewed as unlikely.
The nuclear balance between India and China, although unequal, has also served to 
reduce threat perceptions along the border. Overall, China has greater numbers of 
nuclear devices and significantly better delivery systems, although India is gradually 
increasing the number of its devices and is developing missile delivery systems that 
would reach into eastern China. However, India and China, which have both 
enunciated “ no first use'' doctrines, are expected, at least in the current security 
environment, to maintain minimal nuclear deterrents. As a result, Western analysts 
have suggested that there are no realistic scenarios under which China's nuclear forces 
would be used to facilitate Chinese aggression against India.5
5 George Perkovich, "The Nuclear and Security Balance," in Francine R. Frankel and Harry 
Harding (eds.) The India-China Relationship: What the United States needs to know (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2004), pp.178-218 at p.189; Ashley Tellis, India's Emerging Nuclear 
Posture: between recessed deterrent and ready arsenal (Santa Monica, CA : Rand, 2001), 
p.136.
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It is arguable that reduced military threat perceptions in the Himalayas have 
contributed to greater assertiveness by India of its position in the Indian Ocean and 
Southeast Asia.
Energy security and strategic competition
Competition in the field of energy security is a significant and growing factor in the 
India-China relationship.
In coming years, both India and China will have a growing dependence on energy 
imports, primarily from the Middle East, but also from Northeast Asia, Central Asia, 
Africa and Australia. In 2007, China imported approximately 55% of its oil 
requirements (the great majority from the Middle East and Africa) and this is expected 
to rise significantly. In 2007, India imported approximately 69% of its oil requirements 
(around 2/3 of which from the Middle East), which is expected to rise to around 75- 
80% by 2015. China has over the past decade or more taken what has been described 
as a "diplomatic-mercantilist" approach to securing oil supplies. This has involved a 
centralised strategy of Chinese state-owned companies taking equity positions in 
energy resource suppliers, particularly in "rogue" or unstable states such as Sudan, 
Angola, Venezuela, Thailand and PNG. China has also encouraged extensive cross­
investment by major exporting companies in the Chinese energy sector to reinforce 
long-term ties w ith suppliers.6 In contrast, India's major oil companies (which 
paradoxically appear to be under closer state control than China's) have been subject 
to bureaucratic restrictions that have inhibited their ability to acquire equity oil.7 As a
6 See generally, Bimal Kumar Sikdar and Amitabh Sikdar, India & China: Strategic Energy 
Management and Security (New Delhi: Manas Publications, 2009); and Hongyi Lai (ed.), Asian 
Energy Security: the Maritime Dimension (London: Palgrave MacMillan 2009).
7 Jeffrey G.Brown, Vijay Mukherji and Kang Wu, "The Energy Race between China and India: 
Motivations and Potential Opportunities for Cooperation" in China, India and the United
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result of China's aggressive approach, between 2004 and 2006 Chinese companies 
outbid Indian companies to acquire major stakes in oil and gas fields in Angola, 
Kazakhstan, Nigeria and Burma. This prompted an agreement in 2006 between India's 
ONGC and China's CNPC to make joint bids on projects, leading some to be optimistic 
about the prospects for Sino-lndian cooperation in the development of supplies, 
particularly in Iran and Central Asia.* 8 However, Tow argues that China's strategy has 
been to compete with India for control of energy supplies while remaining open to 
cooperation with India where Indian involvement would be advantageous. He believes 
that it is unclear to what extent joint collaboration in securing supplies will overcome 
their legacy of geopolitical competition.9
Concerns over energy security have been a prime factor in China and India's increased 
focus on the security of SLOCs in the Indian Ocean, and particularly the chokepoints in 
the Straits of Hormuz and Malacca. While approximately 80% of China's oil imports 
pass through the Strait of Malacca, China is not able to provide SLOC protection there, 
raising what Chinese President Hu Jiantao referred to as China's "Malacca dilemma". 
China's concerns about protecting energy supplies is now an important factor in the 
expansion of its interests in the Indian Ocean region, including the development of the 
port of Gwadar in Pakistan and proposals to build oil pipelines through Pakistan and 
Burma.
States: Competition fo r Energy Resources (Abu Dhabi: The Emirates Centre for Strategic
Studies and Research, 2008), pp.223-254.
8 Amardeep Athwal, China-lndia relations : contemporary dynamics (New York : Routledge, 
2007), p.105; and Sudha Mahalingam, "India-China energy cooperation: commonalities, 
synergies and complementarities" in Ligia Noronha and Anant Sudarshan (eds), India's Energy 
Security (London: Routledge, 2009), pp.97 -107.
9 William T. Tow, "Strategic dimensions of energy competition in Asia," in Michael Wesley 
(ed.), Energy Security in Asia (London: Routledge, 2008), pp.161-173.
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The economic dimension
In recent years, the Sino-lndian relationship has also developed a significant economic 
dimension. This has several aspects, including the impact of economic growth on 
overall national power and the potential impact of the bilateral economic relationship 
on strategic competition and cooperation.
China's head start in implementing economic reforms and attracting foreign 
investment has led to a significant disparity between China's and India's GDP, a 
disparity that seems likely to grow in absolute terms in coming years. Goldman Sachs 
has projected China's GDP in 2010 to be US$4,667 billion as compared with India's 
GDP of US$1,256 billion, and China's GDP in 2030 to be US$25,610 billion as compared 
with India's GDP of US$6,683 billion. Although India's rate of economic growth is 
expected to exceed China's from around 2015, China's GDP is still expected to be 
almost twice the size of India's in 2050.10 It is apparent that China's political system 
has been much more successful than India's in driving economic development, 
although Indian optimists suggest that India's democratic system will deliver stronger 
economic benefits over the longer term. Nevertheless, for some, the growing disparity 
in China's and India's economic power will make China an increasing threat to India in 
coming years.
The opening of China's and India's economies and the global financial crisis has also led 
to some remarkable increases in Sino-lndian trade. Bilateral trade has grown from 
US$117 million in 1987 to US$51.7 billion in 2008 (up 34% from 2007), making China 
India's largest trading partner. According to some forecasts bilateral trade is expected 
to grow as high as US$100 billion by 2011. Some analysts suggest that rapidly
10 Tushar Poddar and Eva Yi, "India's Rising Growth Potential," Goldman Sachs Global 
Economics Paper No.152. <www.usindiafriendship.net/viewpointsl/lndias_Rising 
_Growth_Potential.pdf>
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increasing trade between India and China w ill lead to  greater interdependence 
between them , perhaps moderating tensions and providing an environm ent fo r 
greater strategic cooperation.11 However, there are major imbalances in the trade 
relationship. W hile China's exports are largely manufactures, Indian exports to  China 
are largely low value added commodities. There is also a massive numerical imbalance 
in China's favour. In the 12 months ended April 2009, exports from  China (including 
Hong Kong) to  India aggregated US$37.74 billion, while  India's exports to  China 
(including Hong Kong) were only US$15.93 billion, leaving a physical trade defic it fo r 
India o f US$21.81 b illion .12 There are w idely held concerns tha t India is being flooded 
w ith  Chinese manufactured goods which w ill destroy local industries, increasing 
pressure on the Indian governm ent to  institu te  anti-dum ping measures against China. 
A bila tera l free trade agreement has been under negotiation since 2004, although 
there  is reported ly "considerable scepticism" about it in light o f these imbalances.13 
Bilateral investm ent between India and China is negligible, h ighlighting the shallow 
nature o f the relationship. Actual Chinese foreign d irect investm ent in India between 
2000 and 2009 was US$14 m illion14 while approved Indian foreign direct investm ent in 
China between 1996 and 2004 was US$96 m illion .15 The economic relationship 
between India and China may well mature and broaden in coming years, however it is 
arguable tha t in some ways the expansion o f trade between China and India is 
curren tly  as much a source o f fric tion  as a driver fo r strategic cooperation.
11 See, for example, B.Raman, "China & India: Reality behind statistics," South Asia Analysis 
Group Paper No.2567, 28 January 2008.
12 Indian Department of Commerce and Industry. < http://commerce.nic.in/eidb>.
13 Athwal, China-lndia relations, p.88.
14 Indian Ministry of Commerce and Industry. < http://commerce.nic.in/eidb>.
15 Athwal, China-lndia relations, p.91-2.
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2.4.3 Visions of the future of Sino-lndian relations
The history of Sino-lndian relations and the new dimensions in their relationship have 
led to a great deal of uncertainty and debate about the overall trajectory of the 
relationship. To what extent it will be primarily characterised by cooperation, rivalry or 
a complex mixture of the two? Mohan believes that the way New Delhi handles ties 
with Beijing will be the biggest challenge for Indian foreign policy in the coming 
decades, claiming that all the big issues in India's foreign relations, including its 
relationship with the United States and Asia are intimately tied to the China 
relationship.16 It is worth considering the streams of thinking on China in New Delhi, 
which might be called the cooperationists, the realists and the pragmatists.
"Cooperationists" see significant potential for a convergence in the views of China and 
India about a multilateral world order, trade and energy that may overcome historical 
mistrust. Indian supporters of China include communist and leftist opposition parties 
who also generally oppose closer strategic relations between India and the United 
States. Indian sinologists such as Alka Acharya generally take an optimistic view of the 
relationship, believing that the border dispute can be resolved through mutual 
goodwill and emphasising the importance of a balanced economic relationship.17
In contrast are those who see a fundamental geopolitical divide between India and 
China as a result of their size and geographic proximity, aggravated by the fact that 
both are virtually simultaneously rising as major powers. The conflict between China 
and Indian concepts of national greatness and security are played out as a 
"geopolitical" conflict centred around the Himalayas and increasingly over a broader 
geographical area. According to Garver, periods of cooperation have been "brief and
16 Mohan, Crossing the Rubicon, p.143.
17 Alka Acharya, China & India: Politics of Incremental Engagement (New Delhi: Har-Anand 
Publications, 2008).
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problematic" and conflict is the dominant characteristic of the Sino-lndian relationship. 
He believes that this would continue to exist even if the immediate issues of the 
border dispute and China's relationship with Pakistan were resolved.18 As was 
discussed in section 2.2, such thinking underlies a large and growing school of 
"hyperrealists" in New Delhi who strongly focus on the territorial dispute and China's 
"encirclement" strategy in South Asia and the Indian Ocean and advocate a 
containment-cum-counter-encirclement strategy in East Asia.
However, the dominant view of China in New Delhi is more pragmatic - of recognising 
that India and China are strategic competitors, while trying to manage their 
aspirations. According to this view, China is not necessarily a direct military threat, but 
may pose a potential threat to India's interests, particularly if it does not acquiesce to 
the rise of India and the extension of Indian power beyond South Asia.19 In recent 
years the Indian government has sought to keep strategic rivalry with China within 
limits while it builds its national power and asserts its status as a great power. 
Relations improved for several years following Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee's 2003 
visit to Beijing and a declaration of a strategic partnership between India and China in 
2006. However, there are real limits to any rapprochement, as shown by India's 
reported rejection of a Chinese request to conclude a "peace and friendship treaty" 
prior to President Hu's visit to India in late 2008.20 India and China have nevertheless 
sought to place the border issue on the backburner and to focus on encouraging 
bilateral trade. Both have made periodic gestures of cooperation on security issues 
including exchanging ship visits and small bilateral exercises. Malik calls India's 
current strategic policy toward China as one of "balanced engagement" that steers a
18 Garver, Protracted Contest, p.6.
19 Steven A. Hoffman, "Perception and China Policy in India," in Frankel and Harding, The India- 
China Relationship, pp.33-74.
20 Mohan, "The Evolution of Sino-lndian Relations,"in Ayres and Mohan, Power Realignments 
in Asia, pp.270-290 at p.288.
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path between viewing China as a threat and appeasement and emphasises the need 
for India to accumulate economic, technological and military power.21 Frazier argues 
that both sides have recognised the need to prevent tensions from leading to 
sustained overt rivalry and that the prevailing pattern of relations has been one of 
"quiet competition." However, there is still a real possibility of heightened 
competition, particularly if a stagnant Indian economy leads India to bind itself closer 
to the United States, or a sustained downturn in China's economic performance 
changes the balance of power between India and China, leading to greater 
assertiveness by India.22
Adding to uncertainties in the relationship is an asymmetry in threat perceptions 
between India and China - generally high from India's perspective and low from 
China's.23 Notwithstanding its policy of engagement India remains focused on China as 
its primary strategic competitor. In contrast, the Chinese do not generally see any 
strategic equivalence between themselves and the Indians - they perceive themselves 
as a global power and any comparison with India as demeaning. They see India as 
weak, divided and an economic catastrophe and lacking in comprehensive national 
strength, but with "unrealistic and unachievable 'big power dreams' (daguomeng)"24
21 Mohan Malik, "Eyeing the Dragon: India's China Debate" Asia-Pacific Center fo r Security 
Studies, Special Assessment, December 2003.
22 Mark W. Frazier, "Quiet Competition and the Future of Sino-lndian Relations" in Frankel and 
Harding, The India-China Relationship, pp.294-318.
23 John W.Garver, "Asymmetrical Indian and Chinese Threat Perceptions" in Sumit Ganguly, 
India as an Emerging Power (London: Frank Cass, 2003), pp.109 -  134; and Susan L. Shirk, 
"One-Sided Rivalry: China's Perceptions and Policies Toward India" in Frankel and Harding, The 
India-China Relationship.
24 Andrew Scobell, '"Cult of Defense' and 'Big Power Dreams': The Influence of Strategic 
Culture on China's Relationship with India," in Malcolm R.Chambers (ed.), South Asia in 2020: 
Future Strategic Balances and Alliances (Carlisle: US Army War College, Strategic Studies 
Institute, 2002), pp.329-359.
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According to  one com m entator: "China perceives India to  be an ambitious, 
overconfident yet m ilitarily  powerful neighbour w ith  whom it may eventually have to  
have a day o f reckoning."25 China is a long way from  accepting tha t India has any 
regional "leadership" role and appears to  believe tha t India's own inadequacies are 
likely to  lim it its influence in East Asia.26 However, both Tellis and Garver argue tha t 
the true  perceptions of Chinese security managers d iffe r significantly from  public 
statem ents and Chinese indifference towards India is "fe igned" w ith  the objective o f 
delegitim ising India's security concerns.27 Certainly, over the last several years China 
has dem onstrated increasing concern about developing strategic links between India 
and the United States, which have been compared by some Chinese analysts to  the 
United States and China finding common cause against the Soviet Union in the early 
1970s. Some believe tha t there may be a hardening o f China's stance on a whole 
range issues as India draws closer to  the United States and other East Asian m aritim e 
powers.
China would no doubt prefer to  see a continuation o f the long-running strategic divide 
between the  East Asian and South Asian security complexes, seeking to  place itse lf at 
the core o f East Asian security while also continuing to  play a major balancing role in 
South Asia through its relationships w ith  India's neighbours. However, this divide is 
breaking down w ith  India's increasing security engagement in East Asia and it is not yet 
clear how China w ill seek to  mould tha t engagement. Some have argued tha t India 
and China could each accommodate the other's great power am bitions through a 
m utual understanding of each other's sphere o f influence, i.e. India over South Asia
25 Gary Klintworth, "Chinese Perspectives on India as a Great Power" in Babbage and Gordon, 
India's strategic future, pp94-106 at p.96.
26 Shirk, "One-Sided Rivalry."
27 Ashley J.Tellis, "China and India in Asia," in Frankel and Harding, The India-China 
Relationship, at p.143; Garver, "Asymmetrical Indian and Chinese Threat Perceptions," at 
p.131.
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and China over Southeast Asia. However, there is no indication that either China or 
India would be willing to accept such an arrangement.
2.4.4 Political and economic rivalry in Southeast Asia
This section provides an overview of economic and political rivalry between India and 
China in Southeast Asia, a rivalry which Nehru once called the "basic challenge" of 
security in the region.28
Arguably, for more than a millennium Southeast Asia has been the primary area of 
(indirect) cultural and economic interaction between India and China or, as some 
would have it, overlapping spheres of interest. Certainly, the region is fast becoming a 
key area of economic and political rivalry.29 There are increasing concerns among 
Indian policy-makers about the growing economic power of China and the potential for 
China to dominate the whole Asia-Pacific region and some see India's Look East policy 
primarily in terms of a competition by India w ith China for regional dominance.30 Tellis 
believes that of all geographic areas where Sino-lndian rivalry is likely to materialise, 
Southeast Asia will likely be one of the most important. However, he sees the rivalry 
as asymmetric in that China has positive objectives in the region, while India's 
objectives are largely negative.31 According to Tellis, India has three broad strategic 
objectives in Southeast Asia, which are largely aimed at China: first to prevent China 
from acquiring a forward presence that could threaten the Indian homeland and its 
freedom of action in South Asia; second to prevent China from gaining sufficient
28 Sankar Ghose, Jawahorlal Nehru, a biography (New Delhi: Allied Publishers, 1993), p.298.
29 For discussions of Sino-lndian rivalry in Southeast Asia, see Tellis, "China and India in Asia"; 
and Zhao Hong, "India and China: rivals or partners in Southeast Asia?" Contemporary 
Southeast Asia, Vol. 29, No. 1 (April 2007), pp. 121-142.
30 J.Mohan Malik, "Sino-lndian Relations and India's Eastern Strategy" in Gordon and 
Henningham, India Looks East, pp.119-163.
31 Tellis, "China and India in Asia."
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regional influence so as to be able to coerce regional states into supporting policies 
that undercut Indian security; and third to develop strategic relationships with key 
states that give India freedom to operate in the region, including providing support to 
regional partners. This thesis will argue that while such "reactive" dynamics in 
relation to China are important in India's engagement w ith Southeast Asia, India's 
engagement is also to a significant extent driven by its own "active" search for great 
power status in the region.
China and India's economic and political influence in Southeast Asia
Through much of the Cold War, the political and economic influence of both China and 
India in Southeast Asia was limited: China was generally seen as an ideological and 
security threat, while India abstained from assuming a significant role in the region. 
Since the early 1990s China's economic and political influence in Southeast Asia has 
grown markedly and is now regarded within Southeast Asia as a key economic and 
political partner, albeit one which still needs to be brought fully within the 
international order. India is now attempting to catch up to China's position.
China's policies of economic liberalisation since the late 1970s, combined w ith its long­
standing economic and cultural links with the region has allowed it to develop a major 
economic role in Southeast Asia, far in excess of India's (although India's economic 
relationship is now growing faster in percentage terms).32 Bilateral trade between 
China (excluding Hong Kong) and ASEAN states grew from US$8 billion in 1993 to
32 Some have placed particular significance on the so-called "bamboo networks" of ethnic 
Chinese that form a significant trading class across Southeast Asia, while Indian ethnic 
communities in Southeast Asia are either small or do not have significant economic influence.
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US$192 billion in 2008 (an annual increase of 12.5% over 2007).33 In contrast, 
bilateral trade between India and ASEAN states grew from  $2 billion in 1993 to  US$47 
billion in 2008 (an annual increase o f 37% over 2007).34 The disparity is paralleled in 
investm ent relationships, which arguably is a be tte r long-term  gauge o f economic 
influence and interdependence than trade. Net FDI from  China to  ASEAN aggregated 
US$5.1 billion between 2000 and 2008 as compared w ith  FDI from  India to  ASEAN of 
US$1.3 billion in the same p e r io d .35 FDI from  ASEAN to  China aggregated US$52 
billion up to  2008 (mostly in the  m anufacturing sector),36 while FDI from  ASEAN to  
India aggregated US$7.9 billion between 2000 and 2008 (mostly in real estate and 
services).37
China has also successfully developed institu tiona l linkages w ith  the region which w ill 
continue to  enhance its economic position and potentia lly  complicate India's. During 
the 1997 Asian financial crisis, China's o ffe r o f financial support to  Thailand and its 
pledge not to  undertake com petitive  currency devaluations won it significant 
goodw ill.38 China signed trade agreements w ith  ASEAN on goods and services in 2004 
and 2007. China's approach in giving ASEAN early access to  the Chinese market in 
certain areas as well as concessional ta riffs  on agricultural items magnified China's 
image as a benevolent, responsible pow er.39 An ASEAN-China free trade area w ill
33 However it is argued that China-ASEAN trade figures are exaggerated because much of 
China's exports is "processing" trade involving the re-export of goods to which Chinese 
companies have added little value.
34 Indian Ministry of Commerce and Industry. < http://commerce.nic.in/eidb>.
35 ASEAN Secretariat, <http://www.aseansec.org/22122.htm>.
36 "China attracts $52 bln investment from ASEAN," Xinhua, 21 October 2008.
37 Indian Ministry of Commerce and Industry. < http://commerce.nic.in/eidb>.
38 Jurgen Haacke, "Seeking Influence: China's Diplomacy Towards ASEAN after the Asian Crisis," 
Asian Perspective, Vol.26, No.4 (2002), pp.13-52.
39 Bronson Percival, The Dragon Looks South: China and Southeast Asia in the New Century 
(Westport: Praeger Security International, 2007), p.79.
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commence in 2010 (for the 6 original ASEAN states) which w ill provide fo r zero-tariffs 
on around 90% o f m anufactured products and reduced tariffs  on agricultural products. 
Some argue tha t this has significant potentia l to  underm ine any fu tu re  m ultila tera l 
Asia-Pacific free trade area by "dividing and conquering" ASEAN states.40 China also 
hopes tha t the Chinese yuan which is currently largely only used in border trade w ill 
grow  to  play a significant role as a regional currency, partia lly replacing the current 
role o f the  US do lla r.41
In contrast, India's political and economic influence in Southeast Asia has grown 
re la tively slowly. A lthough ASEAN states have generally welcomed India's 
partic ipa tion  in various regional fora, India has been relatively slow to  develop form al 
economic linkages w ith  ASEAN. India signed a trade agreement w ith  ASEAN only in 
August 2009. Negotiations were reportedly hampered by a lack o f strategic vision on 
the part o f India and disagreements w ith in  the Indian bureaucracy, leading to  India's 
insistence on extensive exceptions and anti-dum ping measures.42 W hile India has 
made significant progress in developing economic links w ith  Singapore, it has had 
significant problems in negotiating trade agreements w ith  less developed ASEAN 
members (including potentia l regional partners such as Vietnam and Indonesia), where 
the Indian governm ent is under significant domestic pressure to  maintain its 
p ro tection is t policies over the im port o f agricultural products from  Southeast Asia.
In parallel to  its economic links, China is developing good political-security 
re lationships in the region. W ith the end of the Cold W ar China has actively pursued
40 Vincent Wei-cheng Wang, "The Logic of China-ASEAN Free Trade Agreement: Economic 
Statecraft of "Peaceful Rise"" paper presented at Institute of China Studies University of 
Malaya conference, 5-6 August 2007.
41 China-ASEAN FTA to accelerate RMB regionalization" Peoples Online Daily, 23 October 2009.
42 Debashis Chakraborty, "China Factor in India-ASEAN Relations" IPCS China Seminar Report # 
273, 15 December 2008.
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relations in Southeast Asia, at both bilateral and multilateral levels, moving past its 
previous distrust of multilateral institutions. China now participates in numerous 
regional arrangements including the ARF from 1994, as ASEAN Dialogue Partner from 
1996, and ASEAN + 3 from 1997, which China has sought to position as the main 
"vehicle" for Asian economic integration. ASEAN + 3 has become institutionalised to a 
significant degree, with 57 bodies now implementing ASEAN + 3 coordination over an 
increasing range of political, security and economic issues.43
The greatest irritant in China-ASEAN relations remains China's claims over much of the 
South China Sea, a maritime area far removed from the China mainland, resulting in 
territorial disputes with six ASEAN states. China and ASEAN were able to significantly 
reduce tensions over the South China Sea through the multilateral 2002 Declaration on 
the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea and China's accession to the ASEAN 
Treaty of Amity in October 2003. In December 2004, ASEAN and China announced a 5 
year Plan of Action to implement a China-ASEAN Strategic Partnership , focused heavily 
on defence and security cooperation, including confidence building measures, 
consultation and joint exercises. At the same time, China has also pursued bilateral 
security dialogues with Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and 
Vietnam. However, despite significant progress in developing cooperative security 
relationships, China's periodic actions to bolster its territorial claims in the South China 
Sea continues to raise concerns in the region, as does China's military modernisation 
and capacity building.
While building relations with the region, China has sometimes obstructed the 
development of India's role. In the late 1990s, China refused to allow India into the 
ASEAN + 3 grouping, apparently seeking to create an "inner circle" of East Asian states 
in a close relationship with ASEAN that China hopes to eventually dominate. As a 
result, India was forced into a separate summit meeting with ASEAN. In 2005, China
43 <http://www.aseansec.org/16580.htm>.
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also sought, unsuccessfully, to exclude India from participation in the East Asia 
Summit. During the Summit China led moves to cast India as an "outsider" and place it 
in the back seat in developing any future East Asian economic grouping which would 
be "driven" by ASEAN within the "vehicle" of ASEAN + 3.44 As Chinese Premier Wen 
Jiabao claimed, the East Asian Summit "should be led only by East Asian countries." 
While China has sometimes obstructed an enhanced role for India in Southeast Asia, it 
has not generally seen India as an impediment to its overall regional strategy.45 
China's main regional rivals remain the United States and Japan whose economic (and, 
in the case of the United States, also political) influence exceed China's by a 
considerable margin. Some believe that in the future China may see benefit in 
cooperation w ith India in Southeast Asia to help balance the overwhelming influence 
and unilateralism of the United States and contribute to a multipolar Asia Pacific.46
India is highly sensitive to China's overwhelming advantage in any competition for 
influence in Southeast Asia, leading it to downplay any suggestions of rivalry in the 
region. Former Indian foreign ministry secretary, Sudhir Devare warned that: "India 
does not and should not seek closer m ilitary ties w ith Southeast Asia as a bulwark 
against China or Pakistan" and that such an approach would be "flawed conceptually 
as well as disastrous politically."47 According to Mohan, despite the "exaggerated 
debate "about India's rivalry w ith China, New Delhi is acutely conscious of its
44 J. Mohan Malik, "China and the East Asian Summit: More Discord than Accord," Asia-Pacific 
Center for Security Studies, February 2006. <www.apcss.org/Publications/APSSS/ 
ChinaandEastAsiaSummit.pdf>.
45 Percival, The Dragon Looks South, p.14.
46 Zhang Guihong, "US-India Strategic Cooperation: Implications for China" Paper submitted to 
The Asia Fellow China Alumni Conference, 13-14 November 2005, Beijing University, China; 
and Zhao Hong, "India's Changing Relations with ASEAN in China's Perspective," East Asia 
Institute Background Paper No.313, 7 December 2006 and D.S.Rajan, "Is China wary of India's 
"Look East" policy?" Chennai Centre fo r China Studies Paper No.97, January 13, 2008..
47 Devare, India and Southeast Asia, p.211.
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lim ita tions in Southeast Asia and therefore wishes to  expand India's strategic weight in 
the region while avoiding creating overt rivalry w ith  China.48 India w ill therefore 
a ttem p t to  build security ties w ith  Southeast Asia outside o f the m atrix o f Sino-lndian 
riva lry.49
ASEAN perspectives on Sino-lndian rivalry
ASEAN states are likely to  respond to  Sino-lndian strategic rivalry in several ways. First, 
and most obviously, is in the economic dimension. As Indonesian President Yudhoyono 
com m ented in 2004, the economic challenge fo r ASEAN can be described in tw o  
words: China and India.50 W hile there are concerns about China and India in terms of 
po tentia lly  crowding out ASEAN's share o f global trade and investm ent, ASEAN leaders 
generally see economic com petition between China and India w ith in  Southeast Asia in 
positive term s, and in particular w ill continue to  use it as an opportun ity  to  encourage 
Indian economic integration in to ASEAN and to  open the Indian market to  Southeast 
Asian products and investm ent. Singapore Prime M in iste r Go Chok Tong described 
ASEAN as the  fuselage of economic jum bo je t w ith  China and India being the wings. 
This p icture o f course places Singapore and o ther ASEAN states in the (highly 
pro fitab le) centre, between the Chinese and Indian economies.
Second, the ASEAN states and India w ill have a common interest in seeking to  lim it the 
grow th  o f China's political and m ilitary power in Southeast Asia. India is generally seen 
in Southeast Asia in benign terms, in contrast to  which China is still regarded by many 
as a potentia l security th rea t whose power needs to  be balanced. As a result, ASEAN 
has fac ilita ted  India's links w ith  the region to  help balance China (as well as the United
48 C.Raja Mohan, “ India's Geopolitics and Southeast Asian Security" in Singh and Maung, 
Southeast Asian Affairs 2008, p.53.
49 Mohan, "Is India an East Asian power?"
50 "Faster ASEAN integration urged," International Herald Tribune, 29 November 2004.
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States and Japan). As will be seen in section 3.1, this should not be seen as an attempt 
to create a balancing coalition in a neorealist sense. Rather, it is an attempt to enmesh 
both China and India in a web of cooperative relationships while using each to limit the 
power of the other.
Third, ASEAN states will likely try to mitigate any overt rivalry between India and China 
in and around the region. While many ASEAN states are encouraging India to play a 
greater security role in Southeast Asia, absent a significant change in the security 
environment they will also want any Indian security presence to be discreet. For the 
same reasons, although ASEAN states (particularly Singapore, Indonesia and Malaysia) 
have avoided criticising China's interests in the Indian Ocean they are likely to 
encourage China to be discreet in developing such interests.
Fourth, is the potential for ASEAN to use Sino-lndian rivalry to maintain and enhance 
its own strategic influence. ASEAN's role in future regional security arrangements is 
unclear particularly in light of perceived inadequacies in the effectiveness of the 
ASEAN Regional Forum. Some believe that India now has an important stake in the 
continued relevance of ASEAN in countering domination of the region by the United 
States or China.51 Arguably, ongoing strategic rivalry between India and China may 
lead them both to seek to deepen relationships with ASEAN, reducing the likelihood of 
its marginalisation.
Finally, is the potential for Sino-lndian rivalry to be a factor in intra-regional relations in 
Southeast Asia. During the Cold War, links with extra-regional powers such as the 
Soviet Union, China and the United States were significant factors in stoking intra- 
regional tensions. It is already possible to discern Sino-lndian rivalry along potential 
fault lines within ASEAN: in Indochina between Cambodia (traditionally sponsored by
51 Sinderpal Singh and Syeda Sana Rahman, "The Next Stage of Singapore-lndia Relations: 
Possibilities and Prospects," ISAS Working Paper No.91, 24 September 2009, pp.12-13.
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China) and Vietnam (a longstanding political ally of India); and in maritime Southeast 
Asia between, on the one hand, Malaysia (China's most vocal supporter in the region) 
and, on the other, Singapore (India's primary regional partner) and Indonesia. India 
and China could therefore become significant factors in existing intra-regional rivalries 
to the extent that ASEAN is not able to effectively manage tensions within a regional 
framework.
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This part will make a detailed examination of India's strategic relationships with key 
middle powers of East Asia. Chapter 3.1 will examine India's comprehensive strategic 
partnership with Singapore. Chapter 3.2 will review the development of India's 
security relationship with Indonesia, particularly in the maritime security sphere. 
Chapter 3.3 will look at India's attempts to develop its long-standing political alliance 
with Vietnam into a broader security relationship and chapter 3.4 will consider India's 
relationship with South Korea.
The key themes that will be examined in this part are:
• The pattern of India's strategic engagement with Southeast Asia since the end 
of the Cold War.
• Southeast Asian ideas of what constitutes a balance of power and India's 
potential role in that balance.
• India's potential role as a maritime security provider in Southeast Asia and its 
particular interest in the security of the Malacca Strait.
• The potential limitations on a security role for India in the South China Sea and 
in Northeast Asia.
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Chapter 3.1 India's Strategic Partnership with Singapore
3.1.1 India's hesitant strategic role in Southeast Asia
3.1.2 The new economic partnership between India and Singapore
3.1.3 The new security partnership between India and Singapore
3.1.4 Cooperation in maritime security
3.1.5 Singaporean perspectives on India
3.1.6 Indian perspectives on Singapore
Introduction
India and Singapore have developed a bilateral security and economic partnership that 
occupies a central position in India's strategic engagement in Southeast Asia. Having 
sought strategic engagement with India for many decades, Singapore has now 
successfully positioned itself as India's leading political partner and economic gateway 
to the region. The two have also actively pursued close defence ties which may lead to 
India assuming an active role in Singapore's security.1
This chapter will examine these developments and consider to what extent the 
relationship involves balancing China's growing economic and political dominance of 
the region and to what extent it reflects a return to a "natural" strategic sphere for 
India stretching from Aden to Singapore and beyond. Singapore, despite its small size, 
may well act as a pivot to the future development of India's security role throughout 
Southeast Asia.
1 See generally, David Brewster, "India's Security Partnership with Singapore," The Pacific 
Review, Vol. 22, No. 5 (December 2009), pp. 597 -  618.
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3.1.1 India's hesitant strategic role in Southeast Asia
The institutional links between Singapore and India are as old as Singapore itself. 
Singapore was founded by the British East India Company as a trading post for China 
trade. For almost the first 50 years of its settlement Singapore was under the direct 
administration of British India and to a great extent Singapore inherited its political, 
legal and administrative systems from the Raj -  it was under the authority of the 
Indian legislative council, the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of Calcutta and its civil 
service was established by the Indian civil service. Even after Singapore was placed 
under separate colonial control it was assumed that British India would be primarily 
responsible for its security. This reflected not only the availability of Indian colonial 
forces, but also a broadly held acceptance prior to World War II that the "natural" 
strategic sphere of British India ran to Singapore and beyond. Leading strategic 
thinkers from Lord Curzon to K.M.Panikkar recognised the strategic importance of 
Singapore to India as the eastern anchor of India's maritime security and that India -  
whether British-controlled or independent -  would be a principal security provider to 
Singapore.2
The importance of Singapore as the eastern anchor to India's maritime security was 
played out with the fall of Singapore to the Japanese in February 1942 involving the 
surrender of some 40,000 Indian troops. This was followed by the capture of India's 
Andaman Islands and the evacuation of the British Eastern fleet to Africa, exposing 
India's entire eastern seaboard to attack. However the Japanese were for various 
reasons unwilling or unable to properly exploit their position.
2 Lord Curzon of Kedleston, The Place of India in the Empire (London: John Murray, 1909). 
Panikkar proposed that in the long term, independent India and Indonesia, as the local sea 
powers, would need to take joint responsibility for the security of Singapore. Panikkar, The 
Future of Southeast Asia at pp.100-1.
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The granting of independence to India in 1947 and the subsequent decolonisation of 
Southeast Asia led to a significant discontinuity in Indian perceptions of the region. 
Nehruvian strategic doctrine largely eschewed a direct security role for India outside of 
South Asia and India saw its interests as limited to making generally ineffective efforts 
to minimise the intrusion of other major powers into Southeast Asia. Despite India's 
abdication of any strategic responsibility and its tarnished reputation following its 
defeat at the hands of China in 1962, Singapore continued to recognise a legitimate 
role for India as a regional security provider.
In what has been called Singapore's "survival phase" in the years following 
independence, Singapore saw' itself as being in a precarious strategic position, 
concerned not only with the prospect of Communist Chinese-supported internal 
subversion, but also with external threats posed by Indonesia and a potentially 
revanchist Malaysia. Singapore saw India as potentially helping to maintain its new­
found sovereignty against infringements by China as well as its large neighbours. 
Within minutes of Lee Kuan Yew's declaration of independence on 9 August 1965, in 
what was probably his first act as leader of an independent Singapore, Lee wrote to 
Indian Prime Minister Shastri requesting Indian assistance in training the newly- 
established Singaporean army. However, the Indians declined to even respond to the 
request, apparently not wishing to be seen as taking sides against Malaysia.3 (The 
United States, Britain and Egypt also reportedly declined Singapore requests for 
assistance in military training, leading Singapore to turn to Israel for military advisors.) 
In the following years, Lee continued, unsuccessfully, to lobby New Delhi to involve 
itself in Singapore's security, with the idea that India would in some way take over 
Britain's role as a "protecting" power. Lee believed that India's presence was
3 it has also been suggested that India, then seeking to consolidate its position in Bhutan, 
believed that military support for Singapore would unduly antagonize China. Lee, From Third 
World to First, pp.30-1.
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necessary to deter Malaysia's plans to continue to control Singapore after 
independence and to guarantee against Indonesia going "berserk." At the same time, 
Malaysia actively campaigned in New Delhi against India extending its relationship with 
Singapore, with Malaysian Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman arguing to Indira 
Gandhi that India should not "do anything to hurt Malaysia."4
In May 1968, following the announcement of the withdrawal of the British navy from 
Singapore, Lee again unsuccessfully tried to encourage an Indian military presence in 
Singapore, proposing to Indira Gandhi that the Indian navy should take over the Royal 
Navy's regional security role, including making use of Singaporean naval dockyard 
facilities for the building and repair of ships.5 When, during a visit to India in 1970, Lee 
asked Indira Gandhi whether India intended to extend its naval influence into 
Southeast Asia, the Indian Foreign Minister Swaran Singh responded that India's 
greater interest was in keeping its western sea lanes open.6
Singapore also unsuccessfully sought to persuade India to assume a broad regional 
security role, primarily but not wholly to counterbalance China. Following the first 
Chinese Lop Nur nuclear test in October 1964 -  even before Singapore's formal 
independence -  Lee reportedly suggested to visiting Indian dignitaries and journalists 
that India should also explode a nuclear bomb, "at least for the sake of Southeast Asia, 
even if she wanted to throw it into the sea later."7 Through the late 1960's, 
Singapore's leaders were concerned about the possibility of a regional power vacuum
4 Sunanda K. Datta-Ray, Looking East to Look West: Lee Kuan Yew's Mission India (Singapore: 
ISEAS Publishing, 2009), p.87.
5 Dr V. Suryanarayan, "India-Singapore Relations: An Over View" Chennai Centre for China 
Studies, C3S Paper No.140, 2 April, 2008.
5 Lee, From Third World to First, at p.452.
7 V.P.Dutt, India's Foreign Policy (New Delhi: Vikas), at p.256. Lee later denied making this 
statement although admitting that at the time he "was quite confident that India would have 
the bomb." Datta-Ray, Looking East to Look West, p.98.
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follow ing the British withdrawal and the likely reduction in the US military presence 
following a wind-down of the Vietnam war. In 1966, Lee proposed that India should 
adopt an "Asian Monroe Doctrine" to prevent "poaching" in Asia. Lee added that India 
was the ideal candidate to fu lfil such as role because it conducted its foreign policy "on 
a basis of equality and not on a basis of power relations."8 He told Indira Gandhi 
during his 1966 visit to New Delhi that India should consider taking a leading role in 
m ultilateral security arrangements for Asia.9 The Indians however again declined to 
make any official response to Lee's proposal. Singapore also reportedly tried to 
encourage India to join ASEAN upon its formation in 1967, perhaps with a view to 
finding a balance with large states within that grouping. However, other ASEAN states 
were not in favour of India's inclusion (possibly for the same reason) and India also 
remained suspicious of a possible security dimension to ASEAN.10
India's opposition to involvement in any regional security mechanism puzzled the 
Singaporeans and others in Southeast Asia,* 11 particularly in light of shared perceptions 
of a threat from China. To Southeast Asians, India's persistent downplaying o f any idea 
of a power vacuum and statements about the uselessness of m ilitary alliances seemed 
callous, incredible and unrealistic.12 Lee reportedly told friends that India was "living 
in a dream w orld ."13 The Indians however opposed security alliances or treaties a 
priori as part of Nehruvian strategic doctrine. There were also important differences in
8 Straits Times, 3 September 1966
9 Dutt, India's Foreign Policy at p.277-8.
10 Kripa Sridharan, The ASEAN Region in India's Foreign Policy (Aldershot: Dartmouth 
Publishing, 1996), p.49.
11 Malaysia also sought to persuade the Indians to join in the collective defense of Asia, 
proposing an "association" between India and Japan as the two major non-communist powers 
in Asia.
12 Kripa Sridharan, "Regional Perceptions of India" in Grare and Mattoo, India and ASEAN, 
pp.67-89 at p.74.
13 Quoted in Sridharan, The ASEAN Region in India's Foreign Policy, p.40.
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perceptions of the ideological or m ilitary th rea t posed by China -  the Singaporeans 
saw Chinese expansionism prim arily as an issue of com m unist subversion, while the 
Indians saw Chinese expansionism not prim arily as an ideological issue but as a 
d is tortion  of Chinese nationalism. The Indians also saw themselves as hardly capable 
o f providing fo r the ir own security, let alone acting as a regional security provider. As 
the jun io r Indian Foreign M in ister, B.R.Bhagat, argued in the Indian parliam ent in April 
1968: " If there was a defence agreement [w ith  Southeast Asia] it would only mean 
India com m itting her m anpower to  the defence o f areas which is beyond our capacity 
at present... If we dispersed our efforts and took on responsibilities tha t we are not 
capable o f shouldering, it would not only weaken our own defence but would create a 
false sense of security and m ight even provoke a greater tension in the area."14 
Rather than working directly w ith  Southeast Asian states to  improve the ir security,
India confined its e fforts to  the half-hearted endorsem ent o f proposals fo r major 
power security guarantees o f the region, such as the vague and unworkable Soviet 
collective regional security proposal made in 1969.
The Singaporeans began to  conclude tha t India did not have the material or moral 
w herew itha l to  extend its influence in to Southeast Asia. Lee observed what he called a 
"gradual run-down of the country." By the end o f the 1960s, India was moving 
tow ards a security relationship w ith  the Soviet Union, leading India to  lose whatever 
in terest it may have had in the security o f Southeast Asia, tha t is, apart from  a keen 
in terest in lim iting the influence of the United States and China in Indochina. During 
this period, the balance o f Singapore's strategic and economic interests also shifted 
away from  the Indian Ocean and towards the Asia-Pacific and the United States.15
14 Indian Parliament, Lok Sabha debates, 1968.
15 See generally, Emrys Chew, "A Merlion at the Edge of an Afrasian Sea: Singapore's Strategic 
Involvement in the Indian Ocean" RSIS Working Paper No. 164 (2008).
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It was Indira Gandhi's refusal in 1980 to oppose what Singaporeans saw as aggression 
by the Soviets and their proxies in the region that brought Singapore-lndia relations to 
their lowest point. Through the 1970s, New Delhi's burgeoning relationships with 
Moscow and its regional ally, Vietnam, were viewed with suspicion in Southeast Asia, 
which came to a head with the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia. In a major 
diplomatic misstep, in June 1980 the Gandhi government cancelled planned meetings 
with ASEAN ministers to discuss India's elevation as a full dialogue partner of ASEAN. 
Days later, India officially recognised the Vietnam-installed Cambodian government, 
becoming the first non-communist state to recognise the regime. India's action was 
interpreted as proof of it toeing the Moscow-Hanoi line. Whether this was true or if, 
as some claim, India was primarily concerned with resisting Chinese influence in 
Indochina, India was not able to convince the ASEAN states that China represented a 
greater threat than Vietnam. The Singaporeans, in particular, took a hardline stand on 
the Vietnamese actions, seeing them as a major test of the principle of sovereignty of 
small states, even if run by a despised regime such as the Khmer Rouge. Singapore's 
Foreign Minister S.Rajaratnam observed that India's recognition of the Vietnam- 
backed Heng Samrin regime would “amount to endorsing aggression and forcible 
installation of puppet regimes."16 Lee was even advised at one stage to break off 
diplomatic relations with India over the issue.17 For their part, Indian policy-makers 
viewed Singapore's stance on Cambodia as not based on real fears of Vietnamese 
expansionism, but as merely playing an anti-Soviet card to curry favour with the United 
States. India's continuing support for Vietnam and its failure to condemn the Soviet 
occupation of Afghanistan would bedevil political relations between India and 
Singapore and other ASEAN states for the remainder of the 1980s. In 1990 
Singaporean Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong publicly questioned India's intentions in 
Southeast Asia following reports of India's naval expansion plans. However, 
notwithstanding political strains, military to military contact between the Indian and
16 Sridharan, The ASEAN Region in India's Foreign Policy, p.140.
17 P.S.Suryanarayan, “ India, Malaysia step up defence ties" The Hindu, 8 January 2008
152
Part 3 Chapter 3.1 - India's Strategic 
Partnership with Singapore
Singaporean armed forces continued through the 1980s, including high level visits by 
Indian and Singaporean officers, the provision of tra in ing to  Singapore by Indian air 
force instructors (in both India and Singapore), and the supply by Singapore o f missile 
gunboats to  India.
As has been discussed in section 2.1, the end o f the Cold War and India's economic 
crisis o f the  early 1990s led to  a major reassessment by India o f its political and 
economic relationship w ith Southeast Asia. Although India's "Look East" policy, 
in itia lly  targeted Southeast Asian investm ent in India, India also made it clear tha t it 
sought security engagement w ith  the region. Singapore, unlike Malaysia and 
Indonesia, was unencumbered by Islamic political loyalties and represented an 
attractive  political and economic gateway fo r India into ASEAN. Singapore, which itself 
was undergoing somewhat o f a foreign policy reorientation, responded to  India's new 
policy w ith  enthusiasm. Despite fears in the early 1990s tha t a superpower w ithdraw al 
from  the region m ight lead to  unhealthy rivalry between Japan, China and India, 
Singapore had concluded by 1993 tha t India's strategic presence in Southeast Asia 
would, as it said, "help stabilize the region by counterbalancing the o ther political 
heavyweights."18 Singapore was concerned not only about a more assertive China 
(which in 1992 claimed much o f the South China Sea as Chinese te rrito ry ), but also by 
the modernisation o f the Malaysian and Indonesian armed forces and fears o f the 
possible form ation  o f a Kuala Lumpur-Jakarta political axis directed against it .19 At
18 As stated by the current Foreign Minister, George Yeo, while on a visit to India in 1993. See 
Kripa Sridharan, "Transcending the Region: Singapore's India Policy" in N.N.Vohra (ed.), 
Emerging Asia: Challenges fo r India and Singapore, (New Delhi: Manohar, 2003) pp.15-32 at
p.21.
19 Escalating tensions between Singapore and Malaysia over security-related issues from the 
late 1980s included a large scale military exercise by Malaysia and Indonesia in the adjacent 
Malaysian state of Johor in August 1991, culminating on Singapore's National Independence 
day. Singapore responded with a large scale military mobilisation. Serious political tensions
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about the same time, the Singapore government also concluded that for its relatively 
mature economy to develop further in spite of its severely limited size and resources, 
it needed to create an “external economy" within the region as a “second wing" to its 
onshore economy.20 India, with its large labour force and relatively undeveloped 
markets, was identified as a key target for the development of an external economy 
for Singapore.
Singapore quickly positioned itself as India's de facto  regional sponsor and became 
central to India's multilateral engagement in Southeast Asia. With the support of 
Singapore and Indonesia, India was soon elevated to be a full ASEAN dialogue partner 
in December 1995 and following Singapore's hard lobbying of reluctant ASEAN 
members, India joined the ASEAN Regional Forum in 1996. India's entry into the ARF 
reportedly involved a significant diplomatic effort by Singapore to overcome fears of 
importing the India-Pakistan dispute into the forum, the grounds on which India's 
membership had previously been rejected in 1993.21 When India was refused 
membership in the ASEAN + 3 grouping in 2000, Singapore successfully lobbied for a 
separate India-ASEAN summit, which was held in November 2002.22 In 2005, 
Singapore (along with Indonesia, Japan and others) supported the inclusion of India in 
the first East Asian Summit, with Lee arguing that it “would be a useful balance to 
China's heft."23 Unsurprisingly, Lee also supported the inclusion of India in any Asian 
Economic Community, arguing that it would help "expand the market" and lead to
with Malaysia continued through the 1990s. Timothy Huxley, Defending the Lion City: the 
Armed Forces of Singapore (St Leonards: Allen & Unwin, 2000) p.46.
20 Arun Mahizhnan, "Developing Singapore's External Economy," Southeast Asian Affairs Vol.21 
(1994), pp.285-301.
21 Kripa Sridharan, “ Regional Perceptions of India" at p.76.
22 Malaysia, Thailand and Philippines reportedly opposed it despite Singapore's energetic 
advocacy. Sridharan, “Transcending the Region: Singapore's India Policy" at pp.28-9.
23 “ Lee Kuan Yew Reflects" Time Asia, 5 December, 2005.
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"more specialisation and division of labour."24 While acting as India's regional 
sponsor, Singapore also worked hard to develop the bilateral relationship. Despite 
scepticism among many ASEAN partners about the ability of India to deliver economic 
development comparable to China, the Singaporeans have shown considerable 
tolerance of and patience with Indian systemic problems, seeking in many cases to 
bypass New Delhi and work directly with Indian state authorities, while nudging the 
centre towards economic and institutional reform.25
3.1.2 The new economic partnership between India and Singapore
Economics plays a primary role in most of Singapore's bilateral relationships, and 
Singapore's relationship with India is no different. Although Singapore plays an 
important role as an economic gateway between China and Southeast Asia, in many 
ways India represents a greater opportunity. In contrast to China, which has the 
benefit of longstanding direct trading links with many Southeast Asian economies 
(including through the large Chinese ethnic communities in many states), India's direct 
economic ties with the region are much less established. As well as acting as India's 
gateway to Southeast Asia, the Singaporeans also believe that they can become a 
trade and financial intermediary between India and China.26 More generally, they 
believe they can assist in India's development as an "economic balancer" to China. As 
Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong explained in 2004: "We see Singapore as being lifted by 
two economies. I visualize ASEAN as a fuselage of a jumbo plane with China as one 
wing, and India the other wing. If both wings take off, ASEAN as the fuselage will also
24 Interestingly, Lee went further than the Indian proposal and suggested the inclusion also of 
Sri Lanka and Pakistan in such a grouping. P.S. Suryanarayana, "A Vision for Asia" Frontline, 
Vol.22 Issue 1,1-14 January, 2005.
25 Nirmal Gosh, "India govt 'should try to change its mindset" Straits Times, 20 January 2000.
26 George Yeo, Address to the Global Leadership Forum in Kuala Lumpur, 6 September, 2005.
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be lifted."27 Singaporean Minister of Trade and Industry (now Foreign Minister), 
George Yeo, went further than this, claiming that Singapore could be to India what 
Hong Kong is to China.28
Singapore has aggressively pursued economic ties with India since the opening of the 
Indian economy and the announcement of its Look East policy in Singapore in the early 
1990s. Singapore has now become the largest investor in India among ASEAN states 
and in 2006/07 the third largest foreign investor in India overall. In 2007, Singapore 
FDI in India aggregated US$2.9 billion for the year, much of it in the infrastructure 
sector, including ports and roads, while cumulative Indian FDI in Singapore aggregated 
US$8.8 billion. Bilateral trade has grown from US$2.34 billion in 2000/01 to US$11.49 
billion in 2006/07 (with the balance of trade in India's favour). By some (perhaps 
optimistic) estimates it could reach US$50 billion by 2010.29 Nevertheless, Singapore- 
India bilateral trade is a fraction of Singapore-China trade and is likely to remain so for 
some time.
In June 2005, India and Singapore signed an extremely broad-ranging Comprehensive 
Economic Cooperation Agreement, the first such arrangement India has entered into 
with a developed country. The CECA is unusually comprehensive, covering not just 
trade in goods, but also services, investment and tax. It provided for significant tariff 
reductions on goods covering approximately 80% of Singapore's exports to India and 
for Indian exports to Singapore tariff free - thereby promoting Singapore's role as a 
logistics hub for the export of Indian goods to Asia and the United States. However, 
the most significant aspects of the CECA are its treatment of services, investment and 
tax. It provides for removal of many restrictions on services, something of particular
27 Latif, Between Rising Powers: Chino, Singapore and India, p.274.
28 George Yeo, Speech in New Delhi, 18 February 2004.
29 Amitav Acharya, Singapore's foreign policy: the search fo r regional order (New Jersey: World 
Scientific, 2008).
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significance for India with its large number of well-trained English speakers. The CECA 
also extends to financial services, giving specified Singaporean banks unrestricted 
access to the Indian market (and Indian banks to the Singaporean market) and 
provides special arrangements for Singaporean companies (and in particular the 
Singapore state-controlled investment companies, Temasek and GIC) to invest in India. 
The significance of the tax treaty arrangements should also not be underestimated, 
providing special concessions to Singaporean companies which place Singapore on par 
with Mauritius and Cyprus, historically the two primary gateways for foreign 
investment into India. As a result of the CECA, more than 2,800 Indian-owned 
companies now operate out of Singapore.30 In aggregate, the CECA gives Singapore a 
gateway role with respect to India -  particularly in relation to financial services and 
investment - that it could never realistically hope to achieve with China. The China- 
Singapore Free Trade Agreement, which was signed only in October 2008, is 
significantly more limited in scope. The Singaporeans certainly have high hopes for the 
CECA as a key element in India's regional economic integration and Prime Minister Goh 
Chok Tong suggested that the agreement would eventually lead to an Asian Economic 
Community linking South Asia, Southeast Asia and Northeast Asia.31
The India-Singapore economic agreement also stands in contrast with the slower 
progress on India's other regional free trade arrangements. Whereas the clear 
complementarities in the Indian and Singaporean economies have assisted in the 
creation of economic links, the negotiation of free trading arrangements including 
other ASEAN states is hampered by greater competition in low-end manufacturing and 
agriculture. For this reason, the multilateral ASEAN-India Free Trade Agreement, 
signed in August 2009, is much narrower than the CECA, excluding important
30 Pranav Kumar, "Singapore as a gateway for Indian companies," Institute of Peace and 
Conflict Studies, Paper No.2593, 10 June 2008.
31 Nagesh Kumar, "Regionalism with an 'Asian Face': An Agenda for the East Asia Summit" RSIS 
Policy Briefs No.28, October 2006.
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manufacturing sectors such as textiles, chemicals, automobiles and steel, as well as 
agricultural products and services. If anything, its limited scope may well reinforce 
Singapore's role as India's economic gateway in Southeast Asia.
3.1.3 The new security partnership between India and Singapore
The development of bilateral security links between Singapore and India since the end 
of the Cold War have paralleled - and in some respects preceded - growth in the 
economic relationship. Indian Prime Minister P.V.Narasimha Rao raised the prospect 
of substantial defence cooperation with Singapore's Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong as 
early as September 1992, which led to annual bilateral naval exercises from 1993.32
From around the turn of the century, in what has been called the second phase of its 
Look East Policy, India has become more proactive in developing the security 
relationship. In October 2003, Singapore and India entered into a defence cooperation 
agreement providing for comprehensive annual defence policy dialogues between 
defence secretaries; joint exercises; intelligence sharing; and cooperation in defence 
technology. This facilitated extensive and broad-based defence cooperation. 
Intelligence cooperation was formalised through the establishment in 2003 of a Joint 
Working Group for Intelligence Cooperation on Combating Terrorism and 
Transnational Crime and cooperation in defence technology was formalised through 
the establishment in 2006 of a Defence Technology Steering Committee. India has 
become the largest recipient of Singapore arms exports and further large deals may be 
in the pipeline.33
32 S.D. Muni, "India and Singapore: Bilateral Issues," in N.N.Vohra (ed.), Emerging Asia: 
Challenges fo r India and Singapore (New Delhi: Manohar Publishers, 2003), pp.22-48 at p.44.
33 Singapore is also reportedly the frontrunner in a major Indian order of lightweight howitzers 
that will dwarf previous Singapore's prior arms export orders. "India expected to buy 
Singapore howitzers" Asian Defence, 12 March 2009.
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In addition to extensive jo in t maritime exercises discussed below, since 2004 the 
Indian and Singaporean airforces have conducted annual exercises (generally hosted 
by India, but hosted by Singapore in 2006). Commencing in 2005 India has hosted the 
annual "Agni Warrior" artillery and "Bold Kurukshetra" armoured exercises (which by 
2007 included jo in t planning of brigade-level armoured operations). From 2004, 
Singapore was granted access to Indian facilities to conduct its own air and army 
training.34 However, the security relationship was taken to a new level when, in 
October 2007, India agreed to upgrade Singapore's training facilities in India, including 
allowing long term use of the Indian Kalaikunda air base (near Kolkata) by the 
Singaporean Air Force. In August 2008, India also agreed to the stationing of a small 
number o f Singaporean army personnel and artillery and armoured vehicles at its 
Babina and Deololli firing ranges for an initial 5 year term.
The operation of training facilities on foreign soil is certainly nothing new for Singapore 
which, due to severe constraints on domestic land and airspace, has for many decades 
had numerous overseas training establishments for its air force, army and navy.35 In 
fact, the Singaporeans, as ever, have made a virtue out of necessity. In what has been 
called a "second wing" to its defence,36 Singapore has used its overseas establishments 
to give its armed forces (and particularly its air force) strategic depth as well as to 
develop closer relationships w ith its informal allies. It has been speculated that the 
growing relationship with India may also eventually replace Singapore's existing
34 Something originally suggested by the Indian air force to Singapore in November 1995.
35 Singapore has or has had arrangements for the training of its armed forces in Australia, 
Brunei, France, Indonesia, New Zealand, South Africa, Thailand, Taiwan and the United States. 
The Singaporean air force operates permanent flight training establishments in the United 
States, Australia, Brunei and France.
36 Bilveer Singh, The Vulnerability of Small States Revisited: A Study of Singapore's Post-Cold 
War Foreign Policy, (Yogyakarta: Gadjah Mada University Press, 1999) at p.301.
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training arrangements with Taiwan which, naturally, represent an ongoing irritant to 
Singapore-China relations.37
The long term use of Indian territory by foreign military defence forces does however 
represent a major shift in Indian policy. Since 1947, India has as a matter of policy 
been opposed to any foreign military bases in Asia. India has fiercely opposed any 
foreign military bases on its territory and has until recently refrained from establishing 
its own military bases elsewhere. In the early 1960s, in the wake of the Sino-lndian 
war, the Indians refused to allow US forces to be based in India to assist in its defence, 
and in the early 1970s resisted pressure from the Soviets to be granted limited naval 
basing rights to support the Soviet Indian Ocean fleet. It appears that these "sacred 
cows" of Indian politics are quietly dying -  at least so far as Singapore is concerned - 
as the announcement of these arrangements seems to have created relatively little 
political stir in India.
3.1.4 Cooperation in maritime security
Given the position of Singapore at the head of the Malacca Strait, between the South 
China Sea and the Indian Ocean, maritime security will inevitably be at the heart of any 
security relationship between India and Singapore.
Since the end of the Cold War, the Singaporean and Indian navies have exercised 
together frequently, and the tempo of joint training has increased in recent years. 
Singapore and India have held annual bilateral naval exercises since 1993 (which later 
became known as the SIMBEX exercises), making Singapore India's longest running 
naval exercise partner in Asia and India's only regular bilateral exercise partner in the 
region. The exercises started primarily with an anti-submarine focus and over the 
years have expanded in both size and scope to include maritime interdiction, air
37 Jane's Sentinel Southeast Asia (2008) Issue No.22, at p.585.
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defence and gunnery and may in the future be expanded to combined exercises of all 
three services. While most joint maritime exercises have been held in the Bay of 
Bengal, since 2005 biennial exercises have been held in the South China Sea (which, 
according to the Commanding Officer of the Indian Navy's Eastern Fleet, "was not a 
signal to be given to somebody.")38 The Indian navy also provided Singapore with 
training onboard Indian submarines, as well as providing Singapore's navy with access 
to Indian naval facilities and firing ranges.39 In 2007, the annual Malabar exercises 
with the United States were expanded to also include Singapore, Japan and Australia.
The extent to which India might seek to use its relationship with Singapore to extend 
Indian naval power into the South China Sea remains to be seen. However, any 
credible Indian naval presence in the South China Sea would require the cooperation 
of a local partner such as Vietnam or Singapore. This could involve non-exclusive 
arrangements for the use of Singapore's Changi Naval Base, just as it is currently used 
by the United States navy. It has been reported that an arrangement allowing for 
"frequent" visits of Indian naval vessels to Changi Naval Base is already in place, and 
the development of a semi-permanent Indian naval presence seems not beyond the 
realms of possibility.40
3.1.5 Singaporean perspectives on India
As we have seen, Singapore has for many years consistently welcomed an increased 
security role for India in the region and has actively sought to encourage that role. 
This does not merely reflect a recent desire to use India to balance against China's
38 P.S. Suryanarayana, "India, Singapore hold ’maritime exercise’ The Hindu, 6 March 2005.
39 G.V.C. Naidu, "Whither the Look East Policy: India and Southeast Asia" Strategic Analysis, 
Vol.28, No.2 (April-June 2004), pp.331-346, at p.339.
40 Mohan, "India's Geopolitics and Southeast Asian Security."
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rising power in what the Foreign M inister George Yeo has called Singapore's “ strategic 
prom iscuity/' but also by a belief that India has a “ natural" security role in the region.
Unlike some Southeast Asian states that have often resisted a security role for outside 
powers in the region, Singapore has consistently welcomed and encouraged a 
balanced role for external security providers on the basis that competition between 
major regional powers “ must be squarely confronted and cannot be wished away."41 
However, Singapore's conception of a “ balance of power" differs very much from 
neorealist predictions of states joining competing power blocs; rather it is more of a 
conception of a multipolar balance that provides freedom to smaller states. As 
Singapore's first and long-serving Foreign Minister, S.Rajaratnam, explained: “Where 
there is a multiplicity of suns, the gravitational pull of each is not only weakened but 
also by a judicious use of the pulls and counter-pulls of gravitational forces, the minor 
planets have a greater freedom of navigation."42 Similarly, as the current Prime 
M inister Lee Hsien Loong has argued, Singapore's concept of a balance of power 
“ depends on the competing interests of several big powers in the region, rather than 
on linking the nation's fortunes to one overbearing power. The big powers can keep 
one another in check, and will prevent any one of them from dominating the entire 
region, and so allow small states to survive in the interstices between them ."43 Leifer 
has characterised this policy as “a paradoxical combination of nonalignment and 
balance o f power, w ith an emphasis on the la tte r."44
41 Goh Chok Tong, “Constructing East Asia," Speech to Asia Society, 15th Asian Corporate 
Conference, Bangkok, 9 June 2005.
42 Chong Guan Kwa (ed.), 5 Rajaratnam on Singapore: From Ideas to Reality (Hackensack, 
N.J.: World Scientific, 2006).
43 Straits Times, 6 November 1984.
44 Michael Leifer, Singapore's Foreign Policy: Coping with Vulnerability, (London: Routledge, 
2000) at pp.5-6.
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In seeking such a balance, Singapore's founder, Lee Kuan Yew, was not unhappy to  see 
the grow th in Soviet naval capacity in the Indian Ocean in the early 1970s as a useful 
balancing force in the region,45 a position which only changed in 1972 fo llow ing signing 
o f the  India-Soviet friendship treaty. In his firs t visit to  Beijing in 1976, Lee also 
declared tha t the stronger China became, the bette r and more equal the balance 
between the United States, the Soviet Union and China. During the 1980s, Lee 
suggested tha t Japan should take a greater role in balancing Soviet and Chinese 
influence in the region. Historically however the Singaporeans have regarded the 
United States as the key benign hegemon, w ith  a particular role in contributing to  the 
region's security and, as a result, they have worked to  facilita te  a strong US security 
presence in the region. In the early 1990s, when the US navy faced eviction from  Subic 
Bay, Singapore sought to  secure the presence o f the US navy in the region through 
agreements perm itting  the establishment in Singapore o f a US naval logistics centre 
servicing the US Seventh Fleet and the use o f Singapore by US aircraft (including 
a llow ing fo r the rotational deploym ent o f US figh te r aircraft).
Singapore's approach to  India in part reflects this th inking and, in a somewhat 
remarkable fea t fo r such a small country, it has led the way in drawing India in to a 
security role in Southeast Asia. Singapore's regional sponsorship o f India reflects a 
cardinal principle o f its balance o f power approach to  in ternational relations, which is 
tha t a regional order cannot be durable if it seeks to  exclude an existing or emerging 
power. Further, Singapore's encouragement o f India's strategic engagement in the 
region is intended to  create a positive balance and not to  encourage rivalry between 
India and China. Singapore was thus reportedly uneasy about the way in which the 
Bush adm inistration cultivated the India-US relationship in the context o f its China 
policy, which was thought to  add to  regional uncerta inties.46
45 Latif, Between Rising Powers, p.236.
46 Kripa Sridharan, "Transcending the Region: Singapore's India Policy" at p.30.
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The development of the India-Singapore relationship has been paralleled by the 
strategic rapprochement between India and the United States, and there are many 
issues on which there is a coincidence of interests between the three. However, any 
implication that there may be a trilateral coalition to contain China should be avoided, 
as each of Singapore, India and the United States have very different perspectives on 
China.47 While the growing power of China represents an obvious source of concern, 
Singapore's desire to encourage India to act as a security provider is not just intended 
to balance China but has the broader motivation of ensuring an overall balance of 
power in the region (which clearly includes balancing China but arguably also includes 
some degree of hedging Singapore's reliance on the United States and Japan). In 
addition, following Singapore's particular efforts to bring India into ASEAN-centred 
institutions, India now arguably has an important stake in the continued relevance of 
ASEAN as a way of countering domination of the region by the United States and/or 
China.48 In intra-regional terms, a "special relationship" w ith India also improves 
Singapore's strategic power and political bargaining position vis a vis its large Muslim 
neighbours, Malaysia and Indonesia and, arguably, could also increase Singapore's 
attractiveness to the United States as a regional security partner.
Importantly, for Singapore India is seen not just as another external power. The 
Singaporeans see India as an essentially benign security partner, which unlike Japan or 
China, carries no adverse historical baggage in the region. Further, while others have 
not been entirely comfortable with claims about India's historical influence in the 
region, Singapore (perhaps due to its majority Chinese ethnic background) has been 
happy to acknowledge the extent of Indian cultural influence and has used it to 
distinguish themselves from Northeast Asians. As George Yeo once commented: "...
47 For a detailed discussion of the trilateral relationship and perspectives on China, see Latif, 
Three Sides in Search of a Triangle.
48 Sinderpal Singh and Syeda Sana Rahman, "The Next Stage of Singapore-lndia Relations: 
Possibilities and Prospects," ISAS Working Paper No.91, 24 September 2009, pp.12-13.
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the influence of Indian civilization... has given to South-east Asian Society a certain 
gentleness which characterises the region and makes it so different from North-east 
Asia."49
Moreover, there is also a geopolitical element underlying Singaporean thinking. India 
is not just another rising external power, but has a natural strategic role in Singapore 
and the rest of Southeast Asia that it strangely sought to deny for nearly half a century. 
This view was expressed most strongly by Lee Kuan Yew who, as has been seen, 
essentially saw India as the natural "protecting power" for Singapore which should 
impose its own version of the Monroe Doctrine in Southeast Asia. Similarly, as 
K.Kesavapany, a former senior Singaporean diplomat, put it: "India has de facto 
inherited the British security role" stretching from Aden to Singapore.50 Arguably this 
view is given less emphasis by Singapore's current leaders who see India's role mostly 
in terms of regional balance. Singapore's approach also reflects a belief that the East 
Asian and South Asian security regions which historically operated in an almost 
completely separate manner, are in the process of merging into a single security 
region. To once more quote George Yeo: "India's rise compels us to look at our 
environment in new ways. It will be increasingly less tenable to regard South Asia and 
East Asia as distinct strategic theatres operating only at the margins."51
Finally, there are also significant practical benefits to Singapore's armed forces in close 
security relations with India. The availability of Indian facilities provides Singapore 
with much needed training areas and gives Singapore additional strategic depth, 
particularly for its air force and navy. The opportunity to train with forces deploying
49 The Arts (Centre for the Arts, National University of Singapore) November/ December 1995, 
P-4-
50 K. Kesavapany, India's Tryst with Asia (New Delhi: Asian Institute of Transport Development, 
2006), p.48.
51 George Yeo, Speech to India Economic Summit 2002, New Delhi.
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Soviet/Russian equipment and non-Western military doctrine also provides a 
significant tactical benefit to Singapore, particularly given the extent of Soviet/Russian 
equipment deployed by the Malaysian armed forces (and, perhaps, also given India's 
role in providing training to the Malaysian air force) . 52
3.1.6 Indian perspectives on Singapore
In recent years India has shown a similar degree of enthusiasm to that of Singapore in 
developing Singapore as its political and economic gateway into Southeast Asia. As 
Indian Defence Minister Pranab Mukherjee commented, Singapore has become "the 
hub of its political, economic and security strategy in the whole of East Asia. " 53
In comparison with Singapore, India has been less articulate about the objectives of its 
security engagement with Singapore and with Southeast Asia in general. This reflects 
the often conflicting pressures faced by India which include immediate security threats 
in South Asia, perceived encroachments of China into the Indian Ocean, concerns 
about China's increasing economic dominance in Southeast Asia, and an 
understandable desire to avoid being used by others to balance against China. The 
unwillingness (or inability) to fully articulate India's security policy in Southeast Asia 
also reflects the continuing evolution in Indian strategic thinking. Nevertheless, it is 
clear that Singapore's active role in assisting India to join regional institutions and 
become one of Southeast Asia's "multiplicity of suns" represents a major strategic 
opportunity for India in overcoming decades of neglect of Southeast Asia. The relative 
weakness of India's strategic position in Southeast Asia as compared with China also
52 Ho Weizan, Examining Singapore-lndia Security Relations after the Cold War: Motivating 
Factors, Trends and Implications fo r Singapore (unpublished thesis, National University of 
Singapore, 2008).
53 Pranab Mukherjee, Address to the 5th MSS Asian Security Summit, 3 June 2006.
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narrows India's strategic options: India has little choice but to extend its influence in 
the region in a cooperative manner.
From India's perspective, Singapore, in terms of its size, economic role and geographic 
position makes it an almost ideal partner in extending India's strategic influence into 
Southeast Asia. Singapore's role as the key trading and services hub in Southeast Asia 
provides India with an expeditious way of expanding its economic presence while it 
improves direct bilateral trading and investment links with the major regional 
economies (including Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand and Vietnam). In political terms, 
Singapore's clear-sighted approach to its own strategic needs and those of the region 
allows the relationship with India to develop without the historical or ideological 
baggage that could be a factor in some of India's other relationships in the region 
(most notably, with Malaysia). In strategic terms, access to Singapore's port and air 
facilities, in combination with India's bases in the Andaman Islands, places India in an 
excellent position to potentially control the Malacca Strait as well as projecting power 
into the South China Sea.
There are, however, some limitations to the relationship. Singapore's small size and its 
omnidirectional foreign policy means a relationship with Singapore can only be a 
stepping stone to India developing stronger economic, political and security 
relationships with larger states if India wishes to have a major strategic role in the 
region. The imperatives behind the development of India's strategic relationship with 
Indonesia will be discussed in the next chapter.
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Chapter 3.2 The evolving security relationship between India and Indonesia
3.2.1 Cooperation, rivalry and coexistence during the Cold War
3.2.2 Indonesian security perceptions in the post-Suharto era
3.2.3 Current dimensions of security cooperation between India and Indonesia
3.2.4 Perspectives on the security relationship
Introduction
This chapter will examine the evolution of the strategic relationship between India and 
Indonesia. It will argue that Indonesia is likely to become an essential element in 
India's regional strategy in Southeast Asia and that India also represents an attractive 
partner for Indonesia in its hopes to build a multipolar regional order.1
3.2.1. Cooperation, rivalry and coexistence during the Cold War
This section will review the strategic interaction between India and Indonesia during 
the Cold War. Despite periodic friction between them, during much of the Cold War 
India and Indonesia shared many similar strategic perspectives. Both claimed 
nonaligned status as a way of leveraging their influence between the competing blocs. 
From the 1960s, both shared significant concerns about Chinese expansionism and 
subversion in the region. Both also claimed a leading role in their respective regions 
and, w ith only limited success, sought to minimise the influence of external powers in 
the ir neighbourhoods.
On gaining independence in the late 1940s, India and Indonesia found themselves in 
similar strategic circumstances. Among the earliest and largest states to gain
1 See David Brewster, "The evolving security relationship between India and Indonesia" Asian 
Survey (forthcoming).
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independence after World War II, both India and Indonesia were sprawling m ulti­
ethnic and multilingual states which struggled to  maintain internal cohesion, deal with 
the post-colonial legacies and claim their rightful place in the international order. A 
close political relationship developed between the two from the late 1940s as a newly 
independent India supported the Indonesian nationalist struggle against the Dutch and 
then Indonesia's role as a leading post-colonial state. Indonesian post-independence 
leaders also drew inspiration from India's nonaligned posture and its resistance to 
attempts by the United States to draw the newly decolonised states into the anti- 
Soviet camp. India and Indonesia were founders of the Movement of Non Aligned 
States. Through the 1950s and 1960s they shared the world stage as its leaders (and 
increasingly, rivals), struggling against the disintegrating European colonial system and 
resisting the development of a new international order dominated by the United 
States.
Both India and Indonesia also see themselves as the legitimate successor states for 
peoples that had been arbitrarily divided by the European colonisers. Both also fought 
against ethnic and religious separatism as their leaders sought to build cohesive and 
secular states. As a result, India and Indonesia spent much of their early years as 
independent states coming to terms with colonial-era divisions: for India, the partition 
of the Indian subcontinent between it and Muslim Pakistan and for Indonesia the 
colonial-era division of the ethnically Malay archipelagic Southeast Asia between it and 
Malaya/Malaysia. India and Indonesia gave each other significant diplomatic support 
in absorbing neighbouring colonial territories including India's takeover of French 
Pondicherry in 1954 and Portuguese Goa in 1961 and Indonesia's takeover of Dutch 
New Guinea in 1963 and Portuguese East Timor in 1975.
However, India and Indonesia were less supportive of each other's broader regional 
ambitions. In the early 1960s, when Indonesia sought regional hegemony in Southeast 
Asia through scuttling the creation of an independent Malaya, India gave Malaya 
significant support in various international fora as well as supporting a continuing
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security role for its form er colonial master, Britain. In response, Indonesia supported 
Pakistan in its 1965 conflict w ith India, supplying Pakistan with submarines, missile 
boats and MiG fighters (along w ith Indonesian crews).2 Indonesian President Sukarno 
even briefly considered seizing the Andaman and Nicobar islands from India as a way 
of showing support to Pakistan.3
Rivalry between India and Indonesia during the early 1960s was aggravated by 
Indonesia's increasing t ilt  towards Communist China, including the perceived 
form ation of a China-Indonesia-Pakistan axis hostile to India. When Indonesian 
President Sukarno stage-managed attacks by mobs on the Indian embassy in Jakarta in 
1962 and again in 1965, India generally responded w ith forbearance, downplaying 
suggestions that Indonesia presented a significant threat to India.4 The overthrow of 
Sukarno in September 1965 eased tensions significantly. Chinese political influence in 
Indonesia was swept away, and Indonesia moved quickly to repair damaged relations 
w ith India and its neighbours. Indonesia effectively ceased to pursue hegemony over 
maritime Southeast Asia, instead backing the creation of ASEAN. Indonesia w ithdrew 
its m ilitary support for Pakistan and backed India's claims over Kashmir.5 India and 
Indonesia now had a shared view that China constituted the most significant threat to 
the region.6
2 According to the former Commander in Chief of the Pakistan Air Force. See M.Asghar Khan, 
The First Round Indo-Pokistan War 1965 (Sahibabad: Vikas Publishing, 1979), pp.42-47. It 
appears that Indonesian personnel and equipment arrived in Pakistan too late to see action 
against India and were withdrawn after President Suharto came to power.
3 Ibid.
4 See Saroj Pathak, India and Southeast Asia: A Study of Indian Perspective and Policy since 
1962 (New Delhi: Atma Ram, 1990) at pp.109-110.
5 See Dutt, India's Foreign Policy, at p.265.
6 Joint Communique of Indian Foreign Minister M.C.Chagla and Indonesian Foreign Minister 
Adam Malik, as reported in News from Indonesia, No.545, 21 January 1967.
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India has long recognised Indonesia's leading role in Southeast Asia. During the second 
half of the 1960s, India saw Indonesia and Vietnam as the regionally preeminent 
powers in archipelagic and mainland Southeast Asia which, it has been claimed, "led to 
the Indian perception that Vietnam and Indonesia form[ed] the kingpins of any 
strategy aimed at preventing the expansion of Chinese influence in Southeast Asia."7 
India proposed the establishment of a regional arrangement anchored by India, 
Indonesia and Japan to promote regional economic development and resist Chinese 
influence. Despite shared perceptions of a Chinese threat, Indonesia was very cautious 
about any arrangement that might be perceived as an anti-China coalition. Indonesia 
also rejected suggestions that India might join ASEAN on the grounds that India was 
not in Southeast Asia. The Indonesians were wary of bringing India and its troubles 
into an already unstable region and, no doubt, were also mindful of the significant 
impact of the membership of India on the balance of power in Southeast Asia and 
Indonesia's status within ASEAN.
Through the late 1960s and 1970s, India and Indonesia worked together to lim it the 
influence of "extra-regional" powers in Southeast Asia and the Indian Ocean, acting as 
co-sponsors of the Indian Ocean "Peace Zone" proposals to prohibit warships from 
non-littoral states from using the Indian Ocean except for transit purposes. (Among 
other things this would have had the long run result of leaving India as the major naval 
power in the Indian Ocean.) However, while Indonesia firm ly opposed the presence of 
all outside naval powers in the Indian Ocean in the 1960s, its thinking evolved towards 
accepting what it called a "reasonable balanced presence" of outside powers.8 By the 
late 1970s, in light of increasing concerns over the Soviet naval presence, the 
Indonesians concluded that a limited US presence in the Indian Ocean and Southeast 
Asia was not necessarily undesirable. As Indonesian Foreign M inister Ali Alatas later
7 Ayoob, India and Southeast Asia, at p.36.
8 Pathak, India and Southeast Asia,p.198.
171
Part 3 Chapter 3.2 - The evolving security 
relationship between India and Indonesia
put it: ''we can't keep the four powers [the United States, Japan, China and India] out 
of the region. But there must be equilibrium between them and Southeast Asia."9
Through the 1970s, India's previous worries over Indonesia's Chinese entanglements 
were partially echoed by Indonesia's concerns over India's growing relationship with 
the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, during this time Indonesia sought to bring India into a 
closer relationship w ith ASEAN, proposing that India be given associate status. 
However, as has been discussed previously, Indonesia's initiatives were torpedoed in 
1980 when India recognised the Vietnamese-installed Cambodian government 
following Vietnam's invasion o fth a t country, a move which caused outrage among 
some ASEAN states. Although Indonesia fe lt bound to support its more hawkish 
ASEAN partners in their criticism of India (in particular, Singapore), it was not greatly- 
concerned about India's stance or its connection w ith Vietnam or the Soviet Union.
The Indonesian military took a relatively relaxed view of Communist Vietnam, seeing it 
as acting as a buffer against the extension of Chinese influence.
Despite its relatively relaxed view about India's actions in Indochina, the Indonesian 
m ilitary became increasingly concerned about a possible Indian role in assisting the 
growth of Soviet naval power in the Indian Ocean, a concern which was heightened 
after the Soviets were granted rights to Vietnam's Cam Ranh Bay naval base in 1979. 
Although Indonesia had extracted a promise from Indian Foreign Minister Swaran 
Singh in 1974 that India would not provide the Soviet navy w ith facilities in the 
Andaman Sea,10 by the mid-1980's there was open concern among Indonesian military 
circles both about India's naval expansion program and the possible use by Soviet 
submarines of Indian naval facilities at Great Nicobar Island, with an Indonesian 
m ilitary commander commenting that "Soviet submarines were roaming in Indonesian
9 "Live and Let Live," Far Eastern Economic Review, 11 July 1991.
10 The Statesman, 12 August 1974.
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waters around Sabang" and that they came from the Indian base at Great Nicobar 
island.11
Despite concerns about the Soviet relationship, the Indonesians did not see India in 
terms of a threat but more as a potentially destabilising factor in the region. As a 
leading Indonesian analyst commented in the early 1990s, "Few perceive India as a 
potential threat, primarily because of its distance. India is still mostly perceived as a 
South Asian power whose strategic interests are confined to its immediate 
neighbouring areas."12 Indonesia did not really consider India as a "neighbour." In 
Indonesian strategic thinking, India was regarded as an extra-regional power along 
w ith the United States, Japan, China and the Soviet Union. India was seen in largely 
benign terms as well as being a peer: holding preeminence in South Asia while 
Indonesia held a leading role in Southeast Asia.13
3.2.2 Security perceptions in the Post-Suharto era
Like India, there have also been significant changes in Indonesia's strategic perceptions 
following the end o f the Cold War. Just as India suffered a series of crises in the early 
1990s, Indonesia experienced a succession of economic and political crises in the late 
1990s, beginning with the Asian economic crisis in 1997 (which hit Indonesia 
particularly badly), the subsequent fall of the Suharto regime and transition to 
democracy and the separation of East Timor from Indonesia in 1999. Together, these
11 Stroits Times, 13 October 1986.
12 Dewi Fortuna Anwar, "Changes and Continuity in Indonesia's Regional Outlook" in Chandran 
Jeshurun (ed.), China, India, Japan, and the security of Southeast Asia (Singapore: Institute of 
Southeast Asian Studies, 1993), pp.211-233 at p.228.
13 Franklin B. Weinstein, Indonesian Foreign Policy and the Dilemma of Dependence: From 
Sukarno to Soeharto (Ithica: Cornell University Press, 1976).
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were a catalyst for Indonesia to readjust its relationships w ith major powers, including 
India.
In 2000, President Abdurrahman Wahid, Indonesia's first democratically elected 
President after the fall of Suharto, unveiled an "Asianist" strategy to reduce 
Indonesia's economic and political dependency upon the West through forging formal 
or informal alignments with India, China, Japan and Singapore.14 Wahid, while on a 
visit to New Delhi, proposed a triangular economic alliance between Indonesia, India 
and China and Indonesian Defence Minister Mohammad Mahfud later suggested a 
defence pact between Indonesia, India, China and Russia. Wahid's proposals, which 
were founded in mild anti-Westernism and vague ideas of "pan Asian" consciousness, 
were subject to significant criticism in Indonesia for lacking coherence and ignoring 
bilateral problems between India and China.15
While Wahid's proposals were not pursued by subsequent Indonesian administrations, 
they were indicative of more open thinking about enhancing Indonesia's international 
status. Since 2004 in particular, Indonesia has adopted a more active foreign policy, 
showing impatience with the limitations of the "golden cage" of ASEAN in terms of its 
size and perceived tim id ity and seeking to develop its bilateral relationships with major 
powers beyond the relationships that exist through ASEAN. Indonesia has sought to 
improve relations with China which included the April 2005 declaration of a "Strategic 
Relationship" involving commitments to collaborate in defence production, and to 
consult on defence, law enforcement and intelligence. However, there has been little 
follow-through on any commitments.16 Although ideological differences have been
14 Kai He, "Indonesia's foreign policy after Soeharto: international pressure, democratization 
and policy change," International Relations of the Asia-Pacific, Vol.8 No.l (2008), pp.47-72.
15 Dewi Fortuna Anwar, Indonesia at Large: Collected Writings on ASEAN, Foreign Policy, 
Security and Democratisation (Jakarta: The Habibie Centre, 2005), p.83.
16 Rizal Sukma, "Indonesia needs a post-ASEAN foreign policy" The Jakarta Post, 30 June 2009.
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reduced, Sino-lndonesian relations remain strained by the ir m aritim e te rrito ria l 
dispute in the South China Sea and continuing resentm ent against the economically 
powerful Chinese ethnic m inority  in Indonesia. Arguably the Sino-lndonesian 
declaration amounted to  Indonesia playing a "China card" to  accelerate the 
resumption of US-Indonesian m ilitary ties .17 Indonesia's relations w ith  the United 
States have also improved under US Secretary o f State Condoleezza Rice and now 
under the Obama Adm inistration. Although Indonesia continues its rhetoric o f calling 
fo r an autonomous regional order free from  external in tervention, Jakarta has 
indicated tha t it prefers a continuing US security role in Southeast Asia as a counter to  
China's rising pow er.18 President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono's adm inistration has 
reinforced previous statements tha t Indonesia is looking fo r a new global role which 
includes taking the lead in the Muslim  w o rld .19 Recently there have been influentia l 
calls in Jakarta to  develop a new regional security management arrangement -  a sort 
o f regional concert o f powers -  tha t would include Indonesia alongside India, China, 
Japan and the United States.20 There has also been increased interest in the 
Indonesian security com m unity fo r prom otion o f democracy in the region, including 
the establishment o f the Bali Democracy Forum in December 2008.
As Indonesia's strategic posture continues to  evolve, it may increasingly see India as an 
attractive security partner fo r several reasons. First, as China's regional power grows, 
so w ill Indonesia's need fo r "balancing" partnerships. Second, the continuing
17 Ian Storey, "China and Indonesia: Military-security ties fail to gain momentum," China Brief, 
Volume IX Issue 4, 20 February 2009. The Sino-lndonesian declaration may have also created 
concerns in New Delhi, leading to the declaration of an Indo-lndonesian "strategic partnership" 
several months later.
18 Ralf Emmers, "Regional Hegemonies and the Exercise of Power in Southeast Asia: A Study of 
Indonesia and Vietnam," Asian Survey, Vol.45, No.4 (July-August 2005), pp.645-665 at p.664.
19 Terry Lacey, "Indonesia Looks to Play on the World Stage," Asia Sentinel, 1 February 2010.
20 Jusuf Wanandi, "The ASEAN Charter and Remodelling Regional Architecture," The Jakarta 
Post, 3 November 2008.
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development of a co-operative security relationship between India and the United 
States has brought India's strategic posture much closer to Indonesia's. Both India and 
Indonesia are now prepared to cooperate w ith the United States in a number of areas 
including the creation of "balanced" regional institutions. Third, a relationship with 
India would fit well w ith Indonesia's hopes to extend its reach beyond ASEAN towards 
other major powers and, ultimately, to sit alongside India at the top table in a 
multipolar regional order. Fourth, Indonesia may see some benefit from India playing 
an active maritime security role in the region, balancing not only against China but also 
potentially against US naval predominance. Despite major sensitivities over any 
foreign security presence in the Malacca Strait, India may well be seen as a useful 
partner in developing Indonesia's naval capabilities in the Strait and further afield.
The importance of Indonesia in India's regional strategy is also now arguably 
increasing. For India, Indonesia has particular significance in several ways. First, it is 
by far the largest state in Southeast Asia and is regarded a primus inter pares in ASEAN. 
A relationship w ith Indonesia will help India not only in developing its relationship with 
ASEAN institutions but also furthering its bilateral relationships across the region. 
Second, as a result of its historical concern about China, Indonesia is a potentially 
important partner in balancing against China's influence in East Asia, particularly in 
influencing the development of regional political and economic institutions favourable 
to India. Third, Indonesia's geographical location between the Indian and Pacific 
Oceans makes it key to India's aims to counter China's growing maritime interests in 
the Indian Ocean, take a security role in the Malacca Strait and gain a role as a naval 
power in the Western Pacific. Fourth, Indonesia's cooperative (though independent) 
security relationship w ith the United States fits well w ith India's own strategic posture. 
For India, a political partnership with Indonesia may be useful in increasing its freedom 
of action in working w ith the United States and its regional allies while simultaneously 
promoting the development of a multipolar region. Fifth, India has an important stake 
in the continued stability and viability of Indonesia, the world's largest Muslim majority 
nation, as a secular and democratic state. As a partner, Indonesia would help
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legitimise India's foreign policy among its own Muslim minority as well as acting as an 
important bridge for India's dealings with the Islamic world. Indonesia's relatively 
tolerant Islamic tradition, infused w ith mystical Sufi beliefs, has many links with the 
Islamic Sufi traditions practiced in India. Indonesia has traditionally framed its foreign 
policy largely in secular terms and generally avoided the Islamic factor colouring its 
relationship with India (including, for many years, opposing Pakistan's stance on 
Kashmir in various international fora).21 All these reasons create an imperative for 
India to develop its strategic relationship with Indonesia.
3.2.4 Current dimensions of security cooperation between India and Indonesia
Indonesia has given significant support to India's ambitions to improve its political and 
security links with the region. While Indonesia has long been in favour of an 
institutional relationship between India and ASEAN, it was in the mid 1990's that 
Indonesia came to see India as important to the regional balance of power. According 
to  Lee Kwan Yew, Indonesia realised that they could not dominate the region after the 
Americans eventually left, leaving China or Japan as dominant powers, and therefore 
decided to help bring the Indians into the region. According to Lee, "they calculated 
not what is going to happen next year but in ten, twenty or th irty  years."22 Although 
Indonesia has generally allowed Singapore to take the lead as India's regional 
advocate, it nevertheless played an important role in supporting India's membership of 
the ARF in 1996 and helped to head off criticism of India in the ARF over the Pokhran II 
nuclear tests in 1998. A fter China and others resisted the inclusion of India in the 
ASEAN + 3 grouping, Indonesia also backed the creation of the annual ASEAN-India
21 "Indonesia for security cooperation with India," The Hindu, 30 July 1999.
22 Datta-Ray, Looking East to Look West, p.289.
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summit in 2002. Indonesia was also a strong supporter of India's participation in the 
East Asian Summit in 2005, "in order to keep balance in the East Asian community."23
Since the turn of this century, there have also been important developments in the 
bilateral relationship and the tempo of visits and meetings between Indian and 
Indonesian leaders increased markedly. Much of the emphasis, particularly from the 
Indonesian side, has been on the development of the economic relationship with India, 
although to date little has been achieved in this area. For Indonesia, India represents a 
potential major source of capital and a major market for Indonesian agricultural 
products. Nevertheless, bilateral trade and Indian investment in Indonesia remains 
weak. A bilateral Free Trade Agreement has been stalled since 2005 on issues of 
access to Indian markets for Indonesian palm oil and other key agricultural products, 
although this may be given fresh impetus following the signing of the India-ASEAN FTA 
in August 2009. For its part, India has failed to develop its economic relationship with 
Indonesia, particularly as an energy supplier. There have been some Indian 
investments in the Indonesian coal sector to secure supplies for Indian power 
generation, but no major Indian investments in hydrocarbons.
In contrast to  the relatively stagnant economic relationship, there have been some 
important developments in the security sphere, including agreements on defence 
cooperation in 2001, on jo in t naval patrols in the Andaman Sea in 2002 and on 
terrorism in 2004. In 2005, the Indian Prime Minister and Indonesian President 
declared a "New Strategic Partnership" which placed much emphasis on political, 
defence and security cooperation, including the creation of an annual strategic 
dialogue between senior officials. However, as will be seen, maritime security is likely 
to remain the key focus of the security relationship.
23 Jusuf Wanandi, Global, Regional and National: Strategic Issues and Linkages (Jakarta: Centre 
for Strategic and International Studies, 2006), p.257.
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Defence industry cooperation
In January 2001, a Defence Cooperation Agreement was signed during a visit by Indian 
Prime M inister Behari Vajpayee to Jakarta. Although nominally dealing with 
cooperation in the supply by India of training and defence equipment and the 
development of an Indonesian defence industry, the agreement is seen as having 
broader symbolic value, particularly following its formal approval by the Indonesian 
parliament in 2006. Indian assistance in defence technology and training could, at 
least in theory, be of particular value to Indonesia in light of India's capabilities in 
producing and supporting Russian-designed equipment and Indonesia's goal of 
diversifying its defence supply arrangements away from the United States. According 
to an Indonesian foreign ministry spokesman in 2007, defence industry cooperation 
with India would "help enhance security in the region" and that "would be a way for 
Indonesia to help ASEAN nations check the power o f China in the region."24
However, there has been little  real progress in this area. Indonesia has, among other 
things, unsuccessfully sought to acquire from India: radar systems; Brahmos cruise 
missiles;25 and training for Russian-built Su-30 aircraft.26 It is currently evaluating the 
purchase of the Indian Advanced Light Helicopters and has indicated interest in Indian 
participation in a proposed corvettes program and Indian expertise in communications 
and networking technology. However, the prospects of India becoming a major 
supplier of defence technology and services to Indonesia is restricted by Indonesia's 
small defence acquisition budget. It is also restricted by India's own limitations: the 
supply of radar systems and missiles was vetoed by India's European and Russian 
partners; India was also unwilling to provide training for Indonesia's SU-30 aircraft,
24 Abdul Khalik, "Indonesia -  India security pact comes into effect," Jakarta Post, 3 April 2007.
25 "Indonesia and Malaysia keen on buying Brahmos," Frontier India Strategic and Defence, 13 
April 2007. <www.frontierindia.net>.
26 "India says not yet to Indonesian plea," India Express, 21 April 2004.
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fearing the risk of disclosure to third parties (i.e. Pakistan) of operational information 
on its frontline strike fighters. As will be discussed in chapter 3.3, others in the region, 
such as Vietnam, have also experienced significant problems in dealing India in the 
supply of defence technology. As a result, at least in the medium term, it seems likely 
that cooperation in the field of defence supply will remain limited.
Cooperation in combating Islamic extremism
India has been in a position to provide assistance to Indonesia in countering Islamic 
jihadist threats. Indonesia's vulnerability in this area, and its potential as a source of 
regional instability, was underlined through the rise of Islamic extremist cells based in 
Indonesia post 9/11 and the Bali and M arrio tt bombings in 2002 and 2003. President 
Wahid publicly supported India's position on terrorism in January 2001.27 The arrest of 
senior members of Indonesia's Jemaah Islamiyah while training in Pakistan w ith the 
Kashmir separatist group Laskar-e-Toiba led to a Memorandum of Understanding on 
Combating International Terrorism in July 2004. In November 2004, Indonesia 
requested additional Indian assistance in countering terrorism, with an emphasis on 
maritime security, including a proposal to create what the Indonesians termed an 
"institutional arrangement." 28 Shared interests in combating Muslim extremist 
terrorism  were underlined in July 2009 when Indonesia and India made a jo in t plea at 
the ASEAN Regional Forum for more effective intelligence sharing in the region.29
27 T.R.Ramachandran, "Wahid backs India on Kashmir," The Tribune, 12 January 2001.
28 "Indonesia Seeks India's Cooperation to Counter Terrorism" Financial Times, 29 November 
2004.
29 Sandeep Dikshit, "India, Indonesia call for better intelligence-sharing to tackle terror," The 
Hindu, 24 July 2009.
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Maritime security cooperation in the Andaman Sea
India has made a concerted effort to develop a strong maritime security relationship 
w ith Indonesia. Even before the end of the Cold War, aware of earlier concerns over 
its naval expansion program, India began implementing confidence building measures 
in maritime security, including hosting jo in t naval exercises with Indonesia and other 
regional partners. India and Indonesia commenced bilateral naval exercises off 
Surahbaya in 1989 and in the Andaman Sea in 1991 and several years later India 
instituted the biennial MILAN meeting with the navies of Indonesia, Singapore,
Malaysia and Thailand. India also invited senior Indonesian naval officers to inspect 
Indian naval facilities in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands to allay Indonesian concerns 
over the base.
The separatist insurgency in Indonesia's Aceh province (located on the western end of 
Sumatra, around 150 km from India's Nicobar Islands) was a further focus point in 
developing the security relationship in the early years of this decade. India and 
Indonesia, as large and ethnically and religiously diverse states, have had a long- 
running mutual interest in opposing separatism and since independence have provided 
mutual support on issues of territoria l integrity. The Islamic-inspired insurgency in 
Indonesia's Aceh province gained momentum following the separation of East Timor in 
1999 and formed a focus of Prime Minister Vajpayee's visit to Jakarta in January 2001, 
when Vajpayee emphasised India's support for Indonesia's sovereignty and territoria l 
in tegrity.30 For Indonesia the possible secession of Aceh province represented an 
existential threat, although this threat has been greatly reduced following the 2005 
peace agreement which granted the province a large degree of autonomy. For India, 
Aceh is significant not only as a case of separatism or as a potential source of jihadist 
terrorism, important as those issues are, but that Aceh also commands the western
30 Sonia Trikha, “ Indonesia changes its stance, supports India's bid for UN security council seat" 
Indian Express, 11 January 2001.
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entrance to  the Malacca Strait. Some fear that an independent and fundamentalist 
Aceh might obstruct use of the Malacca Strait or that China might be granted port 
facilities.31 At least prior to 2005, Aceh's GAM (Free Aceh Movement) insurgents were 
believed to have been involved in the hijacking of merchant vessels off Sumatra both 
as a political statement and a source of funding.
India has played only a very limited role in assisting in the settlement of the Aceh 
conflict. Indian weapons inspectors participated in the international Joint Security 
Committee monitoring team in 200332 and the Indian navy made a prominent 
contribution to relief efforts in Aceh following the December 2004 tsunami, but India 
did not participate in the international Aceh Monitoring Mission (comprised of EU and 
ASEAN representatives) established after the 2005 peace agreement. Nevertheless, 
the Indian navy has used the Aceh conflict to build bilateral naval cooperation with 
Indonesia in the Andaman Sea. The Andaman Sea provides a key communication route 
w ith extremist groups in the region and in April 2002, Indonesian President Megawati 
expressed concerns about Aceh rebels finding support within India.33 The Indians, 
claiming evidence of links between Aceh insurgents and Pakistan's Inter-Services 
Intelligence agency and the use of islands in the Nicobar group for gunrunning, pressed 
Indonesia to put in place a cooperative response.34 This led to the Indlndocorpat 
Agreement under which the Indian and Indonesian navies have undertaken biannual 
"coordinated" naval patrols in the Andaman Sea, in the Six-Degree Channel at the 
northern entrance to the Malacca Strait through which most of the traffic to and from
31 See Donald K.Emmerson, "Indonesia's Eleventh Hour in Aceh," PacNet Newsletter, No.49,17 
December 1998 and Pankaj K. Jha, "India-lndonesia: Emerging Strategic Confluence in the 
Indian Ocean" Strategic Analysis, Vol.32, No.3 (May 2008), pp. 439-458 at p.454.
32 Apparently at the request of GAM.
33 Atul Andeja, "India, Indonesia anchor new partnership," The Hindu, 4 April 2002.
34 Josy Joseph, "Following Gujarat riots, Indonesia reluctant on JWG to fight terrorism," 
<http://www.rediff.com>, 1 April 2002. Other observers have been highly skeptical of any link 
between GAM and Pakistan.
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the Malacca Strait passes. Since 2002 these patrols have comprised Indian and 
Indonesian vessels and aircraft, commanded out of India's Joint Operations Command 
in the Andaman Islands. Although token in practical terms, such jo in t military action 
has significant symbolic value.
While security concerns in Aceh province and related piracy in the Malacca Strait have 
substantially diminished following the 2005 peace agreement, the region remains a 
concern to some in the Indonesian army. In February 2009, Indonesian Army Chief of 
Staff proposed creating direct links between the Indonesian military command in Aceh 
and Indian m ilitary command in Andaman to allow army units operating in the area to 
work directly together. In March 2009, the Indonesian army announced that the 
Indlndocorpat patrols would be "intensified" in response to a request from the Sri 
Lankan government to prevent Tamil Tiger rebels taking refuge on Indonesian 
territory.
Indonesia and the "String of Pearls"
While India has been able to demonstrate its value as a maritime security partner in 
the Andaman Sea, it has been less successful in nurturing concerns in Indonesia about 
the growth of Chinese naval influence in the Indian Ocean. As discussed in chapter 2.3, 
since the early 1990s, Indian officials and commentators have repeatedly raised 
concerns China's so-called "String of Pearls" strategy, including repeated assertions by 
Indian analysts that China has established naval facilities on the Burmese mainland and 
on islands in the Andaman Sea. India also expressed concerns to Indonesia over 
rumours of possible Chinese involvement in the development of a port facility in the 
Palau Weh islands in Aceh province, a contract which was later awarded to Malaysian 
interests. According to one Indian observer, while Southeast Asian countries have 
historically seen the 'China threat' as emerging from the east through Indochina and
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the South China Sea, they should now be concerned about the opening of a new 'front' 
through Chinese expansion into the Indian Ocean.35
However, there is little evidence that concerns about a Chinese naval presence in the 
Indian Ocean are high on Indonesia's agenda. Instead, Indonesia's maritime security 
concerns about China are focused on the South China Sea, including, its long-running 
dispute w ith China over competing territoria l claims over the oil rich waters adjacent 
to  Indonesia's Natuna Islands.36 Indonesia also has security concerns about Malaysia, 
focused on its maritime territoria l dispute in the Ambalat area in the Celebes Sea.
India has not taken any public position on the South China Sea or Celebes Sea maritime 
disputes. It is apparent that while both India and Indonesia are generally concerned 
about China's power in the region, these concerns have not yet coalesced into a 
shared perspective on a China threat in maritime security.37 Nevertheless, the "String 
of Pearls" continues to be a significant issue in Indian strategic thinking and is an 
im portant factor in India's thinking about its relationship with Indonesia.
The role of Indonesia in India's ambitions in the Malacca Strait
One issue of immediate import in the India-lndonesia relationship is India's ambitions 
to  act as a security provider in the Malacca Strait. As has been discussed in section 
2.3.3, a direct security role in the Malacca Strait represents a key strategic objective for 
India in Southeast Asia.
35 M. Malik, "Sino-lndian Relations and India's Eastern Strategy" in Gordon and Henningham, 
India looks east, pp. 119-163
36 See generally, Ian James Storey, "Indonesia's China Policy in the New Order and Beyond: 
Problems and Prospects," Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol.22, No.l (April 2000), pp. 145- 
174.
37Although a senior Indonesian official reportedly voiced concerns in the mid-1990s over 
China's assistance to Burma in establishing a naval base in the Irrawaddy delta. M.Vatikiotis 
and B.Lintener, "Pariah No More," Far Eastern Economic Review, 3 March 1994, p.27.
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Indonesia has been ambivalent about an Indian security role in the Strait. In July 2005, 
an Indonesian Foreign Ministry spokesman publicly rebuffed Indian requests for a 
security role, telling the Indian Chief of Naval Staff Admiral, Arun Prakash, that 
responsibility for safety in the Malacca Strait lay w ith "Indonesia, Malaysia and 
Singapore only," leading Prakash to deny that India had any intention of patrolling the 
Malacca Strait.38 In June 2007 Indonesian Defence Minister, Juwono Sudarsono, 
deflected renewed requests from the Indian Defence Minister for a role in patrolling 
Malacca Strait, claiming that Jakarta was keen that India, South Korea, China and Japan 
"pitch in to provide infrastructure" in the Strait.39 Nevertheless, the Indonesian 
m ilitary appears to take a generally benign view of an Indian maritime security role in 
and around the Strait. In March 2009, a meeting of the ARF in Jakarta produced an 
invitation to  Thailand to join with Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore in coordinated 
patrols of the Strait.40 At the same time, the Indonesian military reportedly requested 
India to take part in maintaining security in the Malacca Strait, on the basis that "all 
approaches to the strait will be more secure for international shipping."41
While Malaysia did not publicly demur from the Indonesian announcement it remains 
to be seen what level of Indian involvement in the Strait it would tolerate. India's 
relations w ith Malaysia are uneasy and Malaysia's Islamic oriented foreign policy, its 
strong economic and political relationship with China and recent political demands by 
Malaysia's Indian ethnic minority have all led it to be suspicious of India's ambitions in
38 Rakesh Sinha, "Jakarta says no to Indian patrol in Malacca Straits," Indian Express 13 July 
2005.
39 P.S.Suryanarayana, "Indonesia for defence tie-up with India," The Hindu, 5 June 2007.
40 "Thai to join Rl patrolling Malacca Strait," The Jakarta Post, 16 March 2009. This 
conveniently extended the definition of the Malacca Strait north towards Indian waters.
41 "Indonesia asks India to help maintain Malacca Strait security" Xinhua, 5 March 2009. The 
Indonesian Foreign Ministry has kept its silence on the request although Indonesian embassies 
posted reports of the invitation.
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the region. Although Malaysia has previously firm ly opposed any Indian role in the 
Strait, this seems to have softened in recent years. In 2005, the Malaysian Prime 
Minister Abdullah Badawi is reported to have told Indian Prime Minister Manmohan 
Singh that Malaysia holds the key to India's ambitions in the Malacca Strait and the 
South China Sea, and that his country is ready for a strategic partnership with India, 
provided that India's security ties with Thailand are scaled down.42 In 2008, Malaysia 
consented to an Indian role in the "Eye in the Sky" project to provide air surveillance 
over the S tra it.43 Malaysia's views may have been helped by Indian offers of training 
and technical support for Malaysia's MiG-29 aircraft and Scorpene submarines.
For Indonesia, any invitation to India would represent an important departure from its 
position on Indonesian sovereignty of the Strait. Nevertheless, the Indonesian navy 
may see it as a useful way to build its relationship w ith the Indian navy to assist in its 
own development. India may in certain circumstances also represent a convenient 
"compromise candidate" as an external security provider in the Malacca Strait. 
Certainly, if Indonesia comes under increased pressure to take action on security in the 
Strait it may find it politically more acceptable for India to take a security role 
compared w ith the United States, Japan or certainly China. There is considerable 
political opposition in both Malaysia and Indonesia to a US security presence in the 
Strait and Japan continues to carry historical baggage in the region. Any direct 
presence of Chinese naval forces would almost certainly be unacceptable to Indonesia. 
It is arguable that in the event of increased international pressure to take action on 
Strait security, Indonesia may allow India to participate in Strait security on Indonesia's
42 This has included India-Thai joint naval patrols in the Andaman Sea. "Malaysia Warns India 
against Thailand" Newsinsight, 3 January 2005.
43 P.S.Suryanarayana, "India, Malaysia to step up defence ties," The Hindu, 8 January 2008; 
and "Indian Air Force Chief to Visit Malaysia; Boost in Military Ties," India Defence, 17 August 
2008.
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term s .44 Any security role for India in the Malacca Strait would be a significant step for 
India. Beyond the immediate security implications in the Strait, it would help legitimise 
India's claims as a major power and a benign security provider to the region as a 
whole. Cooperation between the Indian and Indonesian navies would provide an 
opportunity for the expansion of relationships with the Indonesian m ilitary and would 
likely presage increased political cooperation between India and Indonesia in dealing 
w ith regional security issues. However, w ithout agreement on any Indian role in the 
Strait, India will need to content itself w ith assisting littoral states to build maritime 
surveillance capacities and relying on its relationships with the United States and 
Singapore to gain a Recognised Maritime Picture in the Strait.
3.2.4 Perspectives on the security relationship
What are the prospects for the development of a broad-based security partnership 
between India and Indonesia? Although there are some caveats, there are several 
reasons to  believe that the security relationship will continue to develop, if slowly.
Despite periods of rivalry or friction in the past, similarities in the strategic 
perspectives of India and Indonesia are likely to increase commonalities in strategic 
interest. Both have long-held concerns about the growth of China's power. Both wish 
to see the development of a multipolar regional order in which they sit at the top 
table. Both see a cooperative security relationship w ith the United States as a means 
to  achieve that objective.
India is increasingly likely to see a close relationship w ith Indonesia as a key to its 
security ambitions in Southeast Asia. Indonesia's leading role in Southeast Asia, 
together with its geographical position as gatekeeper between the Indian and Pacific
44 See comments by former Indian Foreign Secretary Rajiv Sikri, in Sikri, Challenge and 
Strategy.
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Oceans make it an indispensible partner for India. For its part, Indonesia has long 
sought to bring India into a closer relationship with ASEAN although it has also been 
careful to maintain its leading role in the region. Indonesia is likely to see India as a 
useful partner in balancing the growth of China's influence in the region and a 
potential partial alternative to reliance on the United States as an external security 
provider. While this is consistent with Singapore's approach, unlike the smaller ASEAN 
states, Jakarta also has ambitions to sit alongside the major powers in any future Asian 
security arrangements.
Nevertheless, one should treat developments in the security relationship with caution. 
As C.Raja Mohan has commented, "While India has a set of complementary interests 
with Indonesia, both countries are notorious for their inability to turn words into 
practical deeds."45 India has so far failed to take the initiative in making itself an 
attractive economic partner to  Indonesia. In the security sphere there is little 
indication that, despite its ambitions, India will become a major supplier to defence 
technology to Indonesia. India has also not shown itself to be willing to take risks in 
providing security assistance to Indonesia. Neither has Indonesia demonstrated 
interest in publicly supporting India in its claims about China's "String of Pearls" in the 
Indian Ocean.
Despite these caveats, there are two areas where one might expect further 
developments in the security relationship, at least in the medium term. One is political 
cooperation in promoting the development of "m ultipolar" regional security and 
economic institutions i.e. institutions which constrain the influence of China and the 
United States and in which India and perhaps Indonesia have seats at the top table.
The other area is naval cooperation. The main focus of security cooperation will likely 
be maritime policing and related issues, including a more prominent role for the Indian 
coast guard. Increased cooperation could also involve Indian assistance in building
45 Mohan, "Is India an East Asian Power?" p.13.
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Indonesia's naval capabilities, with particular focus on surveillance capacity in the 
Malacca Strait. India might come to see Indonesia as a very useful partner in 
complementing India's naval capabilities in the northeast Indian Ocean.
There are reasons to believe that the India-lndonesia relationship will develop into a 
broader security partnership. However, this will only likely occur when both India and 
Indonesia see an imperative to turn their numerous complementary interests into 
practical deeds.
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Chapter 3.3 India's political alliance with Vietnam
3.3.1 India's most trusted friend and ally: the long-running political alliance
3.3.2 Attempts to develop a post-Cold War security relationship
3.3.3 The dragon is scratching away and the elephant must move fast: economics 
comes to the fore
3.3.4 Perspectives on India's strategic relationship with Vietnam
Introduction
For more than 40 years, India and its "most trusted friend and ally" Vietnam, have 
consistently stood together in resisting external domination of Indochina. In recent 
years India has been seeking - with limited success - to recalibrate the relationship with 
Vietnam as part of its security ambitions in the region.1 This chapter looks at 
developments in this long-standing political alliance and what it reveals about 
potential lim itations on India's security engagement w ith Southeast Asia. Among 
other things, the relationship provides an excellent example of the meeting point 
between India's imperatives to balance China's power in Asia and the realities faced by 
China's neighbours in East Asia.
3.3.1 India's most trusted friend and ally: the long-running political alliance
The relationship between India and Vietnam over the last half a century or more was 
built on an ideological foundation of pan-Asian nationalism reinforced by shared 
struggles against US and Chinese hegemony. During the 1940s, Indian and 
Vietnamese nationalists were at the forefront of independence struggles in Asia and in 
the immediate post-war years, Ho Chi Minh looked to Nehru and the Indian leadership
1 See David Brewster, "The strategic relationship between India and Vietnam: The search for a 
diamond on the South China Sea?" Asian Security Vol. 5, Issue 1 (January 2009), pp. 24 -  44.
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for support, which was forthcoming in moral if not material terms.2 Although Nehru's 
support for the Vietnamese nationalists was initially tempered by suspicions of 
communism, Nehru was the first foreign leader to visit Hanoi on the establishment of 
the separate North Vietnamese state in October 1954 and his public embrace of Ho Chi 
Minh reportedly provided him "incalculable prestige."3
In the 1950s, India saw itself as having an important role to play in securing the 
independence of Vietnam through the negotiation of the French withdrawal from 
Indochina. Although not an official party to the Geneva Peace talks in 1954 (largely 
due to US opposition), the Indians made significant efforts to insert themselves into 
the discussions, and the role of Indian Foreign M inister Krishna Menon in the talks has 
been described as "ubiquitous."4 The Indians saw it as essentially a process of applying 
to Indochina the principles of Ponchsheel, as well as far as possible keeping China, the 
United States and France out of the region. India took the job of overseeing the 
implementation of the Geneva agreements through the International Control 
Commission which had the job of supervising the separation of rival forces, dealing 
w ith refugees and overseeing proposed nation-wide elections.
India's relationship with North Vietnam was not entirely smooth. India saw its primary 
interest as limiting Chinese influence in Indochina rather than limiting the interests of 
the United States. US Vice President Hubert Humphrey later claimed that during a visit 
to  New Delhi in 1966, Indira Gandhi admitted to him that although domestic politics
2 In November 1946, while praising the Vietnamese nationalists, Nehru blocked an attempt to 
organise an Indian volunteer brigade to fight against the French colonial forces in Vietnam.
See D.R.SarDesai, Indian Foreign Policy in Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam 1947-1964 (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1968), at p.12.
3 Ibid, at p.76.
4 One journalist at the Geneva talks commented, "there is no antechamber where one does 
not find oneself face to face with Mr. Krishna Menon." Quoted in Frank N.Trager, Why 
Vietnam? (London: Pall Mall Press, 1966), p.88.
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required her to criticise the United States, she was concerned about Chinese support 
for North Vietnam and was glad the Americans were there.5 However, as the 1960s 
progressed, the Indians increasingly believed that the administration in the South 
would collapse w ithout American support, which would one day be withdrawn, and it 
was therefore prudent and sensible to cultivate relations with the North rather than 
the South.6 As a political rift between Beijing and Hanoi developed through the 1960s, 
Hanoi leaned more and more towards New Delhi. India reciprocated, viewing Vietnam 
as a major long term  regional actor because of its intrinsic moral and material strength. 
Indira Gandhi, aware of the increasing divergence of North Vietnamese and Chinese 
views, took the opportunity to draw North Vietnam into the anti-Chinese camp during 
the late 1960s. However, the relationship was still driven more by a mutual desire to 
keep Indochina free from superpower alignment and from shared ideals of Asian 
nationalism than by overt hostility to China.7 By April 1975, when the fall of Saigon 
was greeted w ith thunderous applause in the Indian Parliament, New Delhi and Hanoi 
had developed a mutually supportive political relationship.
The Chinese invasion of Vietnam in 1979 not only brought back memories of India's 
own humiliation at the hands of China in 1962, but heightened perceptions of a 
continuing Chinese threat to India. Indira Gandhi believed that if India were to 
become the paramount power in South Asia, it must prevent a Chinese advance into 
Southeast Asia. A strong, anti-Chinese Indochina, led by Vietnam, would guard the 
flank of India's sphere of influence in South Asia.8 There were influential calls to create 
an India-Vietnam axis to  contain China, in the nature of the relationship between China
5 Hubert H. Humphrey, The Education of a Public Man: My Life and Politics (New York: 
Doubleday, 1976),p.248.
6 Thakur and Thayer, Soviet Relations with India and Vietnam, at p.234.
7 Ibid., at pp.231-2.
8 John W.Garver, "Chinese-lndian Rivalry in Indochina," Asian Survey, Vol.27, No.11 (Nov. 
1987), pp.1205-1219 at pp.1207-8.
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and Pakistan. In 1979, India's long time senior diplomat and former foreign secretary, 
T.N. Kaul, was dispatched on a "private" visit to Hanoi and later argued that India 
should enter into Soviet-style "Friendship Treaties" with Vietnam and other 
Indochinese states in order to "protect" Indochina from great power rivalry.9 
However, India shied away from developing any security relationship and also refused 
to provide assistance to Vietnam in developing any indigenous arms manufacturing 
capability.10 Whether or not a close security relationship may have been possible 
during the 1970s and 1980s, India did not pursue the opportunity and security 
relations were limited to information sharing arrangements.* 11 Indian support for 
Vietnam remained firm ly at a politico-diplomatic level even after the Chinese invasion 
of Vietnam in February 1979.
India's diplomatic support for Vietnam, in opposing US hegemony in Indochina in the 
1960s and 70s and Chinese hegemony in the 1970s and 80s, came at a significant cost 
in its political relations with the United States, China and much of Southeast Asia. 
Indian support for Hanoi during the Vietnam War was an important factor in the 
development of a hostile relationship between India and the United States during the 
1960s and 1970s. As early as 1965, India's position on Vietnam led to US President 
Johnson postponing the planned visit to the United States by Indian Prime Minister 
Shastri and a decade later New Delhi's glee at the fall of Saigon in 1975 led to the 
cancellation of a planned visit by President Ford. India's later support for Vietnam
9 See Kaul, India, China and Indochina at p.150; and T.N.Kaul (ed.), India and Indochina: 
Perspectives in Cooperation (New Delhi: Patriot Publishers, 1987), p.2.
10 Nayan Chanda, Brother Enemy: The War after the War (New York: Harcourt Brace 
Jovanovich, 1986), p.257.
11 Including studies of the effectiveness of Vietnamese tactics against the Chinese in 1979 and 
a limited three- way information sharing arrangement with the Soviet-backed Afgani 
government in the 1980s. Dr.Subhash Kapila, "India-Vietnam Strategic Partnership: The 
Convergence of Interests," South Asia Analysis Group, Paper No. 177, 2 January 2001.
193
Part 3 Chapter 3.3 - India's 
political alliance with Vietnam
over Cambodia merely confirmed India's place in US policy perspectives as a Soviet 
fellow-traveller.
India's support for Vietnam over the Chinese invasion in February 1979 and the 
Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia through the 1980s also delayed improvements in 
Sino-lndian relations for a decade. The intended reopening of high-level relations with 
China in 1979, frozen since the 1962 war, was wrecked when the Chinese invaded 
Vietnam during the visit of Indian Foreign Minister Vajpayee to China. The invasion, 
according to the Chinese to "teach Vietnam a lesson," evoked bitter memories of 
India's own defeat by China in 1962. The Indian Prime Minister expressed his 
"profound shock and distress" at the invasion and the Indian press described it as 
"perfidy" and "studied insult" by China.12 Whether the tim ing of the invasion during 
Vajpayee's visit was intended to achieve tactical surprise,13 as a reminder of Chinese 
m ilitary power or, as some thought, an attempt to create suspicions between India and 
Vietnam, it seems unlikely to have been a coincidence, particularly given the care with 
which the Chinese had given prior notification of the attack to the Americans. In all 
events, it pointed to the extraordinary disregard held by the Chinese for their relations 
w ith India. The visit was cut short and Vajpayee returned to Delhi, humiliated. The 
planned return visit by Chinese Foreign Minister Huang Hua to New Delhi, scheduled 
fo r August 1980, was also postponed by almost a year after India recognised the 
Vietnamese-backed Cambodian government a few weeks earlier.14 In January 2001, 
Vajpayee, now Prime Minister, repaid the diplomatic insult from 1979 by pointedly
12 Sunanda K.Datta-Ray, "Invasion of Vietnam brings an end to the thaw between India and 
China," Canberra Times, 21 March 1979.
13 It has been argued that Vietnam would not have expected a Chinese attack to occur during 
the Indian visit. Harlan W.Jencks, "China's "Punitive" War on Vietnam: A Military Assessment," 
Asian Survey, Vol.19, No.8, (1979), pp.801-815 at p.805.
14 Garver, "Chinese-lndian Rivalry in Indochina," at p.1209.
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keeping Chinese Premier Li Peng waiting for two days in New Delhi while he completed 
an official visit to Vietnam.
As has been discussed in chapters 3.1 and 3.2, India's relationship with Vietnam also 
had a major impact on its relations in Southeast Asia. India's unsuccessful attempts 
during the 1980s to facilitate a Vietnamese withdrawal from Cambodia w ithout 
strengthening China's regional position placed it at odds with the ASEAN states which, 
by and large, feared Vietnam as a Soviet regional proxy more than China. It was only 
w ith the collapse of the Soviet Union that India's relationship with Vietnam has 
become a potential asset in its political and security relationships in East Asia.15
3.3.2 Attempts to develop a post-Cold War security relationship
It took almost a decade after the end of the Cold War for India and Vietnam to seek to 
revitalise and extend their bilateral relationship beyond their Cold War and anti­
colonial camaraderie. This occurred only after both India and Vietnam had taken 
significant steps to develop other economic and political relationships in East Asia.
The end of the Cold War forced a major change in Vietnam's strategic thinking. For 
Vietnam, like India, the collapse of the Soviet Union meant the loss of its major arms 
supplier and its strategic guarantor against China. However, the end of the Cold War 
also facilitated a resolution of the impasse over Vietnam's occupation of Cambodia and 
consequent room for improvement of relations w ith ASEAN states and China. Vietnam 
moved quickly in the new strategic environment to stabilise its regional security 
relationships, beginning with Southeast Asia. Vietnam signed the ASEAN Treaty of 
Amity and Cooperation in 1992 and was invited to join ASEAN in 1995. Beginning in
15 For detailed discussions of India's recognition of the Heng Samrin regime and its impact on 
relations with ASEAN, see Ayoob, India and Southeast Asia; and Thakur, Soviet Relations with 
India and Vietnam.
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the early 1990s, Vietnam also made efforts to repair relations with China. A "good 
neighbourliness" treaty was signed in February 1999, leading to the resolution of their 
land border dispute in December 1999, and an agreement delimiting the maritime 
boundary in the Gulf of Tonkin in December 2000. While the boundary disputes in the 
South China Sea remain a major source of disagreement, tensions have moderated 
somewhat, particularly since the 2002 agreement on a Code of Conduct on the South 
China Sea between China and ASEAN states, including Vietnam.
Despite significant progress in stabilising its relations in the region, sharp ideological 
divisions remained between Vietnamese reformists and conservatives over whether 
China should be viewed as Vietnam's last remaining socialist friend and the extent of 
Vietnam's relations with non-socialist states.16 Vietnam's policy of reengagement with 
China also reflected the centuries-long pendulum between obeisance and outright 
hostility towards China. As one Vietnamese official remarked: "Remember after 
defeating the Chinese we always sent tribu te ."17 In the late 1990s, the balance had 
swung towards paying "due respect" towards China and acceptance of a position as 
"L ittle Brother" in the relationship. Vietnam's leaders took the view that strategic 
stability was a precondition to economic development and that it would be better to 
settle territoria l disputes sooner rather than later, given the continuing rise of China's 
power. As one observer put it: "Economics has replaced security as the central 
concern of the normalcy era."18 The increased importance placed on "economic
16 See generally, Henry J. Kenny, Shadow of the Dragon: Vietnam's Continuing Struggle with 
China and its Implications for U.S. Foreign Policy (Washington D.C.: Brassey's, 2002); and 
Stephanie Balme and Mark Sidel, Vietnam's New Order: International Perspectives on the State 
and Reform in Vietnam (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006).
17 Quoted in Kenny, Shadow of the Dragon, p.100.
18 Brantly Womack, China And Vietnam: The Politics of Asymmetry (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2006), p.229.
196
Part 3 Chapter 3.3 - India's 
political alliance with Vietnam
security" within the context of national security would also be played out in Vietnam's 
relationship with India.19
In April 2001, a new Vietnamese Communist Party General Secretary, Nong Due Manh, 
re-emphasised a policy of seeking a diversification of international relations. Vietnam 
had already moved to revitalise its relationship with Russia, declaring a "new strategic 
partnership" between them in 1998, and now also sought (if hesitantly) to improve 
relations with the United States, Japan and India. An enhanced relationship with India 
may have been seen as not just helping to provide a measure of balance with China, 
but also in providing a balance between the conflicting pressures coming from the 
United States and Russia.20 However, in hedging its relationships, the Vietnamese 
have avoided any explicit discussion of any threat from China and continued to pay 
public respect towards its socialist brother.
Consistent with moves towards a diversification of international relations, the 
Vietnamese military were also looking for diversification in arms procurement and 
training beyond its traditional partner, Russia. Despite a significant amount of military 
to military contact between the Vietnamese and Chinese militaries since the end of the 
Cold War, China was not considered an appropriate weapons procurement partner at 
least until 2005.21 While Russia and former Soviet republics would remain Vietnam's 
predominant arms suppliers, India, with its large inventory of Soviet weapons and 
indigenous defence industry, also seemed to be a good source of weapons and
19 Pham Cao Phong, "Vietnam's new security perception: the role of economic security," paper 
prepared for the 43rd annual ISA convention, New Orleans, 24-27 March 2002.
20 According to the Thai Foreign Minister, Surin Pitsuwan. See Micool Brooke, "India Courts 
Vietnam with Arms and Nuclear Technology" Asia-Pacific Defence Reporter, Vol. 25 
(August/September 2000), pp.20-21.
21 Carlyle A. Thayer, "Vietnam's Defence Policy and its Impact on Foreign Relations," Paper 
delivered to EuroViet 6, Asien-Afrika Institüt, Universität Hamburg, Hamburg, Germany, June 
6-8, 2008, p.29.
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training. The Vietnamese military had been pursuing a defence supply and training 
relationship with India since the mid-1990s and was eager to develop closer military to 
m ilitary relations.
Attempts to develop a new security partnership
The first significant steps in expanding India-Vietnam relations beyond the traditional 
political alliance were taken in 2000, seemingly at the initiative of India. During a visit 
by Vietnamese Prime Minister Phan Van Khai to New Delhi in January 2000, Indian 
Defence Minister, George Fernandes, called for a renewed political relationship with a 
strong security focus, describing Vietnam as India's "most trusted friend and ally."23 
The Indians called for a new relationship w ith Vietnam with a major security 
dimension, including a proposal to develop India's naval presence in the South China 
Sea through access to the Cam Ranh Bay naval and air base (discussed later) and jo int 
defence training and the supply of advanced weapons to Vietnam. The Indians and 
Vietnamese formalised a wide-ranging defence cooperation agreement providing 
among other things for regular exchange of intelligence, jo in t coastguard training to 
combat piracy, jungle warfare and counterinsurgency training for the Indian army 
(something particularly useful in dealing w ith the Naga insurgency in northeast India), 
repair of Vietnamese MiG aircraft, training o f  Vietnamese pilots and Indian assistance 
on small and medium arms production. Fernandes declared that India could supply 
Vietnam with not only warships, but also anti-ship and air defence missiles.24 
Pursuant to the agreement, Hindustan Aeronautics and Bharat Electronics were
22 In 1994, India and Vietnam entered into a low key protocol providing for limited training of 
Vietnamese officers at India's defence academy and provision of some maintenance services. 
A broader defence cooperation agreement was also negotiated but not signed.
23 "India must not ignore S.E. Asia: Fernandes," The Hindu, 28 March 2000.
24 Micool Brooke, "India Courts Vietnam with Arms and Nuclear Technology" Asia-Pacific 
Defence Reporter, Vol. 25 (August/September 2000), pp.20-21.
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contracted to repair and overhaul up to 125 of the VPAF's Russian-built MiG-21s, 
including new avionics and radar to support Russian antiaircraft missiles.25 The Indian 
navy also supplied much-needed spares for Vietnamese Osa ll-class missile gunboats 
and other Russian built warships and in October 2002, the Vietnamese requested India 
to provide submarine training for its navy.
While the Vietnamese made steps towards closer security relations with New Delhi, 
they remained cautious, concerned not to upset the newly-found stability in relations 
w ith China. It was only in early 2003 that the General Secretary Nong Due Manh 
yielded to pressure from the integrationist camp within the Vietnamese Communist 
Party to enter a "strategic relationship" w ith India.26 This resulted in the "Joint 
Declaration on the Comprehensive Cooperation Framework" in May 2003, which 
included commitments to regular high-level meetings, close cooperation in 
international fora and gradual steps to expand cooperation in security and defence.
At the same time, the Vietnamese decided to pursue what they called a "reliable 
partnership" w ith Japan and later that year made significant steps to improve political 
ties with the United States. In agreeing to develop relationships with key non-socialist 
states, the Vietnamese however continued to delicately balance its relations with 
China. As a result, the development of the security dimension of the Vietnam-lndia 
relationship has been much slower than India had originally hoped.
For its part, India has turned out to be a less than reliable weapons procurement 
partner, proving itself to be often uncompetitive, bureaucratic and politically hesitant
25 Ian Storey and Carlyle A.Thayer, "Cam Ranh Bay: Past Imperfect, Future Conditional," 
Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol.23, No.3 (December 2001), pp.452-73 at p.468; Jane's 
Sentinel Southeast Asia No.12 (2003) p.637.
26 Alexander L.Vuving, "Strategy and Evolution of Vietnam's China Policy: A Changing Mixture 
of Pathways," Asian Survey, Vol. XLVI, No.6 (November/December 2006), pp.805-824 at
pp.816-8.
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in supplying weapons to Vietnam. While Vietnam was initially keen on sourcing spares 
for Soviet-vintage equipment from India, the Indians found themselves undercut by 
cheap suppliers from Belarus, Ukraine and Russia. Other deals have been lost through 
payment-related problems and Indian bureaucratic bottlenecks.27 One Indian 
observer complained of excessive bureaucracy coupled with highly complex and 
uncoordinated procedures required to export military goods.28 However, there was 
also a significant element of political caution on the part of India, particularly in 
relation to the supply of advanced missile technology. Several years ago, Vietnam 
formally requested the supply of Indian Prithvi intermediate range ballistic missiles and 
Brahmos cruise missiles (both of which can be supplied under the Missile Technology 
Control Regime).29 The supply of Brahmos missiles was blocked by India's Russian 
partners. Although the Indians reportedly agreed "in principle" to the sale of Prithvi 
missiles, they have since stalled.30 The Vietnamese are believed to have indicated 
their displeasure at delays in the supply of Prithvi missiles through the purchase by the 
Vietnamese Ministry of Public Security of a small number of small arms from Pakistan 
in 2007 and 2009, despite "discreet" protests from India.
As will be discussed later, bilateral discussions after 2003 have increasingly placed 
greater emphasis on political and economic aspects of the relationship and less on 
security aspects. The Congress-led Indian government, elected in May 2004, was much 
less assertive in regional security matters than its BJP predecessors and the 
Vietnamese too sought greater focus on an economic partnership. As a result, the 
jo int statement following the October 2004 visit to Hanoi by Indian Foreign Minister
27 John Cherian, "The Vietnamese Prime Minister's visit comes at a time when his country is 
emerging as an economic powerhouse in Asia "Frontline Vol.24, Issue 14,14 July 2007.
28 Rahul Bedi, "Despite India's Protests, Vietnam buys arms from Pakistan," India News, 17 
August 2007.
29 "What's Hot? -  Analysis of Recent Happenings -  Indian Navy Update" India Defence 
Consultants, 20 November 2005.
30 Rahul Bedi, "Strategic Realignments" Frontline, Vol.20, Issue 13, 21 June -  4 July 2003.
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Natwar Singh did not include the references to security and defence cooperation that 
were so prominent in the 2003 Cooperation Framework. India and Vietnam have 
nevertheless continued and enhanced their tradition of remarkably consistent mutual 
political support. Vietnam has continued its support of India's position on Kashmir, 
India's status as a nuclear weapons state, and India's bid for a permanent seat on the 
UN Security Council. Vietnam took the lead in blocking Pakistan's bid for membership 
of the ASEAN Regional Forum.31 India also supported Vietnam in its recent successful 
bid for a non-permanent Security Council seat.
The development of the bilateral relationship has been complemented by stronger 
cross-regional links among China's southern neighbours. In November 2000, the 
Mekong Ganga Cooperation initiative was established, sponsored largely by India and 
Thailand. Its ostensible purpose is to promote greater east-west transport connectivity 
between South Asia and Indochina, as well as regional tourism, culture and education. 
Its members include India, Burma, Thailand, Vietnam and the other Indochinese states. 
China, a major Mekong river state, was conspicuous by its absence. Indian Foreign 
M inister Jaswant Singh claimed that the initiative "was not aimed at China or a means 
of increasing India's power projection."32 China has shown interest in joining the 
grouping several times, but has made no formal request (presumably reflecting a 
desire by the majority of members not to include China). The Indians continue to 
emphasise the non-security and even non-economic focus of the MGC grouping, 
describing it as "engaging India's civilisational neighbours."33 Although it has had few 
concrete achievements, it remains for both India and Vietnam a potentially useful 
regional talk shop among China's southern neighbours. China has also taken steps to
31 Kripa Sridharan, "Regional Perceptions of India," in Grare and Mattoo, Indio and ASEAN.
32 Amit Baruah, "Looking East" Frontline 8 December 2000, p.50.
33 E.Ahmad, "Reinforcing Look East Policy."
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cultivate a separate grouping of Mekong River states;34 however, no formal Indochina 
regional grouping which includes China has yet been established.
Despite slow progress in a number of areas (and a reduced priority in overhauling the 
Vietnamese armed forces),35 both the Indians and Vietnamese are continuing to 
develop the ir security relationship. A "New Strategic Partnership" was declared during 
a July 2007 visit by Vietnam Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dun to New Delhi and the 
third bilateral Strategic Dialogue held in November 2007 decided to step up training of 
jun ior level officers, hold annual security dialogues and to share other expertise. This 
was followed by a flurry of official visits to Vietnam by the Indian Defence Minister A.K. 
Antony and senior Indian officers and to India by Vietnamese signatories. In early 
2009, Vietnam announced the acquisition from Russia of 12 Sukhoi aircraft and 6 Kilo 
class submarines. If those acquisitions proceed, it is likely that India will play a 
significant role in the provision of training and maintenance services for these 
platforms.
The role of Vietnam in India's ambitions in the South China Sea
One of the most interesting and intriguing aspects of India's recent attempts to create 
a security relationship with Vietnam involves India's request in 2000 for rights to the 
Cam Ranh Bay naval and air base. Indian strategists have long recognised the 
potential role of Vietnam in controlling the South China Sea and blocking Chinese naval 
penetration of the Indian Ocean36 and this was not the first time that the Indians had 
sought to establish a naval presence in the South China Sea. In the early 1990s, there
34 For example, in April 2000 it signed an agreement with Burma, Thailand and Laos (but not 
Vietnam or Cambodia) relating to Mekong River navigation.
35 Jane's Sentinel Southeast Asia No.22 (2008) p.738.
36 K.M. Pannikar, India and the Indian Ocean: An Essay on the Influence of Sea Power on Indian 
History (London, George Allen and Unwin, 1945), p.85.
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had reportedly been preliminary talks between Indian and Vietnamese officers about 
the use of Cam Ranh Bay by Indian warships37 and/or an Indian naval squadron of Bear 
maritime reconnaissance aircraft.38
When George Fernandes visited Vietnam in March 2000, he proffered India's 
capabilities not only in policing sea lanes of communication in the South China Sea but, 
significantly, also India's capability in "containing" local conflicts. In referring to the 
South China Sea, he stated: "A strong India, economically and m ilitarily well endowed, 
will be a very solid agent to see that the sea lanes are not disturbed and that conflict 
situations are contained."39 He was, of course, referring to the longstanding disputes 
between Vietnam and other littoral states w ith China over maritime boundaries in the 
South China Sea. As recently as 1988, the Vietnamese and Chinese navies had clashed 
in the Spratly Islands, when several Vietnamese naval vessels were sunk. In 1992, 
Vietnam protested against the Chinese landing troops at Da Luc Reef and the Chinese 
seizure of Vietnamese commercial vessels. There were further naval confrontations 
about Vietnam's claims in the mid-1990s and in 2007, the Chinese PLA navy sank an 
"armed" Vietnamese fishing boat as part of a dispute about the grant of oil exploration 
blocks. China has stepped up pressure in the South China Sea in recent times, 
including pressuring oil companies in Vietnam and establishing an administrative body 
fo r the Spratly and Paracel islands. The Vietnamese were also involved in m ilitary 
incidents in the South China Sea with Taiwan in 1995 and the Philippines in 1998 and 
1999. The disputed maritime boundaries in the South China Sea remain one of Asia's 
m ilitary flashpoints, and represent a clear and continuing strategic divide between 
China and Vietnam.
37 Annuar Kassim "New Delhi Want Use of Hanoi Naval Facilities," Asian Defense Journal Vol.9 
(1990) p.108.
38 H.Jenkins, "Dwindling Support Throws Status Quo into Sea of Change" Insight, 14 January 
1991, p.29.
39 Nayan Chanda, "After the Bomb," Far Eastern Economic Review, 13 April 2000 p.20.
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However, it should have come as no surprise to the Indians when the Vietnamese 
turned down their requests to use Cam Ranh Bay. It is widely understood that the 
Vietnamese consider Cam Ranh Bay as a strategic trum p card of great domestic and 
international political sensitivity. The Soviets were granted rights to Cam Ranh Bay in 
1978 as part of the Vietnam-Soviet Friendship Treaty, which was signed by Vietnam 
only when it became clear that they would require significant Soviet assistance in 
dealing w ith both Pol Pot and an increasingly threatening China. While the base was 
provided as quid pro quo for considerable Soviet m ilitary and economic support, the 
Vietnamese quickly decided that they gained insufficient direct benefit from the Soviet 
presence.40 By the early 1990s, the Vietnamese were actively trying to evict the 
Russians, and managed to negotiate their complete departure in 2002.
If the Indians believed in the early 1990s or in 2000 that they might be the post-Cold 
War inheritors of the strategic mantle of the Soviets in the South China Sea, they were 
mistaken. Since the late 1980s with the gradual draw-down of the Russian presence, 
the Vietnamese have sought to use Cam Ranh Bay in what has been called a "subtle 
game" of balancing relations with the United States and China and seeking to increase 
Vietnam's strategic options.41 During this period the Vietnamese have tried to use 
Cam Ranh Bay as leverage in its relations with the United States and Japan including as 
a carrot to  normalise relations,42 obtain aid, and to extract promises in relation to
40 For example, the Soviets reportedly failed to provide the Vietnamese with SIGINT 
information at the time of the Sino-Vietnamese naval clash in the Spratly Islands in 1988.
41 In November 1988, Vietnamese Deputy Foreign Minister Tran Quant Co stated that "Cam 
Ranh Bay will be offered to others in the future." Bangkok Post, 28 November 1988.
42 Vietnamese General Secretary Nguyen Van Linh is reported to have stated in June 1990 that 
Japan and the United States would be allowed to use Cam Ranh Bay if they agreed to 
normalise relations with Vietnam. IDSA News Review on Southeast Asia and Australia, June 
1990.
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support of local opposition groups.43 Even before the final departure of the Russians, 
the US navy was flirting with the possibility of returning to Cam Ranh Bay and the idea 
of US access or prepositioning rights (in the style of US access rights in Singapore) 
appears to have been a regular item on the agenda of US-Vietnamese discussions. 
While the Vietnamese would undoubtedly be highly sensitive to the potential impact 
of any foreign naval presence at Cam Ranh Bay on relations with China they would also 
be increasingly sensitive to the attitude of the ir ASEAN partners who would be likely to 
have considerable misgivings over such a development. As a result, the Vietnamese 
have increasingly emphasised Cam Ranh Bay's commercial rather than military 
potential in the same way that the former US naval base at Subic Bay in the Philippines 
has been converted into a commercial port.44 Thus in November 2004, while on a visit 
to  India, Vietnamese Foreign Minister Nguyen Dy Nien, when asked about use of Cam 
Ranh Bay by the Indian navy, claimed that it was no longer a m ilitary port.45 Despite 
substantial political friction between Vietnam and China in 2007 over the Vietnamese 
grant of oil exploration rights in the South China Sea and revelations of the 
construction by China of a major naval base on Hainan island there is no reason to 
believe that Vietnam will quickly revise its attitude towards any Indian military 
presence in Cam Ranh Bay. Rather, the port is likely to be available to visiting naval 
vessels on an open access basis.
While one the Vietnamese might not be unhappy to see an increase in India's naval 
presence in the region, in the current environment it seems unlikely that any 
(inevitably small) Indian naval presence at Cam Ranh Bay could justify China's likely 
reaction, whether in strategic or economic terms. The practical benefits for Vietnam
43 "Vietnam's Risky Game in the South China Sea," Stratfor, 20 May 2004 <www.stratfor.com/ 
vietnams_risky_game_south _china_sea>.
44Storey and Thayer, "Cam Ranh Bay," at p.461.
45 P.S.Suryanarayana, "India can help Vietnam integrate with world economy," The Hindu, 22 
November 2004.
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from such an arrangement would seem small and any implicit security guarantees 
arising from such an arrangement doubtful. One could argue that it would look a little 
like the French security guarantee of Poland in 1939, but with less credibility. It 
would also run entirely counter to the Vietnamese strategy of creating security 
stability so as to provide the basis for economic development. It is therefore difficult 
in the current strategic environment to see the India-Vietnam security relationship 
extending much past an arms supply relationship, even assuming that India will 
overcome its caution regarding the supply of missiles to Vietnam.
3.3.3 The dragon is scratching away and the elephant must move fast: economics 
comes to the fore
Over the past several years, the India-Vietnam relationship has also increasingly 
focused on mutual economic interests, particularly so following the announcement of 
a "New Strategic Partnership" between them in July 2007. The shift of the relationship 
primarily into the economic dimension reflects India's increasing economic integration 
into East Asia, as well as a response to widely-held fears of Chinese economic 
dominance of Vietnam and the wider region. It is something that the Vietnamese have 
been emphasising to the Indians for some time. As one senior Vietnamese Foreign 
M inistry official commented, "The dragon is scratching away and the elephant must 
move fast."46
Although Vietnam began its process of economic liberalisation and globalisation later 
than India, its recent economic performance has been impressive, with annual 
economic growth of around 7-9% and annual export growth of around 25%. Economic 
growth has been driven to a significant extent by economic integration with ASEAN, 
and to a lesser extent China. Its location in East Asia in proximity to Japanese and
46 "Vietnam for greater economic engagement with India," The Press Trust of India, 20 June 
2007.
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South Korean markets, low wage rates and an autocratic political system make it a 
relatively attractive destination for foreign investment. Nevertheless, Vietnam 
remains relatively poor and many years behind India in economic development. As a 
result, India's economic relationship with Vietnam is in many ways the reverse of its 
relationship with capital rich East Asian states such as Japan, South Korea and 
Singapore. Vietnam looks to India as a potential investor and provider of technology 
and manufactured goods. India-Vietnam bilateral trade is growing strongly (though 
from a low base) from a nominal US$72 million in 1995 to over US$2 billion in 2008. In 
the reverse of India's normal trading position in Asia, the India-Vietnam balance of 
trade is strongly in favour of India. The Vietnamese are impatient to gain greater 
access to the Indian market through a reduction of ta riff barriers over agricultural and 
manufactured goods.
Indian FDI in Vietnam aggregated US$580m in 2006, making it the largest destination 
of Indian FDI in ASEAN (although it ranks only as the sixth largest source of FDI for 
Vietnam). Indian FDI in Vietnam is growing, with recently announced investments 
including a US$500 million steel refinery, a US$600 million oil exploration project and a 
project announced by Tata Steel in 2007 for the establishment of steel mills with a 
value of US$4 billion. India and Vietnam have targeted increased future Indian 
investment in the Vietnamese energy sector, including in oil exploration, refining and 
downstream marketing and in nuclear and conventional power generation. Some of 
the proposed and targeted investments have strong political overtones, including, for 
example, the October 2000 grant to Indian state-owned ONGC Videsh Limited (in 
partnership with BP) of major gas production blocks in areas of the South China Sea 
claimed by China. India has also been a strong supporter of the development of civil 
nuclear technology by Vietnam since the 1970s, and in 2002 funded the establishment
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of a jo in t nuclear research centre in southern Vietnam.47 However, India's 
participation in the development of a civilian power industry will likely be lim ited.48
The Vietnamese have given consistent diplomatic support for Indian economic 
integration in East Asia, reflecting their concern about regional economic dominance 
by China. The Vietnamese are concerned about the potential for Chinese domination 
of multilateral arrangements, and were reportedly privately unenthusiastic about the 
China-ASEAN Free Trade Area, established in 2010.49 There were also concerns about a 
proposed East Asian economic community which would not include India. Vietnam 
publicly supported India's alternative "Arc of Advantage and Prosperity" proposal for 
an Asian economic community that included India. However, it is apparent to many 
that an Asia-wide free trade area is many years away. Of more immediate concern, 
particularly to Vietnam, is to put in place a bilateral free trade agreement with India, 
including access to the Indian market and facilitation of Indian FDI. In July 2007, the 
Vietnamese proposed negotiations on a free trade agreement, but the Indians, as 
beneficiaries of the trade imbalance, have stalled.
Some might see the failure of India to open its markets to Vietnam and actively pursue 
an economic partnership as being short-sighted in view of India's broader ambitions in 
the South China Sea. While a long-term political alliance is likely to continue, the 
experience since 2000 suggests that the relationship needs to be placed on a more
47 Some see India's assistance in Vietnam's nuclear program as being pregnant with the 
potential to provide a strategic parallel to the assistance given by China to Pakistan in the 
development of nuclear weapons aimed at India. See Bharat Karnad, Nuclear weapons and 
Indian Security: the realist foundations of strategy (New Delhi : Macmillan India, 2005). 
However, there is no indication that India has been involved in nuclear weapons technology 
proliferation with Vietnam.
48 In May 2008, a Japanese company was awarded a contract to develop the Vietnamese 
nuclear generation industry.
49 Vuving, "Strategy and Evolution of Vietnam's China Policy," at p.819.
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comprehensive footing. Vietnam is enjoying a relatively stable security relationship 
with China and, at least in the short term, is likely to give priority to economic 
development over the development of new security partnerships.
3.3.4 Perspectives on India's strategic relationship with Vietnam
The story of the attempt by India at the turn of this century to inject a significant 
security dimension into the India-Vietnam relationship is an interesting one. For 
decades, the political alliance between India and Vietnam has provided a limited 
exception to the strategic separation between East and South Asia. However, the 
failure of India to develop its relationship into a substantive security relationship also 
highlights some of the limitations of New Delhi as a regional security partner, including 
its reliability as an arms supplier, its limited credibility in projecting naval power 
beyond its immediate neighbourhood and its failure to fully appreciate the security 
dynamics of East Asia. Despite hesitations and road bumps in the development of the 
relationship since the turn of the century, it seems likely in the long term that the 
relationship will grow in significance - if nothing else as a result of India's closer 
engagement with the region as a whole. The relationship is underpinned by more than 
six decades of anti-colonialism, pan-Asian nationalism and fiercely independent foreign 
policies. Their shared concerns about Chinese hegemony are derived from their past 
experience of Chinese military aggression and fears of future economic domination. 
These shared perspectives provide an unusually strong foundation for the relationship.
The development of relations between India and Vietnam since the turn of the century 
is also an example of the meeting point between two potentially inconsistent strategic 
forces: on one hand, apparent imperatives to balance against China's rising power and 
on the other hand, traditions within East Asia of showing formal deference towards 
China. Developments in the relationship between India and Vietnam might be seen as 
a case of both forces at work. There can be little doubt that a substantial factor in 
India's strategic calculus earlier this decade was to balance against China through
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strengthening Vietnam's military power. Numerous Indian strategic commentators 
have pointed to the parallels between China's strategic relationships with Pakistan and 
Burma and India's relationship with Vietnam. Karnad, for example, claims that “ by 
cultivating a resolute Vietnam as a close regional ally and security partner in the 
manner China has done Pakistan, India can pay Beijing back in the same coin."50 Such 
perspectives contrast sharply with those of Hanoi. Although Vietnam is seeking to 
diversify its international relationships and further enmesh itself in ASEAN, it is willing 
to do so only in a context of showing overall deference towards China. As C.Raja 
Mohan commented, "An acute sensitivity to the changing balance of power in Asia 
guides the current Vietnamese strategy of befriending the US and Japan and 
intensifying security cooperation with India without antagonizing China."51 According 
to Mohan. Vietnam has the history and self-confidence to play the game of reolpolitik, 
something which by implication India is less able.
While Vietnam may not be balancing against China, it is at least signalling to China that 
it has strategic options. Certainly, Vietnam has over the last decade or so sought to 
diversify its international relations through the development of partnerships with 
Russia, India and Japan in addition to its ASEAN partners. In revitalising its relationship 
with New Delhi at the turn of the century, Hanoi was primarily seeking to form a new 
partnership to assist in its economic development. It was not seeking to take any 
actions that would result in the destabilisation of the security of the region -  as 
granting the Indian navy rights to Cam Ranh Bay certainly would have done.
India, which unlike many Asian states has no cultural or historical tradition of showing 
deference to China, may have underestimated the influence of the long tradition of 
formal deference that Vietnam has shown to China and failed to understand that 
Vietnam's relationship with the Soviet Union during the latter half of the Cold War was
50 Bharat Karnad, “China uses Pak, Vietnam opens to India," Express India, 3 October 2005.
51 C.Raja Mohan, “The Importance of Being Vietnam" indiaexpress.com 9 July 2007. 
<www.indianexpress.com/story_print.php?storyid=204292>.
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an exception to this tradition. There is little chance for example that Vietnam would 
allow India to merely step into the Soviet Union's strategic shoes in Cam Ranh Bay; 
rather, if India wishes to extend its role as a potential security provider in Southeast 
Asia it will need to do so in a manner that allows Vietnam and other states to continue 
the ir traditions of deference to China. India will also need to take greater care in 
assisting Vietnam's economic development and not merely treat Vietnam as merely a 
potential customer or a host fo r the Indian navy.
It seems that India's relationship with Vietnam will always have a strong political 
element, although to what extent that is translated into a direct security relationship 
remains to  be seen. While India doubtless has a strong strategic interest in Indochina, 
its aims can be achieved w ithout an overt security relationship with Vietnam. India 
may see its interests as best served in focusing on an economic partnership with 
Vietnam which promotes Vietnam's economic development and India's influence in 
the region.
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Chapter 3.4 Developments in India's relations with South Korea
3.4.1 The strategic estrangement of India and South Korea
3.4.2 The breakdown of the strategic separation of South and Northeast Asia
3.4.3 Recent developments in the India-South Korea relationship
3.4.4 Perspectives on an Indian role in Northeast Asia
Introduction
Until recent years there has been a virtually complete strategic disconnection between 
South and Northeast Asia. There could be few better examples of this than India and 
South Korea, which managed to virtually ignore each other for almost the first half 
century o f their modern history as independent states.1 This section will use the 
India-South Korea relationship to consider the gradual breakdown of the strategic 
separation between South and Northeast Asia and its implications for India's strategic 
relationships in East Asia.
3.4.1 The strategic estrangement of India and South Korea
The strategic history of Asia has often been more of disjunction than of interaction 
between different parts of the continent, particularly between South Asia and 
Northeast Asia. The size and power of China has served to strategically divide the 
region rather than unite it. There can be few better examples than the relationship 
between India and South Korea (ROK). In the four decades or so following the end of 
the Korean War, India and ROK had virtually no political and economic interaction: 
both remained largely preoccupied with their own subregional problems, and both
1 See David Brewster, "Developments in India's relations with South Korea: a useful friend in 
East Asia?" Asian Survey, Vol.50 No.2 (March 2010), pp.407 to 425.
212
Part 3 Chapter 3.4 - Developments in 
India's relations with South Korea
ultimately relied on different extra-regional strategic guarantors against the perceived 
threat from China.
The strategic estrangement of India and ROK throughout this period might be 
considered odd in some ways. Certainly there were, and continue to be, interesting 
parallels between the strategic circumstances of India and ROK that might lead one to 
expect a greater degree of strategic cooperation between them. Both India and ROK 
were the successors of colonised national entities that gained independence soon after 
World War II and were immediately partitioned as a result of ideological or religious 
conflict. For each the partition has occupied a central place in their political culture 
and discourse, and each identified its "breakaway" neighbour as its most immediate 
threat. Both shared a resurgent and belligerent Communist China as an immediate 
neighbour, which they both came to regard as presenting an existential threat. Both 
fought wars against the Chinese in the early part of the Cold War, resulting in a 
continuing military standoff.
Despite these parallels, India and South Korea's interactions during the Cold War were 
largely unhappy. In the early 1950s, India, as Chairman of the Neutral Nations 
Repatriation Commission, played an important role in persuading China and North 
Korea (DPRK) to drop their claims to the forcible repatriation of their nationals, 
allowing the conclusion of the armistice to effectively end the war. In contrast to 
India's mediating role in the Vietnam war which reflected India's strategic interests in 
Indochina, India's role in the Korean war did not reflecting any direct interest in the 
Korean peninsula. India's involvement was essentially an opportunity for India to 
assert a high-minded role as a major independent and nonaligned Asian state standing 
between the superpowers. However, India's attempts to achieve a negotiated 
resolution to the conflict were strongly opposed by the South Korean regime which 
saw its interests in a continuation of the war. The South Koreans took the view that
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India was a merely acting as communist fe llow-traveller,2 a view which was later 
reinforced by India's Friendship Treaty with the Soviet Union in 1971.
For its part, India perceived both ROK and DPRK as mere client states of the 
superpowers, products of an undesirable intrusion of external Cold War rivalries into 
Asia. India harshly criticised South Korea's contribution of troops to the Vietnam War 
in support of the United States in the 1960s, and was equally unimpressed by the 
North Koreans' attempts to bring their revolutionary fervour to India.3 As a result,
India adopted a policy of equidistant non-interest in both South and North Korea, to 
the extent even of not having any diplomatic relations w ith either regime.
The major strategic realignments that occurred in Asia in the early 1970s -  the US- 
China rapprochement and the development of a security relationship between India 
and the Soviet Union -  merely served to reinforce the strategic estrangement of South 
and Northeast Asia. South Korea, for a period left somewhat isolated by the new 
alignments, sought to expand its diplomatic contacts with the Soviet Union and India in 
1973. However, the Indians, while agreeing to give "balanced" diplomatic recognition 
to  both ROK and DPRK, remained largely uninterested in giving substance to the 
relationship.4 India and South Korea would remain strategically estranged until well 
after the end of the Cold War.
2 India's involvement in the POW issue reportedly led to the South Korean President Rhee 
Syngman "nurturing a vendetta" against Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru throughout 
the 1950s. B.K. Gills, Korea versus Korea: a case of contested legitimacy (New York: Routledge, 
1996), p.88.
3 For example, in May 1971 the Indian government threatened to expel North Korean consular 
officials in New Delhi if they continued to engage in "undesirable activities," including openly 
providing classes in guerrilla warfare to interested Indians. The Times, 1 May 1971.
4 In an interesting Cold War twist, India was pressed by the Soviet Union to improve its 
relationship with South Korea, apparently prompted by indications of South Korean support 
for Soviet proposals for a regional collective security arrangement aimed at containing China.
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3.4.2. The breakdown of the strategic separation of South and Northeast Asia
Changes in the international system since the end of the Cold War, especially changes 
in China's role within Asia, have led to the gradual breakdown of the strategic 
separation between Northeast and South Asia. One of the starkest reminders of the 
potential for increased interaction between the regions and of the central role of China 
was provided by China's support for the development of a relationship between 
Pakistan and the DPRK during the 1990s, involving the trade of missiles and nuclear 
weapons technology.* 5 This would have a major strategic impact on both the Indian 
subcontinent and the Korean peninsula.
A security relationship between Islamabad and Pyongyang was first established in 1971 
when Pakistan purchased artillery ammunition and spare parts from DPRK for its 
coming conflict with India. Pakistani and North Korean experts worked together on 
the Iranian missile program during the 1980s, but it was only with the end of the Cold 
War that this relationship evolved into cooperation in weapons development, initially 
in missile and then in nuclear technology. In December 1993, Pakistan Prime Minister 
Benazir Bhutto visited DPRK to seek assistance in the development of ballistic missiles 
and in January 1994, Pakistan, DPRK and China signed a formal technical assistance 
agreement which, officially at least, was concerned w ith cooperation in missiles and 
guidance systems.6 In addition to the major missile components supplied by DPRK to
See Lee Man-woo, "The Prospect for Normalisation of Relations between Moscow and Seoul,"
Korea & World Affairs Vol.4 No.l (Spring 1980) at p.129.
5 For detailed discussions of this relationship see Adrian Levy and Catherine Scott-Clark, 
Deception: Pakistan, The United States and the Global Nuclear Weapons Conspiracy (London, 
United Kingdom: Atlantic Books, 2007) and International Institute of Strategic Studies, Nuclear 
Black Markets: Pakistan, A.Q. Khan and the rise of proliferation networks: A net assessment., 
<http://www.iiss.org/publications/strategic-dossiers/nbm/nuclear-black-market-dossier-a-net- 
assesment/>.
6 Jane's Defence Weekly, 15 October 1994.
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the Pakistani missile program, China provided significant complementary assistance to 
Pakistan, including technology, engineering, and components in areas in which the 
DPRK was still struggling (e.g. guidance systems).7 As a result, Pakistan, with the 
assistance of North Korean missile crews, was able to test a modified version of a 
Nodong missile in April 1998.
According to a 2002 Central Intelligence Agency report, Pakistan began sharing nuclear 
technology w ith the DPRK in 1997 when the Pakistani government reportedly realised 
that it had no more money to purchase North Korean missiles.8 Pakistan provided the 
DPRK prototypes of high-speed centrifuge machines as well as information on building 
a nuclear device. US intelligence reportedly tracked at least 13 visits to North Korea by 
A.Q.Khan, the so-called "father of the Pakistani bomb" as late as July 2002. Although 
North Korean officials admitted to possessing nuclear weapons in 2003, there is 
speculation that Pakistan's nuclear tests in 1998 also included the testing of a North 
Korean device.9 Although there have been no public reports of strategic cooperation 
between Pakistan and DPRK since August 2002 there can be little doubt that incentives 
fo r such a relationship continue today.
While publicly available evidence o f China's involvement in the Pakistan/DPRK 
countertrade is limited, it seems highly likely that during the 1990s China actively 
facilitated the trade in missiles and nuclear technology between Pakistan and the 
DPRK. As noted, a formal three-way agreement among China, Pakistan, and North
7 Joseph S. Bermudez Jr., "DPRK-Pakistan Ghauri Missile Cooperation," 21 May 1998 
<http://www.fas.org/news/pakistan/1998/05/ghauri2.htm>; and Josephs. Bermudez. Jr. "A 
History of Ballistic Missile Development in the DPRK," CNS Occasional Papers: #2 , Center for 
Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies, November 1999. 
<http://cns.miis.edu/opapers/op2/op2.pdf> .
8 Seymour M.Hersh, "The Cold Test," The New Yorker, 78:44, 7 January 2003, p.42.
9 David E.Sanger and William J.Broad, "Did North Koreans Fuel Pakistan Bomb?" Internotionol 
Herald Tribune, 28 February 2004.
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Korea was reached in January 1994 involving the trade of missile technology. Given 
the level of Chinese involvement in Pakistan's nuclear program (including Chinese 
technicians working at Pakistani nuclear and missile development facilities) it is 
difficult to believe that China was not aware of the nuclear trade and relationship 
between Pakistan and North Korea, including the presence of North Korean nuclear 
technicians in Pakistan.10 It has also been reported as likely that Pakistani C-130 
aircraft, which ferried missile and nuclear technology to and from North Korea, were 
refuelled in western China.* 11 There is little doubt that China, if it so desired, could 
have halted the trade between Pakistan and North Korea.
What might China gain in this? Pakistan and DPRK, locked in to the (losing) side of 
decades long conflicts with their neighbours, were apparently motivated by their own 
immediate security needs and not for broader strategic reasons. China's position is 
somewhat different. Since 1949, China has successfully managed to keep the power 
of both India and Japan in check. For China, the Pakistan/DPRK transactions helped in 
the creation of low-cost local nuclear checks on each of India and Japan while 
maintaining a measure of deniability. Some argue that this is part of China's overall 
strategy to tie India and Japan into sub-regional conflicts. According to Mohan Malik:
"Chino has played a double game in South Asia and Northeast Asia, having 
earlier contributed to their destabilisation by transferring nuclear and missile 
technology to its allies (Pakistan and Korea) and later offering to help contain 
the problem of nuclear/missile proliferation in South Asia and on the Korean 
peninsula. Such tactics have buttressed the point that China's "centrality" in 
regional security issues must be recognised as essential to their resolution.
10 See Thomas Woodrow, "China Opens Pandora's Nuclear Box," China Brief, 2:24 (10 
December 2002).
11 Mohan Malik, "The Proliferation Axis: Beijing-lslamabad-Pyongyang," Korean Journal of 
Defense Analysis,Vol. 15 No.l (Spring 2003), pp.57-100 at p.69.
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...Such o strategy not only obviates the need fo r  China to pose a direct threat to 
Japan or India, but also allows Beijing to wield its prestige as a disinterested, 
responsible global nuclear power while playing the role o f an impartial, regional 
arbiter.” 12
For the same reasons, the possible development of a nuclear proliferation relationship 
between DPRK and Burma, another Chinese ally in South Asia, is of major concern to 
India.13
3.4.3 Recent developments in the India-South Korea relationship
Development of the economic relationship between India and South Korea since the 
1990s
The strategic separation between South and Northeast Asia during the Cold War was 
reinforced by a very low level of economic contact between each region, including 
between India and South Korea. However, with the opening and liberalisation of the 
Indian economy beginning in earnest in 1991 India actively sought investment from 
both Japan and ROK, kick-started through visits by Indian Prime Minister P.V. 
Narasimha Rao to Japan in 1992 and then ROK in 1993. While Japanese businesses 
were slow to  take the opportunity, the South Koreans responded quickly, expanding 
both investment and trade links. Bilateral trade between ROK and India grew from 
around US$600m in 1993 to approximately US$11 billion in 200714 and is expected to
12 Malik, "The Proliferation Axis: Beijing-lslamabad-Pyongyang," p.80.
13 For a discussion of the DPRK-Burma arms supply relationship, including the possible supply 
of nuclear technology, see Andrew Selth, "Burma and North Korea: Smoke or Fire?" Australian 
Strategic Policy Institute Policy Analysis No.47, 24 August 2009.
14 "South Korea, India Reach Agreement on Free Trade Pact," Agence France-Presse, 29 
September 2008.
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reach US$15 billion in 2010.15 Indian exports to Korea (largely agricultural and mineral 
commodities but increasingly low-end manufactures) grew at 25% p.a. in 2006 and 
Indian imports from Korea (largely machinery and equipment) grew at 37% p.a. with a 
trade balance currently in favour of India.16
Growth in trade has been outmatched by the growth in investment links. From a base 
of almost nothing, between 1996 and 2001 ROK became the largest Asian investor in 
India, w ith aggregate FDI approvals of Rs 92,597 million (US$1.9 billion), compared 
w ith Rs72,503 million (US$1.48 billion) for Japan and Rs80,296 million (US$1.63 billion) 
for all ASEAN countries combined.17 In 2002, a South Korean government 
representative announced that ROK aimed soon to be the largest foreign investor in 
India.18 Major Korean investors in India have included LG, Samsung, Hyundai and 
Daewoo, primarily in the automotive and consumer electronics sectors. Korean 
companies have also successfully employed a strategy of creating so-called "industrial 
clusters" through encouraging their established Korean subcontractors to also make 
jo in t venture or greenfield investments around the new Indian hub. The 
transplantation of entire production chains has allowed them to manufacture locally 
w ith  relatively high levels of Indian domestic content, while maintaining standards in 
quality and price.19 As a result, Korean brands, cheaper than their Japanese rivals and 
better quality than Chinese products, have achieved a dominant position in significant
15 Lakhvinder Singh, "Future of India-Korea Ties," The Korea Times, 21 April 2008.
16 Pravakar Sahoo, "India-South Korea Trade and Investment Relations" Paper presented at 
Seminar held by Center for Northeast Asian Economic Cooperation, 10 March 2008.
17 Nagesh Kumar, "Towards an Asian Economic Community: The Relevance of India" Research 
and Information System for the Non-Aligned and Other Developing Countries, Discussion Paper 
#34/2002.
18 "Korea to raise investments in India," The Hindu Business Line, 28 August 2002.
19 See Jongsoo Park, "Foreign Direct Investment in India since 1991: A Korean Perspective," in 
Sushila Narsimhan and Do Young Kim (eds), Korea and India: A Forging Relationship (New 
Delhi, India: Manak Publications, 2006), pp.15-44.
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portions of the consumer electronics, whitegoods and automotive markets in India, 
including LCD televisions, washing machines, air conditioners, microwave ovens and 
mini-cars.20
In contrast w ith many foreign investors who were largely interested only in 
establishing manufacturing operations to service the Indian domestic market, the 
South Korean chaebols were often also interested in establishing their own version of 
the Japanese "flying geese "strategy, integrating Indian manufacturing into their Asian 
and world-wide operations or developing India as a regional hub for doing business 
throughout South Asia and Middle East.21 For example, Hyundai now uses India as its 
hub for the manufacture of small cars for export throughout the world.
The South Korean government has also promoted investment and participation in 
Indian infrastructure projects, including in railways, roads, bridges, and in the power 
and communications sectors. As a result, Korean construction companies have won a 
significant share of contracts awarded for the Indian National Highway Development 
Project as well as major pipeline construction projects. The level of South Korean 
investment was boosted by the 2005 announcement of a massive US$12 billion 
investment by Korean steel company POSCO to build a steelworks with supporting iron 
ore mines and export infrastructure in Orissa. This represents the largest single foreign 
investment in India from any country as well as the largest foreign investment 
anywhere by a Korean company.22 The relative level and success of investment from
20 Lee Tee Jong, "Made in Korea, loved in India," Straits Times, 27 January 2006.
21 Nagesh R. Parthasarathi, "India Regional Hub for Korean Firms," The Korea Times, 24 January 
2008.
22 In early 2010, despite significant Indian federal and state government support, the POSCO 
investment remained stalled by local protesters and the project may be put on hold, 
demonstrating the continuing difficulty in executing major industrial projects in India.
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South Korea stands in marked contrast w ith India's experience with Japan, South 
Korea's much larger neighbour.
The development of closer political and security links between India and South Korea
While some believe that the India-South Korea relationship will always be primarily 
defined by economic ties, political and strategic dimensions of the relationship have 
developed in the last several years, indicative of a more comprehensive relationship. 
The Pakistan-North Korea nuclear proliferation relationship has been a particular point 
of focus. In August 2000, South Korean Foreign Minister Lee Joung-binn commented 
that "India and South Korea are now fully conscious of the new security linkages 
between the subcontinent and the Korean peninsula" and that India and South Korea 
were now moving to strengthen cooperation "for mutual reinforcement of peace and 
stability between our respective regions."23 India and South Korea subsequently 
acted as co-convenors of the "Community of Democracies" ministerial meetings held 
in Seoul in 2002 (an initiative proposed by the US in 2000 and cautiously joined by 
India).24 This was followed by the declaration of a "Long-term Cooperative Partnership 
fo r Peace and Prosperity" during a visit by South Korean President Roh Moo-hyun to 
New Delhi in October 2004. An annual Foreign Policy and Security Dialogue was also 
announced, intended to cover regional and international security issues, bilateral, 
defence and service-to-service exchanges and counterterrorism. Subsequent 
exchanges have led to  agreements on cooperation in relation to defence logistics, 
coast guards and energy security in 2005, and the granting to ROK of observer status 
w ith SAARC in 2006. As will be discussed later, an India-South Korea Strategic 
Partnership was declared during President Lee's visit to New Delhi in January 2010.
23 C.Raja Mohan, "India, South Korea to strengthen partnership" The Hindu, 1 August 2000.
24 In September 2007 the Bush administration made a renewed proposal for an Asia-Pacific 
regional democratic club including India and South Korea. South Korea hosted the first senior 
officials meeting for this association in October 2008.
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The developing political relationship between India and South Korea can be analysed in 
three main areas: first, in its impact on the development of new multilateral economic 
groupings in Asia; second, bilateral security cooperation, including weapons supply and 
development programs and defence cooperation; and third, energy security and 
nuclear-related issues.
The India-Korea free trade agreement and an Asian Economic Community
The India-Korea economic and political relationship will be significantly enhanced by a 
broad-ranging bilateral free trade agreement or Comprehensive Economic Partnership 
Agreement between India and ROK, which came into effect in January 2010. Based on 
the India-Singapore Closer Economic Cooperation Agreement, the agreement covers 
trade in goods and services as well as investment. Although an important step, the 
agreement should be seen as part of a string of free trade agreements being 
considered or negotiated by both India and ROK with other states in the Asia-Pacific.
Of perhaps greater long-term significance is the role that South Korea might play in 
helping India to achieve its vision of a multilateral Asian free trade area encompassing 
East Asia and India. A major strategic goal of India is its inclusion in any multilateral 
East Asian free trade area, a goal which China has not helped India to achieve. India 
has identified Japan and ROK, the two capital rich economies in Northeast Asia, as 
potentially important allies within ASEAN + 3 in the negotiation of any future 
multilateral Asian economic grouping. In September 2007, Indian Foreign Minister 
Pranab Mukherjee called for South Korea to support a broadly defined Asian Economic 
Community, questioning whether any narrower grouping based only on East Asia will
222
Part 3 Chapter 3.4 - Developments in 
India's relations with South Korea
"serve regional interests, Korean interests" if it "exclude[s] others whose development 
is integral to the region as a whole." 25
The South Koreans have been happy so far to sit on the sidelines of debate about the 
inclusion of India and/or the United States in a regional economic grouping. One 
might argue that ROK and Japan as well as the ASEAN states have a shared interest in 
limiting China's influence in multilateral regional groupings through the inclusion of 
India. However, the Koreans do not see it in such simple terms. In 2000, South Korea 
took a leading role in the creation of the East Asian Vision Group to push towards an 
East Asian economic grouping made up the ASEAN + 3, and they have concerns about 
the dilution of the "East Asian regional identity" in any broadergrouping, perhaps 
reflecting a desire to support China or perhaps reflecting concerns about their own 
regional influence through ASEAN + 3.26 More immediately, they see the issue 
primarily in terms of a dispute between Japan and China over regional influence, one 
in which it would prefer not to be directly involved. Perhaps for this reason, at the 
East Asian Summit in 2005, the South Koreans were happy to see ASEAN placed into 
the "driver's seat" of the process within the "vehicle" of ASEAN + 3.27 Others have 
warned that the attempt by South Korea to play passive "balanced diplomacy" risks 
leaving South Korea out of important regional relationships and instead the South 
Koreans should play a more active political role in acting as a "bridge" between China 
and the regional democracies.28 South Korea's failure to take a definite stance on the 
inclusion of India or the United States in a regional economic grouping indicates that 
for the moment it wishes to keep its options on the subject open.
25 Sanjay Kumar, "India Calls for the formation of an Asian Economic Community," Malaysian 
Sun, 17 September 2007.
26 Park Sang-seek, "Reshaping East Asia: East Asian summits," The Korea Herald, December 19, 
2005; Kwon Yul, "Challenges and Future Prospects for East Asia Summit," The Korea Herald, 12 
December 2005.
27 Ryu Jin, "Asia Summit Augurs Power Struggle," Korea Times, 15 December 2005.
28 Michael Green, "Korea's role in Asia's new regionalism" JoongAng Daily, 13 June 2007.
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Security cooperation between India and South Korea
The other area of focus of the India-ROK political relationship has been in enhancing 
security cooperation. In May 2007, Indian and South Korean Defence Ministers held 
the ir first ever consultations with the Indian Defence Minister commenting that: "The 
m ilitary field needs to keep up with the development of the two sides' economic 
cooperation."29 The declaration of a "Strategic Partnership" by President Lee and 
Indian Prime Minister Singh in January 2010 included an enhanced focus on political 
and security cooperation. This included an agreement for an annua! security dialogue 
between respective foreign secretaries and cooperation in jo in t development of 
defence technology. There is also potential for enhanced cooperation in relation to 
India's role as a maritime security provider to South Korea in the Indian Ocean region.
Prior to 2005, defence industry cooperation was extremely limited, and the South 
Korean defence industry had been virtually locked out of the Indian arms market.30 
However, since 2005 there have been some important steps forward in defence 
industry cooperation with India, including in the jo in t development of self-propelled 
artillery and mine-countermeasure vessels. In March 2007, the Indians and South 
Koreans began talks on the development and purchase by South Korea of 5,000 ton 
frigates, armoured vehicles and m ilitary trucks, and South Korea now hopes to also sell 
KT-1 je t trainers to India.
Direct cooperation between Indian and South Korean defence forces had been virtually 
non-existent prior to 2005. The Indians have proceeded cautiously on this front, 
beginning w ith a memorandum of understanding in relation to the Indian and ROK
29 Satu Limaye, "India-Asia Pacific Relations: Consolidating Friendships and Nuclear 
Legitimacy," Comparative Connections, Vol.9 No.4, January 2008, 
<http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/ 0704qindia_asia.pdf>.
30 Except for a small number of inshore patrol craft supplied by South Korea in the early 1980s.
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coastguards. This led to jo in t coastguard exercises in July 2006 which happily 
coincided w ith nearby Indian and US bilateral naval exercises. India and South Korea 
have subsequently agreed to hold jo in t naval exercises and regular military 
consultations. Naval cooperation between India and ROK will initially focus on search 
and rescue and anti-piracy. In practical terms, South Korea sees India's capabilities in 
providing maritime security for South Korea's sea lines of communication across the 
Indian Ocean (including the Strait of Malacca). For its part, India would likely welcome 
South Korea's recognition of India's predominant role as a maritime security provider 
in the Indian Ocean region.
The potential for security cooperation between South Korea and India on the Korean 
Peninsula is more doubtful. It is arguable that India has a clear interest in seeing the 
development of a strong and unified Korea sitting on China's eastern flank. Some 
observers have called India "a legitimate dialogue partner in any future settlement 
with North Korea," and the South Korean government has requested that India use its 
"special status" w ith the tw o Koreas to support its position in the Six-Party Talks.31 
India could conceivably play an honest broker role between South Korea and North 
Korea as it did during the Korean War but, in reality, India has little leverage over 
North Korea and China would likely strenuously object to any Indian role in the 
region.32 It seems that New Delhi has no taste to  become involved in Northeast Asian 
security issues whether on the Korean Peninsula or in the Taiwan Strait.33 It is not
31 Kim ll-young and Lakhvinder Singh, "The North Korean Nuclear Program and External 
Connections," The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis,Vol. 26 No.l (Spring 2004), p.98.
32 It should be noted that India has acted as an arms supplier to North Korea in the past 
including supplying Soviet-made weaponry, using its expertise in Soviet weapons to assist 
North Korea in upgrading MIG-21 planes, and extending the life of other Soviet supplied 
equipment during the 1990s. The DPRK Report (November-December 1996), <http://cns.miis. 
edu/archive/dprkrprt/ 96novdec.htm>.
33 Zhao Gancheng, "India: Look East Policy and Role in Asian Security Architecture," Position 
Paper at the SIIS-Brookings Conference on Regionalism in Asia, December 11-12, 2006.
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entirely clear whether India's hesitancy in involving itself in Northeast Asian security 
issues arises from provoking China in its own backyard (which may, for example, lead it 
to retaliate in relation to Kashmir) or if India regards Northeast Asia as simply beyond 
its area of interest. In some ways, India's policy towards DPRK seems to be stuck in the 
NAM era. In an apparent continuation of its Cold War era policy of "equidistance" 
between North and South Korea, the Indian government, seemingly for domestic 
political reasons, withheld criticism of the DPRK over its April 2009 ballistic missile 
tests and muted any criticism over DPRK's nuclear test in May 2009.34 India's 
unwillingness to support its strategic partner over these developments may be a 
reminder of the potential limitations of India as a regional security partner.
Any suggestion that the India-South Korea relationship might evolve into a coalition to 
contain China should also be treated with a large degree of caution. Any wish on the 
part of the South Koreans to develop a security relationship with India is likely to be 
driven less by any strategy to balance China and more by a desire to remain involved in 
the evolving US strategy in the Asia-Pacific, in which India seems likely to play a key 
role. Since the acceleration of the strategic relationship between the US and India in 
recent years, there has been pressure on US regional allies to improve relations with 
India, including calls for US allies to "collaborate to promote strategic stability in South 
Asia and to give greater weight to India's role in Asia and in international 
institutions."35 The Koreans fe lt keenly their exclusion from the US-Japan-Australia 
trilateral relationship earlier this decade,36 which was heightened by India's
34 Siddharth Varadarajan, "India in dilemma over North Korean satellite launch" The Hindu, 6 
April 2009, and "India urges N Korea to return to talks" Indian Express, 24 June 2009. The 
DPRK thanked India for its stance on the missile tests.
35 Robert D.BIackill, "An Action Agenda to Strengthen America's Alliances in the Asia-Pacific 
Region,"in Robert D.BIackwill and Paul Dibbs (eds), America's Asian Alliances (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts, United States: The MIT Press, 2000), p.129.
36 Jin Dae-woong, "U.S., Japan, Australia push triangular alliance," The Korean Herald, 5 
September 2007.
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participation in the 2007 Malabar naval exercises with the United States, Japan, 
Australia and Singapore and by Japan's 2007 Quadrilateral proposals for a security 
dialogue with India, the United States and Australia.37 In recent years, under the 
"Global Korea" policy, ROK has played an unprecedented role in regional security 
beyond its traditional concerns on the Korean peninsula, including naval deployments 
to the Gulf of Aden and a 500 member Provincial Reconstruction Team to Afghanistan. 
Some see this as part of a broadening in focus of ROKs' US alliance.38 There has also 
been significant movement in developing a web of bilateral security relationships in 
the region through various Security Declarations between India, Japan and Australia, 
and a declaration between ROK and Australia in March 2009. There has been talk of a 
Security Declaration between ROK and Japan and one wonders whether a Security 
Declaration between ROK and India may also be possible. For ROK, bilateral security 
relationships are much more palatable than the anti-China implications that seem 
inherent in a multilateral approach. For this reason, any enhanced security 
relationship between India and ROK would most likely remain only at a bilateral level 
rather than involving US regional allies, something which the Indians would also likely 
see as desirable given their own cautious attitude towards multilateral security 
relationships.
Energy security and the nuclear issue
Given the high level of energy dependency of both India and ROK, energy security 
issues are likely to play an increasing role in the relationship. In November 2005, India 
and ROK entered into a number of agreements on cooperation in the energy sector, 
including strategic alliances and South Korean assistance in the construction of
37 Sandip Kumar Mishra, "South Korean Posture on the Indo-US Deal and NSG," Institute of 
Peace and Conflict Studies China & East Asia, Article No.2393, 15 October 2007.
38 Scott Snyder, "South Korea's Emerging Global Security Role," World Politics Review, 23 
March 2010.
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strategic underground petroleum storage facilities. In the future there will 
undoubtedly be further opportunities for cooperation in energy security (such as a 
proposal involving South Korea taking its gas from an Indian jo in t venture in nearby 
Sakhalin in return for India taking gas from Korean contracted supplies from Indonesia 
and Australia). Nevertheless, India and South Korea will remain long term competitors 
fo r hydrocarbons in Asia. This was amply demonstrated in early 2007 when Daewoo 
pushed India out of long term gas contracts with Burma (although the South Koreans 
themselves were subsequently pushed aside by Chinese interests).
One of the most sensitive and difficult issues that India and South Korea have 
addressed in recent times is India's nuclear status. Although South Korea has a vital 
interest in the international nuclear non-proliferation order and the denuclearisation 
of the DPRK, it has taken a relatively muted position on India's development of nuclear 
weapons. Its reaction to India's Pokhran II nuclear tests in 1998 was much softer than 
say Japan's. Despite concerns about the impact on South Korea's stance on the non­
proliferation order,39 South Korea had "no reservations" in supporting the India-US 
nuclear deal in the Nuclear Suppliers Group in August 2008, and has taken the position 
that it "was up to  India's discretion" whether or not to join the Nuclear Non- 
Proliferation Treaty.40
South Korea may be rewarded for its flexibility on nuclear issues. Both South Korea 
and India have had limited cooperation in civilian nuclear technology since at least the 
mid-1990s41 and in January 2010 announced the commencement of negotiations over 
a new civilian nuclear cooperation agreement. This is expected to put South Korea's 
large and politically powerful nuclear industry in good stead to play a significant role in
39 A South Korean representative in the Six-Party talks reportedly expressed reservations about 
the India-US deal on this basis. Mishra, "South Korean Posture on the Indo-US Deal and NSG."
40 P.S.Suryanarayana, "No reservation over India deal," The Hindu, 22 September 2007.
41 P.S.Suryanarayana, "Pranab in Seoul for Talks," The Hindu, 17 September 2007.
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the development of the Indian nuclear power sector. As will be seen in Part 4, South 
Korea's flexib ility on nuclear issues stands in marked contrast to that of Japan.
3.4.4 Perspectives on an Indian role in Northeast Asia
How can we best view the bilateral relationship? Certainly India represents a major 
economic opportunity for South Korean businesses seeking investment and trade 
opportunities. The fast and flexible response of South Korea to the liberalisation of the 
Indian economy in the early 1990s gave it a first mover advantage, allowing South 
Korean businesses to make big inroads into the Indian consumer electronics and 
automotive sectors. The more recent focus on infrastructure and the development of 
India as a regional business hub is consistent with South Korea playing an even larger 
role in the Indian economy.
There is also significant potential for a broader political relationship. Most immediate 
are issues relating to Asian economic integration and the development of multilateral 
economic arrangements not overly dominated by China. Here, it is arguable that India 
and South Korea (and Japan) all have similar interests. South Korea, as a middle power 
in particular, w ill likely be forced to play a delicate balancing game between China, 
Japan and the United States. There are perceptions that South Korea's previous 
attempts at middle power diplomacy (including attempts to mediate the North-South 
economic relationship within APEC) have met with little  success and there is a sense of 
uneasiness in South Korea about a sense of "sitting on the fence" or being a "loner" in 
East Asian affairs.42 Some believe that South Korea's previous perceptible t ilt  towards 
China has changed under the current President, Lee Myung-bak, towards a more 
balanced approach towards China and the United States, which has been called a
42 For a discussion of South Korea's attempts at middle power diplomacy since the 1960s, see 
Brian Bridges, "From ASPAC to EAS: South Korea and the Asia-Pacific Region," Center for Asian 
Pacific Studies, Lingnan University, Working Paper No.172 (August 2006).
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policy o f "tw in  hedging" to  maximise South Korea's strategic and economic position 
between the tw o .43 The South Koreans may find tha t a closer political relationship 
w ith  India a helpful addition in balancing the conflicting demands made on it by China, 
the United States and Japan.
For India, closer political relations w ith  South Korea could be part o f a useful balance 
to  China's "all weather friendship" w ith  Pakistan and its more recent cultivation of 
o the r friendships in South Asia.44 South Korea (and, as w ill be seen, Japan) are also 
useful allies in balancing Chinese influence in key regional fora and ensuring the 
inclusion o f India in any Asian economic grouping. Although some in New Delhi m ight 
see the developm ent o f closer political relations as part o f a process o f bringing the 
ROK in to  an inform al balancing coalition among India, the United States, Japan and 
Australia, there is little  evidence o f this in South Korean thinking.
An a lternative analysis m ight be to  see the developm ent o f relations between India 
and ROK not as an exercise in balancing against China, but more as a consequence of a 
gradual merging o f previously separate regional security complexes in Asia. The 
developm ent o f the India-South Korea relationship reflects a region-w ide process of 
the  breakdown of economic and political barriers between South and Northeast Asia 
tha t has been happening since the end o f the Cold War. To the extent tha t economics 
has acted as a driving force in the developm ent o f cross-regional relationships, one 
could argue tha t it is part o f the globalisation process which is breaking down historical 
barriers th roughout Asia and elsewhere. As a result, states in South and East Asia are 
increasingly likely to  perceive shared interests -  not only in the ir dealings w ith  China,
43 See Sukhee Han, "From engagement to hedging: South Korea's new China policy," The 
Korean Journal o f Defense Analysis, Vol. 20 No.4 (December 2008), pp.335-351.
44 Including Bhutan, Bangladesh, Nepal, the Maldives and Sri Lanka. See Mohan Malik, "China's 
Strategy of Containing India," Power and Interest News Report, 6 February 2006,
<http://ww w. pinr.com/report. php?ac=view_report&report_id=434>.
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but also in say, exploring complementary economic capabilities and in dealing with a 
whole range of security problems. While these relationships may not necessarily be 
directed at China, it is certainly the case that China can no longer assume that it will be 
free to operate in East Asia without regard to India.
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This part will make a detailed examination of India's strategic relationship with Japan. 
Chapter 4.1 will give a historical perspective, tracing the major points of strategic 
interaction during the second half of the twentieth century. Chapter 4.2 will detail the 
development of the strategic relationship over the last decade and consider how the 
relationship fits with contemporary strategic thinking in India and Japan. Chapter 4.3 
will consider some potential constraints on the development of the relationship.
The key themes that will be examined in this part are:
• India and Japan have historically exhibited an extraordinary degree of strategic 
indifference towards each other. China, even when perceived as a threat, 
served to separate rather than unite them.
• An Indo-Japanese partnership is now consistent with several different streams 
of strategic thinking in both India and Japan. There is a possibility of a "grand 
strategic bargain" between them, effectively involving a coalition against China 
and the recognition by Japan of India's status as a great power.
• There are several constraints on the further development of the India-Japan 
relationship. They are largely up to Japan to resolve.
Part 4 Chapter 4.1- India -  Japan 
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Chapter 4.1 India-Japan strategic relations from 1942 to 1998
4.1.1 Overview of the India-Japan strategic relationship 1942-1998
4.1.2 India's role in Japan's East Asian empire
4.1.3 India's perspectives on Japan's post-war settlement in 1951
4.1.4 Japan's perspectives on the 1962 Sino-lndian war
4.1.5 Proposals for an India-Japan axis against China in the 1960s
4.1.6 Japan and India's 1998 nuclear tests
Introduction
This chapter examines the strategic relationship between India and Japan between 
1942 and 1998, a period beginning with Japan's bid for an East Asian empire and 
ending w ith India's reach for great power status. It is a period in which both India and 
Japan demonstrated a remarkable degree of mutual indifference. This chapter will 
examine key strategic interactions between Japan and India during this period in order 
to discern the underlying reasons for this indifference and so better understand the 
contemporary relationship and how it is likely to develop in coming years.
This chapter will provide an overview of the strategic relationship between India and 
Japan between 1942 and 1998. Subsequent sections will make a detailed examination 
of the discrete episodes of strategic interaction between India and Japan during the 
twentie th century. These episodes will be used to illustrate several propositions 
regarding the relationship which are essential in understanding the contours of the 
India-Japan strategic relationship: first, that Japan has historically seen its strategic 
interests as being limited to East Asia and the Pacific, while India had few interests in 
Northeast Asia; second, that India has rejected any strategic role for Japan in South 
Asia; and third, that both India and Japan have historically given priority to their 
relationship with China over their relationship with each other. As will be seen later,
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some of these themes continue to play a role in Indian and Japanese strategic thinking 
today.
4.1.1 Overview of the India-Japan strategic relationship 1942-1998
In early 1942 Japan was at the zenith of its bid for an East Asian empire. Much of China 
was under Japanese occupation and Japan had apparently destroyed the US Pacific 
Fleet and roundly defeated the European colonial powers in Southeast Asia. As will be 
discussed in section 4.1.2, in May 1942 when an apparently invincible Japanese army 
stood at the border of India, both Japanese and Indian leaders were forced to consider 
the strategic connection between India and East Asia. To what extent did Japan see 
South Asia as a region that was important to its own strategic needs? To what extent 
were Indian leaders willing to submit, even for tactical reasons, to Japanese strategic 
dominance over South Asia? As will be seen, both Japanese and Indian leaders 
provided a clear answer that Japan was seen as having no significant strategic role in 
South Asia.
Following Japan's defeat at the hands of the United States and its allies, there was 
considerable uncertainty about a new regional order. India, as the earliest and largest 
decolonised state in Asia, sought the departure of all "external" powers from the 
region as a prelude to a new regional order that would be led by it and China. Indian 
leaders believed that the prostrate Japan should also be encouraged to rise again as a 
peaceful power and a source of economic development for India and the region as a 
whole. However, the developing confrontation in Asia between the United States and 
the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China during the late 1940s led the 
United States to conclude that Japan would be an essential element in the US regional 
alliance system to contain communist expansionism. This would involve a peace 
treaty returning partial sovereignty to Japan and an agreement giving the United 
States responsibility for Japan's security. Neither the Soviet Union nor the PRC could 
be parties to these arrangements. As will be seen in section 4.1.3, in a show of
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solidarity with the PRC, the newly independent India rejected the Japanese peace 
treaty and Japan's new security arrangements with the United States.
For much of the remainder of the Cold War, New Delhi saw the Japanese government 
as little more than a US puppet with little value as a potential strategic partner, 
although it did see Japan as a potentially important economic partner in industrialising 
India's economy. While Nehru was a popular figure among some in Japan, 
representing a possible "third way" for Japan's security needs, the Japanese 
government increasingly saw India's policy of nonalignment as untenable and India as 
an unreliable economic partner. Section 4.1.4 discusses how these perspectives were 
brought into relief with the 1962 Sino-lndian war which Tokyo saw as an outcome of 
India's arrogant and unrealistic attitudes towards China. Attempts during the second 
half of the 1960s by Western states and the Soviet Union to bring India and Japan 
together to anchor an axis to contain China were also a failure. As will be detailed in 
section 4.1.5, despite similar concerns about the potential threats posed by China, 
neither New Delhi nor Tokyo had any real interest in developing a security relationship 
with the other -  each in effect went their separate way in addressing these concerns.
The political and economic relationship between India and Japan stayed largely frozen 
for much of the remainder of the Cold War, with India seeing itself as having no direct 
interests in Northeast Asia and Japan as having few interests in South Asia. The 
strategic realignments of the early 1970s, with China joining with the United States and 
Japan to oppose the Soviet Union, and India joining with the Soviet Union against 
China, cemented India and Japan's strategic estrangement. Underlying these differing 
Cold War alignments was also a deeper clash of strategic goals -  Japan's preparedness 
to cede strategic autonomy in pursuit of economic development stood in stark 
contrast with India's pursuit of strategic and economic autonomy, often at the cost of 
economic development. As a result, for most of the 1970s and 1980s there was little 
cause for strategic, political or economic interaction. From the 1970s, India focused on 
internal economic development, becoming possibly the most closed economy of
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significant size in the world. Despite regular pleas for Japanese investment, in reality 
India was not interested in pursuing the model for economic development followed by 
many Southeast Asian states. Rather, India pursued a model of virtual economic 
autarchy, w ith a closed economy based on im port substitution, licensing to inhibit 
competition and a major role for the state-owned sector. From the early 1970s, apart 
from  agricultural products, Indian trade in goods was largely with the Soviet Union and 
its satellites. In contrast, Japan, while sheltering under the US security umbrella, 
pursued a policy of economic mercantilism in which Japanese companies sat at the top 
of an export production chain covering much of East Asia, allowing Japan to become 
the second largest exporter in the world .1 As part of Japan's "flying geese" strategy, 
Japanese investment was largely channelled to Southeast Asia and China, where 
investors generally found cooperative governments and compliant workforces. 
Japanese investors had virtually no interest in South Asia which was seen as "too 
hard." By 1991 cumulative Japanese investment in India was negligible, representing 
only 0.1% of all Japanese foreign investment.2 By the early 1990s, Japan was one of 
the richest states in the world, while India remained one of the poorest.
Although the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union removed some 
obvious impediments to strategic engagement, neither India nor Japan saw any clear 
benefits from  a close relationship. Renewed attempts by India from 1991 to promote 
an economic partnership with Japan held little  attraction for Japanese business and 
India focused its energies on building relationships in Southeast Asia. Japan also had 
hesitations about India's participation in East Asian political and economic 
arrangements, including strong reservations about its membership of the ARF which
1 For an excellent discussion of the Japanese political, economic and strategic system through 
the Cold War, see Pyle, Japan Rising.
2 Hideko Esho, "Japanese investment in South Asia: The case of India" in Purnendra C.Jain (ed.), 
Distant Asian Neighbours: Japan and South Asia (New Delhi: Sterling Publishers, 1996), p.68.
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only receded in 1996 after US opposition was overcome.3 Instead; Japan's strategic 
interest in India during the 1990s was largely defined by attempts to persuade India to 
cease its nuclear weapons program and become part of the international nuclear non­
proliferation order. As will be seen in section 4.1.6, Japan's activism in relation to 
India's nuclear status was motivated more by Japan's disinterest in South Asian 
strategic affairs than by any direct interest. When India declared itself as a nuclear 
weapons state w ith its 1998 Pokhran II nuclear tests, Japan led international 
condemnation of India, a position that caused significant resentment in New Delhi and 
was wholly unsuccessful in causing India to renounce nuclear weapons.
Underlying the profoundly different strategic perspectives of Japan and India during 
the twentie th century were different concepts of "Asia." From the Japanese 
perspective this was reflected in a particular cultural and geographic understanding as 
to  where "Asia" begins and ends and in perceptions of social incompatibility between 
Japanese and Indian people. Both these factors contributed to the strategic 
disconnection between the two. For many Japanese, "Asia" has historically meant 
East Asia. India was seen as occupying a wholly separate cultural, economic and geo­
strategic sphere to Japan. Japan also perceived India as falling outside of its security 
environment, which was defined as primarily Northeast Asia, but in broader terms,
East Asia and the Pacific. As the distinguished Indian journalist, Durgas Das, noted: "A 
majority o f [Japanese] bureaucrats prefer to exclude India from the Asian personality, 
which according to them ends on the borders of Burma and Malaysia."4 In 1967, the 
Japanese delegation to a conference, organised to explore the possibility of a trilateral 
Australian-Japan-India strategic relationship, pondered the question of whether India 
was an Asian country at all.5 Such perceptions led Japan to withhold support for
3 Datta-Ray, Looking East to Look West, p.288.
4 Durgas Das, "Japan's Role in Asia," Indian and foreign review Vol. 7 No.18,1 July 1970
5 J.D.B.Miller (ed.), India, Japan, Australia, partners in Asia? (Canberra : Australian National 
University Press, 1968), p.86-7.
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India's participation in various regional fora for several decades, including in the South- 
East Asian Ministerial Conference for Economic Development in the late 1960s, and 
APEC and the ARF in the 1990s. Although Japan has in recent years come to see India 
as an important participant in regional groupings, it has arguably still not yet 
demonstrated a clear understanding as to how India might fit in "East Asia."
For its part, India has had a longstanding self-perception of its cultural centrality to 
Asia; however this has not translated into the strategic dimension. In the years 
following independence in particular, many Indian scholars wrote about a "Greater 
India" to describe what they saw as India's "commanding" cultural influence over 
South and Southeast Asia. Some also saw great significance in India having been the 
birthplace of Buddhism which was carried to China and then Japan.6 Despite these 
claims, throughout the Cold War India's strategic perspectives were almost exclusively 
focused in South Asia and India actively disclaimed any positive strategic role in 
Southeast Asia or any substantive role in Northeast Asia.
Underlying these "geo-strategic" perceptions is what many observers see as a 
particular cultural and social incompatibility between Japanese and Indian peoples.
One commentator in the 1960s noted the "formidable" cultural and linguistic barriers 
that stood between Japanese and Indians, adding that: "No two people could have 
been more unlike or mutually impenetrable."7 Similarly, Nakane Chie, a noted 
Japanese anthropologist, commented that while the Japanese were able to cope in 
social terms in China and Southeast Asia, there was a "fantastic difference between 
the two sets of cultural values" of Japan and India that makes Indian culture "almost 
incomprehensible" to Japanese people. Fie concluded that the boundary between East
6 See generally, T.A.Keenleyside, "Nationalist Indian Attitudes Towards Asia: A Troublesome 
Legacy for Post-Independence Indian Foreign Policy" Pacific Affairs, Vol.55, No.2 (Summer, 
1982), pp210-230 at 213.
7 Lawrence Olson, Japan in Postwar Asia (London: Council on Foreign Relations, 1970), p39.
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and West lies not between Asia and Europe, but somewhere between India and 
Burma.8 Another observer commented that, "On the one level the Indians showed 
respect for Japan's modernising experience... Yet [the Japanese] were condescended 
to constantly by the Indians, who saw them as opaque, uncommunicative members of 
an essentially derivative civilisation."9 This dissonance goes well beyond the cultural 
or social sphere and was arguably an important underlying factor in the failure of India 
and Japan to develop any meaningful economic or political relationship.
Some believe that Japanese perceptions about India's role in Asia are changing. As 
will be discussed in chapter 4.2, claims by Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe in 2007 
that the India-Japan relationship "will be the most important bilateral relationship [for 
Japan] in the w o rld "10 would have been unthinkable even 10 years earlier. Former 
Japanese Ambassador to India, Yasukuni Enoki, comments that "For many decades, 
Asia has been, to the Japanese mind, almost identical with East Asia," but that the 
"scope of Asia" was now changing in the Japanese mind to include South Asia.* 11 
Others doubt that a significant change has occurred in Japanese perceptions.
According to Jain: "...except for a few symbolic events, very little has changed. Japan's 
foreign policy concern has been the Asia that Japan knows and needs most -  East and 
Southeast Asia. It is Pacific Asia. It has not been the Asia of the subcontinent, in which
8 Nakane Chie, "Logic and the Smile: When Japanese meet Indians" Japan Quarterly, V o l.ll, 
No.4 (Oct/Dec 1964), pp.434-438
9 Olson, Japan in Postwar Asia, p229.
10 K. Venugopal, "Japan's guarded, positive response on nuclear issue," The Hindu, 16 
December, 2006.
11 "The Japan-lndia New Partnership", speech to the United Services Institute, New Delhi, 28 
May 2004.
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Japan sees litt le  basis fo r em otional, strategic, economic or o ther practical 
connec tion .../'12
This chapter w ill now examine key episodes o f strategic interaction between India and 
Japan p rio r to  1999. As w ill be seen in chapter 4.2, many of the perspectives shown in 
these episodes remain relevant to  the ir strategic relationship today.
4.1.2 The position of India in Japan's East Asian empire
In May 1942 a victorious and apparently invincible Japanese army stood at India's 
eastern border. The British army, routed in Malaya and Burma and having lost much 
o f its tra ined troops and equipm ent, seemed unlikely to  stop the Japanese advance.
The British Eastern Fleet had fled to  Africa the previous month, leaving India's east 
coast v irtua lly  undefended. It seemed to  many tha t India was ripe to  be conquered -  
tha t Japan, perhaps w ith  the assistance of Indian nationalists, would liberate India 
from  the British im perialists and India would in one way or another fall w ith in  the 
bounds o f a new Japanese empire in Asia.
This m om ent represented the firs t significant strategic interaction between Japan and 
India in modern tim es, and in some ways would set the tone o f strategic interaction 
between them  fo r the next 60 years. Despite its apparently overwhelm ing strategic 
position, the  Japanese army halted on the Burmese border in 1942 and by the end of 
the  war would never occupy more than an insignificant portion o f Indian te rrito ry . In 
fact, o ther than concerns about securing the flanks o f its empire in East Asia, Japan had 
litt le  in terest in conquering India. There were good practical reasons fo r this: India 
was seen as too  big and ungovernable, there were concerns about overstretch of
12 Purnendra Jain, "India's Calculus of Japan's Foreign Policy in Pacific Asia" in Takashi Inoguchi 
(ed.), Japan's Asian Policy: Revival and Response (New York: Palgrave, 2002), pp.211-236 at 
p.232.
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Japanese forces and there were geographic obstacles to invasion. However, 
underlying Japan's decision to halt at India's border was a sense that India did not fall 
within what Japan considered its strategic environment - India was seen as not 
belonging w ithin Japan's empire, the so-called Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. 
Although during the 1930s and early 1940s there were many "research groups" in 
Tokyo making plans about Japan's imperial expansion, very few had particular ideas 
about India. While some planners assumed that India would eventually become 
somehow associated w ith Japan's new sphere of influence in East Asia, Tokyo was also 
willing to trade a sphere of influence over India away to other powers. In September 
1940, when considering joining the Tripartite Pact w ith Germany and Italy (with which 
the Soviet Union was then more or less associated through a non-aggression treaty 
w ith Germany), Tokyo was primarily interested in obtaining recognition of its sphere of 
influence in East Asia and was willing to concede India and Iran to the Soviets as the 
price of directing Soviet attention away from East Asia. According to Hauner's 
exhaustive study of the place of India in Japanese war plans: "It became more 
convenient therefore to keep India ready as a pawn for future diplomatic bargaining, 
especially after 1940, in order to win Soviet partnership, or at least neutrality, against 
the Anglo-Saxons."13
At the same time, Tokyo made few real efforts to encourage Indian aspirations 
towards independence.14 In November 1941 a Japanese Imperial Conference decided 
that, as a matter of principle, Japan should seek to "separate" India from Britain and to 
"stim ulate" the Indian independence movement; however, it was not decided when
13 Milan Hauner India in Axis Strategy: Germany, Japan, and Indian Nationalists in the Second 
World War (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1981), p.107. A perspective which had echoes in Japan's 
relative indifference towards the expansion of Soviet influence in India in the 1970s.
14 Ibid.,p.407.
241
Part 4 Chapter 4.1- India -  Japan 
strategic relations from 1942 to 1998
and how this would be brought about.15 The Japanese Army sought to mobilise 
captured Indian soldiers along with soldiers from other East Asian states to serve 
Japanese forces as armed auxiliaries.16 However, the Japanese Foreign Ministry 
retained significant concerns about the governability of an "independent" India under 
Japanese suzerainty and the ability of the Indian nationalist movement to establish an 
"independent, orderly state" if the British were driven out.17 In 1943, the Japanese 
leadership concluded that the Japanese army should occupy the northeast territories 
o f India, principally to disrupt Allied supply lines to Chinese Nationalist forces and to 
protect the Japanese flank in Burma. However, an attempt by Japanese troops to 
occupy Indian border towns in 1944 was routed by British-led forces.
The great majority of Indian nationalist leaders also had little appetite for cooperation 
w ith Japan in their struggle for independence: Japan was generally regarded as 
presenting a greater danger to Indian freedom than the British Raj. In early 1942, 
Indian nationalists were at a standoff with the British in their bid for a negotiated 
independence. Although they had significant political leverage over Britain, especially 
since the outbreak of the European War in 1939, the British were standing firm  against 
granting India any political autonomy until after the end of the war. The apparently 
imminent invasion by the Japanese provided Indian nationalists with a choice and an 
opportunity. Indian nationalist leaders knew that if they chose, they could effectively 
destroy any British-led defence of India through violent protest, mutiny, strike or civil 
disobedience. However, the prospect of Japanese forces at India's borders also 
focused the ir minds as to the consequences of a British military withdrawal. The
15 Joyce C. Lebra (ed.), Japan's Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere in World War II: Selected 
Readings and Documents (London: Oxford University Press, 1975), at p.64.
16 Later to be led by Subhas Chandra Bose, a former Congress leader who organised captured 
Indian soldiers to assist the Axis side against Britain, first unsuccessfully in Europe and then 
with more success in Asia.
17 Willard H.EIsbree, Japan's Role in Southeast Asian Nationalist Movements 1940 to 1945 
(New York, Russell & Russell, 1970)
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com prom ise arrived at by the Indian National Congress by mid 1942 was to  seek a 
handover o f pow er while also seeking British m ilitary protection from  the Japanese. 
W hile they would not give the British adm inistration the ir positive cooperation, neither 
would they do anything to  “ embarrass" a British-led defence o f India against the 
Japanese. A lthough debates over the nature o f support tha t should be given to  Britain 
to  resist any Japanese invasion led to  a split w ith in  the Indian National Congress, all 
m ajor nationalist leaders were firm  in the ir opposition to  Japan. Nehru, in particular, 
threatened, “ guerrilla  warfare“ and “ a scorched earth policy" should the Japanese ever 
try  to  enter Ind ia .18 This decision allowed Britain to  raise a huge vo lunteer Indian army 
which made a significant contribu tion  to  the defeat o f Japan in Burma and, arguably o f 
even greater significance, allowed the maintenance o f US supply lines to  China over 
the  Himalayas. Interestingly, while the fighting between Japanese and British Indian 
Arm y forces along the Burmese border between 1941 and 1945 was as bloody and 
bruta l as any o f the  fighting in the Pacific War, it does not seem to  have le ft a legacy of 
b itterness tow ards the Japanese among Indian army veterans as existed among other 
veterans o f the  war.
W hile some have since sought to  portray Japanese use o f captured Indian soldiers as 
armed auxiliaries during the Pacific W ar as an im portant symbolic bond between Japan 
and Ind ia ,19 it is clear tha t in the 1940s the great m ajority o f the Indian nationalist 
leadership unequivocally rejected any Japanese role in gaining Indian independence 
from  Britain. It is also clear tha t Japan saw little  reason to  include India in its East 
Asian em pire.
18 Murthy, Indio ond Japan at p.162.
19 Including Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe who visited Subhas Chandra Bose' house in 
Kolkata in 2007 -  see section 4.2.2.
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4.1.4 India's perspectives on Japan's post-war settlement in 1951
The next episode of significance in India-Japan relations during this period was India's 
decision to oppose the US-sponsored post-war strategic order as formalised in the 
1951 San Francisco Peace Treaty with Japan. The signatories to the peace treaty 
included 48 states, but not India, which would later sign its own treaty with Japan.
The San Francisco Treaty with Japan was negotiated between 1947 to 1951 against a 
background of escalating regional crisis between the West and communist states, 
including the surrender of mainland China to the communists in October 1949, the 
Korean War in June 1950 and Chinese intervention in the Korean War in October 1950. 
The peace treaty and the accompanying US-Japan security pact were intended to 
return partial sovereignty to Japan and cement the continuing security role of the 
United States in Japan as a bulwark against the Soviet Union and Communist China.
The Indian leadership opposed the US strategy of containing Communist China, 
believing that Chinese territoria l and ideological ambitions could be moderated 
through engagement and support for China.
India publicly objected to the Japanese Peace Treaty on several grounds. India 
objected to  the ongoing security arrangements w ith the United States that were to be 
adopted in conjunction with treaty. Nehru also insisted that no settlement with Japan 
was likely to endure unless the PRC was a party to it, something which the United 
States could not accept given its non-recognition of Communist China. However, the 
primary grounds put forward by India for refusing to sign the treaty related to the 
transfer of Japanese territories to the Soviet Union and China. India claimed that while 
the treaty provided for a waiver of Japan's claims to the Kurile islands, the islands were 
not clearly ceded to the Soviet Union. India objected on similar grounds that Taiwan 
was not clearly ceded by Japan to the PRC -  something which was seen as undermining 
the PRC's claims to be the only legitimate government in China. Nehru believed that it 
was in India's essential interests to show solidarity with the PRC in opposing the treaty.
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In a private letter explaining his reasoning to his Ambassador in the United States,
Nehru commented: "To accept the Japanese peace treaty as it now is....might mean
almost, though not quite, a political break with China."20 In 1952, India entered into a 
separate bilateral peace treaty with Japan, so avoiding either undermining the PRC's 
legitimacy or endorsing any US role in Japan's security.
Although some have sought to depict India's stance against the treaty as a 
demonstration of India's "solidarity" with Japan,21 such claims are a poor post facto  
rationalisation of India's actions. There is no record of Indian representatives ever 
consulting with Japanese leaders or any Japanese person at all about their views on 
the treaty and neither is there any evidence that the Indian leadership considered 
Japan's security needs. India's immediate objection to the treaty was that it did not 
irremediably strip Japan of its island territories by clearly transferring them to the 
Soviet Union and China. Far from showing solidarity with Japan, India's position was 
primarily motivated by solidarity with China and opposition to a continuing regional 
security role for the United States. Nehru arguably took the view that the benefits to 
India of promoting a multipolar regional security order that included the PRC and the 
Soviet Union outweighed Japan's immediate security needs, whatever they may have 
been.
4.1.4 Japan's perspectives on the 1962 Sino-lndian war
The centrality of China in the Japan-lndia strategic relationship is further demonstrated 
by Japan's response to the 1962 Sino-lndian war.
20 Quoted in B.N.Pandey, Nehru (New York: Stein & Day, 1976) at p.333.
21 See, for example, speech by Prime Minister P.V. Narasimha Rao, "Towards an India-Japan 
Partnership in the Twenty-first Century" in Tokyo on 23 June 1992, reprinted in Japan Review 
of International Affairs (Summer 1992), p.195-202.
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As has been seen, the 1962 Sino-lndian war played, and continues to play, a pivotal 
role in the India-China strategic relationship in which India conceives itself as having 
been betrayed and attacked w ithout cause by its erstwhile partner. China's invasion 
of Indian claimed territory in the Himalayas in 1962 sparked outrage from the United 
States and most of its non-communist allies, who characterised it as another instance 
of unprovoked communist aggression. However, the response of Japan, the largest US 
ally in Asia, was publicly equivocal and privately hostile to India.
When the conflict commenced in October 1962, India sought regional support for itself 
and condemnation of China. Japanese Prime Minister Ikeda was initially critical of 
China's actions, commenting the dispute should be settled on the "basis of 
international justice through peaceful means at the earliest possible date."22 However 
China's unilateral suspension of hostilities in November 1962 created a favourable 
impression in many quarters.23 Ikeda subsequently refused to express any opinion as 
to whether the Chinese actions amounted to aggression.24 Ikeda also took the 
opportunity to chide India, as well as domestic advocates of neutrality, of the unreality 
of neutrality between the West and Communism, stating: "The reality of the armed 
Sino-lndian clashes in the border dispute has demonstrated how unrealistic are 
advocacy of neutralism and mere calls for peace."25 The Japanese leadership was 
much more critical of India in private. Kenjiro Shiga, the Director General of the 
Japanese Defence Agency told US Assistant Secretary of State Averill Harriman of the 
"arrogant attitude" of the Indians in refusing Beijing's offers to negotiate the dispute,
22 Reported in The Japan Times, 10 November 1962.
23 Mainichi Shimbum, 24 November 1962 (evening edition), quoted in John Welfield, An Empire 
in Eclipse -Japan in the Postwar American Alliance System: A Study of the Interaction of 
Domestic Politics and Foreign Policy (London: The Athlone Press, 1988).
24 Reported in The Hindu, 1 December 1961.
25 Statement by Prime Minister Ikeda to the Japanese Diet on 10 December 1962 as reported in 
The Hindustan Times, 13 December 1962.
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adding that most Japanese fe lt "considerable resentment" against India.26 Japanese 
Foreign Minister, Masayoshi Ohira, later told an "astonished" US Secretary of State 
Dean Rusk that "India had got its just deserts" at the hands of the Chinese Army, and 
that the United States "should leave Communist China alone."27
Tokyo had several reasons for not supporting India over the conflict. An immediate 
reason fo r Japan's stance related to the ongoing domestic political crisis over Japan's 
entry into a new US Security Treaty in which the government found it (paradoxically) 
convenient to demonstrate an independence of action from the United States by not 
supporting India.28 More importantly, the Japanese also saw the conflict as an 
unwelcome hindrance to the normalisation of its economic and political relations with 
China. In October 1962, Sino-Japanese relations were at a somewhat delicate stage as 
the two countries were in the final stages of negotiation of a key "private" trade 
agreement which was signed on 9 November 1962. The agreement had important 
political implications, leading to the opening of semi-official "trade liaison" offices in 
Tokyo and Beijing29 and a significant expansion in two-way trade. The Japanese 
generally understood, as Prime Minister Sato was to later put it, that "China wanted to 
isolate India and tem pt Japan with trade."30 However, from subsequent accounts of 
participants, the Sino-lndian war was not a factor in the negotiations from the
26 Memorandum of Harriman-Shiga conversation, Nov.14,1962, U.S. Department of State as 
quoted in Michael Schaller, Altered States: The United States and Japan since the Occupation 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1997) at p.174.
27 U.S. Department of State Memorandum of conversation by Swayne, Department of State, 
Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D330 as quoted in U.S. Department of State 
Memorandum of Conversation, Washington December 3,1962, 5.30pm, FRUS 1961-63, 
Vol.XXII Doc #362.
28 See Murthy, India and Japan at p.377.
29 See, George P. Jan, "Japan's Trade with Communist China" Asian Survey, Vol.9 No.12 (1969), 
pp.900-918.
30 Durga Das, India: From Curzon to Nehru and After (London: Collins, 1969), p.415.
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Japanese side.31 The Japanese delegation apparently did not even care sufficiently 
about appearances to delay signing the agreement until after the conflict had ended.32 
Rather, the reaction of the Japanese leadership to the conflict indicated a deep 
empathy felt towards China and indifference towards India, which was crystallised by 
the conflict. The 1962 war accelerated Japanese disenchantment with India as a 
leader of an 'idealistic' nonaligned movement.33
For the Indians, Japan's publicly equivocal stance was highly disappointing and 
confirmed Indian suspicions about Japan's policies. Aware of Tokyo's equivocation on 
the conflict (but apparently not aware of the Japanese leadership's hostility towards 
India), it was assumed in New Delhi that Japan was merely being "amoral" or 
"apolitical" in refusing to support India . According to one commentator, India had 
expected Japan to pass judgement on which nation was right and which was wrong. 
However, Indian policymakers concluded that Japan's only concern was to pursue its 
economic interests.34
31 Chae-Jin Lee, Japan Faces China: Political and Economic Relations in the Postwar Era 
(Baltimore: The John Hopkins Press, 1976); George P. Jan, "Japan's Trade with Communist 
China"; Yoshihide Soeya, Japan's economic diplomacy with China, 1945-1978 (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1998); and Welfield, An Empire in Eclipse.
32 However, China was under significant pressure to conclude the agreements as the war had 
resulted in a reduction in Western trade credits and Soviet economic assistance. See Chad J. 
Mitcham, China's Economic Relations With The West And Japan, 1949-79: Grain, Trade and 
Diplomacy (London: Routledge, 2005).
33 Takako Hirose, "Japan in a Dilemma: The search for a Horizontal Japan-South Asia 
Relationship" in Jain, Distant Asian Neighbours, p.41.
34 Jain, "India's Calculus of Japan's Foreign Policy in Asia" at p.221.
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4.1.5 Proposals for an India-Japan axis against China in the 1960s
The next period of significant interaction between India and Japan was during the 
second half of the 1960s, a period of major strategic uncertainty in Asia. This was a 
time of widespread anxiety about the growing belligerence of China and concerns 
about the withdrawal from the region, in whole or in part, of its primary external 
security managers, the United States and the United Kingdom. During this period, 
Britain, the United States and the Soviet Union each promoted regional strategic 
arrangements to be anchored by India and Japan. India also made its own proposals 
for regional economic and political arrangements anchored by India, Japan and 
Australia. However, as will be seen, India had no intention of joining any Western- 
sponsored regional arrangement and nor did Japan have any interest in joining any 
economic or political arrangement with India. Instead, Japan focused on the economic 
development of East Asia, and India would turn to the Soviet Union for its security 
needs.
Throughout the 1960s many influential Western analysts saw a strategic relationship 
or entente cordiole between India and Japan as a natural response to the threat posed 
by China.35 In February 1966, Britain and Australia, contemplating Southeast Asia's 
security needs following the planned withdrawal of Britain west of Suez, publicly 
floated a proposal for the security of Southeast Asia involving the creation of a three- 
way alliance between Australia, Japan and India w ith the backing of the United 
Kingdom.36 The proposal, which the Australian Foreign Minister, Paul Hasluck, would
35 See, for example, Russell H. Fifield, Southeast Asia in United States Policy (New York: Council 
on Foreign Relations, 1963); William J.Barnds, India, Pakistan and the Great Powers (New York: 
Council on Foreign Relations, 1972); and Alastair, "An Asian Balance of Power?" The Australian 
Journal of Politics and History, Vol.XII, No.2 (August 1966), pp.271-281 at p.278.
36 Canberra Times, 4 February 1966.
249
Part 4 Chapter 4.1- India -  Japan 
strategic relations from 1942 to 1998
later call the "great tr ipod "37 received no response from either India or Japan. As the 
distinguished Australian historian, T.B.Millar, would comment: "From her sense of 
weakness and danger, India finds attraction in the idea of cooperation with Japan, but 
the Japanese see no profit in any such arrangement... Despite being a common threat, 
China divides them more than it unites th e m ."38
From as early as 1967 US defence planners were also contemplating East Asian security 
requirements following a contemplated reduction in the direct US military 
commitment in Asia. This led to a variety of proposals in which regional powers could 
take a greater share of responsibility for regional security and the containment of 
China. Through 1968, the Johnson administration became increasingly desperate to 
find a regional collective security arrangement that would preserve the status quo of 
non-communist states in Asia and ease a US withdrawal from Vietnam. In September 
1968, US Defence Secretary, Clark Clifford, proposed that Australia, Japan and India 
should work together with other Southeast Asian nations to develop a regional 
security arrangement, commenting that: "The basis of our future policy should be the 
development of regional agreements by the countries in the region in which we [the 
United States] will be but a limited partner."39 The US proposals were opposed by 
both Japan and Australia40 and brought a sharp response from India, with the junior 
Indian Foreign Minister, B.R.Bhagat, commenting that a defensive alliance between 
India, Australia and Japan was "out of the question."41 As Hedley Bull would later 
comment, the British and US-inspired proposals merely reflected:
37 The Age, 30 March 1967.
38 T.B.Millar, "India, Japan and Australia, and the Security of Asia" Australian Quarterly, (1967) 
Vol. 39 No.3, pp7-19 at p.17.
39 Vincent Smith, "Australia urged to seek own defence" The Australian, 1 October 1968
40 Robert Duffield, "Let's Leave Arms out of ASPAC" The Australian, 21 September 1968.
41 Justus M. van der Kroef, "The Gorton Manner: Australia, Southeast Asia and the U.S." Pacific 
Affairs Vol.42 No.3 (1969) pp.311-333 at p.328.
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" the desire o f the external powers to rationalise their own withdrawal by 
demonstrating that their presence in the area is no longer necessary, since local 
elements are a t hand to accomplish the common task. They are not founded 
upon the realities o f the area. India, Australia and Japan do not share a 
common perception o f external threats to their security..."42
In 1969, the Soviet Union, which had also become increasingly alarmed at the security 
threat posed by China, proposed its own regional collective security system to be 
anchored by India and Japan. The Soviet proposal, while vague, involved a cooperative 
system involving all of South, Southeast and East Asia to be guaranteed by the Soviet 
Union and the United States. The Soviets saw participation of both India and Japan as 
being essential to a regional grouping. India, perhaps not wishing to publicly rebuff the 
Soviets, was polite but lukewarm about the proposal, while US regional allies stayed 
largely silent.43
During this period, India also saw its economic and security position as deteriorating, 
and was developing its own proposals for regional political and economic 
arrangements. In particular, the Indian government saw improved economic and 
political relations with Japan as a way of assisting in India's economic development 
while form ing a political counterbalance to China. At this time there was little political 
communication of substance between the Indians and Japanese and the Indian 
Embassy in Tokyo reportedly did not have a single diplomat who spoke or read 
Japanese well.44 Although India initiated discussions w ith Japan at foreign secretary 
level, India was never able to propose concrete steps for bilateral political cooperation
42 Hedley Bull, “The New Balance of Power in Asia and the Pacific" Foreign Affairs, Vol.49 
(1971), pp. 669-681 at p.680.
43 See generally, Marian P.Kirsch, "Soviet Security Objectives in Asia" International 
Organization, Vol.24, No.3 (Summer 1970), pp. 451-478.
44 "India Continues to Neglect Japan" The Economic Weekly, 17 October 1964, p.1679.
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on issues that really mattered to both countries (e.g. mutual positions on Kashmir, the 
Kuriles or China). By early 1968, an Indian official would admit "we have reached 
nowhere" in improving political relations with Japan.45
India nevertheless pressed on with its own proposals. In May 1968, while visiting 
Australia, Indira Gandhi proposed a new regional arrangement to be anchored by 
India, Japan and Australia which would involve regional economic cooperation and an 
international guarantee by the big powers that neutrality and independence of 
aspiring nations would be preserved.46 Gandhi remained vague about the concept of a 
guarantee by big powers and would later "clarify" it to exclude region-wide security 
guarantees and replace Australia as the third anchor with a "neutralist" Indonesia. 
However, the thrust of the proposal involved the reduction of regional tensions so as 
to allow regional states to pool their resources for economic development. Between 
mid-1968 and mid-1969 India pursued the project of creating a regional economic and 
political arrangement anchored by India, Japan and Indonesia including arrangements 
to safeguard the independence and political integrity of Southeast Asia. According to 
the then Indian Foreign Minister, Dinesh Singh, any regional agreement would be a 
political rather than a military one and there would be no provision for collective 
military security.47
Despite a m ultitude of proposals during the second half of the 1960s for regional 
security arrangements "anchored" by Japan and India, there is no evidence that the 
Japanese government ever gave serious consideration to any security relationship with 
India. While Japan gave a great deal of consideration to the Chinese "threat" and its 
impact on regional security, concerns about the potential for confrontation with China
45 P.A Narasimha Murthy, "Notes and Memoranda: Seminar on India and East Asia" 
International Studies, Vol.9 No.4 (1968), p.468.
46 Indian Express, 28 May 1968.
47 "Neutrals plan guarantee for Asian freedom" The Australian 5 March 1969.
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far outweighed any potentia l benefits to  Japan tha t a relationship w ith  India m ight 
o ffe r.48 A t the same tim e, Tokyo realised tha t Japan could itse lf add little  to  regional 
security except to  prom ote regional economic developm ent.49 In late 1966, Japanese 
Foreign M in ister Takeo M iki began to  prom ote a new "Asia Pacific" policy in which 
Japan would act as a bridge from  the United States, Australia and others in fostering 
regional economic cooperation, a policy tha t m ight now be described as "open 
regionalism ." W hile Tokyo made clear tha t any Asia-Pacific regional organisation 
should have an open membership, including even China, they did not consider tha t 
the ir new concept o f the "Asia-Pacific region" included India.50 The Japanese focused 
on the creation o f East Asian based arrangements to  prom ote economic cooperation 
and free trade, including the M in isteria l Conference fo r Economic Development o f 
Southeast Asia (MEDSEA) and the Pacific Trade and Development forum  (forerunners 
o f the  m odern-day APEC). (Japan would come up against its own resistance to  these 
in itia tives in Southeast Asia, where they were seen by many as an unwanted a ttem pt 
by Japan to  assume regional leadership.)51
In June 1969, Gandhi visited Tokyo to  discuss the various proposals fo r enhanced 
regional relationships, a visit tha t was described as the most delicate and d ifficu lt 
foreign mission o f her career.52 Several m onths earlier, Gandhi had forced the recall o f 
Japan's ambassador to  New Delhi over differences in economic cooperation, 
apparently on the grounds tha t the Japanese envoy had been insuffic iently receptive
48 John Welfield, An Empire in Eclipse, at p.196.
49 Kyokuto no Anzen Hosho, p.14, cited in Lawrence Olson, Japan in Postwar Asia (London: 
Council on Foreign Relations, 1970) at p.135.
50 Takashi Terada, "The Origins of Japan's APEC policy: Foreign Minister Takeo Miki's Asia- 
Pacific Policy and current implications", The Pacific Review, V o l. l l No.3 (1988) pp337-363.
51 Singapore Foreign Minister Rajaratnam, reportedly unsuccessfully sought Indian 
involvement in MEDSEA to balance Japan's role. Datta-Ray, Looking East to Look West.
52 Malnotra 'Japanese not interested in Indian pact' The Australian, 26 June 1969.
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to Gandhi's demands for Japanese aid or investment.53 During Gandhi's visit, Japanese 
Prime M inister Sato made clear that Japan did not welcome Indian proposals for an 
India-Japan economic axis that would include Southeast Asia.54 The Japanese 
regarded its area of interest as ending at Burma and did not wish to be involved in 
India's quarrels in South Asia. The Indians were also reportedly "horrified" to find that 
the Japanese were more concerned about the Soviet threat than any threat from China 
and that India's increasingly close relationship with the Soviets merely heightened 
the ir concerns. The Japanese regarded the Indians as potential regional rivals rather 
than partners.55 As an olive branch, Sato offered Gandhi the opportunity to participate 
in both MEDSEA and the Asian and Pacific Council (a regional talk shop of anti­
communist states) as part of a policy of encouraging all "neutralist" states to join 
regional fora .56 Gandhi refused, publicly accusing the Japanese of trying to create a 
regional m ilitary bloc.
It was clear that there was no deal to be had. Although they shared concerns about 
China, the Indian and Japanese perspectives on regional economic and security needs 
were entirely at odds. Despite its earlier proposals, India was term inally suspicious of 
any arrangement with US regional allies that had any political element. Japan was not 
willing to underwrite India's economic development and had its own strategy for the 
economic development of Southeast Asia. Gandhi returned to Tokyo and within 
several months began secretly negotiating the terms of a strategic partnership with 
the Soviet Union intended to balance China. By December 1969, the Indian Foreign 
M inister would be expressing concern about the possibility of the development of a 
new axis between Japan, the United States and China and the expansion of Japan's
53 Far Eastern Economic Review, 3 July 1969, p . ll.
54Marian P.Kirsch, "Soviet Security Objectives in Asia," at p471. See also Far Eastern Economic 
Review, 24 July 1969, p.249.
55 Malnotra 'Japanese not interested in Indian pact' The Australian, 26 June 1969.
56lbid.
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military capacity.57 As has been discussed above, Japan and India would remain 
estranged for the remainder of the Cold War.
4.1.6 Japan and India's 1998 nuclear tests
Although the end of the Cold War removed some of the structural and ideological 
obstacles in the India-Japan relationship, the strategic indifference largely continued.
India had been a de facto  (although undeclared) nuclear weapons state since 1974 and 
during the 1990s Japan had put much effort into persuading India to forgo its nuclear 
capabilities. In particular, from 1991 Japan sought political leverage from its aid 
contribution to India, for the first time seeking to link the provision of Japanese aid to 
nuclear non-proliferation, and for Japan this became a central issue in the relationship. 
For its part, New Delhi was largely unpersuaded by the Japanese efforts to gain 
political leverage from aid, with Indian diplomats seeing Japan's anti-nuclear position 
as "ritualistic", part of a supporting act for the United States.58 India's Pokhran II 
nuclear tests in May 1998 took the international community by surprise, leading to 
widespread international condemnation. The Japanese response to the tests was 
unusually sharp and led to its most active foreign policy intervention in South Asian 
affairs since the Pacific War. Japan "strongly demanded" that India suspend its further 
nuclear development program, freezing aid, recalling its ambassador, and using its 
position on the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank to block multilateral 
loans to India. Japan also took a leading role in organising the international 
community against the development, in the G-8 and the UN Security Council. Most 
controversially, Japan offered to host an international conference on Kashmir and to 
mediate between India and Pakistan on the issue. However, Japan's diplomatic
57 "Japan: New Axis" Link Vol.12 (20) 28 December 1969 p.27
58 Purnendra Jain, "Japan's Relations with South Asia" Asian Survey, Vol. 37, No. 4 (Apr., 1997), 
pp. 340-352 at p.348.
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intervention against India would ultimately fall flat, achieving nothing but hostility 
from India.
Japan's punitive measures did significant damage to its relations with India, which 
reached their lowest level since the 1940s. While India resented reaction from the 
international community to the nuclear tests, it particularly resented the reaction from 
Japan and other allies of the United States who were seen as sheltering under the US 
nuclear umbrella. However the strongest hostility was reserved for Japan's attempts 
to involve itself in the Kashmir dispute, w ith one Indian diplomat reportedly 
commenting:
"l/l/e understand Japanese special sentiments against nuclear weapons. But i f  
Japan tries to bring the Kashmir issue into an international stage like the UN, 
India would regard Japan as an enemy and Japan would stay such fo r  many 
years to come."59
Although some have argued that Japan's strong reaction to the tests was motivated by 
the prospect that India, through its acquisition of nuclear weapons, would leapfrog 
Japan to major power status,60 a quite different explanation seems more likely. Japan 
cared little  about India's strategic requirements or its claims to major power status. 
Rather Japan was immediately motivated by concerns about it encouraging North 
Korea to become a declared nuclear weapons state (which, in fact, occurred in 2006).61 
The issue also allowed the Japanese to exhibit its commitment to anti-proliferation and
59 Takako Hirose, "Japan's Role in South Asia in the Post-Cold War Period" in K.V.Kesavan and 
Lalima Varma (eds), Japan-South Asia: Security and Economic Perspectives (New Delhi: Lancer's 
Books, 2000), at p. 105.
60 See, for example, Baldev Raj Nayar, India and the Major Powers after Pokhran II (New Delhi: 
Har-Anand Publications, 2001).
61 National Institute of Defense Studies, East Asian Strategic Review, 1998-99.
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provided an opportunity for it to demonstrate international political leadership. Japan 
fe lt it was in a position to take such an activist line against India precisely because it 
had so little  of concrete interest in South Asia -  the Japanese had little  to lose in terms 
of bilateral relations while potentially much to gain in international prestige if it 
achieved a leadership role on non-proliferation and the India-Pakistan conflict.62
However, the bilateral relationship would recover remarkably quickly -  India's fa it  
accompli had changed the strategic equation in Asia and Japan could do nothing but 
accept it. According to a senior Indian diplomat in Tokyo, "For all its downside, it 
provided a much needed reality check which, by briefly stripping our ties of false 
sentiment, allowed for a serious engagement, perhaps for the first tim e ."63
Conclusion
This chapter has reviewed the strategic indifference between India and Japan, two 
major states of Asia, for much of the twentieth century, focusing on some major 
episodes of strategic interaction. There are several reasons for this historical 
indifference. India and Japan's strategic interactions -  or lack of them -  appear to be 
highly consistent with Buzan's suggestions as to the existence of historically separate 
regional security complexes in Northeast Asia and South Asia (and Southeast Asia), 
that is, strategic behaviour of states in each region has largely been w ithout regard to 
states outside the region. Although China provides a geographic and strategic link 
between South and Northeast Asia, the link was insufficient to cause India and Japan 
to perceive common strategic interests. Instead, during the Cold War each of Japan
62 Satu P.Limaye, "Tokyo's Dynamic Diplomacy: Japan and the Subcontinent's Nuclear Tests", 
Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol.22, No.2, August 2000, pp.322-339 at p.329.
63 S.Jaishankar, "India-Japan Relations after Pokharan II," Seminar (New Delhi), No.487 (March 
2000), p.42.
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and India dealt w ith China, variously as a partner and a rival, with little reference to the 
other.
Differing strategic alignments was also a major contributor towards Japanese and 
Indian strategic estrangement for most of the Cold War. However, underlying these 
differing Cold War alignments was deeper clash of strategic goals, and one that to 
some extent still continues. India's "Holy Grail" of strategic autonomy contrasted 
sharply w ith Japan's preparedness to cede its strategic autonomy in pursuit of 
economic development. As will be seen in chapter 4.2, this basic difference in 
approach continues to be a significant factor in the India-Japan relationship.
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Chapter 4.2 Strategic engagement between India and Japan after 1998
4.2.1 The developing strategic partnership between Japan and India
4.2.2 The underlying economic relationship
4.2.3 Japanese perspectives on a security relationship with India
4.2.4 Indian perspectives on a security relationship with Japan
Introduction
This chapter will consider developments in the India-Japan strategic relationship over 
the last decade and consider whether a security partnership between the two is likely 
to be both enduring and substantive. It will argue that, following the change in relative 
strategic positions of Japan and India in recent years, the relationship is now consistent 
with multiple streams of strategic thinking in both Japan and India. Although there are 
limitations and constraints on the relationship, including an anaemic economic 
relationship, the potential exists for a "grand strategic bargain" between India and 
Japan as two major powers of Asia.
4.2.1 The developing strategic partnership between Japan and India
India's declaration as an overt nuclear power in 1998 marked a major turning point in 
its relationship with Japan, fundamentally altering the balance of the relationship that 
had existed since the 1950s. The nuclear tests represented a decisive and risky step by 
India to alter the strategic balance in Asia in its favour. As has been discussed in the 
previous chapter, Japan's response to the tests represented a significant defeat for 
Japanese diplomacy and a failure to understand the limitations in its own strategic 
position. After 1998, Japan, like the rest of the world, was forced to treat India as a 
major strategic player in Asia and give more rigorous consideration of India's place in 
the broader strategic environment. As will be seen, it has led to a major realignment 
of Japanese strategic thinking about India.
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The initial steps to mend the relationship after India's 1998 nuclear tests were made 
by Indian Foreign Minister Jaswant Singh during a visit to Tokyo in December 1999. The 
Japanese responded quickly to India's overtures, agreeing to regular consultations.
The Japanese realised that their assertive stance against India over its 1998 nuclear 
tests had failed utterly, risking leaving Japan isolated.1 As early as January 2000, Indian 
Defence M inister George Fernandes commented that: "after more than 50 years of 
aloofness on these issues, India and Japan have decided on a security and defence 
related dialogue on a regular basis."2
In August 2000, Japanese Prime Minister Yoshiro Mori visited New Delhi to declare 
that Japan and India had become "global partners," and Japan used the aftermath of 
9/11 to lift its post-Pokhran II sanctions against both Pakistan and India. The political 
relationship between India and Japan has improved steadily from that time, although 
generally in parallel w ith developments in India's relationship with the United States. 
This included a so-called "strategic partnership" announced in 2005 and in 2006 
agreements were concluded providing for the expansion and formalisation of defence 
ties, particularly in the area of maritime cooperation.
The 2007 Quadrilateral initiative
This process moved into top gear in 2007 under the leadership of Japanese Prime 
M inister Shinzo Abe and his Foreign Minister, Taro Aso. Abe, in particular, had a 
strong belief in the key role of India in Japan's future, claiming that the India-Japan 
relationship "w ill be the most important bilateral relationship [for Japan] in the 
w o rld ."3 Aso also sought to provide an ideological basis for the relationship through
1 See Limaye, "Tokyo's Dynamic Diplomacy."
2 "India, Japan will have close defence ties, says Fernandes" Times of India, 16 January 2000.
3 K. Venugopal, "Japan's guarded, positive response on nuclear issue," The Hindu, 16 
December, 2006. Abe, in his 2006 political manifesto Utsukushii kuni e: jishin to hokori no
260
Part 4 Chapter 4.2- Strategic engagement 
between India and Japan after 1998
his "Arc of Freedom and Prosperity" initiative which proposed that Japan should 
pursue "value-oriented diplomacy," justifying closer cooperation by Japan with others 
holding "shared values" such as India, Australia and NATO states.
In early 2007 Prime Minister Abe proposed the so-called "Quadrilateral" initiative, 
under which India would join a formal security dialogue with Japan, the United States 
and Australia. Abe's proposal was vague and would remain so, although some saw it 
as essentially suggesting the extension of the US-Japan-Australia trilateral security 
dialogue to include India. In April 2007, the first ever trilateral naval exercises were 
held between the United States, Japan and India in the Western Pacific and in August 
2007, the annual India-US Malabar naval exercise was transformed into large-scale 
multilateral exercises in the Bay of Bengal involving three carrier battle groups and 
other ships from  the United States, India, Japan, Australia and Singapore.
Developments in the relationship reached a crescendo with the visit of Abe to India in 
August 2007, when in an address to the Indian parliament he spoke of a "broader Asia" 
partnership of democracies. Abe suggested that the India-Japan partnership would 
"evolve into an immense network spanning the entirety of the Pacific Ocean, 
incorporating the US and Australia."* 4 These developments, taken together, were seen 
by some as the beginnings of a formal four-way coalition between the United States, 
India, Japan and Australia, aimed at balancing or containing a rising China.5
moteru Nihon e [Towards a beautiful country: A confident and proud Japan] (Tokyo: Bungei
Shunju, 2006) includes a lengthy discussion of how Japan should strengthen ties with India,
stating: "It will not be a surprise if in another decade, Japan-lndia relations overtake Japan-US 
and Japan-China ties."
4 Sudha Ramachandran, "What are friends for...?" AsioTimes Online, 25 August 2007. 
<www.atimes.com>.
5 For more detailed accounts of these developments in 2007, see Purnendra Jain, "Westward 
Ho! Japan Eyes India Strategically," Japanese Studies, Vol.28, Issue 1 (May 2008), pp.15-30 and
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However, by late 2007, these developments had lost much of their momentum. 
Reactions from Chinese official and semi-official sources to the Quadrilateral initiative 
and naval exercises in 2007 were highly negative, including criticism that the initiatives 
resurrected "a cold-war mentality" and marked "the formation of a small NATO to 
resist China."* 6 In May 2007 China issued diplomatic demarches to India, Japan, the 
United States and Australia requesting explanations about the Quadrilateral proposal 
and in the following month Chinese President Hu Jintao pressed home the point by 
seeking "clarification" of India's position in a face to face meeting with Indian Prime 
M inister Singh.7
During the course of 2007, Australia, India, the United States and even Japan had 
become increasingly hesitant about the Quadrilateral initiative. Canberra had serious 
misgivings over the proposal, which was seen by many as undefined and unduly 
provocative. Australia declined to participate in meetings on the initiative after May 
2007, although its withdrawal was only announced in early 2008. Washington was 
divided over the proposal and did not make any public statements in support of it. The 
Indian government also faced significant domestic political pressure against any 
perceived alliance involving the United States. In Japan there was criticism of the 
proposal from within the governing coalition, the bureaucracy and the opposition, with 
many considering a formal multilateral political coalition as "too provocative" towards 
China. The resignation of Abe as Japanese Prime Minister in September 2007 
removed a strong proponent of a security relationship w ith India and by the end of
Madhuchanda Gosh, "India and Japan's Growing Synergy: From a Political to a Strategic Focus"
Asian Survey Vol.48, No.2 (March/April 2008), pp. 282-302.
6 Sun Cheng, "A Comparative Analysis of Abe's and Fukada's Asia Diplomacy," China 
International Studies, No.10 (Spring 2008), pp.58-72.
7 D.S.Rajan, "China: Media Fears over India Becoming Part of Western Alliance," Chennai 
Centre fo r China Studies Paper No.46, 29 August 2007.
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2007 proposals fo r a formal multilateral security relationship involving Japan, India, 
and the United States had, it seemed, been quietly shelved. However, the emphasis 
shifted towards the development of the bilateral relationship between India and 
Japan.
The 2008 Security Declaration
In October 2008, the Indian and Japanese Prime Ministers concluded the India-Japan 
Joint Security Declaration, asserting that the strategic partnership between the two 
countries would become "an essential pillar fo r the future architecture of the region."8 
The Security Declaration represented the third security declaration made by Japan 
(after jo in t declarations with the United States in 1996 and Australia in 2007) and the 
first such declaration by India (and was followed by a further jo in t security declaration 
w ith Australia in 2009).9 Both Japanese and Indian leaders made repeated denials that 
the Declaration was "aimed at" China10 and Taro Aso (then Prime Minister) 
downplayed suggestions that Tokyo was still pursuing the idea of a security 
relationship involving India, Japan and the United States. China's reactions to the 
Security Declaration have been restrained.* 11
While the Security Declaration is in many ways more symbolism than substance, it is 
nevertheless an im portant step in creating a framework for the further development
8 "Joint Statement on the Advancement of the Strategic and Global Partnership between Japan 
and India," 22 October 2008.
9 See generally, David Brewster, "The Australia -  India Security Declaration: the Quadrilateral 
redux?" Security Challenges, Vol.6, No.l (Autumn 2010), pp.1-9.
10 Siddhart Varadarajan, "India, Japan say new security ties not directed against China," The 
Hindu, 23 October 2008.
11 D.S.Rajan, "Beijing: Suspicions on Japan-lndia Security Declaration targeting China," Chennai 
Centre fo r China Studies Paper No.221, 2 November 2008.
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of the security relationship.12 The declaration identifies shared security interests, so- 
called "elements of cooperation" in nine specified areas and outlines consultative 
mechanisms to  be implemented between them, the so-called "mechanisms of 
cooperation." Although the form of a "jo in t declaration" was new for India, much of 
its content merely repeats previous jo in t statements of Indian and Japanese leaders.13 
Key areas of cooperation identified in the Security Declaration and accompanying Joint 
Statement include cooperation in the creation of a new Asian security order, bilateral 
cooperation w ith in multilateral regional frameworks, a continuing defence dialogue, 
cooperation between coastguards, transport safety, the fight against terrorism and 
transnational crimes, sharing of experiences in peacekeeping and peace-building, 
disaster management and disarmament and non-proliferation.
A notable aspect of the Security Declaration is its emphasis on political cooperation 
between Japan and India in existing regional multilateral frameworks and in the 
creation of a new Asian security order. This indicates an intention to focus on 
cooperation at the political level in seeking to create a new security order in East Asia, 
although there is no guidance as to what that new security order might look like. The 
emphasis on political cooperation is an inevitable consequence of Japan's inability 
under the current interpretation of its Constitution to engage in anything that smacks 
of collective defence or to make a military contribution to regional security beyond 
Japan's immediate environs. An interesting absence from the India-Japan Security 
Declaration is any reference to Northeast Asian security issues (including Japan's 
concerns about abduction of its citizens by DPRK and DPRK's nuclear capacity). This
12 For a detailed examination of the terms of the security declaration, see David Brewster, "The 
India -  Japan Security Declaration: an enduring security partnership?" Asian Security, Vol.6,
No.2 (2010), pp.95-120.
13 A point acknowledged by Indian Foreign Minister Shiv Shankar Menon. Siddharth 
Varadarajan, "India, Japan say new security ties not directed against China," The Hindu 23 
October 2008.
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reflects India's current desire to avoid taking a role in security issues on the Korean 
peninsula.
The so-called "mechanisms of cooperation" in the Declaration, an unusually detailed 
list of consultation and cooperation mandated at numerous levels, provide an 
interesting indication of the expected depth and breadth of engagement between the 
two. This includes consultation among Foreign and Defence Ministers (although not in 
the so-called 2+2 format as currently occurs between Japan and the United States and 
Australia) and the respective permanent secretaries and national security advisors.
The Declaration also prescribes a range of military to military cooperation and 
exchanges, navy to navy staff talks, coast guard cooperation, a Joint Working Group on 
counterterrorism and cooperation on money laundering. In December 2009, Japan 
and India agreed on the terms of an Action Plan to implement the Security Declaration. 
This added further agreements on consultation and cooperation including an annual 
subcabinet/senior officials 2+2 meetings (foreign affairs and defence), the 
institutionalisation of the annual maritime security dialogue (first held in October 
2009), the institutionalisation of annual bilateral naval exercises, discussions of direct 
cooperation in anti-piracy operations, institutionalisation of cooperation on UN reform 
(particularly on UNSC permanent membership for both India and Japan) and the 
development of detailed plans for cooperation in disaster management both in India 
and regionally. The level of detail devoted to these consultative mechanisms portrays 
an apparent determination of both to undertake a prolonged and multi-faceted 
engagement and to build a broad-based relationship across multiple agencies.
Although there is a determination to build a broad-based consultative security 
relationship, any security relationship will be subject to significant constraints. The 
most obvious issue inhibiting a symmetrical security relationship is the restrictive 
Article IX of Japan's Constitution which, as it is currently interpreted, prohibits Japan 
from entering into collective defence arrangements. However, as will be discussed 
later, India appears to have few expectations in this regard and arguably, like the
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United States, may benefit from the lack of symmetry in the relationship (which would 
be somewhat ironic given the decades of criticism by New Delhi of Japan's 
asymmetrical security relationship with the United States). There are however other 
issues which India expects that Japan will address and resolve in order to further 
develop the relationship, particularly including the willingness of Japan to meet India's 
needs in civilian nuclear cooperation and defence technology cooperation. While 
India has shown a degree of patience on these issues, their resolution will inevitably be 
seen in India as a test of Japan's seriousness to  further developing the relationship.
The supply of civilian nuclear technology to India
Japan's refusal to supply nuclear generation technology to India is a significant issue in 
the security relationship and seems likely to remain so for some time to come. For 
India, Japanese cooperation is an important factor in the development of its nuclear 
industry. While Japan has shown some flexib ility in recognising India's anomalous 
nuclear status, India's refusal to formally accede to non-proliferation norms represents 
a major political obstacle to allowing the supply of Japanese nuclear technology.
India requires a huge investment in electricity generation over the next several 
decades in order to support economic development, including plans to install around 
12-16 GW of additional nuclear generating capacity by 2020.14 An agreement with 
Japan allowing the provision of nuclear technology to India will be an important factor 
in these plans. Japan ranks third in installed nuclear capacity worldwide and Japanese 
companies (primarily Toshiba, Hitachi and Mitsubishi) rank among the largest suppliers 
of nuclear technology in the world, with Toshiba alone representing some 30% of total 
worldwide nuclear reactor building capacity. Japanese companies are at the forefront 
of, or have proven competencies in, the utilisation of advanced mixed oxide fuels and
4 See generally, J.Nandakumar and A.Vinod Kumar, "India-Japan relations: Are there prospects 
for civil nuclear cooperation? " Strategic Analysis Vol.31, No.6 (November 2007), pp.973 -  984.
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the construction of light water reactors, advanced boiled water reactors and fast 
breeder reactors, each of which India hopes to deploy.15 Japan is not absolutely 
essential to India's plans for its civilian nuclear industry as India can still access such 
technology from Russia, the United States, France and South Korea. However, the 
absence of key Japanese technology would significantly restrict India's options and, 
according to Indian experts, would prevent India from achieving planned technology 
standards in developing India's nuclear industry.
Japan, as a leading campaigner against nuclear proliferation, remains extremely 
sensitive about India's nuclear status. As discussed in chapter 4.1, the role of Japan in 
leading international condemnation of India over its Pokhran II nuclear weapons tests 
in 1998 caused significant (although as it turns out, short-lived) damage to the bilateral 
relationship. Japan has moderated its rhetoric since that time, tacitly accepting India's 
status as a de facto nuclear weapons state outside of the non-proliferation system, and 
in September 2008 gave its grudging approval to India's 123 nuclear deal with the 
United States in the multilateral Nuclear Suppliers Group. The Japanese waiver was 
given on the condition that India observes all its commitments, including its pledge not 
to conduct further nuclear tests. According to Japan, if India resumes tests, "the 
logical consequence is to terminate trade" under the NSG waiver.16
The Japanese nuclear industry (with the support of the Ministry of Economy, Trade and 
Industry) is placing significant pressure on the government to allow Japanese 
companies to participate in India's nuclear program. Toshiba has the ability to trade 
indirectly with India through the supply of US technology by its US subsidiary, 
Westinghouse. However, Hitachi, which supplies complementary technology together 
with its US joint venture partner, GE, is effectively locked out of the market and is said
15 Ibid.
16 "Worrisome NSG agreement," Japan Times, 14 September 2008.
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to be “desperate" to be allowed to access the Indian market.17 However, the issue 
remains one of extreme domestic political sensitivity for Japan, with one official 
commenting that the Japanese government decision to allow the NSG waiver “ met 
much more opposition from the public than we anticipated."18 While the Indians have 
stated that they propose to “ move at a pace which the Japanese government and 
people are comfortable w ith ," they nevertheless continue to press Japan on the 
issue.19
However, with the election of a DPJ led government, it seems less likely that there will 
be a major change in Japan's position on export of nuclear technology to India in the 
near future. Although DPJ party policy opposes the US-India nuclear agreement and 
the NSG waiver, this does not appear to have translated into any change in 
government policy.20 The DPJ government's position, reiterated in December 2009, is 
that progress on civil nuclear cooperation will only occur when India becomes a party 
to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and commences negotiations on the 
Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FCMT). In February 2010, India announced that it 
would commence negotiations on the FMCT. However, India refuses to sign what it 
calls the “discriminatory" CTBT while at the same time reiterating its voluntary 
moratorium on nuclear testing.21 It is not clear how this impasse can be resolved. It 
has been suggested that a coordinated international campaign by Japan and India to 
strengthen the international non-proliferation regime or to make progress in nuclear 
disarmament could possibly provide the Japanese government w ith sufficient domestic
17 Author interview with senior Japanese government advisor, June 2009.
18 "Japan to Postpone Nuclear-Pact Talks with India," Nikkei Report, 20 October 2008.
19 Indrani Bagchi, "Japan refuses to commit on N-pact," Times of India, 23 October 2008.
20 Yoshiro Hachiro and Keiichiro Asao, "Statement Following the Approval of a Nuclear 
Agreement Proposed by the US Which Exempts India from Certain Export Restrictions" DPJ 
Webpage, 11 September 2008. <http://www.dpj.or.jp/english/news/080918/04.html>.
21 "India reiterates voluntary moratorium on n-testing," Thaindian News, 6 February 2010. 
<www.thaindian.com>.
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political coverage to come to a nuclear supply agreement with India.22 However, the 
Indians have not so far shown a willingness to help the Japanese out of their political 
predicament. New Delhi may believe that they are now in a strong bargaining position 
with Japan and that the Japanese nuclear suppliers will inevitably force a change in 
government policy.
Cooperation in defence technology
Another issue on which little progress has been made is the supply of defence 
technology by Japan to India. India has taken the view that access to first rate defence 
technology will be a key feature of its rise as a military power. India already has access 
to sophisticated defence technology through its supply relationships with Russia and 
Israel and has made access to US defence technology a central part of the India-US 
relationship. India is now placing significant pressure on the Japanese government to 
relax its restrictions on high technology trade.
The ability of Japan to supply defence technology to India formed a key issue in the 
visit of Indian Defense Minister Mukherjee to Tokyo in May 200623 and in March 2007 
Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi agreed to the creation of a so-called bilateral Japan- 
India "Consultation Mechanism for High Technology Trade" to give consideration to 
relaxing Japan's restrictive rules regarding arms exports to India on a case by case 
basis. The issue was again emphasised in the December 2009 summit between Indian 
and Japanese leaders when Prime Minister Hatoyama stated that he had obtained 
Indian assurances that there would be no diversion of Japanese defence technology to
22 Author interview with senior Japanese government advisor, June 2009.
23 C.Raja Mohan, "Pranab's nudge could bring Japan defence tech to India," Indianexpress, May 
25, 2006. <www.indianexpress.com>.
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third countries. A Japanese spokesman later commented that "There will be ample 
space for cooperation in this area."24
Like the nuclear issue, any easing of the longstanding restrictions on arms exports and 
sharing of defence-related technology by Japan represents a major domestic political 
taboo.25 Although this prohibition was loosened slightly following the North Korean 
nuclear crisis in 2003 to allow the jo in t development of ballistic missile technology with 
the United States, any further loosening of the restrictions faces opposition across the 
Japanese political spectrum. Nevertheless, there have been a number of influential 
calls to loosen Japan's defence export controls.26 It has been suggested that Japan 
could have a particular role in the establishment by India of a Ballistic Missile Defence 
system. Because of the co-development by Japan and the United States of BMD 
technology, trilateral cooperation in technology may be highly desirable or even 
necessary for the roll-out of that technology by India.27 While there seems to be some 
room for Japan to move on this issue, it is possible that Japan may also seek to link 
progress on this area to progress on India's commitments on nuclear non-proliferation.
24 "Nuclear deal unlikely as Japan sounds CTBT alert," Thaindian News, 28 December 2009, 
<thaindian.com>.
25 It has been argued that the prohibition on arms exports forms a key part of the Japanese 
"security identity." Andrew Oros, Normalizing Japan: Politics, Identity and the Evolution of 
Security Practice (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2008).
26 Including by the LDP's National Defence subcommittee in 2009. See also Yukari Kubota, 
"Japan's New Strategy as an Arms Exporter: Loosening the Three Principles on Arms Exports," 
RIPS Policy Perspectives No.7, November 2008.
27 G.V.C.Naidu, "Ballistic Missile Defence: Perspectives on India-Japan Co-operation," Strategic 
Analysis, Vol.31, No.l, (Jan-Feb 2007), pp.155-177.
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4.2.2 The underlying economic relationship
The most glaring structural weakness in the India-Japan strategic relationship is in the 
economic dimension. Tokyo's courting of a security relationship with India despite 
the lack of significant economic links has been called "a remarkable case of the 
Japanese flag preceding trade and investment."28 Despite persistent attempts by the 
Japanese government to encourage Japanese private investment in India since the 
early 1990s, Japanese business is, and seems likely to continue to be, wary of doing 
business in India. The theoretical literature indicates that a close economic 
relationship is not an absolute prerequisite to a good political and security
I Q
relationship. However, one might argue that a closer economic relationship would at 
least assist in avoiding a misalignment of interests, particularly in dealing with China, 
as was apparently the case in the early 1960s. An anaemic economic relationship 
between Japan and India when placed against the overwhelming economic significance 
of China to Japan and the burgeoning trade relationship between China and India 
could place significant limitations on the alignment of Japan and India's interests, 
particularly in seeking to develop "balanced" regional political and economic 
institutions. The lack of a substantial economic relationship could lead to fragility in 
the security relationship to the extent there is a disjunction between India and Japan's 
political and economic interests.
In the immediate years following independence, India had high hopes of an economic 
partnership w ith Japan that would act as a major driver of India's industrial
28 Evan S. Medeiros et ol, "Pacific Currents: The Responses of US Allies and Security Partners in 
East Asia to China's Rise" (Santa Monica: Rand Corporation, 2008).
29 Among the extensive literature on the relationship between trade and alliances, see Edward 
D. Mansfield, Power, Trade & War (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994); Joanne Gowa, 
Allies, Adversaries and International Trade (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994); and 
Michael P.Gerace, Military Power, Conflict and Trade (London: Frank Cass, 2004).
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development. Just as Japan had successfully industrialised its own economy, India's 
leaders believed it could provide capital, technology and know-how to India to assist in 
India's industrialisation. Japan also identified India as a major potential market in the 
post-war reconstruction of the Japanese economy and in 1958 India was chosen as the 
first country to receive Japanese ODA as part of Japan's policy of promoting economic 
liberalisation in the region. However, the Indian economy remained largely closed 
until the 1980s. Japanese businesses found that India was essentially an unattractive 
place for investment as a result of high tariff barriers, an inefficient, obstructive and 
often corrupt Indian bureaucracy and legal system, restrictive labour laws and severe 
restrictions on repatriation of capital and profits.
Underlying the economic disconnection for the second half of the twentieth century 
was a major disconnect between the Indian and Japanese business cultures. As has 
been discussed in chapter 4.1, there appears to be powerful cultural barriers between 
India and Japan. While Japanese businesses successfully adapted to the business 
environments in Southeast Asia and China during the 1960s, 70s and 80s, there were 
difficulties in adapting to the Indian business environment. This contributed to the 
inability/unwillingness of Japanese business to adapt its assembly/export business 
model that was so successful in Southeast Asia and China to the Indian business 
environment. Japan's experience stands in notable contrast with South Korean 
businesses which, as discussed in chapter 3.4, have been better able to adapt to the 
local business environment and have become a major economic force in India.
The focus on developing Indian economic links by Japanese political leaders since the 
early 1990s, and particularly since the turn of the century has largely failed to reverse 
this situation. While Japanese investment in India has increased significantly in 
absolute terms, it remains extremely small relative to other Japanese investment 
destinations. Japanese investment in India over the period April 2000 to December 
2009 aggregated US$3.6 billion or 4% of total FDI in India. Japanese investment in 
India in the ten years to 2007 represented a mere 0.7% of all Japanese foreign
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investment over that period (as compared with 26% invested in China). Bilateral trade 
too is small in relative terms. Bilateral trade between India and Japan for 2008/09 was 
US$10.9 billion and is growing at a rate of around 20-30% per annum. (By way of 
comparison, Japan-China bilateral trade was US$232 billion in the year to November 
2009.) Nevertheless, a recent survey indicated that Japanese businesses expect India 
to  become a major trading partner over the next several years.30
The picture for private trade and investment between Japan and India contrasts with 
Japanese ODA to India, where in recent years the Japanese government has made a 
concerted effort to give priority to the relationship. India overtook China as the 
largest destination of new Japanese ODA loan commitments in 2003. The Japanese 
government is continuing to use its ODA program in an attempt to expand economic 
ties. Simultaneously with the signing of the Security Declaration, Japan announced an 
ODA package of US$4.6 billion in loans to help build a Mumbai-Delhi rail freight 
connection, the largest amount ever provided under Japanese ODA for a single project. 
However, suggestions that ODA should be directed towards security-related projects 
such as the upgrading of port and maritime infrastructure have not been 
implemented.31 While an impressive indication of political commitment from the 
Japanese government, the focus on ODA-driven investment underlines the lack of 
major private Japanese investment in India as compared with Japan's economic 
competitors.
Both India and Japan have sought to encourage greater economic links through a 
bilateral Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement intended to encourage 
trade and investment. Although negotiations on an agreement began in early 2007, 
progress has stalled on lowering ta riff and non-tariff trade barriers on certain products
30 " India and Japan." < http://www.ibef.org/india/indiajapan.aspx>.
31 Hitachi Research Institute, "Manmohan Singh's Visit to Japan: Recent Trends, Historical 
Perspectives," 7 February 2007.
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and nor is there an agreed target date for its finalisation. Sales of Indian agricultural 
and pharmaceutical products to Japan and Japanese automobiles and chemical 
products to India remain significant issues. Meanwhile, India has finalised free trade 
and investment agreements with key competitors of Japan such as Singapore, South 
Korea and ASEAN and Japan has finalised its own free trade agreements with Malaysia, 
Indonesia and ASEAN. Given the history of the economic relationship over the last 60 
years there may be doubts whether a free trade agreement would make a major 
difference to economic relations between India and Japan. Nevertheless, it may be an 
interesting test of political resolve of both in overcoming powerful domestic 
constituencies that would be opposed to such a deal.
The continuing weakness in the economic dimension of the relationship has led to the 
India-Japan relationship being described as having a "top heavy security component 
(albeit, at present, more in intent than content)."32 Indian Prime Minister Manmohan 
Singh made no bones about this problem in the October 2008 summit, reminding his 
hosts of the paucity of Japan's economic links w ith India in comparison with its 
competitors. Singh pointed out that the increase in India's bilateral trade with China in 
the past one year alone is more than the whole of India's to ta l annual trade with 
Japan. Indian Foreign Minister Menon described security and political cooperation as 
the second leg of the bilateral relationship and made it clear that the firs t leg, 
economic cooperation, was yet to realise its full potentia l.33
This chapter will now examine the underlying perceptions and expectations in Japan 
and India about the relationship.
32 Sourabh Gupta, "Japan-lndia Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation: Groping towards an 
Asia-wide Security Architecture," Nautilus Institute Policy Forum Online 08-085A, 4 November 
2008.
33 Siddhart Varadarajan, "India, Japan say new security ties not directed against China," The 
Hindu, 23 October 2008
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4.2.3 Japanese perspectives on a security relationship with India
Japan's security environment is dominated by two factors: its security alliance with 
the United States and its relationship with China. While the US alliance is generally 
regarded as core to Japan's security there are also widespread anxieties in Japan about 
the nature of the alliance. This has led to attempts to draw closer to the United States 
simultaneously with a desire to reduce Japan's reliance on the US. At the same time, 
Japan is also painfully aware of the decline in its power relative to China and perceives 
potential risks in the maintenance of the US alliance in the face of China's rise.34 
Comments such as those by the now US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton that the US 
relationship with China "will be the most important bilateral relationship in the world 
this century"35 have only served to heighten these fears. Despite broadly-held fears in 
Japan about a China "threat" and the relative decline in Japan's strategic position, 
there is little consensus about an appropriate response to this perceived threat or 
about Japan's relationship with the rest of Asia.
Since the end of the Cold War, Japan's security policy has been a domain that is hotly 
contested among various streams of thinking (which have been tagged variously as 
normal nationalists, middle-power internationalists, new autonomists, neo­
revisionists, realists, globalists, mercantilists, Asianists and pacifists).36 A lack of 
consensus has significantly contributed to a lack of direction in Japanese security policy 
and, according to Katzenstein, resulted in a high degree of policy rigidity.37 While
34 Japan's views on the Chinese threat has been described as "something approaching panic." 
Aurelia George Mulgan, "Breaking the Mould: Japan's Subtle Shift from Exclusive Bilateralism 
to Modest Minilateralism," Contemporary Southeast Asia Vol.30, No.l (2008) pp.52-72 at p.60.
35 "A glance at features of Hillary Clinton's Asian tour," Xinhua (English edition), 22 February 
2009.
36 Samuels, Securing Japan.
37 Peter J. Katzenstein, Rethinking Japanese Security: Internal and external dimensions (London: 
Routledge, 2008), p.3-4
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changes in Japanese government may lead to a change in emphasis, there is often no 
clear change in policy direction. Further, according to Katzenstein, Japanese security 
policy is formulated within an institutional structure that biases policy strongly against 
a forceful articulation of military security objectives, making it more difficult to discern 
significant changes in policy direction.38
Amidst this contestation on security policy, Japanese thinking about the substance of 
its relationship with India is relatively underdeveloped. However, the Japan-lndia 
relationship is unusual for the degree to which it is seen in positive terms (if not always 
of central importance) across several streams of Japanese strategic thinking, 
simultaneously fulfilling several different external policy objectives. In broad terms, 
the development of a relationship with India whose relative power is on the rise while 
Japan's relative power is in decline is seen as one response to Japan's strategic 
dilemma. Japan's new view of India as a useful security partner stands in stark 
contrast with the indifference shown to India for five decades or so after the end of 
the Pacific War where it was seen to have little value as a partner.
Some in Japan see a closer relationship with India as part of developing better security 
relationships w ith key US security partners both inside and outside the region. They 
argue that the US security relationship can be strengthened through better embedding 
Japan in the broader Western alliance system. An explicit goal of improving Japan's 
relations with US strategic partners was first articulated as a specific strategic objective 
by Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi in May 2003 and was reaffirmed in the 2004 Araki 
Commission Report and Japanese National Defence Program Guidelines.39 Aso (then 
Foreign Minister and later Prime Minister) also expressly advocated strengthening 
relations with NATO as a means of strengthening Japan's relations with the United
38 Peter J. Katzenstein and Nobuo Okawara, "Japan's Security Policy: political, economic and 
military dimensions" in Katzenstein, Rethinking Japanese Security, pp.59-75.
39 See Samuels, Securing Japan, at p.193.
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States. Developments in Japan's relationships w ith Australia and to a lesser extent 
India (at least during the period 2007-08) should be understood within this context.40
There is little doubt that Japan's relationship w ith India has improved as a 
consequence of improvements in US-Indian strategic relations in recent years.
Elements of the Bush administration played a key role in encouraging Japanese 
proposals for the Quadrilateral, which the Abe government seemed glad to pursue.
The idea had been proposed within the track 1.5 US-Japan-India trilateral strategic 
dialogues first held in June 200641 and then supported in the so-called Second 
Armitage-Nye Report issued in February 2007.42 It was then pressed by Vice President 
Dick Cheney during his March 2007 visit to Tokyo.43 While the Quadrilateral initiative 
did not receive wholehearted support in the Bush administration (with Secretary of 
State Condoleezza Rice reportedly opposed to it), the United States remains 
supportive of a closer security relationship with India as part of extending Japan's 
regional security role.44 However, as will be seen below, the current Hatoyama 
government is likely to be inclined to further extend the bilateral nature of the
40 Heigo Sato, "Arc of Freedom and Prosperity" in Centre for Strategic and International 
Studies, "Bridging Strategic Asia: The Rise of India in East Asia and Implications for the US- 
Japan Alliance" Winter 2008. <www.csis.org>.
41 See, "The United States, Japan and India: Toward New Trilateral Cooperation" Center for 
Strategic and International Studies, 16 August 2007. <www.csis.org>.
42 The US-Japan Alliance: Getting Asia Right through 2020, co-authored by former US Deputy 
Secretary of State Richard Armitage, which asserted the importance of cooperation by Japan 
with Australia and India founded on "common values." Despite its unofficial status, the report 
was considered in Japan as intended as a policy guide for the then current and next US 
administrations.
43 Denis Shanahan, "Pacific allies enlist India," The Australian, 15 March 2007.
44 See "US-Japan-India Strategic Dialogue October 17-19 in Delhi, India -  Key 
Recommendations," Center for Strategic and International Studies. 6 November 2008. 
<www.csis.org>.
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relationship w ith India while also distancing the Indo-Japanese relationship somewhat 
from the US aspect.
A relationship w ith India is also consistent with a long-running Pan-Asionist stream in 
Japanese strategic thinking. Pan-Asian ideas are found both among nationalists and 
historical revisionists who have had influence in the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) 
administration over the last decade or so, as well as anti-m ilitarists within the current 
Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) administration. The Pan-Asianism prevalent in Japan 
in the years up to the Pacific War was a loose set of ideas positing egalitarianism 
among Asians (in opposition to the West), at the same time as Japanese superiority.45 
It grew as an idealistic/romantic antithesis to the realist foreign policies pursued by 
Meiji-era Japan in pursuing relationships w ith Western great powers. Although 
suppressed in post-war Japan, ideas of Pan-Asian nationalism have experienced 
something of a revival. In broad terms Pan-Asian thinking favours close relations with 
Asia over exclusive reliance on the US alliance and it is seen by some as potentially 
undermining the alliance.46 Others see such thinking as not necessarily inconsistent 
with a simultaneous desire to continue or even strengthen the US alliance. Pan 
Asianism in Japan has traditionally been confined to the Sinic world (Japan, China, 
Korea and Vietnam) and more generally East Asia, although in recent years the 
Japanese concept of "Asia" has been gradually expanding westwards. A particular 
attachment to India could be found during Prime Minister Nobusuke Kishi's 
administration during the late 1950s, which was continued by his grandson, Prime 
Minister Abe in 2007, then leader of the Kishi faction in the LDP. Abe was particularly 
fond of highlighting examples of supposed solidarity between India and Japan against 
the West during the 1940s. Thus Abe on his visit to India in August 2007 made a public
45 See generally, Sven Saaler and J.Victor Koschmann (eds.), Pan Asianism in modern Japanese 
history: Colonialism, Regionalism and Borders (New York: Routledge, 2007).
46 See, for example, S.Javed Maswood, "Japanese foreign policy and regionalism," in SJaved 
Maswood, Japan and East Asian regionalism (London: Routledge, 2001), pp.6-25.
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visit to the home of Subhas Bose, the wartime leader of the Indian National Army, a 
group of captured Indian soldiers who collaborated with the Japanese in fighting the 
British during the Pacific War.47 Abe also met with the family of Radhabinod Pal, an 
Indian judge who in 1949 dissented from  the conviction of Japanese leaders in the 
Tokyo War Crime trials.48 In highlighting these episodes Abe sought to both legitimise 
Japan's wartim e role and the supposed legacies of pan-Asian cooperation between 
Japan and India. Many in the current DPJ Hatoyama government exhibit similar ideas 
about Asian regionalism (albeit w ith an anti-m ilitaristic bent), which may lead to 
greater emphasis on key regional relationships as an intended counterpoint to Japan's 
relationship w ith the United States.
A security relationship w ith India would also find support among Japanese notionalists 
who hold significant (though often non-public) influence throughout Japan's political, 
bureaucratic and m ilitary systems. The nationalist or rightist movement is essentially 
revisionist in terms of Japan's foreign policy, advocating a m ilitarily strong, assertive 
and independent Japan and generally identifying China as Japan's key threat.
Although some nationalists find Japan's reliance on the US security umbrella 
"hum iliating" they do not necessarily oppose the US alliance, though they would 
advocate that the alliance be placed on more equal terms. Nationalists are attracted 
to a relationship w ith India in terms of finding common cause in forming a military 
balancing coalition against the perceived China threat and an opportunity for Japan to 
partially hedge against a perceived risk of the United States abandoning Japan in 
favour of China. Nationalists identify India as a potentially important security partner
47 As previously discussed, in celebrating Japan's sponsorship of the INA, Abe conveniently 
forgot that in early 1942 Nehru and the great majority of the Congress Party leadership had 
firmly resolved to assist the British in resisting Japanese imperialism.
48 The Japanese defendants in the Tokyo trials almost included Abe's grandfather, Nobusuke 
Kishi. He had been armaments minister in Japan's wartime cabinet, but was released from 
prison by the Americans in 1948 in somewhat obscure circumstances.
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of a future Japan shorn of its current legal and political constraints on the projection of 
military power and having the ability to act outside the US security umbrella.
Overlaying these streams of Japanese thinking are questions about whether Japan may 
be about to make a major change in strategic direction. Kenneth Pyle, a long-time 
observer of the historical development of Japanese strategic practice, believes that 
Japan is currently in the process of making one of its periodical revolutionary changes 
of course in foreign policy strategy in response to the new strategic environment in 
Asia and a generational change in Japan's leadership. According to Pyle, this may 
involve Japan completely abandoning the Yoshida Doctrine which anchored Japan to 
the US security relationship during the Cold War. This will not necessarily involve a 
loosening of the US alliance, but is likely to involve Japan seeking to rebuild its ties in 
Asia and promoting multilateral institutions in Asia where it can establish leadership 
and compete with China for influence. 49
Japanese thinking on future directions of an Indian security relationship
While a security relationship with India has conceptual support among several 
different streams in Japanese strategic thinking, there is little consensus about how 
the relationship might be developed. A security relationship with India is also 
inescapably limited by Japan's self imposed limitations on the projection of military 
power. Under its current constitutional arrangements, Japan is effectively unable to 
extend military cooperation with India much past the level of regular jo in t naval and 
coast guard exercises,50 anti-piracy operations, jo int disaster management51 and the
49 Kenneth B. Pyle, "Abe Shinzo and Japan's Change of Course," NBR Analysis, Vol.17, No.4 
(October 2006); and Pyle, Japan Rising.
50 The Japanese and Indian Coast Guards have held annual joint search and rescue and anti­
piracy exercises since 2000 and signed a Memorandum on Cooperation in 2007. The Japanese
280
Part 4 Chapter 4.2- Strategic engagement 
between India and Japan after 1998
multi-layered consultations as provided in the Security Declaration. Despite these 
limitations, India could still play an important role in Japan's evolving security posture 
in at least two key respects.
The key area of cooperation between Japan and India over the coming years is likely to 
be political and diplomatic cooperation in regional fora. Japan's efforts to include 
India in regional multilateral political and economic structures such as the East Asia 
Summit have clearly been motivated by a desire to use India to balance China w ithin 
those fora. This balance is perhaps more in the nature of a balance of power 
contemplated by some classical realists (i.e. the development of a preferred 
distribution of power) than the type contemplated by neorealists (i.e. the form ation of 
a coalition to balance against a perceived m ilitary threat). In this sense, a relationship 
with India may serve simultaneously as part of a political balancing strategy in relation 
to China and as a political hedging strategy with respect to the United States. In 
cooperation with India, Japan might carve out for itself a greater political role in Asia- 
Pacific security and play a greater role in security agenda-setting so as to potentially 
strengthen Japan's political hand within the US alliance.52 This could help to ensure 
that Japan's interests were not overlooked by the United States as was sometimes 
perceived to be the case in the past (for example, the North Korean nuclear issue 
where Japan has sometimes fe lt sidelined by the United States).
Coast Guard is administered separately from the Japanese Self Defence Forces and is not 
subject to the same constitutional or political limitations as the Self Defence Forces.
51 Such as cooperation demonstrated between India and Japan during the December 2004 
Indian Ocean tsunami.
52 Former Foreign Minister, Kakizawa Koji, quoted in Paul R. Daniels, "Beyond 'Better than 
Ever': Japanese Independence and the Future of US-Japan Relations," Institute for 
International Policy Studies, IIPS Policy Paper 308E, July 2004, p.10.
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Developing this theme further, some have argued that India might also be a useful 
partner for Japan in helping to bring about a "strategic convergence" between the 
United States and its allies and a future East Asian economic community which would 
include both China and India.53 This reasoning rejects casting India as merely a 
defensive balancer against China, a role which, it is claimed, India would refuse to take 
in any event.54 Instead India would be a partner in promoting multilateral political and 
economic institutions that allow for the inclusion of China in a way that is acceptable 
to the region.
For Japan, the other key role of an India relationship is in maritime security. Many in 
Japan identify the India relationship primarily as a maritime coalition, particularly in 
connection w ith the security of Japan's sea lanes to the Middle East.55 The title  of 
Prime M inister Abe's 2007 address to the Indian Parliament, "The Confluence of Two 
Seas", provides an insight into Japanese thinking about the relationship, i.e. a meeting 
of maritime powers of the Pacific and Indian Oceans. For Japan, a key concern is the 
ability of India to provide maritime security to Japan in the Indian Ocean in 
combination w ith or, potentially, as a partial alternative to Japan's reliance on the 
United States in that region. As the form er Chairman of Joint Staff of the Japanese 
Defence Agency, Admiral Natsukawa, commented in 2006, "Only India has the 
capability and intention for security cooperation in this huge sea area [the Indian 
Ocean], the west side of the Malacca Strait."56 Similarly, the Japanese National 
Institute of Defence Studies has called India "the sole dominant power" in the Indian
53 National Institute of Defense Studies, East Asian Strategic Review 2005, p.36. See also 
Samuels, Securing Japan, at p.201.
54 See, for example, Takenori Horimoto, "The World as India sees it" Gaiko Forum, Vol.6, No.3 
(Fall 2006) p.4-5.
55 Daniels, "Beyond 'Better than Ever,"' p.10.
56 Kazuya Natsukawa, Opening Address, Indo-Japan Dialogue on Ocean Security, Tokyo, 12 
October 2006.
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Ocean.57 Given the current pre-eminence of US military power in the Indian Ocean 
region these comments are significant and suggest that Japan may wish to partially 
hedge its reliance on the United States. Japanese views on an Indian security role 
inside the Malacca Strait may be less enthusiastic, although it is arguable that Japan, 
like the United States, may see India as playing a useful role as an external security 
provider in the Strait given local political sensitivities.
In contrast with its enthusiasm for an enhanced role for India in the Indian Ocean there 
seems to be little desire in Tokyo to see the Indian navy playing a material role north of 
Singapore.58 India is largely seen as an Indian Ocean power w ithout direct interests in 
East Asian security. Certainly, a tacit division of responsibilities between Japan and 
India to provide maritime security in the Pacific and Indian Oceans is not wholly 
unfeasible from Tokyo's standpoint, particularly if the United States is perceived to 
have a reduced presence or reliability in the Indian Ocean. Some might even go 
further and see a potential demarcation of Japanese and Indian maritime spheres of 
influence north and west of the Malay peninsula.
The unanswered question in all this is the extent to which Japan would realistically be 
prepared to develop a meaningful security relationship with an India that is not 
prepared to act substantially in coordination with the United States. Some in Japan 
would prefer to see India as occupying a strategic role akin to a "France in Asia"59 (i.e. 
generally within the US strategic sphere while maintaining a degree of political 
autonomy), in which India could cooperate closely w ith a Japan that is still deeply 
embedded in the US security relationship. However it seems unlikely that India would 
allow itself to be cast in those terms.
57 National Institute of Defense Studies, East Asian Strategic Review 2008, p.219.
58 Author interviews with Japanese security analysts, June 2009.
59 For example, Horimoto, "The World as India sees it."
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While the current DPJ-led government generally sees an India relationship in positive 
terms, the government's foreign policy stance remains unclear in many respects. The 
Hatoyama government has made US bases a major domestic political issue and scaled 
back the previous government's goal of a global security partnership with the United 
States.60 It is also generally inclined against the projection of military power (it 
cancelled Japan's token maritime role in the Indian Ocean in support of the 
Afghanistan campaign, although it has so far continued Japan's contribution to anti­
piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden) and against any relaxation of restrictions on the 
export of nuclear technology. However, until the Hatoyama administration develops a 
clearer vision of Japan's role in the region it seems unlikely that there will be significant 
developments in the India relationship.
4.2.4 Indian perspectives on a security relationship with Japan
For India, the development of a security relationship w ith Japan is one outcome of the 
revolution in Indian strategic thinking since the end of the Cold War. Nehruvian 
strategic doctrine effectively placed Japan in a box that made it very difficult for New 
Delhi to consider it as a potential strategic partner. However, a strategic relationship 
with Japan is now consistent with several of the themes in Indian strategic thinking. As 
discussed section 2.2, these themes include the "holy grail" of strategic autonomy and 
related ideas of a m ultipolar regional security order; concerns over the impact on 
China on the Asian balance of power and ambitions to  make India an "indispensible 
element" in that balance; thinking about India as a maritime power, predominant in 
the Indian Ocean; as well as the development of a new strategic relationship w ith the 
United States. Japan, as a key US ally, a major Asian power and a Pacific maritime
60 See generally, Leif-Eric Easley, Tetsuo Kotani and Aki Mori, "Electing a New Japanese Security 
Policy? Examining Foreign Policy Visions within the Democratic Party of Japan," Asia Policy,
No.9 (January 2010), pp.x-xx.
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state w ith  security needs in the Indian Ocean, stands at the intersection of all these 
themes in Indian strategic thinking.
Since the turn  o f the century, there has been a high degree o f consistency in Indian 
policy towards Japan, largely reflecting a consensus w ith in  the Indian political e lite on 
the desirability o f enhancing the relationship. As Manmohan Singh commented, "Our 
relations w ith  Japan enjoy a strong national consensus in our coun try ."61 A bilateral 
security relationship w ith  Japan is almost universally seen as non-threatening to  India's 
strategic autonomy. The lack o f perceived th rea t presented by Japan reflects the long- 
running separation o f security dynamics between East Asia and South Asia. A lack o f 
strategic or historical baggage, toge ther w ith  Japan's non-assertive stance in regional 
security affairs since the end o f W orld W ar II, has contributed to  a view in India tha t 
Japan is unlikely to  act as a strategic com petitor.
India has also shown a considerable degree o f patience in developing its relationship 
w ith  Japan. New Delhi is re latively sensitive towards Japan's domestic political 
lim itations and as a result has generally allowed Japan to  set the pace in developing 
security aspects o f the relationship. W hether or not India would be prepared to  enter 
in to a m ultila teral re lationship involving Japan and the United States (in the nature, fo r 
example, o f the putative Quadrilateral), it is clear tha t New Delhi is very com fortable 
w ith  a bilateral security relationship w ith  Japan. Thus New Delhi acted w ith 
uncharacteristic speed in September 2008 when a new Japanese governm ent under 
Taro Aso proposed the  Security Declaration.62 As Indian Foreign M in ister Shiv
61 "India, Japan ink Action Plan on Security Cooperation" Netlndian News Network, 29 
December 2009. <http://netindian.in/news/2009/12/29/0004571/india-japan-ink-action-plan- 
security-cooperation>
62 The Security Declaration was apparently pressed on Aso by LDP's Kishi faction (on which Aso 
depended) and seen as a "low cost" diplomatic achievement.
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Shankar Menon commented at the time, the Security Declaration was signed largely at 
the initiative of Japan and its form was largely driven by Japanese considerations.63
Indian thinking on future directions of a Japan security relationship
Although there is broad consensus in the Indian security community about the 
desirability of an India-Japan relationship, there is a divergence of views in India about 
how it might fit within India's evolving strategic posture. To a significant extent this 
reflects tension between a perceived need of India to form strategic relationships with 
the United States and its allies on the one hand and on the other a goal of maintaining 
strategic autonomy and promoting the development of a multipolar region. While 
there is a broad understanding in New Delhi of Japan's strategic limitations, these are 
not generally seen as a major impediment to India's goals except as they affect India's 
immediate desires to gain access to Japanese nuclear and defence technology. 
Paradoxically, Japan's self-imposed limitations on the projection of power also make it 
a attractive partner in helping to legitimise India's great power status regionally and 
particularly in the Indian Ocean.
Many in India see a security relationship with Japan as highly consistent with India's 
goal of strategic autonomy. While it is generally understood in New Delhi that the 
immediate trigger for improvement in relations with Japan over the last several years 
was the development of India's security relationship with the United States, Indian 
analyses tend to place significant emphasis on the "independent" and "equal" nature 
of the India-Japan relationship. This is often contrasted with the India-US relationship 
where there is a perceived risk of the United States building India as a junior alliance
63 Siddharth Varadarajan, "India, Japan say new security ties not directed against China," The 
Hindu 23 October 2008.
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partner.64 Although a US ally, Japan is generally not seen as threatening India's 
freedom of action. Many Indian strategic commentators see India and Japan as 
becoming "key stakeholders" in East Asian affairs.65 Japan, as a major power could 
also anchor a series of bilateral relationships between India and its East Asian partners. 
Some even see the Japan relationship as potentially part of an Indian-centred 
"constellation" of Asian states linked by strategic cooperation and sharing common 
interests, including in counterbalancing China.66 Chellaney sees the relationship as 
providing India with another link into the US security sphere, forming the foundation 
for a quadrilateral relationship including the United States and Australia, as well as 
potentially forming the foundation of an India-Japan-Russian trilateral relationship.
This, according to Chellaney, would be the way to form  a "true counterbalance to 
China," because it "would effectively contain China on all sides."67 Others hope that 
Japan (presumably with India's encouragement) will one day cast off its US strategic 
umbrella to join with India as a new global power centre and that China will thereby 
afford them both "strategic space."68 According to these perspectives, the Japan-lndia 
relationship is potentially of fundamental importance to India, possibly helping to 
place India at the pivot of any future Asian security arrangements.
Other Indian analysts are less enthusiastic about any suggestion that India might 
attem pt to sponsor a separate Asian security system, but nevertheless see Japan as an
64 Jain, "From Condemnation to Strategic Partnership," and Chellaney and Takenori, "Indo kara 
mita Nihon, Ajia."
65 G.V.C. Naidu, "Indo-Japan relations: Emerging Contours of Strategic Partnership."
66 Ibid.
67 Chellaney and Takenori, "Indo kara mita Nihon, Ajia". As unlikely as such a vision may seem, 
it is not necessarily new -  Indian commentators speculated about the development of an 
India-Soviet-Japan axis against China in the early 1970s. Press Trust of India, "Reaction to Indo- 
Soviet Treaty-Japan's Isolation Heightened," The Patriot, 19 August 1971.
68 Dr. Subhash Kapila, "Japan-lndia "Strategic Dialogue" (March 2007) A Misnomer," South Asia 
Analysis Group, Paper No. 2187, 29 March 2007.
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important partner in India's strategic ambitions. These include the modern-day 
successors of the nonalignment school who see a relationship with Japan and India as 
potentially helping to keep India relatively equidistant and nonaligned between two 
poles in Asia, China and the United States.69 Others see the possibility of India 
occupying a middle ground of partial attachment to the United States while retaining 
significant autonomy. Mohan sees the Japan relationship as springing from India's 
closer relationship w ith the United States, but also as potentially part of an issue-based 
coalition that India could use to maintain its strategic flex ib ility .70 According to this 
view, while India and Japan will have interests in assisting each other in East Asia and 
elsewhere, neither will Japan abandon the US alliance nor will India become a 
"deputy" for the United States in Asia. Mohan believes that a bilateral relationship 
between India and Japan (in contrast to a multilateral security relationship including 
the United States) would avoid alienating China, allowing India and Japan to "create a 
new magnet in Asia; not a wall of separation."71
One area where New Delhi recognises a strong alignment of interests with Japan is on 
the need to integrate India into various East Asian political and economic institutions. 
Japan along w ith others such as Singapore can provide India with crucial diplomatic 
support in gaining entrance to these groupings potentially against the resistance of 
China. New Delhi believes that it is imperative that India be integrated into the 
economic engine of East Asia and avoid being locked out of regional economic and 
political fora as had often occurred in the past. Japan is seen as a key ally in ensuring 
that India not only participates in these regional arrangements, but that it is seated at
59 See, for example, Rajesh Rajagopalan and Varun Sahni, "India and the Great Powers: 
Strategic Imperatives, Normative Necessities," South Asian Survey Vol. 15 No.5 (2008) pp. 5-32.
70 S.D.Muni and C.Raja Mohan, "Emerging Asia: India's Options," International Studies, Vol. 41 
No. 3 (2004), pp.313-333.
71 C.Raja Mohan, "Japan and India: The Making of a New Alliance?" RSIS Commentaries, 27 
August 2007.
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the "top  tab le" in the negotiation o f an Asian economic com m unity and in any fu tu re  
regional security arrangements.
Like Japan, many in India also see the relationship prim arily in term s o f m aritim e 
security. It is recognised in New Delhi tha t Japan's present ability to  contribu te  to  
regional m aritim e security is lim ited. However, Japan can play an im portan t role in 
legitim ising India's ambitions in the Indian Ocean. W hile Japan is recognised as a 
major (if partly inchoate) naval power in the Western Pacific, it also has few  
pretensions about projecting significant naval power into the Indian Ocean or in 
challenging the Indian navy's vision o f having a leading role in the Indian Ocean.
Japan's preparedness to  accommodate itse lf to  this vision serves to  legitim ise India's 
great power ambitions. As Kesavan puts it "Indo-Japanese cooperation could become 
a core com ponent o f the entire Indian Ocean security m echanism "72 (One m ight 
mischievously add, in an Indian Ocean security mechanism which recognises Indian 
naval pre-eminence.) Not surprisingly, the Indian navy has been at the fo re fron t of 
advocating the Japan relationship, and is keen on building strong ties w ith  the 
Japanese M aritim e Self Defence Force and Japanese Coastguard as part o f a coalition 
o f m aritim e powers. Despite suggestions tha t India and Japan could enter into 
reciprocal security arrangements in the ir respective m aritim e zones (e.g. allowing 
escorts o f each other's vessels on request, or cooperation in m aritim e in te rd ic tion ),73 
there have been few  indications o f concrete Indian expectations o f a Japanese role as a 
m aritim e security provider.
72 K.V.Kesavan, "The Indo-Japanese Partnership: The Security Factor" Observer Research 
Foundation, ORF Issue Brief No.19, May 2009.
73 Gurpreet S. Khurana, "Security of Sea Lines: Prospects for India-Japan Cooperation," 
Strategic Analysis, Vol.31, No.l (January-February 2007).
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Conclusion
After many decades of strategic indifference the India-Japan relationship has 
developed to a remarkable degree over the last five years. Whereas India and Japan 
saw little reason to engage during the second half of the twentieth century (even if 
others may have sometimes perceived good reasons for them to do so), they now 
perceive many reasons to engage. This reflects a virtually simultaneous change in 
both India and Japan's strategic positions at the end of the twentieth century: Japan 
now sees itself as strategically vulnerable, with good reason to develop new 
relationships; India has a newfound confidence that has opened up its strategic 
options. A security relationship between them now has strong conceptual support 
within several constituencies in both Japan and India and has the potential to fulfil 
multiple strategic goals for each.
China looms large in the relationship and mutual perceptions of a "China threat" are 
clearly strong motivations to develop the relationship as a regional balance. However 
the United States looms equally large. For Japan, a relationship with India could help 
strengthen its US alliance (through broadening Japan's relationships in the US security 
sphere) as well as potentially providing it with greater bargaining power within that 
relationship. For India, the relationship with Japan has been facilitated by its closer 
relationship with the United States. However, a security relationship with a Japan, 
either embedded in the US security relationship or, as some in New Delhi dream, 
loosened from it, can potentially increase India's influence and help in achieving India's 
objective of a multipolar region.
Despite some differences in objectives, the growing alignment of interests in relation 
to China has broken through their history of strategic indifference. One might argue 
that the foundations exist for a potential "grand bargain" between India and Japan. 
This could potentially involve a loose coalition to balance against China, a partnership 
to develop regional economic, political and security structures and possibly even an
290
Part 4 Chapter 4.2- Strategic engagement 
between India and Japan after 1998
implicit recognition of spheres of influence in the Indian and Pacific Oceans. Although 
Japan currently seems to have little clear strategic direction, there is good reason to 
believe that the relationship will continue to develop in years to come.
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This Part will draw on the preceding investigations to address the primary questions 
posed by this thesis: What are India's primary objectives in its strategic engagement 
with maritime East Asia? To what extent do India's relationships in East Asia involve 
balancing against China or a desire to expand its strategic space? This will be 
answered through the following inquiries:
• What are India's strategic objectives in maritime East Asia?
• What are East Asian strategic perspectives of India?
• In what ways can theoretical explanations of India's strategic behaviour add to 
our understanding?
This thesis will conclude that balancing against China is an important factor in India's 
strategic engagement with East Asia, particularly in its "peer" relationship with Japan. 
However, a desire to expand India's strategic space is a more significant factor in its 
security relationships in Southeast Asia. This thesis will then consider some of the 
ramifications of these conclusions on India's future strategic role in East Asia.
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5.1 Theoretical perspectives on India's engagement with maritime East Asia
5.2 India's strategic objectives and East Asian perspectives
5.3 Conclusions and future directions
5.1 Theoretical perspectives on India's engagement with maritime East Asia
In what ways can various theoretical frameworks contribute to an understanding of 
India's strategic engagement with maritime East Asia? Although most international 
relations theories posit the existence of a dominant factor or set of factors in 
understanding strategic behaviour,, this thesis has found examining India's regional 
relationships through a single analytical lens to be unsatisfactory. Instead, it has taken 
the approach that strategic relationships are likely to be affected by several strategic 
motivations which may be complementary or even inconsistent. Indeed, the empirical 
evidence presented in Parts 3 and 4 indicates that India's strategic engagement with 
East Asia involves numerous motivations and objectives. Nevertheless, as will be 
seen, each of the theoretical streams discussed in Part 1 remains of considerable 
benefit in understanding these motivations, if not perhaps providing the complete 
picture.
Regional security complex theory
India's limited historical interaction with East Asia is highly consistent with the 
theoretical literature that emphasises the relative autonomy of regional security 
complexes. Until recent years, there was a high degree of strategic indifference 
between India and East Asia, which behaved largely without regard for the strategic 
issues of the other. However, as Buzan has observed, the division between the 
Northeast Asian, Southeast Asian and South Asian security complexes are becoming
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less distinct. As a result, India is becoming a significant factor in the security dynamics 
of Southeast Asia and to a lesser extent in Northeast Asia.
The historical separation of Asian security complexes was at its starkest between South 
and Northeast Asia. India and Japan/South Korea largely ignored each other through 
the latter half of the twentieth century. India was preoccupied with security threats in 
South Asia and its own attempts to achieve predominance within that region. Japan 
saw its own strategic space (even in its most extended version) as effectively ending at 
the Indian border, where the Japanese army halted in 1942. Although China has 
always been a major factor in the security dynamics of each subregion, it historically 
separated them rather than linking them in the classic checkerboard pattern of 
international relations. Throughout the Cold War and after India and Japan gave 
priority (both in positive and negative terms) to their relationships with China, largely 
without reference to their relationships with each other. Nehru's objections to Japan's 
post-war settlement with the United States in 1951 were driven not by concerns about 
Japan's security, but by the future security roles of China and the United States in Asia. 
Tokyo's views on the 1962 Sino-lndian war were driven not by any interest in India's 
security but by the primacy of its relationship with China. Even when both had high 
threat perceptions about China, as in the late 1960s, neither India nor Japan saw a 
commonality of strategic interests. Japan's strong reactions to India's nuclear tests in 
1998 are better explained by an indifference to South Asian security affairs than any 
real interest. It is only in recent years that China has become more of a unifying than a 
separating force between South and Northeast Asia. Mutual threat perceptions of 
China now play a key role in the India-Japan relationship and China's relations with 
Pakistan and DPRK has been a factor in the India-South Korea relationship. The 
relationships are coming closer to resembling the classic checkerboard matrix.
Until recent years, a South Asian security region also operated quite separately from 
Southeast Asia. Despite India's relatively strong historical and cultural links with the 
region, India refused to take any substantive security role in Southeast Asia during the
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Cold War. India's passive approach towards Southeast Asia was partly driven by 
limitations in India's power projection capabilities and a preoccupation with 
immediate security threats in South Asia. It was also reinforced by Nehruvian strategic 
doctrine which denied legitimacy to regional security relationships outside of South 
Asia. The end of the Cold War and India's reach for major power status changed all 
that. India now perceives a need to transcend its security concerns in South Asia and 
form "normal" security relationships in Southeast Asia, something largely welcomed in 
that region.
One point is worth emphasising in this respect: if the regional security complexes in 
Asia are merging, they are only doing so gradually and partially. There is still a 
significant separation in regional security dynamics in Asia, particularly between 
Northeast Asia and South Asia, and limitations on strategic interaction between the 
regions might be expected to continue. While there has been increased security 
interaction between India and Japan due to their broader interests as major regional 
powers, India's primary area of interest remains South Asia and Japan's is 
overwhelmingly Northeast Asia. There is little suggestion, for example, that Japan or 
South Korea would be interested in taking a substantive security role in the security of 
South Asia. Similarly, notwithstanding its great power aspirations, India has avoided 
any involvement in security issues in North Korea or Taiwan. Nevertheless, the key 
change in recent years has been the development of similar perceptions of China:
China now unites much more than it divides.
While there is a relatively greater degree of security interaction between South and 
Southeast Asia, Southeast Asian states still regard India as essentially an extra-regional 
power. There is little or no inclination in Southeast Asia to become involved in South 
Asian security issues (apart, perhaps, from some lingering diplomatic support for 
Pakistan among some Muslim majority states). Southeast Asian states are essentially 
strategically oriented northwards, towards continental Asia. Even Indian Ocean littoral 
states such as Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand have a relatively low level of strategic
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interest in the Indian Ocean. Their northwards orientation suggests that these states 
are likely to have relatively fewer concerns about the expansion of India's strategic 
space in the Indian Ocean as compared with the expansion of China's strategic space in 
the South China Sea.
Although regional security complex theory is of considerable value in understanding 
many of the limitations in security interactions between India and East Asia, it fails to 
provide analytical insight into the forces that are changing regional dynamics and 
driving India's strategic engagement with East Asia. For this, one must consider other 
theories.
Neorealist balancing theory
Many aspects of India's strategic behaviour in recent years are also consistent with 
Walt's balance of threats theory. According to this theory, states that perceive a rising 
China as presenting a potential threat (greater than any threat presented by, say, the 
more powerful but distant United States) might be expected to establish balancing 
coalitions against China.
These considerations are particularly evident in the relationship between India and 
Japan where there are relatively high threat perceptions in relation to China. Their 
relationship is not in the nature of a formal military coalition. Rather it is more in the 
nature of a "soft balancing" political arrangement. The relationship provides an 
implicit message to China about the capacity for India and Japan to join a "hard 
balancing" coalition if China's strategic behaviour goes beyond certain bounds. 
However, among other things due to Japan's constitutional and political limitations on 
collective defence, it seems unlikely that the India-Japan relationship will evolve into a 
"hard" coalition.
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The relationships between India and Southeast Asian states are somewhat different.
As discussed in Part 1, the balancing imperatives that are central to neorealist theory 
are subject to the limitations of collective action. This is particularly the case with 
smaller or less powerful states that have relatively small stakes in the international 
system. They are much less likely than more powerful states to overcome the bias 
against taking risky and costly action against a perceived threat and are therefore 
unlikely to join in any balancing coalition if they can avoid it. In fact, none of India's 
relationships in Southeast Asia are in the nature of a balancing coalition against China 
(although balancing against China is somewhat of a consideration for Indonesia, the 
largest of the Southeast Asian states). As will be discussed below, rather than joining 
in balancing coalitions, Southeast Asian states prefer to encourage the development of 
a multipolar balance among major extra-regional powers, something closer to classical 
realist ideas of a balance of power.
The "omni-enmeshment" of India in Southeast Asia
India's strategic relationships in Southeast Asia are more consistent with the so-called 
"omni-enmeshment" of extra-regional powers into Southeast Asia, as described by 
Goh. According to Goh, the ASEAN states have followed a conscious policy of creating 
a balance among external powers in terms of their interests in Southeast Asia through 
"triangular" diplomacy between them and ASEAN and the integration and socialisation 
of China into the regional system. Much of the discussion about ASEAN's approach 
has focused on its apparently successful embrace of China. However, Goh emphasises 
that this strategy is multidirectional and applies also to other extra-regional powers. 
The efforts of ASEAN states to draw India into a web of sustained exchanges and 
relationships with the long term aim of integration in many ways resembles its 
treatment of China even though regional threat perceptions of India are very different 
from perceptions of China. One might argue that India is just as liable as China to be 
socialised into the "ASEAN way" even though India has a very different starting point 
to China in terms of its approach to regional relations.
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Another feature in ASEAN's approach is not only drawing extra-regional powers into 
the region, but also reducing competition between them within the region. ASEAN 
might therefore be expected to encourage cooperation between India and China (or at 
least create acceptable bounds for competition between them), which could positively 
affect their broader relationship. While ASEAN's primary focus is likely to be 
economic integration and interdependence among ASEAN, China and India, an activist 
ASEAN might also potentially facilitate cooperative solutions in areas of potential 
strategic rivalry between India and China, such as Indian Ocean maritime security.
Theories of hierarchical order
Some of India's relationships in Southeast Asia also illustrate the importance of 
perceptions of hierarchical order in Southeast Asia, as emphasised by writers such as 
Kang. India's pre-modern influence in East Asia differs substantially from that of 
China, which historically exercised a form of suzerainty over many parts of East Asia 
including over Indochina and the Korean peninsula. One could argue that this key 
historical difference has had a significant effect on some of India's relationships in the 
region. For example, some in New Delhi hope that India can cultivate a "balancing" 
relationship with Vietnam (aimed at China) in the nature of China's relationships with 
Pakistan or Burma in southern Asia (which are perceived to be aimed at India). 
However, this seems unlikely. While resisting the expansion of Chinese influence in 
Indochina for many centuries, Vietnam has at the same time paid due regard to its "big 
brother" relationship with China. Since the end of the Cold War, Hanoi has sought to 
diversify its international relationships, but only in the context of showing a calculated 
level of deference towards China. While there are significant differences between 
Vietnam and China in relation to the South China Sea maritime territories, Vietnam is 
unlikely, at least in the current security environment, to take any actions which would 
be seen as unduly provocative or disrespectful to China. Indeed, the overt 
involvement of third parties in Vietnam could well cause China to increase its pressure 
on Vietnam over the disputed territories. The existence of a hierarchical relationship
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between Vietnam and China (as well as between South Korea and China), as argued by 
Kang, suggests that the security relationship with India is likely to remain discreet.
Geopolitical explanations of India's search for strategic space
Geopolitical analysis can also contribute to an understanding of India's strategic 
objectives in East Asia in several respects. The increased emphasis that India has 
placed on maritime power in recent years is consistent with a partial reorientation of 
India from a predominantly continental strategic perspective towards a more balanced 
continental/maritime perspective. At one level, this is a natural consequence of the 
opening of India's economy and expansion of its trading relationships (which includes a 
growing dependence on imported energy), but it has broader implications. Some see 
maritime power as an essential element in India's "destiny" as a great power. The 
United States and Japan as rising powers in the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries similarly saw maritime power as a requisite of great power status, as did the 
Soviet Union in the latter part of the twentieth century, and arguably China in recent 
years. Similarly, India's naval aspirations might be regarded as a natural consequence 
of India's reach for great power status.
India is not only expanding its maritime power projection capabilities (in the manner, 
say, of the Soviet Union in the 1970s), but arguably also aspires to use maritime power 
to expand its strategic space. Because the Indian Ocean is for many purposes a closed 
sea, India has placed significant emphasis on control of the maritime choke points, 
particularly the Malacca Strait between the Indian and Pacific Oceans. The Indian navy 
perceives that an ability to exert negative control over the Malacca Strait as potentially 
a key factor in control over the Indian Ocean space and a potentially important 
bargaining chip in its relationship with China. India's anxieties over China's increased 
influence in the Indian Ocean undoubtedly serve to heighten New Delhi's defensive 
imperatives to secure and expand its strategic space. The security dilemma created by 
their conflicting perspectives suggests that Sino-lndian naval rivalry in the Indian Ocean
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is likely to continue and perhaps increase as a source of regional tension. However, 
one might argue that India's aspirations in the Indian Ocean region are driven not only 
by China but by its ambitions to develop a new hierarchical strategic order in the 
region.
India's apparent aspirations to create its own strategic space could again be compared 
with the United States and Japan which, as rising powers in the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries, aspired to leading naval roles in their regions. In doing so, the 
United States and Japan were compelled to cooperate with Britain, the global naval 
power of the time. Britain saw value in gradually ceding regional naval roles to the 
United States and Japan on a cooperative basis so as to concentrate its energies on 
what it perceived to be the greater threat of Imperial Germany in the North Atlantic. 
Both the United States and Japan were able to convert their enhanced regional naval 
roles into an expanded strategic space, the United States through its Monroe Doctrine 
in the Western Hemisphere and Japan through its short-lived East Asian Co-Prosperity 
Sphere in the Western Pacific. Similarly, one could argue that India will seek to 
convert a leading naval role into strategic space where it is able.
This analysis might suggest several things. First, where possible India will use its naval 
capabilities primarily in an attempt to "create" a semi-exclusive strategic space rather 
than project power beyond that space. This means an emphasis on naval diplomacy 
and cooperation in which India plays a leading role. Second, India will seek to develop 
a degree of negative control over the Malacca Strait as part of its objective of creating 
strategic space in the eastern Indian Ocean and this will continue to be an important 
feature of India's strategic relationships in the Malacca littoral. Third, India will seek to 
demonstrate its ability to project credible naval power into the South China Sea, but 
primarily in response to perceived incursions by China into India's space.
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5.2 India's strategic objectives and East Asian perspectives
There is no single template for understanding India's strategic engagement with 
maritime East Asia. Since the end of the Cold War, India has been feeling its way 
forward in developing strategic relationships with key partners. India has not 
articulated any "grand strategy" in East Asia and seems unlikely to do so in the near 
future. India's lack of economic and military strength relative to other major powers, 
particularly China, also means that it must remain flexible and discreet in its 
engagement with the region with the expectation that its relative power will grow in 
coming decades. Some have argued that India's approach to East Asia could be 
compared w ith Deng Xiaoping's advice about China "keeping a low profile and never 
taking the lead".1 This is only partly true: while India has shown a degree of political 
sensitivity in its dealings in East Asia, it has been far from passive in pursuing a regional 
security role and security relationships with key states across East Asia.
Although there is no real consensus in New Delhi as to India's strategic objectives in 
East Asia, it is still possible to identify several key underlying themes or objectives in 
India's strategic relationships. These principally include the following:
•  the economic integration of India w ith East Asia;
•  balancing China;
• the goals of strategic autonomy and the development of a multipolar regional 
order;
•  the due recognition of India as a great power; and
• the development of a maritime sphere of influence in Indian Ocean region.
1 C.Raja Mohan, "India in the Emerging Asian Architecture," in William T.Tow and Chin Kin 
Wah, Asean India Australia: Towards Closer Engagement in a New Asia (Singapore: Institute of 
Southeast Asian Studies, 2009), pp.40-57 at p.50.
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India's strategic objectives in East Asia are both active and reactive. India wishes to 
balance against China in East Asia and constrain China from intruding on its strategic 
space while also developing its own strategic space. As will be seen, it is often difficult 
to separate the effect of these motivations.
India's goal of economic integration with East Asia
It is difficult to overemphasise the importance of the economic dimension underlying 
India's strategic engagement with East Asia. India's Look East policy was initially 
focused on India's economic engagement with the region and economics continues to 
be a driving force in most of India's relationships in East Asia. The integration of 
India's economy with the dynamic East Asian economies remains India's most 
immediate regional goal. Although India's aggregate GDP is relatively large, India 
remains a poor country and its GDP per capita compares very unfavourably with any 
other claimants to major power status. Access to East Asia's capital, technology and 
markets is seen as a key factor in driving India's future economic development and 
transforming India's economy into an outward-looking, trade-oriented, economy 
comparable with other major powers.
ASEAN states have been particularly keen to encourage India's economic integration 
with the region. They are attracted to the prospect of access to the huge Indian 
market and Indian investment and an economic partnership with India is also seen as 
potentially "balancing" China's economic power. Wealthier ASEAN states such as 
Singapore also see potential economic benefit from positioning themselves as trading, 
services and financial intermediaries between India and China. This is the picture of 
the Asian "jumbo jet" as described by Singapore Prime Minister Go Chok Tong in which 
China/South Korea/Japan and India each represent wings of the jet, while ASEAN 
states represent the fuselage.
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India is unlikely to allow its regional security ambitions to adversely affect its goal of 
economic development, although there is little risk of tension between these 
objectives at present. On the contrary, India's economic and strategic objectives in 
maritime East Asia are seen as complementary. India's comprehensive strategic 
partnership with Singapore is an excellent model for combining the economic, political 
and security spheres in a relationship. India's strong economic relationship with South 
Korea is also a good example of the benefits of a good economic relationship in 
aligning the overall political relationship.
In contrast, India's weak economic relationship with Japan raises significant questions 
about their alignment of interests vis a vis China. An economic misalignment could 
restrict the effectiveness of the political and security relationship. In particular, an 
anaemic economic relationship between Japan and India, compared with the strong 
relationship between Japan and China and fast-growing trade links between India and 
China could allow China to create a wedge between Japan and India on a broad range 
of issues, in the same way that asymmetrical economic relationships among Japan, 
India and China inhibited Japan-lndia strategic cooperation during the Cold War. As 
Japanese Prime Minister Sato put it in the 1960s, China may seek to "isolate India and 
tempt Japan with trade." However, given the long-standing factors that have 
restricted the expansion of business relationships between Japan and India, it does not 
seem that this weakness in the relationship will be resolved any time soon.
Although India sees the economic benefits of India's economic integration with East 
Asia, New Delhi has in practice sometimes failed to fully recognise its strategic 
implications. India's comprehensive economic cooperation with agreement with 
Singapore has been an important factor in aligning their interests. However, in 
negotiating other free trade arrangements, New Delhi seems to have often focused on 
immediate costs/benefits in opening its agricultural and manufacturing sectors to 
competition, allowing domestic political considerations to trump longer term strategic 
and economic considerations. This has impaired the development of relationships
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with important potential partners such as Indonesia and Vietnam where India could 
play a much more prominent role. India's non-strategic approach in this respect 
contrasts sharply with the more generous approach shown by China in negotiating 
trade agreements which has facilitated the growth of China's political/economic 
influence.
India's goals of strategic autonomy and a multipolar regional order
India's "Holy Grail" of strategic autonomy and the related objective of seeing the 
development of a multipolar regional order also have a significant impact on the 
nature of India's relationships in East Asia.
Japan is crucial to India's aspirations towards a multipolar regional order. During the 
Cold War, Japan's close security relationship with the United States precluded a close 
relationship with India. During that period Japan and India had very different 
priorities. Japan demonstrated a willingness to cede its strategic autonomy in favour 
of economic goals, while India allowed its aspirations towards strategic and economic 
autonomy to impede its economic development. India is now more accepting of 
Japan's alliance with the United States and aspires to develop the Japan relationship in 
the hope that Japan will increasingly play an independent strategic role in Asia. In New 
Delhi's view, a bipolar (US/China) regional order would be inimical to India's interests. 
New Delhi sees the development of a more independent strategic stance by Japan as 
an important factor in the possible development of a multipolar regional order 
involving the United States, China, Japan, Russia and India as the major powers. In the 
future India could seek to lure Japan out of the US orbit in order to encourage the 
development of such a multipolar order, although it chances of doing so seem 
questionable. Arguably, some in the Indian security community, particularly those 
who hold strongly to the importance of strategic autonomy, assume that strategic 
autonomy is, or should be, a key objective of other states. They may not fully
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appreciate the extent to which, despite its ups and downs, the US alliance forms the 
bedrock of Japan's security and is likely to continue to be so for the foreseeable future.
India and Japan have clearly flagged their intention to engage in closer political 
coordination in various regional fora. While many see this as being "aimed at" 
containing or limiting China, this is not necessarily the case. Several proposals in 
recent years for regional cooperation, particularly economic cooperation, have 
foundered on fears among smaller states of the potential domination of such 
arrangements by China and/or the United States. Arguably, a political coalition 
between India and Japan could play a positive role in helping to develop regional 
economic, political and security institutions in which both China and the United States 
are seen to play "balanced" roles together with other major powers. Such an 
approach would, in effect, involve the development of a more multipolar regional 
system.
India and the Asian balance of power
A key factor driving India in its relationships in East Asia is India's imperative to balance 
China. This is given greater force by China's perceived intrusions into India's strategic 
space in the Indian Ocean region. One could argue that India is also compelled by its 
own great power aspirations to seek to form (limited) balancing relationships against 
China. An imbalance of power too far in China's favour raises the prospect of a bipolar 
regional order that would limit India's ability to achieve great power status. However, 
there are unresolved tensions between imperatives to balance China and India's goal 
of strategic autonomy. While India needs to cooperate with the United States and its 
allies in balancing China, the continuing need to demonstrate strategic autonomy 
could limit India's commitment to such arrangements. This adds to uncertainties 
about how these relationships are likely to evolve in coming years.
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Japan is an essential partner in India's wish to balance China without becoming wholly 
reliant on the United States. “Soft balancing" against China is a major factor in the 
India-Japan relationship. New Delhi hopes that this political partnership will place 
implicit limitations on China's assertiveness and help ensure India's inclusion at the top 
table of the region. Japan is motivated to develop the India relationship by 
heightened threat perceptions of China and increased anxieties over the US alliance.
A relationship with India does not necessarily mean any loosening of Japan's security 
ties with the United States, although it could be part of a long-term change in strategic 
direction. That being said, the present Japanese government has not yet articulated 
how a political-security relationship with India might fit with its alliance with the 
United States or its regional relationships, and seems unlikely to do so in the 
immediate future. While a “soft" balancing relationship between India and Japan 
could become more intense in coming years it is unlikely to evolve into a "hard" 
balancing coalition in the current strategic environment. Japan's self-imposed 
limitations in the security dimension severely restrict its ability to be an active security 
partner. In any event, New Delhi may find Japan's self-imposed limitations on the 
projection of power as convenient, particularly given Japan's apparent willingness to 
recognise India's role as a leading maritime security provider in the Indian Ocean.
The continuing separation between the South Asian and Northeast Asian security 
regions means that India and Japan will continue to have limited security interests in 
each other's home “turf." While in some ways this limits the degree of support that 
each is willing to offer the other in dealing with local security issues (e.g. Pakistan for 
India and DPRK for Japan), in other ways it might arguably strengthen a balancing 
relationship vis a vis China. There is very little scope for strategic competition between 
India and Japan in South Asia or Northeast Asia. Although there is the potential for 
strategic rivalry between India and Japan in Southeast Asia (as seems to have been the 
case in the late 1960s), this seems unlikely for the foreseeable future.
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India has had less success in developing balancing relationships with lesser powers in 
maritime East Asia. Indeed, in the current security environment there seems little 
likelihood that any East Asian states other than Japan would be willing to join a 
balancing coalition with India against China, however informal. Neorealist notions of 
balancing against China are not a major factor in Southeast Asia and nor do they have 
any real resonance in South Korea. Rather, a key strategic goal of many Southeast 
Asian states in particular is to ensure a balanced distribution o f power through 
developing a balanced role for extra regional powers w ith interests in the region.
While Singapore has been the most articulate proponent of this approach it is a more 
or less shared objective of many ASEAN states. W ith the possible exception of 
Indonesia, few, if any, Southeast Asian leaders would see India as a potential partner in 
a balancing coalition against China. Rather, ASEAN states are likely to encourage the 
United States to continue its stabilising role in the region, while China, Japan and 
India's influence in the region will be accommodated or facilitated to greater or lesser 
degrees.
Several Southeast Asian states see India as a useful security partner. While India is not 
seen as a credible guarantor of security in Southeast Asia it could still play a niche role 
in regional security. India's reliance on ASEAN in extending its influence into the 
region also means that India is likely to be a useful supporter of ASEAN's continued 
role as the organisational focus of East Asian political, economic and security 
arrangements.2 Southeast Asian perspectives on a regional balance of power suggest 
that while some states may facilitate an Indian political and security presence in the 
region, there will be some important limitations. First, India will not develop any 
exclusive security relationships in the region. While India might be a useful security 
partner, India does not have the capability or credibility to play the role of a primary
2 Something acknowledged by Singapore's current Prime Minister. Datta-Ray, Looking East to 
Look West, p.328.
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security provider. Second, Southeast Asian states are likely to resist any attempts by 
India to create a hierarchical security order. Third, Southeast Asian states are likely to 
continue to be highly sensitive towards China's perspectives. They are unlikely to 
facilitate an Indian security presence that would be seen as unduly provocative to 
China (e.g. the establishment of an Indian naval presence in the South China Sea). Nor 
are Southeast Asian states keen to become involved in Sino-lndian strategic rivalry, 
including in the Indian Ocean.
A further factor in the Southeast Asian strategic calculus, and one that is rarely 
discussed, is India's potential impact on the introregionol balance of power in 
Southeast Asia. Although India largely eschewed any security role in Southeast Asia 
during the Cold War, it still played an important role in the intraregional balance of 
power several times during that period. This included India's diplomatic support for 
Malaya over Indonesia during the Konfrontasi period; India's failure to support the 
newly independent Singapore against a potentially revanchist Malaysia in the late 
1960s and early 1970s; the failure of India to become a founding member of ASEAN in 
1967 (although it remains an open question as to whether it could have done so); and 
India's support for Vietnam's bid to dominate Indochina during the 1980s. With India's 
increased engagement with Southeast Asia, its potential role in the intraregional 
balance of power will increase even as India tries to avoid intraregional disputes. This 
is an implicit factor in India's relationship with Singapore. The extent to which 
Singapore makes itself indispensible to India's regional ambitions will help leverage 
Singapore's bargaining position throughout the region. The relatively warm state of 
India's relations with Indonesia also contrasts with India's cool relations with 
Indonesia's rival, Malaysia. Malaysia has also shown itself to be sensitive about 
enhanced security cooperation between India and Thailand. While largely inchoate, 
this dimension could become more prominent if ASEAN is unable to mitigate 
longstanding rivalries or if regional rivalries (e.g. in Indochina) become enmeshed in 
Sino-lndian rivalry.
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The recognition of India's status as a great power
India's self-perception as an emerging great power has made it particularly conscious 
of its relative lack of status in the international system. According to some, India 
perceives there to be status-inconsistency, where it has not been accorded an 
international status commensurate with its power (or, at least, its destiny to become a 
great power in coming decades). The recognition of India's international status has 
been an important factor in its regional relationships. Southeast Asian states were 
generally willing to accept India's status as a de facto nuclear power following its 1998 
nuclear tests. India and Japan have now made common cause in their ambitions to 
hold permanent seats on the UN Security Council. However, the failure to fully 
formally accept India as a legitimate nuclear weapons state in the nuclear non- 
proliferation order is still a significant factor in India's relations with both Japan and 
Australia. Japan's acceptance of India's nuclear legitimacy will be a key test of their 
relationship in coming years.
Despite its attempts to join numerous regional fora over the last two decades, India 
remains somewhat of an outsider in East Asian multilateral institutions. While India 
has been admitted to membership of some fora, it continues to be excluded from 
membership of others such as APEC and ASEAN + 3. In some institutions to which 
India has been admitted, such as the EAS, there is a perception that India has not even 
been granted full membership, let alone recognition as a principal power. Certainly 
China has not welcomed India's presence in East Asian institutions, but there may be 
lingering questions among other East Asian states (such as Malaysia and even South 
Korea) as to how the presence of India might affect an "East Asian" identity. Although 
officially denied, India's claim to an important role in these institutions is an important 
objective for New Delhi. India will therefore be expected to leverage its relationships 
in East Asia to ensure that India has a key role in new multilateral institutions. This is 
evident in India's relationships throughout maritime East Asia.
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The expansion of India's strategic space in the Indian Ocean region
Another major theme underlying India's strategic aspirations in East Asia -  and one 
that is the subject of relatively little analysis - is its ambition to expand its strategic 
space across the Indian Ocean region and partly into Southeast Asia.
While India does not have an expansionist military tradition beyond South Asia, since 
the end of the Cold War there has been an increasing view of a “natural" sphere of 
Indian influence extending well beyond the subcontinent. This frequently finds 
practical expression in maritime terms -  the desire to take a leading role in maritime 
security throughout the Indian Ocean region. The Indian navy has been particularly 
active in extending India's security arrangements throughout the Indian Ocean and 
parts of Southeast Asia. The navy has given particular emphasis on the maritime choke 
points of entrance into the Indian Ocean, which has included a focus on developing a 
maritime presence and security relationships in the southwest Indian Ocean (around 
the Mozambique Channel), in the northwest Indian Ocean (around the Persian Gulf) 
and most particularly in the northeast Indian Ocean, around the Malacca Strait. An 
expansion of India's naval capabilities has been encouraged by the United States, 
which has also indicated a preparedness to cede to India an important or even leading 
role in the northeast Indian Ocean.
Japan and South Korea could also play important roles in legitimising India's 
aspirations in the Indian Ocean region. Both see India as potentially a major 
contributor to their maritime security needs in the Indian Ocean, in a role 
complementary to that played by the United States. Given its constitutional and 
political limitations, Japan has a particular need for assistance in securing its SLOCs 
across the Indian Ocean. Japan's apparent willingness to recognise India as a leading 
security provider throughout the Indian Ocean west of the Malacca Strait makes it an 
ideal partner in helping to legitimise India's ambitions. This suggests that Japan will 
support the continued expansion of India's naval capabilities and would likely support
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India's attempt to limit China's presence in the Indian Ocean. Japan would, however, 
be less likely to support an Indian naval presence north of the Singapore Strait, and 
few in Tokyo would conceive of India as playing a major security role in East Asia. In 
the longer term, if there was a perceived reduction of commitment to regional security 
by the United States one might even imagine a tacit division of responsibilities 
between Japan and India involving the mutual recognition of spheres of responsibility 
for maritime security in the Western Pacific and Indian Oceans.
India's immediate objective in the Indian Ocean region is to halt and reverse the 
growth of China's influence, which is perceived by many in New Delhi as an illegitimate 
intrusion into India's strategic space. India has responded in several ways. It is 
developing its own security relationships among littoral and island states throughout 
the Indian Ocean in the hope of limiting China's influence. It is also developing a 
capacity to exert negative control over the Strait of Malacca (and the capability to 
project naval power into the South China Sea) to limit China's ability to project power 
into the Indian Ocean. The consolidation of India's strategic space in this manner is 
not best understood as an exercise in balancing against China, but more in terms of an 
attempt to create an extended space to a greater or lesser extent under the control of 
India. A balancing relationship implies a partnership with shared objectives in relation 
to China, while an expansion of strategic space may, at least from India's perspective, 
imply a more hierarchical relationship that - in the long run at least - is not just aimed 
at balancing China but could also exclude other powers. It is an important distinction 
in terms of India's long term role in the region. Further, India's geopolitical aspirations 
in the Indian Ocean and Southeast Asia are not just defensive. The desire for an 
extended strategic space is a common - if not universal - feature of aspiring great 
powers, and India is no exception.
In understanding India's engagement with East Asia one must understand the extent 
to which India considers that its strategic space extends into Southeast Asia and how 
India will likely exert its influence in that space. The construction of major naval and
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air force facilities in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands and the Eastern Fleet's new 
base on India's east coast are clear statements of India's intention to be the 
predominant naval power in the Bay of Bengal and the Andaman Sea. In recent years, 
the ASEAN states have not raised significant concerns about India's naval aspirations in 
the Indian Ocean or the development of facilities in the Andaman Islands. There are 
no conflicting territorial claims that could affect India's relations with Southeast Asia as 
does China's claims over the South China Sea. The joint India-lndonesian naval patrols 
off the northern tip of Sumatra (and less publicised joint training and patrols between 
India and Thailand3) arguably involve a tacit acceptance of India's role in the Andaman 
Sea. Nevertheless, ASEAN states have avoided taking any public position on India's 
claims about China's String of Pearls and would likely see heightened naval rivalry 
between India and China in the Indian Ocean as an unwelcome source of instability.
While developing its capabilities in the northeast Indian Ocean, the Indian navy has 
made significant efforts to prove itself as a useful partner in dealing with many security 
issues such as piracy, smuggling, refugees, terrorism and separatism, and disaster 
relief. Since 1995 the Indian navy has successfully used its MILAN biennial naval 
meetings at Port Blair not as a military exercise, but as an opportunity to increase 
military to military relationships with Southeast Asian navies as well as other regional 
navies such as Japan, Australia and New Zealand. The absence of the United States 
and China from the MILAN meetings is a none too subtle reminder of India's assertion 
of regional leadership. Since 2001 in particular, India has been pushing its maritime 
policing and anti-terrorism capabilities, including in cutting maritime supply routes 
across the Andaman Sea used by Indonesian and Thai separatists. The Indian navy 
made a prominent contribution to relief efforts in Aceh following the December 2004 
tsunami and has since enhanced its capabilities in disaster relief. Despite several 
attempts over the last decade, India has not been able to take a role as a security 
provider inside the Malacca Strait to counter the claimed problems with piracy. India's
3 Khurana, "China-lndia Maritime Rivalry."
312
Part 5 -  Understanding India's strategic 
engagement with maritime East Asia
aspirations in the Malacca Strait remain very sensitive with Malaysia and, to a 
somewhat lesser extent, Indonesia. The United States has encountered similar 
resistance to its attempts to gain a security role in the Strait.
It is unclear what an Indian regional security role in Southeast Asia might mean in 
practice beyond the provision of maritime policing and disaster relief functions. India 
would ideally like to assert a type of Monroe Doctrine in the Indian Ocean and parts of 
Southeast Asia, at least insofar as it could exclude any Chinese security presence. Lee 
Kwan Yew unsuccessfully invited India to be Singapore's "protecting power" and 
impose a Monroe Doctrine on Southeast Asia in the 1960s, but it does not seem likely 
that India could assume such a role today. One might argue that a more likely 
outcome is some type of cooperative security arrangement among major interested 
states which recognises a leading role for India in the Indian Ocean region, within limits 
imposed by the United States and other powers.
5.3 Conclusions and future directions
This thesis has concluded that balancing against China is an important factor in India's 
strategic engagement with East Asia, particularly in its "peer" relationship with Japan. 
However, a desire to expand India's strategic space (for both positive and defensive 
reasons) is a more significant factor in its security relationships in Southeast Asia. This 
chapter will now explore some of the implications of those conclusions on the future 
directions of India's security role in East Asia. Before doing so, it is useful to review 
some of the factors that will limit India's security role in East Asia:
Focus on South Asia/Indian Ocean: India's strategic aspirations are very much focused 
on the Indian Ocean region. India primarily aspires to be recognised as the 
predominant South Asian power and more broadly as the leading Indian Ocean power. 
Although it also seeks recognition as a major Asian power, few Indian decision-makers 
would advocate a substantive security role north of Singapore other, perhaps, than in
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response to intrusions into India's strategic space. India will likely continue to develop 
security relationships in East Asia that primarily reinforce its role in the Indian Ocean 
region and enhance its status as a major Asian power.
Limited capabilities: There are significant limitations on India's capabilities to project 
power beyond South Asia and its plans to expand its power projection capabilities are 
unlikely to be realised for some decades. Coordinated planning among India's armed 
services and between the armed services and the government has historically not been 
strong and there is a real possibility that its naval modernisation plans, in particular, 
will not be fully realised in the expected timeframe or at all. India's history is replete 
with examples of lack of follow-through in developing capabilities to meet strategic 
ambitions. In practice, India is much more cautious than some of the rhetoric coming 
from New Delhi implies.
Reliance on Southeast Asian partners: India will need to rely on local partners to 
project power into Southeast Asia. In coming years, India may be able to exert a 
degree of negative control over the Malacca Strait. However, India faces its own 
"Malacca Dilemma" in projecting naval power into the Western Pacific and India 
requires local logistical support for any extended presence. East Asian states generally 
perceive India as having with few direct security interests in East Asia. A desire by 
Southeast Asian states to avoid unnecessary provocation of China means that they will 
likely seek to limit India's security role north of Singapore.
The United States: While the United States has facilitated the development of India's 
relationships in East Asia, it could also act as an implicit limitation on India's role. The 
United States may see some benefit in Sino-lndian strategic rivalry, and may even at 
times encourage that rivalry, at least in the Indian Ocean. However, there will be 
circumstances in which the United States may see India as a destabilising factor in 
regional security. It is difficult to imagine India being in a position to take a direct 
security role in East Asia in the face of strong opposition from the United States.
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What are the likely future directions in India's security role in East Asia having regard 
to these limitations?
Prospects of India joining a multilateral coalition to balance China
Imperatives to form a balancing coalition against China in East Asia will be driven 
primarily by the evolution of China threat perceptions. However the prospects of India 
forming part of a balancing coalition in anything other than in very vague terms seems 
low in the current strategic environment. Although balancing against China is an 
important objective for India, it is a limited one. India currently neither has the 
inclination nor the ability to build a balancing coalition against China, although India's 
developing relationships in East Asia carry an implicit message that such a coalition 
might be established.
There are several reasons why India would avoid any formal balancing coalition. Any 
formal multilateral coalition involving India, Japan, the United States and other 
maritime powers would inevitably be seen as aimed at containing China, with a 
significant risk of provoking increased assertiveness on China's part. India's sensitivity 
to any arrangements that might be perceived as restricting its strategic autonomy also 
creates a strong bias against joining any balancing coalition with the United States and 
its allies except in the case of very high threat perceptions. Arguably, India's objectives 
could be better achieved by a series of bilateral relationships that allow India to exert 
greater influence.
Other East Asian states are also not likely to have much interest in joining any 
multilateral coalition that includes India. Many East Asian states already have the 
benefit of US security guarantees, either explicitly or implicitly, and a multilateral 
arrangement involving India would seem to add little and could potentially complicate 
matters.
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Prospects for the further expansion of India's role in Southeast Asia
India has been relatively successful in recent years in expanding its strategic space into 
Southeast Asia in a cooperative and relatively benign manner. It will continue to try to 
prove itself as a dependable security partner and as a net provider of security to the 
region. In immediate terms, India's actions in expanding its strategic space are often 
driven by rivalry with China. Provided that China keeps any presence in the Indian 
Ocean relatively unobtrusive, there seems little need for India to push too hard for a 
direct security role in the Malacca Strait, establish anything more than a very discreet 
naval presence in Singapore, or to venture into the South China Sea more than on an 
occasional basis.
In coming years, India will focus on developing closer political and security 
relationships with Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand, key northeast Indian Ocean 
littoral states. Although Indonesia has been identified as a key partner for India in 
Southeast Asia, India has been slow in giving substance to the relationship. One might 
see the potential for a broad-based political-economic-security partnership between 
India and Indonesia that could transform India's role in Southeast Asia. This could 
include a political-diplomatic partnership in pursuing India and Indonesia's claims to 
recognition as major regional powers; a better alignment of economic interests 
(essentially meaning giving Indonesia access to India's market for agricultural 
commodities and Indian investment in Indonesia); and a close security relationship 
with a focus on maritime security (including assistance in the modernisation of the 
Indonesian navy). However, such a broad-based relationship seems unlikely for the 
moment. Although India has successfully developed a strategic partnership with 
Singapore, the Indonesia relationship would involve a different level of commitment. 
The extreme asymmetry in size between India and Singapore has made their 
relationship relatively easy from New Delhi's standpoint, as does the economic 
complementarities and Singapore's clear-sighted and proactive approach to foreign
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policy. The development of a broad-based relationship with Indonesia would require a 
major political, economic and security commitment by New Delhi that has so far not 
been forthcoming.
The prospects for major developments in India's other regional relationships also seem 
limited at the moment. Malaysia will be important to India's long-term strategic 
aspirations in Southeast Asia (and particularly in the Malacca Strait), but the 
relationship is limited, among other things, by Malaysia's generally pro-lslamic foreign 
policies and irritations arising from the treatment of its Indian ethnic minority. A 
significant improvement in India-Malaysia relations seems unlikely without major 
political changes in Kuala Lumpur. Although there are also grounds for closer political 
and security cooperation with Thailand (e.g. focusing on joint maritime policing or 
assistance in dealing with Thailand's southern insurgency), political instability in 
Thailand will likely limit decision-making abilities in Bangkok.
The long-running political alliance between India and Vietnam is likely to continue and 
India may in time prove itself to be a useful supplier of defence technology and 
maintenance and training services. However, India's relationship with Vietnam is 
unlikely to develop into a security alliance. At the moment there seems little reason 
for Vietnam to damage its relations with China by developing a close security 
partnership with India -  there are significant risks that an Indian security presence 
would provoke greater assertiveness in the South China Sea. Arguably, India could 
more usefully develop the relationship through promoting closer economic links, 
including giving Vietnam access to the Indian market and promoting greater Indian 
investment in Vietnam.
India's role in an altered regional security environment
How could potential changes in the security environment affect India's regional 
security role? Again, the principal factor will be the state of regional relationships with
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China. Strained relationships with China would in general be expected to result in a 
greater regional security role for India. However, a more detailed consideration of 
potential developments in the regional security environment points to a limited role 
for India in most circumstances.
A deterioration in the Northeast Asian security environment is likely to affect India's 
regional security role only indirectly. India is unlikely, for example, to seek to involve 
itself in a security crisis involving Taiwan or the DPRK, even one that clearly involved 
Chinese aggression, although such a crisis could in the longer run result in Japan 
and/or South Korea upgrading their relationships with India. India is also unlikely to 
play a direct security role in any heightened tensions in the South China Sea territorial 
dispute. Although India has flagged its capabilities to Vietnam in "containing" the 
dispute, it is difficult to imagine India being prepared to play anything other than a 
rhetorical role in support of Vietnam. Any direct role would, in any event, probably 
not be welcomed among ASEAN states. Nevertheless, a significant increase in 
tensions in the South China Sea could lead Southeast Asian states to invite India to play 
a greater role in regional security.
There are other circumstances in which India might act more assertively in Southeast 
Asia. A major security crisis in the Malacca Strait (for example, through terrorist 
action) could lead India to press its case for a security role with greater vigour. Given 
the resistance to Indian proposals shown to date, there would need to be strong 
reasons for Malaysia, in particular, to change its position. However, it is possible that 
littoral states may concede a role to India in the face of significant international 
pressure to accept outside assistance. Any such development would likely have far 
reaching implications for India's role in Southeast Asia.
A significant increase in Sino-indian naval rivalry in the Indian Ocean (for example, 
following the establishment of a permanent Chinese naval presence) could also have 
important consequences on India's role in East Asia. There is a real chance that New
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Delhi may respond to a major ''incursion" by China into its strategic space through 
projecting power more assertively into the South China Sea and even establishing its 
own presence there. However, absent any perceived threats towards Southeast Asia, 
it is not clear to what extent ASEAN states would be prepared to support India in 
taking concrete steps in response to a Chinese naval presence in the Indian Ocean, 
particularly if China's actions were seen as merely a legitimate reflection of its interests 
in SLOC security. The recent announcement by Japan of an intention to construct base 
facilities in Djibouti to support its anti-piracy efforts in the Gulf of Aden4 might be seen 
by some as providing a precedent fo r such a move by China.
Understanding India's strategic engagement with maritime East Asia
The broad purpose of this thesis is an attempt to understand how an emerging India 
fits in East Asian security, particularly in the context of a rising China.
India is becoming an ever more important factor in East Asia's security. India 
increasingly sees the Indian Ocean region as constituting its extended strategic space, 
one that extends into Southeast Asia. However, China is the biggest motivating factor 
in India's strategic engagement w ith East Asia and one that is likely to grow. The rise 
of China and the expansion of its power in East Asia and influence in the Indian Ocean 
are drawing India into East Asian security in two different ways: first, through creating 
perceived imperatives to create balancing relationships against China and, second, 
through imperatives to respond to incursions into India's strategic space through 
enhancing its presence in Southeast Asia. However, despite these imperatives to 
engage with East Asia, India remains primarily focussed on the economic, social and 
security challenges it faces in South Asia. Most of its energies in the security
4 Kari Lipshutz, "Japan's Military Base in Djibouti," World Politics Review, 3 May 2010.
<http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/blog/5482/global-insider-japans-military-base-in-
djibouti>.
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dimension will be directed towards South Asian security threats (both internal and 
external) for many years to come. Much of East Asia is essentially beyond India's 
strategic space and India has only a limited security role there. Although some may be 
tempted to act assertively in response to a China "threat/' wiser heads in New Delhi 
are likely to focus on keeping India's options open as much as possible while India's 
economic and military power develops and its area of influence naturally expands.
India is regarded by many states in East Asia as a potentially useful extra-regional 
security partner, although one of limited scope. India is viewed as an Indian Ocean 
state with little reason to play a significant direct security role north of Singapore.
India is seen in largely benign terms, but the continuation of this perception cannot be 
guaranteed. Heightened Sino-lndian rivalry could make it a destabilising factor in 
regional security. India's aspirations to create strategic space in the Indian Ocean 
could potentially translate into hegemonistic ambitions. The gap between India's 
strategic ambitions and its capabilities could grow further and become a liability in 
India's dealings in the region.
In the coming decades India will likely be an important and largely benign extra- 
regional participant in East Asian security. If India continues to act cautiously it will be 
seen by many as a welcome and stabilising force in regional security. However, India 
is an outsider in East Asia and will be seen as such for many years to come.
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